

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SANSKRIT GRAMMAR

BY

PRABHAT CHANDRA CHAKRAVARTI

KĀVYATĪRTHA, M.A., PH.D.

PREMCHAND ROYCHAND SCHOLAR

LECTURER IN SANSKRIT, CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY



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उत्सर्गः

उन्मीलत्प्रतिभासुधाकरकरैर्दिङ्मण्डलं भ्रणयन्
शिष्टानां हृदयानि साधु कुसुदानीव प्रबोधं नयन् ।
देशेषु प्रथयन् शिवं व्रतमहो सारस्वतं शाश्वतम्
किं नासौः सुहृद् आशुतोष ! सुचिरं विद्यार्थिनां भारते ?

आसीद्यष्टमरीचिर्चिततमोदर्पान्तको दुर्दमः
काले सन्ततसान्द्रनिर्मलयशःपीयूषवर्षी शशी ।
विद्यामश्रुतगौरवैकनिलये श्रोविश्वविद्यालये
शान्तोऽग्रा तव कौत्सिरङ्ग ! सुतरामद्याप्यहो जृम्भते ॥

किं देयं भवतः स्मृतेरनुगुणं निःस्वस्य मे वर्त्तते
यत्न स्नेहविलोलदृष्टिरनघा संसृजतां स्वर्गिणः ।
आदेशप्रतिपालनाय भवतो नो दर्पमोहान्धतो
यः शब्दार्थनिबन्ध एष रचितः स प्रीतये जायताम् ।

त्वदुत्साहपयःसैकसमेधिततरोरिदम् ।
शब्दशास्त्रार्थविज्ञानं फलं तुभ्यं समर्प्यते ॥

चत्वारि वाक्परिमिता पदानि
तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनोषिणः ।

ॐ ॐ ॐ ॐ

वृषभो रोरवीति मत्तो देशो मर्त्या आविवेश ।

Rk-Veda.

ॐ ॐ ॐ ॐ

यस्तु प्रयुङ्क्ते कुग्लो विशिषे शब्दान् यथावद्व्यवहारकाले ।
सोऽनन्तमाप्नोति जयं परत्र वाग्योगविद्वज्यति चापशब्दैः ॥

ॐ ॐ ॐ ॐ

मुखं व्याकरणं कृतम् ।

Sikṣā.

प्रधानं च षट्संज्ञेषु व्याकरणमिति ।

* * * * *
दुष्टान् शब्दान् मा प्रयुक्ष्यद्द्वैतव्येयं व्याकरणम् ।
* * * * *

सीऽयमक्षरसमान्नायो वाक्समान्नायः पुष्पितः
फलितचन्द्रतारकावत् प्रतिमण्डितो वेदितव्यो ब्रह्मराशिः ।
* * * * *

सर्ववेदपारिषदं ह्येदं शास्त्रम् ।

* * * * *
व्याकरणं नामैयमुत्तरा विद्या ।

Mahābhāṣya.

—

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।
विवर्त्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥

* * * *

आसन्नं ब्रह्मणस्तस्य तपसासुत्तमं तपः ।
प्रथमं कन्दसामग्नं प्राप्नुव्याकरणं बुधाः ॥

* * * *

तद्धारमपवर्गस्य वाङ्मलानां चिकित्सितम् ।
पवित्रं सर्वविद्यानामधिविद्यं प्रकाशते ॥

Vākyapadiya.

— — —

PREFACE

The following pages present substantially my Doctorate Thesis submitted in 1924, and embody the results of my long-continued efforts to bring together in a concise form the speculations of the Hindu grammarians determining the scope, the function, the definitions of grammatical concepts and the value of grammar as a distinct branch of Sanskrit learning. The systematic study of the purely philosophical aspect of Sanskrit grammar as attempted in this book is, I believe, a long-felt want. The idea of preparing a comprehensive account of these speculations, based on different treatises on grammar, specially on the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Vākyapadīya*, was first suggested to me by the late lamented Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, and I can well imagine how pleased he would have been had he been alive to-day to see in print the work inspired by him. It may be stated here that I have endeavoured to the best of my powers to represent the grammatical speculations of the Hindus in their true significance without unnecessarily amplifying them. I hope that the speculations contained in this book will serve to show that grammar in Sanskrit literature was not a mere by-product of scholarship ; on the contrary, it was elevated to the dignity of *Smṛti* and *Āgama* and considered a system by itself broadbased on philosophical principles.

I take this opportunity of acknowledging my gratefulness to Sir Devaprasad Sarvadhikari, for the encouragement I have all along received from him from the very inception of this work.

I am much indebted to my esteemed friend and colleague Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, who has read the book in proof and has helped me from time to time with his valuable suggestions. I have also profited by discussing with Mr. Kshitish Chandra Chatterjee, Lecturer in Sanskrit and Comparative Philology, some of the points treated in the book.

The index is entirely the work of my pupil Mr. Chintaharan Chakrabarti, Kavyatirtha, M.A., Lecturer Bethune College, Calcutta, who is a keen student of ancient Indian history and culture.

My thanks are due to Mr. Jogesh Chandra Chakravarti, M.A., Assistant Registrar, for his uniform kindness and courtesy.

Mr. Atul Chandra Ghatak, M.A., Superintendent, Calcutta University Press, has helped me in all possible ways in seeing the book through the press, and to him I am much indebted for the keen interest he always took in the progress of the work.

CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY, }
The 15th January, 1930. } P. C. CHAKRAVARTI.

CONTENTS

	PAGE.
CHAPTER I.	
Introductory	1
CHAPTER II.	
<i>Anubandha</i> and Category	34
CHAPTER III.	
<i>Samjñā</i> and <i>Paribhāṣā</i>	60
CHAPTER IV.	
Theory of <i>Sphoṭa</i>	84
CHAPTER V.	
Sentence and Parts of Speech	126
CHAPTER VI.	
<i>Prakṛti</i> and <i>Pratyaya</i>	170
CHAPTER VII.	
<i>Kāraka</i>	213
CHAPTER VIII.	
<i>Samāsa</i>	281
CHAPTER IX.	
Grammar in other Systems of Thought	311
Index	341

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SANSKRIT GRAMMAR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY

Evolution of Sanskrit Grammar—Grammatical speculations—Ancient grammarians—Yāska, Vyāḍi, Vājaspyāyana, Pāṇini, etc.

The history of the origin of Sanskrit Grammar affords a difficult field of study. It is not possible to say anything definitely either about the period when speculations of a grammatical nature had really come into existence, or about the ancient teacher who might be credited with having for the first time assimilated the principle of a regular system of grammar. An attempt is, however, made here to discuss some of the most plausible views on the evolution of Sanskrit Grammar.

Sanskrit Language, though no longer a spoken tongue, has got such a vast stock of words, and contributed so largely to the real knowledge of the intellectual world by its monumental productions, that it can defy any language ever known to the philological world. The refinement of thought, the melody of

intonation and the unsurpassably high order of spiritual and religious speculations that breathe through this "Divine tongue," reveal to us not only the intellectual capacity of the Indo-Aryans who made wonderful progress in civilization, but also serve to show the extent of perfection to which the Indian mind had developed in those primitive days. Let us begin with the first intellectual unfolding of the Indian mind—the Vedas, which are regarded either as a symbol of eternity, or as revelations of eternal truth finding audible expression through the utterances of ancient seers. The Vedas never represent, as some Western scholars have opined, a huge collection of "pastoral songs." But what is true is that they are a sublime embodiment of wisdom. It may be stated without hesitation that the four Vedas with all their subsidiary literature are in reality an encyclopædia of human knowledge. Through centuries they continued to be the sacred storehouse of knowledge, and their authority, in matters both religious and secular, was so great with the ancient Hindus that any idea running counter to the Vedic injunctions was liable to be rejected. In the creative period of the Vedic literature we find, among other things of purely sacrificial and religious interest, the brilliant dawns of many speculations which were popularised and co-ordinated into a coherent system of thought by later thinkers. It can consequently be maintained that the Vedic literature, revealing as

it does, in a crude form, the intellectual horizon of our ancient forefathers, provided ample room for the subsequent development of different branches of science and art. There was a time in ancient India when by 'learning' people used to understand only the Vedic learning ('वैदविद्या'),¹ and a man's education was not complete until he had acquired a thorough knowledge of the Vedas. The time has much changed since then and the ordinance of Manu² is but little honoured in these days.

The reason why we have dilated upon the originality and authoritativeness of the Vedas and their influence on the history of Indian thought is that the origin of Grammar is organically and most intimately connected with the study of the Vedas. The six Vedāṅgas, as is well-known, mainly owe their origin to a vigorous attempt at facilitating the Vedic studies, and, among these, Grammar seems to have been the most important subsidiary. That an earnest student of the Vedas can hardly ignore the studies of these Vedāṅgas (Grammar, Phonetics, Etymology, etc.) is made sufficiently clear by the Śruti³ which emphatically declares

¹ हे विद्ये वेदितव्ये इति आ यज्ञज्ञविदो वदन्ति परा चैवापरा च । सवापर
स्त्ववेदो यजुर्वेदः सानवेदोऽथर्ववेदः शिवा कवी व्याकरणं निरुक्तं इत्यो गीतिरिति ।
अथ परा वया तद्वचनमभिगम्यते ।

Mundaka Upaniṣad.

² श्रीऽनधीव्य विज्ञो वेदानम्यत कुरुते यमम् । स जीवसेन शुद्रस्तमाह गच्छति
सान्धः ॥

Manu Smṛiti, 2.

³ ब्राह्मणेन निष्कारणो धर्मः सद्वीर्यो वेदोऽथो गो गोपय ।

that the unconditional duty on the part of a Brahmin is to make a thorough study of the Vedas along with these popular 'Āngas.' The injunction "स्वाध्यायोऽध्वेतव्यः" does not only insist upon a regular study of the Vedas, but presupposes a knowledge of grammar sufficient for the understanding of the Vedic texts. Patañjali refers to the ancient custom¹ when Brahmin students, as a rule, used to take up grammar first for their study, as an indispensable step towards the study of the Vedas. Grammar was, therefore, studied not only for its own sake in ancient India, but as a helping guide for penetrating into the structure of the Vedic texts. While enumerating the motives that are practically served by the study of grammar, Patañjali has first mentioned "Preservation of the Vedas" as the primary reason why the science of grammar should be studied with particular attention. How useful and indispensable the study of grammar is, so far as the understanding of the Vedic texts is concerned, is best shown by such descriptive epithets of grammar as "वेदानां वेदः,"² "सुखं व्याकरणं स्मृतम्,"³ etc.

When we enquire into the origin of Sanskrit Grammar from a historical standpoint, we find

¹ पुराकाल एतदासीत्, संस्कारोत्तरकालं प्राञ्जयाः व्याकरणं आधीयते । तेभ्यस्तत्र स्वनिकरणात्प्रदानं चोच्यते वेदिनाः शब्दा उपदिष्टानि । *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 5.

² *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 7. 1.

³ *Pāṇiniya Śikṣā*, 42.

that there were three prominent causes in operation which brought the speculations on grammar into existence. First, certain principles of spontaneous growth, followed consciously or unconsciously in the utterance of significant sentence, provided the very basis of grammatical generalisation. In combining one word with another so as to make a significant unit of speech, people undoubtedly made use of certain laws or order regulating the mode of their verbal expression. The question of priority of language to grammar is too well known to require any explanation. The way in which men learn almost instinctively their mother tongue without having any knowledge of grammar is an evidence of how we become familiar with the vocabularies as well as with the method of constructing sentences before we actually come in touch with grammar as such. Long before any regular system of grammar was written and studied, people with whom Sanskrit was a spoken tongue could, for example, use such a verbal form as 'भवति,' without having any idea of the grammatical operations whereby the root 'भू' might be changed to 'भो' and 'भव' in obedience to the technical process of 'guṇa' and 'sandhi.' Similarly, forms like 'गच्छति' and 'गच्छोति' had obtained currency in a certain grammarless period when the grammatical conception of 'प्रकृति' and 'प्रत्यय' were unknown, and when

the conjugational difference of the root 'गम्' from 'शक्' could not be explained as peculiarities of two well-marked classes of roots, namely, 'भ्रादि' and 'स्वादि.' The rule 'अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः' presupposes a phonological principle according to which two 'अ' or 'आ' sounds having close proximity in their utterance usually and invariably show the natural tendency of being amalgamated into one lengthened 'अ' sound. To such principles underlying the physical structure of language may be ascribed the rudiments of grammatical speculations. The fundamental basis of grammar is not purely artificial but appears to be more or less natural. A careful study of the *Paribhāṣās* (generalisations of grammar) and of the rules of euphonic combinations makes it abundantly clear that the principles of grammar have close affinity with popular axioms and laws of nature. The extent to which grammar is related to popular usage is best shown by Patañjali in his elaborate exposition of the rules of grammar.¹ The method in which Patañjali² has analysed words or, more properly, a group of similar words, in order to distinguish the stems and formative elements of words, is an indication that grammar has a scientific stamp so far as its basic principles are concerned. The science of grammar does not, however, attempt

¹ नैवेचर आत्मापयति, नापि धर्मस्वकाराः पठन्ति—अपवादैरुत्तरां वाच्यत्वमिति । किं तर्हि ? लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 115.

² सिद्धं लब्धव्यतिरेकान्नाम् ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, *ibid.*, p. 219.

to coin new words and expressions for use, but takes them in the very forms in which they are popularly used.

Secondly, the most important factor in the evolution of grammar, as a scientific and indispensable branch of study, was the necessity, more religious than academic, of devising some practical means ensuring a successful study of the Vedas; and the result was the evolution of grammar. By Śabdānuśāsana or governance of words, the author of the Mahābhāṣya has, as Kaiyaṭa maintains, in clear terms expressed the immediate or supreme end of grammar as such, and by the expression 'रक्षोद्वागमलघुसन्देहाः प्रयोजनम्' he has shown the indirect purposes that are usually served by grammar or Śabdānuśāsana, as he calls it. "Preservation of the Vedic text"¹ seems to have been the sole purpose that made the study of grammar so useful and indispensable at the same time. It is, however, difficult to say definitely when such a necessity was actually felt for the study of grammar. It is in all probability in the transitional period² between the poetical activity of the oldest Saṃhitās, and the prosaic exegesis of the Brāhmaṇas with greater tendency towards classical forms, that we may try to find out the crude beginning of grammatical speculations. The trend of human thought does not always

¹ रक्षायै वेदानामन्येयं व्याकरणम्—Mahābhāṣya, p. 1.

² Systems of Skt. Grammar., Belvalkar, pp. 2-3.

flow along the same level, but it changes its course as time rolls on. The palmy days of beautiful poetry that witnessed the appearance of the *Saṃhitās* were followed by a period of intellectual decadence, if we are allowed to say so. To be more clear, the period of outstanding originality was followed by one of interpretation and elaboration. The ancient seers or *Ṛṣis* are said to have been born with such a spiritual vision as to possess all knowledge intuitively, and it was possibly through their medium that the sacred hymns came to light. The etymological meaning of the term “ऋषि”¹ corroborates this view. Next to these *Ṛṣis* came a comparatively inferior class of seers, better known as “*Śrutarṣi*” who were not gifted with intuitive knowledge from their very birth, but rose to the eminence of ‘seer-ship’ by receiving instructions on the *Vedas* from their teachers. These sages,² out of compassion for the people of future generations, on account of their shorter span of existence and intellectual dwarfishness, are said to have composed the *Vedaṅgas* with the avowed intention of making the Vedic study less arduous. There is reason to believe that the exact meaning of the oldest hymns had already begun to be forgotten in the second stage spoken of above ; and it was undoubtedly to preserve the

¹ ऋषिर्देवैर्नात्—*Nirukta*.

² विष्णुपुत्रायै नमः सनातनादिपुर्वदं च वेदाङ्गानि च—*Nirukta*, p. 143 (Bom. ed.)

Saṃhitā texts intact and to save them from misinterpretation that particular attention was directed towards grammar and the Nirukta. Yāska¹ frankly admits that the study of the Nirukta derives its importance from the fact that the meaning of the Vedic texts are not otherwise comprehensible. As a matter of fact, the Vedic hymns had ceased to be intelligible to a great extent even at so early a period, and, what is still more surprising, some teachers of respectable antiquity even pronounced in clear terms their verdict about the meaninglessness of the hymns. An ancient teacher like Yāska has recorded the contention of Kautsa² against the Vedas. The hymns, he contends, are meaningless and as such not worthy of commanding respect. When an acknowledged teacher of such remote antiquity could have assailed the trustworthiness of the Vedas on grounds, hardly justifiable, it is not at all surprising that later teachers belonging to the atheist school of Sugata and Cārvāka would come forward to demolish the glorious edifice of the Vedas. In the face of such undignified attack threatening to undermine the very basis of religion, the Mīmāṃsakas were confronted with a problem of great seriousness; they consequently tried

¹ अथापीदमन्तरिणं मनोऽर्थद्वययो न विदति—Nirukta, p. 115.

² यदि सकार्यप्रत्ययानर्थात् भवतीति कौकीनर्येण हि मन्ताः—Nirukta, p. 115.

their level best to set aside all antagonistic views regarding the eternality and the trustworthiness of the Vedas. Both *Nairuktas* and *Vaiyākaraṇas* seriously engaged themselves in the arduous task of preserving the Vedic texts intact by advocating the eternality of *Śabda*, on the one hand, and by analysing the entire structure of the Vedic words, on the other. The etymologists sought to bring out the meaning by suggesting derivation of words, while the grammarians took upon themselves the task of supporting the Vedic forms by an analytical process; and these methods, supplementing each other, proved to be of much importance in preserving the sacred texts in their pristine glory. Patañjali seems to have been conscious of this paramount function of grammar, as is clear from his statement 'रक्षार्थं वेदानामध्येयं व्याकरणम्.' In the estimation of Patañjali grammar is pre-eminently the greatest of all *Vedāṅgas*; its greatness is obviously due to the fact that grammar is indispensable to an understanding of the Vedic hymns. The epithet "*Vedānām Vedam*," as applied to grammar by the seers of the Upaniṣads, is really suggestive of the importance and dignity in which *Vyākaraṇa* was held in those days.

In the third place, the growing popularity of different forms of *Prākṛta* served almost like an incentive to the rise of so many systems of grammar in Sanskrit. Sanskrit, even when it was a spoken tongue, had been confined to the area of the cultured community. The *Śiṣṭas* or the

Sanskrit-speaking people had, however, to come frequently in touch with the untutored masses, and this was calculated to destroy the purity of the "Divine tongue" to a certain extent. As a result of this intercourse, many Prākṛta forms crept into Sanskrit and became almost naturalised in course of time. That Sanskrit had suffered mutilation and distortion of forms at the hands of those who failed to pronounce the correct Sanskrit words, either on account of wrong imitation or their natural inaptitude, is testified by the so-called *Apabhraṃśas* which represent Sanskrit only in a distorted form. The space at our disposal will not, however, permit us to discuss the much vexed question as to whether Prākṛta-*Apabhraṃśas* are directly descended from Sanskrit under circumstances stated above, or originated from an altogether different source. We only repeat what we have pointed out elsewhere that the Hindu grammarians, because of their unbounded regard for Sanskrit as the most original of all tongues, or for the striking similarity of the so-called *सङ्ग* forms of Prākṛta with Sanskrit, held Prākṛta to be an off-shoot of Sanskrit. To look upon both Sanskrit and Prākṛta as two sister tongues, descended from a common source, is a view that is little favoured by the Hindu grammarians. As the number of Sanskrit-speaking people gradually diminished, and Prākṛta dialects, on the other hand, began to

obtain greater popularity till they spread all over the country, the orthodox Hindu teachers were almost compelled to notice the linguistic peculiarities of Sanskrit and draw hard and fast rules regulating them, their sole motive being the preservation of their traditionally sacred tongue from corruption. The expression *शब्दानुशासन*, as significantly used by Patañjali instead of the more popular term *व्याकरण*, serves to indicate that the main function of grammar is as much to support the correct forms in conformity with the fixed rules, as to show indirectly how words of pure Sanskrit origin differ from *Apabhraṃśas* which represent the linguistic corruption caused by wrong imitation and inability to pronounce the correct Sanskrit words. In the *Mahābhāṣya* we find it explicitly stated that 'governance of the correct words'¹ forms the main function of grammar, and by the discrimination of correct forms as *gauḥ*, the corrupt ones as *gāvi*, *goṇī*, *gotā*, etc., are indirectly pointed out.² Sanskrit grammar thus draws a line of demarcation between the correct and corrupt forms, the former being conformable to the rules laid down in grammar, and the latter lying entirely outside the scope of Sanskrit grammar. The spread of Buddhism, as it was accompanied by the popularity of *Prākṛta*, is supposed to have given a

¹ *शब्दानुशासनेऽस्मिन् शब्दे*, etc., *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 104.

² *गौरिवेतस्मिन्पदिते गत्यत एतद्भावाद्दधीऽप्यशब्दा इति* ।—Vol. I, p. 5.

stronger impetus to an intensive study of Sanskrit grammar. It must be, however, remembered that the Hindu grammarians, in spite of all their attempts, as is evinced in their formulation of rules, could not entirely evade the possibility of their sacred tongue being mixed up, though to a small extent, with the corrupt *Apabhraṃśas*. Kumārila speaks of the naturalisation of certain Dravidian forms into Sanskrit.

Thus, there grew up different systems of grammar in Sanskrit; commentators after commentators came to elaborate and supplement them in the light of new facts. At this stage of our knowledge, we cannot exactly determine the number of grammatical systems that once existed in ancient India. We generally hear of eight prominent systems each founded by a renowned *Śābdika* or grammarian.¹ The *Aṣṭādhyāyī* mentions the names of many grammarians whose works have, unfortunately, not come down to us. In the *Mahābhāṣya* mention is made of two eminent grammarians, namely, Vyādi and Vājapyāyana, the former is supposed to have written a huge treatise on grammar called *Samgraha*, which is so authoritatively spoken of by Patañjali.² Yāska has

¹ "ऐन्द्रं वाङ् वासिष्ठस्य वीमारं शाकटायनम् । सारस्वतं वापिशतं शाकल्यं पाणिनीयकम् ।"

² "इदं च एतत् प्राच्येन परीक्षितं निम्नो वा स्मृतं कार्यं वेति ।—Vol. I, p. 6.

recorded a controversy between two grammarians—Śākaṭāyana and Gārgya—each of whom had undoubtedly a system of grammar to his credit. The old treatises on grammar are almost irrecoverably lost; but those that remain are sufficient to constitute a vast literature of which there is no parallel in any language of the world. In no other land except India was the science of grammar studied with so much zeal and deliberation.

This is, in short, the history of the evolution of Sanskrit grammar. It is, however, difficult to ascertain the period to which the real foundation of the science of grammar might be traced. The analytical method upon which is based the fundamental principle of *Vyākaraṇa* is first seen, though in a crude form, in the *Pada-Pāṭha* arrangement of the *Saṃhitā* texts, which is popularly attributed to the authorship of Śākalya. It is in this method of decomposition that we meet with the beginning of disjoining *Sandhi* and *Samāsa*, and the addition of *Upasarga* with the verbal forms. While the *Pada-Pāṭha* order thus represents the first step towards grammar, the elaborate phonological speculations of the *Prātiśākhya*s may be said to have shown grammar in the making. Some problems of real grammatical interest are also to be found in the *Prātiśākhya*s. The oldest specimens, however, of the *Prātiśākhya*s, which are so akin to grammar, are not accessible, and most of the extant treatises are of comparatively

modern origin, some of them being even posterior to Pāṇini. There is ample evidence to indicate that different schools of grammar had already been in existence when Yāska wrote his famous commentary on the Nighaṇṭu. That Yāska was preceded by a good many grammarians is clear from his statement वैयाकरणानां चैके¹ and the grammatical controversy he has referred to. Yāska made ample use of these earlier systems of grammar current in his time. The definition of *Sandhi*, परः सन्निकर्षः संहिता,² quoted by Yāska, and incorporated into his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* by Pāṇini, is supposed to have been taken from some older systems of grammar. Moreover, Yāska's fourfold classification of *Padas* as noun, verb, preposition and particle, also seems to be a reproduction from a certain grammar which has not left any trace behind. The use of such technical terms as क्कारित, etc., does not really indicate originality on the part of Yāska, but what is plausible is that they were undoubtedly borrowed from some earlier systems of grammar no longer extant. The loss sustained by grammatical literature is enormous; we find numerous references to several grammarians both in Yāska's *Nirukta* and Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, but it is regrettable that very little of their works has come down to us. Just as

¹ न सर्वासीति गार्ग्यो वैयाकरणानां चैके—*Nirukta*, p. 99.

² Pāṇ., I. iv. 109.

among the huge Nirukta literature, the work of Yāska only is available in a complete form, even so it is the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini alone that has fortunately survived the numerous systems of grammar, such as those of Śākalya, Śākaṭyāyana, Gārgya, Gālava, Senaka, Sphoṭāyana, Bhāradvāja, Āpiśali, Kāśakṛtsna, Vyāḍi, and Vājapyāyana.

The identity of the first grammarian is also a difficult point of enquiry in the history of grammatical speculations. Having discussed the circumstances that paved the path for the evolution of such a scientific branch of study as grammar, we now turn our attention, though without any avail, to the question of determining the first author of a system of grammar. The peculiarities of language, specially when the older forms became obsolete and were consequently replaced by new words of spontaneous growth, provided the basis upon which was built the scientific structure of grammar. There are certain fixed laws underlying the use of words ; they are more or less natural and simple. But the real difficulty comes when we proceed to determine that clever being who first assimilated such principles and developed them into a system of grammar. The Taittirīya Saṃhitā¹ contains a narration according to which Indra may be styled the first grammarian. In an

¹ बान्धे पराच्यव्याहतामदत्ते देवा इन्द्रमब्रुवन्निनां नो वाचं व्याकृत्विति..... तामिन्दो मध्यतोऽवकन्व व्याकरोषव्यादितं व्याहता वाब्रुवन्ति।—Tait. Saṃ., VI. 4. 7.

age when speech was undivided into its component elements, it was Indra who is said to have divided speech, and thenceforward it is known as व्याकृता वाक् or analysed speech. This view, though apparently incredulous, is strengthened by the evidence of the Mahābhāṣya¹ where a tradition is recorded to the effect that Indra made a thorough study of words under the tutorship of Brhaspati—the divine teacher. Further, the name of Indra may be traced in the list of eight Śābdikas or grammarians. But we do not know whether it would be a truism or a positive mistake to ascribe the authorship of the so-called *Aindra* grammar to Indra as a divine personage. There is, however, no wonder that the conception of a grammar had first originated with a respectable divine being, because Pāṇini is also said to have received the first 14 Sūtras from the lord Śiva and these rules are consequently known as "*Māheśvara Sūtra*." Nandikeśvara² in his Kāśikā has shown how on the pretext of beating drum the lord Śiva revealed the fundamental principles of grammar. Similarly, Sarvavarman, the author of the *Kātantra Sūtras*, is said to have received the nucleus of his grammar from Kārttikeya and hence the system

¹ "एवं हि श्रूयते—इन्द्रस्य त्रिभिर्नाय दिव्यं सर्वसङ्गमं प्रतिपदोक्तानां शब्दानां शब्दपारायणं प्रोवाच नानां ज्ञानम्"—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 5.

² सुतावसाने षट्पञ्चरात्रे नवाष्ट ठक्का नवपञ्चरात्रम् ॥

उद्गर्भज्ञानः सनकादिसिद्धान्तदिनर्म मिहसुववाक्यम् ॥

is popularly known as "*Kumāra Vyākaraṇa*."¹ Whatever value we may attach to these narratives and traditions, there is every reason to suppose that long before the grammarians of the Alexandrine period, the Hindu teachers had developed different schools of grammar and succeeded in giving them a highly scientific character.

Before concluding this topic we need only make a passing reference to what has been said by Bhartṛhari in regard to the origin and importance of grammar. Following in the wake of Patañjali, the author of the *Vākyapadīya*² describes grammar as the foremost of all *Vedāṅgas* and as a direct auxiliary to the Vedic studies, supporting as it does the correctness of the Vedic forms. He is loud in eulogising the importance of grammar, for he boldly asserts that it is impossible to comprehend the meaning of words without an adequate knowledge of grammar. He maintains grammar to be the most sacred of all branches of learning and calls it '*Adhividyā*' and sometimes "*Ajikhbhā rājapaddhati*." As an exponent of the doctrine of '*Sphoṭa*,' Bhartṛhari looks upon grammar from a different standpoint, raising grammar to the dignity of *Āgama* and *Smṛti*, for he is

¹ शङ्करस्य सुखादायीं सुखा चैव वदन्तः । लिखितं शिखिनः पुच्छे वक्ष्यामि इति ज्ञायते ॥

² आनय' ब्रह्मणस्तस्य तपसा मुच्यते तपः । प्रथमं कन्दसामर्थं प्राबुध्यैकरथं सुधाः ॥

even prepared to maintain that the study of grammar ultimately leads to salvation.¹ *Vyākaraṇa-Smṛti*, he holds, is a set of rules that helps the comprehension of correct words; it seems to be almost without beginning² (नित्य), because such a process as followed by grammar appears to have been current from time immemorial.

In my "Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus" I tried to show on the basis of some passages from the Rg Veda and Brāhmanas that speculations on language and grammar had their origin in India in a very remote age. The Sāmhita literature represents, of course, the crude beginning of grammatical speculations, and there is consequently absence of systematisation and elaboration. It is interesting to see that the scientific accuracy of these speculations is almost unquestionable. The earliest reference to grammatical speculations, we may venture to add on the authority of Patañjali and Śaṅkara, is to be found in the *Rk* चत्वारि शृङ्गा,³ etc., which

¹ "तस्यावधीयः शब्दानां नास्ति व्याख्येयान्ते"—*Vākyapadiya*, I, *Kār.* 13.

"तद्व्याख्येयत्वम्" and तद्व्याख्येयत्वान्न परं ब्रह्माधिगम्यते

—*Vākyapadiya*, I, *Kār.* 14 & 22.

² "तस्यान्निवृत्तिरिति नित्या साधुत्वविशेषा आ तिः" ।

—*Vākyapadiya*, I, *Kār.* 29 and

तस्याद्वयत्वकं शास्त्रं सा तिं वा समिधव्यनाम् ।

आतिव्याख्येयते शिष्टैः शब्दानामनुशासनम् ॥

—*Vākyapadiya*, I, *Kār.* 43.

³ चत्वारि शृङ्गा तयोऽस्य पादा ये शीर्षे सप्तशृङ्गास्तौ यस्य । विद्यावन्तो इयमेव रोरवोति मद्गो देवी मर्त्या आविर्भूतः ।—*Rg Veda*, 4. 58. 3.

admits of double interpretations—sacrificial and grammatical. The bull spoken of here represents the science of grammar and is said to be a divine being characterised by sound. Its four horns stand for four component parts of speech नामाख्यातोपसर्ग-निपाताः; three feet for three tenses (present, past and future); and two heads and seven hands symbolise respectively two kinds of *Padas* (सुबन्त and तिङन्त) or नित्य and कार्यशब्द and seven case-endings. Another *Rk*,¹ as we have already pointed out, speaks of four different forms of speech (*Parā*, *Paśyanti*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*) and lays down that it is the fourth form of speech that is current among men. The ancient term denoting a grammarian seems to have been “वाग्योगवित्” meaning ‘one who knows the connection of words, viz., combination of stems and suffixes;’ and it is emphatically stated in a *Rk* that *Vāk* ² or speech reveals herself entirely to such ‘analysers of speech.’ While commenting on the *Rk* सुदेशोऽसि वरुण,³ etc., Patañjali explains the expression सप्तसिन्धवः as an allusion to grammatical case-endings which are seven in number. There are many passages in the *Saṃhitās* which have thus either direct or indirect bearing upon grammar—a fact which

Bharṭṭhari also speaks of *Śabda* or, more properly, *Śabda-Brahman*, as a Bull representing the Supreme Deity—“प्रादुर्भूतान्सर्वमेषैव सायुज्यमिच्छते”—*Vākya-padīya*, I. 192.

¹ अत्रानि वाक्परिमिता पदानि तानि विदुर्ब्राह्मणा ये मनोविधः ।

² “ब्रह्मोक्तं तन्” विसृष्टं जायेत एव उक्तो मुवासाः”—*Rg Veda*, X. 71. 4.

³ *Rg Veda*. VIII. 69. 12.

proves beyond doubt that Indian speculations on grammar are decidedly the oldest of their kinds. In the Tait. Samhitā, as we have already shown, *Vāk* is said to have been originally undivided into parts, and that it was Indra who analysed speech in response to an appeal made by gods.

Then, we turn to the Brāhmaṇa literature. Here we find the real beginning of grammar. The etymological explanations of words, such as, यदरोदीत् तद्रुद्रस्य रुद्रत्वम् and so on, showing us at once the derivative meanings as well as the method of analysing words into their parts, bring us face to face with grammar in its growth. The Nairuktas or etymologists adopted this method of explaining words and have quoted largely from the Brāhmaṇas. The term *Vyākaraṇa*, meaning as it does the 'science which dissolves words into elements' (stems and suffixes) and thereby brings out their exact meanings, is in itself an indication that grammar and etymology are intimately connected with each other. It is obviously for their mutual dependence that Yaska has expressly stated that the science of etymology (Nirukta), though it has its independent character as well, may be viewed as a complement to grammar. The difference between the Samhitās and the Brāhmaṇas is not, far from speaking of their subject-matter, one of melodious poetry and monotonous prose, but a careful study will reveal that there is distinct

difference of language too. In the transitional period of this literary activity we find, as we have already shown, that the older Vedic forms have almost disappeared and new words and expressions with greater tendency towards classical forms were coming into existence. That the Brāhmaṇa literature made some progress in grammatical speculations is quite evident from the fact that there occur here and there such grammatical terms as *Vacana* (number), *Vibhakti* (case-endings), *Dhātu* (root) and so on. Of the Brāhmaṇas the Gopatha deserves special mention, since it contains in a passage¹ almost all the popular technical terms of Sanskrit grammar. In its enumeration of different branches of learning the Chāndogya Upaniṣad makes mention of such a branch of study as वेदानां वेदः, which is explained by Śaṅkara as referring to the science of grammar. The epithet "the Veda of the Vedas," as applied to grammar, serves to indicate the indispensable character of grammar for an understanding of the Vedic texts. That is why grammar is compared to the face of the Vedas. Patañjali also observes that grammar is pre-eminently the greatest of all *Vedāṅgas*.

Even in so remote a period as that of the Brāhmaṇas, necessity was already felt to devise

¹ योकारं पुष्पानः । को धातुः ? कः प्रत्ययः ? कः स्वरः ? किं प्रतिपद्विकम् ? किं नाम ? किं माणातम् ? किं लिङ्गम् ? किं वचनम् ? का विभक्तिः ?

practical means for the preservation of the older texts and the natural outcome was the evolution of the *Vedāṅgas*. Of these *Vedāṅgas*, *Śikṣā* and *Nirukta* are more or less related to grammar. The *Śikṣās* or treatises on phonetics deal with letters (vowels and consonants), accents (*Udatta*, *Anudatta* and *Svarita*), different organs of pronunciation, *Sandhi* or euphonic combination and so on. We do not, however, fail to see that the "*Śikṣās*," though their main importance lies in the correct recitation of the Vedic hymns, deal with the phonological side of grammar. That grammar has connection with accents is clearly shown by the fact that the so-called *Samāsas*, so far as the *Saṁhitās* are concerned, had to be determined by different modulations of accents. Here again we first meet with "*Sandhi*," i.e., the combination of letters with one another in accordance with certain euphonic principles. The arrangement of words, as shown in the "*Pada-pāṭha*", serves to evince an attempt not only at disjoining the so-called "*Sandhis*" but clearly indicates how the grammatical method of analysis had already been in operation. Early treatises on phonetics are almost irrecoverably lost. The *Pada-pāṭha* texts which are popularly attributed to Śākalya only seem to have been well preserved.

Early Sanskrit literature had to suffer enormous loss; and nowhere such loss is more remarkable as in the case of the *Prātiśākyas* and the

Niruktas. We have got no oldest specimen of these classes of literature indicating the historical and continuous development of so ancient but extensive a literature; and what have practically survived seem to have a comparatively modern origin. The *Prātiśākhya*s, even in their present forms, are sufficient evidence that the study of grammar as a science had already been taken up with all earnestness. "If the nature and contents of our existing *Prātiśākhya* literature," says Dr. Belvalkar, "can safely be made the basis of any inference, we may suppose that these earlier treatises (1) classified the Vedic texts into the four forms of speech known to Yāska; (2) framed and carefully defined some of the primitive *Samjñās* or technical terms; and (3) possibly also made some more or less crude attempts to reduce the words to their elements and explain the mode of their grammatical formation."

We have already referred to the fact that Yāska, who flourished at a date not later than 700 B. C., had a good many predecessors—both etymologists and grammarians; and his work is not the first of its kind. The list of etymologists and grammarians, as mentioned by Yāska, gives unmistakable proof that Yāska had already found in existence different schools of the Nirukta and grammar. We are naturally inclined to think that the speculations on grammar which had had their crude beginning in the *Brāhmaṇa* literature had gradually obtained

wider scope and scientific character and finally developed into regular systems long before Yāska. That plagiarism as a literary theft was unknown in ancient India is borne testimony to by the fact that a teacher, whenever he happened to cite anything in support of his particular view, either from his predecessors or contemporary authors, was not at all slow to acknowledge his indebtedness to them by mentioning their names. This practice has been of considerable help to us, as it enables us to trace the names of those teachers whose names, like their works, would have been otherwise undiscoverable. In the *Prātiśākhya*s mention is made of a good many teachers some of whom were undoubtedly grammarians. In the *Taittirīya*, for instance, are mentioned some twenty teachers, but we fail to trace there the name of any reputed grammarian. Among the host of teachers mentioned by Yāska, there are four, namely, Śākaṭāyana, Gārgya, Gālava, and Śākalya who are credited with having founded their respective schools of grammar and their works seem to have been existing even in the days of Pāṇini. Yāska has recorded a controversy which had ensued between Śākaṭāyana on the one hand and Gārgya and the grammarians on the other, with regard to the reducibility of words to roots. Śākaṭāyana seems to have been one of the oldest grammarians, and some of his views (as his work is no longer available) might

be collected from the works of later authors. Mention is made of Śākaṭāyana in the Atharva-Prātiśākhya in connection with combination, division, and disjunction of words. Yāska has thrice referred to Śākaṭāyana and has probably given his doctrines verbatim thus:—(1) 'All words are derivable from roots'; (2) 'Prepositions have no significance by themselves apart from nouns and verbs to which they are prefixed'; (3) his fanciful derivation of the word "*Satya*" from two different roots (*as*, *in*).

Though our knowledge of ancient grammarians is nothing but scanty and meagre, it is admitted without contention that speculations on grammar had already taken a definite form long before the Christian era. The few observations, as mentioned above, will serve to show the extent of scientific accuracy exhibited by the Indian grammarians. Yāska had undoubtedly many treatises on grammar and etymology before him and he made ample use of them. The theory enunciated by Śākaṭāyana as to the reducibility of all words to roots was accepted by Yāska with all earnestness; he followed it as a basic principle in all his etymological explanations. He classified speech into four forms, namely, noun, verb, preposition, and indeclinable, giving their exact significance. This four-fold classification of words seems to have been taken by Yāska from some earlier works on grammar. He not only distinguishes nouns from verbs with their grammatical terminations (*sup*, *lin*) but

seems to have known even the formation of verbal nouns (*kṛdanta*). In his discourse as to the priority of combination (*Samhita*), he has given a definition of *Sandhi* 'परः सन्निवर्तः संहिता' which was probably incorporated into his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* by Pāṇini in a later period. The two well-marked forms of the language, namely, *Chandas* and *Bhāṣā* (current speech) were known to him, as he has sometimes derived Vedic words from '*laukika*' (spoken tongue) roots and *vice versa*. He has also taken notice of dialectical varieties of Sanskrit as they existed in different parts of India, where Sanskrit had been then a spoken language.

Among the ancient grammarians, Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana appear to be somewhat prominent, specially as the exponents of two popular doctrines of grammar.

Vyāḍi and Vājapyāyana are said to have been reputed grammarians. The former is well-known as the author of a huge work on grammar called '*Samgraha*.' Patañjali has referred to this work, as an authoritative one, while discussing the eternality of *Śabda*. Mention is again made of Vyāḍi in the *Vārttika* as one holding 'substance' (द्रव्य) as the meaning of all words. This is, in short, what we know about Vyāḍi. The name of Vājapyāyana also occurs in the *Vārttika*. In conjunction with the Mīmāṃsaka point of view, Vājapyāyana holds that all words are expressive of 'class' (व्यवृत्ति).

Next we pass on to Pāṇini, the popular author of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. As the founder of a scientific system of grammar which has survived the destroying hands of time, Pāṇini is regarded as the highest authority on grammar. Pāṇini is mentioned as one of the reputed eight grammarians. His work is often alluded to as a great system पाणिनीयं महाशास्त्रं पदसाधुत्वलक्षणम्¹ and sometimes as “*Vyākaraṇa-Smṛti*.”² He was not a pioneer in his attempt, but had the advantage of consulting many earlier treatises on grammar before he could develop such a system which bears the stamp of scientific perfection in so remarkable a way. With him closes a period of Sanskrit literature which represents the beginning of the classical period. His aphorisms have a history behind them and presuppose a vast literature. Prof. Goldstücker in his ‘Pāṇini: His Place in Sanskrit Literature’ has dealt with the question of pre-Pāṇinian literature and has discussed at length Pāṇini’s scope of knowledge; but my views differ from those of the learned professor in some points. The object kept in view in writing these pages is to show in broad outlines the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar and not to attempt a historical study of grammatical literature. Prof. Belvalkar’s learned work ‘Systems of

¹ Parāśara-Upapurāṇa.

² “साधुत्वज्ञानविषया सैषा व्याकरणस्मृतिः । Vākyaupadhyā and तत्कर्म तद् द्वितीयायं त्वेव पाणिनेः स्मृतिः ।

Grammar,' however, gives a historical survey of different systems of Sanskrit grammar, and is a valuable contribution to our knowledge.

Though Pāṇini had many predecessors in the same line, it is his "Aṣṭādhyāyī" alone that has survived as a great landmark in the domain of Sanskrit literature. To a student of ancient Indian history, Pāṇini's "Aṣṭādhyāyī" has got its historical importance too. Thus, judged from both grammatical and historical standpoints, Pāṇini's work is a very valuable record of Indian culture. Many other works on grammar following in the wake of pre-Pāṇinian and Pāṇinian schools came into existence and gave rise to a vast literature which is almost without a parallel. The system of grammar founded by Pāṇini was studied with uncommon zeal, as a *Vedāṅga*, by so reputed scholars as Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Attempts were also made from time to time to elaborate and supplement it in such a way as to make it a complete whole. Kātyāyana to whom is attributed the authorship of the '*Vārttikas*' tried his best to supplement the work of Pāṇini, having paid keen attention to the new stock of forms that gradually obtained currency in the course of linguistic development. Then came Patañjali with his wonderful genius and unparalleled erudition and wrote his famous commentary the '*Mahābhāṣya*,' which is still regarded as the highest authority on all problems of grammar. He

may be said to have changed the angle of vision. He proceeded on a new line with the consequence that grammar received a far more scientific treatment in his hands and ultimately came to be regarded as a particular system of philosophy. He approached grammar from a logical standpoint always trying to find out the principles underlying the aphorisms of Pāṇini and Kātyāyana. There is indication in the first 'Āhnika' of the Mahābhāṣya that grammar was not only a heterogeneous combination of Sūtras with Patañjali, but it was treated by him as a regular science.

Though virtually a commentary, the Mahābhāṣya has its originality both in method and exposition; it brings the system of Pāṇini to perfection and provides a vast field of study. Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali are popularly known as the "Triad of grammarians" and the system as "*Trimuni Vyākaraṇa*" (त्रिसुनि व्याकरणम्). Next came Bhartṛhari, the author of the "*Vākyapadīya*," who seems to have made a masterly study of the "Mahābhāṣya" which fitted him to write his famous work dealing mainly with the philosophical aspects of grammar. It was, therefore, finally in the hands of Bhartṛhari that the philosophical character of grammar became more and more conspicuous and grammar was ultimately established as a distinct system of philosophy.

To give a consistent history of grammatical speculations and the huge literature that evolved

out of them lies almost beyond the compass of this work. What we have tried to show in the foregoing pages is to point out that the speculations on grammar which had had their crude beginning in the *Brāhmaṇas* and subsequent literature had to pass through different stages of perfection before they could develop into regular systems in the hands of *Śākatāyana*, *Śākalya*, and others.

The indispensable character of grammar for understanding the Vedic texts was a matter of so great concern that grammar came to be regarded as the greatest of all *Vedāṅgas*. The importance of grammar lies in the fact that without a thorough knowledge of grammar one cannot distinguish correct words from incorrect ones (as there is no difference of meanings) and consequently fails to attain that religious felicity which is only attainable by the use of correct words. The study of grammar enables one, on the other hand, to discriminate the correct words as opposed to the so-called "*Apabhraṃśa*." Bhartṛhari calls grammar "*Smṛti*"¹ which has for its subject the knowledge of correct words. One may argue that the knowledge of correct words may be obtained from popular or current usage and consequently grammar does not serve any useful purpose. Bhartṛhari² meets this

¹ साधुलक्षणविषयः सैषा व्याकरणकृतिः । अविच्छेदेन शिष्टानामिदं स्मृति-
निबन्धनम् ।—*Vākyapadiya*, I, 148.

² तत्त्वानवोधः शब्दानां शक्तिं व्याकरणादति ।—11, 1, 13.

argument by holding that grammar derives its importance from the fact that it lays down principles covering almost the entire field of correct words and has thus become a practical standard for distinguishing the correct words current among the "*Śiṣṭas*" from corrupt forms. For the recognition of current words, we should take recourse to certain principles to avoid unwarranted uses; grammar is identified with such principles made on the authority of the Vedas, conforming to the current uses and handed down to us through generations of teachers. "*Vyākaraṇa-Smṛti*",¹ as Bhartṛhari often applies this epithet to grammar, is current from time immemorial and does not appear to have suffered any breach of continuity in the course of its development. The author of the *Vākyapadīya* is not content with this statement only but goes further and maintains that the study of grammar leads ultimately to salvation. How final emancipation is obtained from a study of correct words will be understood only if we, like the ancient seers, try to find out the mystical aspect of sound and look upon words as an emblem or symbol of All-pervading God. The origin of the doctrine of 'world-producing Logos' or *शब्दब्रह्मवादः* may be traced to an attempt to discover the divine element in words. *Puṇyarāja* quotes a verse² which states that

¹ तद्वारमपवर्गस्य वाङ्मन्त्रानां विवित्तुस्त्वितम् ।

एवमेव सर्वविद्यानामविविधं प्रकाशते ।—*Vākya.*, I. 14.

² *Vākyapadīya*, I, p. 8.

water is the most sacred thing in the earth ; the Vedic *mantras* are more sacred than water, but grammar is even superior in sanctity to the Vedas. The references given above are intended to show the respect that was accorded to grammar in those days.



CHAPTER II

ANUBANDHA AND CATEGORY

Grammar—Name and definitions—The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar—Anubandhas—Categories of Grammar.

The earliest name whereby the science of grammar was designated is possibly वेदानां वेदः 'the Veda of the Vedas,' as is to be found in the long list of Śāstras enumerated in the Upaniṣads. The popular term 'Vyākaraṇa' appears to be an old one; it points at once to the analytical process (संस्कार) by which words are dissolved into bases and suffixes. The expression like व्याकृता वाक् meaning 'divided speech' is also to be met with in the Vedic literature. Both the terms व्याकरण and वैयाकरण occur in the Nirukta. Grammar is also called शब्दशास्त्र, and the grammarians are popularly known as शाब्दिक and sometimes as 'वाग्योगवित्,' i.e., one who knows the combination of speech. Patañjali has used the expression 'शब्दानुशासन' instead of व्याकरण at the very beginning of his work, his object obviously being to point out that the first and foremost function of grammar is to show how by their conformity to the rules of grammar correct words are distinguished from incorrect ones. He derives the term व्याकरण as 'व्याक्रियन्ते व्युत्पाद्यन्ते शब्दा अनेनेति-व्याकरणम्' and speaks of both words and rules as

what constitute grammar that supports the correctness of Sanskrit words (लक्ष्यलक्षणे व्याकरणम्). He holds further that the knowledge of words does not really follow from the rules alone, but from a clear interpretation of those rules showing both examples and counter-examples. Of the six *Āngas*, Patañjali maintains, grammar is decidedly the greatest, as it directly helps the study of the Vedas. Durga holds that grammar consists of rules and primarily deals with the physical structure of words, whereas the science of etymology lays greater stress on the psychological aspect, viz., significance. Grammar seems to have attained to scriptural authority, for Bhartṛhari and others are often found to ascribe such epithets to grammar, as व्याकरणस्मृति and व्याकरणागम. There is a special section on grammar in the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā system where grammar has been referred to as a branch of *Smṛti* having bearing upon *Dharma*. The way in which grammar comes in close touch with *Dharma* may be shewn by the fact that grammar, as a science, deals with the correct forms of words, the proper knowledge of which is necessary for the attainment of religious merits. Though the correct Sanskrit forms, says Patañjali, as well as the corrupt words are equally expressive of sense, it is only the use of correct ones that is attended with religious felicity. Moreover, grammar is the only instrument whereby correct words are distinguished from corrupt forms, and the

meanings of words are ascertained. The importance and usefulness of grammar for a thorough knowledge of the Vedic texts cannot, therefore, be over-estimated.

It will be a mistake to suppose that Sanskrit grammar, as defined above, is nothing but a number of rules that attempt to explain the formation and analysis of words in a manner that has nothing to do with principles as such. Words are so numerous and so diversified in forms, that the grammarians had had to face a great difficulty in making a thorough study of words. Scholars of the reputation of Patañjali and Durga failed to take notice of the entire field of words¹ which, as we find, is always being enlarged with the advancement of knowledge. But credit to the vigorous attempts of the Indian grammarians who succeeded conspicuously in their study of words and placed the grammatical speculations on a purely scientific basis.

It is really striking to see how the grammarians could systematise their studies of words in spite of such varieties of forms. Great as the task was, the grammarians proved equal, as they adopted the scientific method and framed the rules on the principle of generalisation and particularisation, taking notice of all possible forms. Still greater was the difficulty in determining the radical and

¹ 'अहं च भाष्यकारस्य सुशब्दैकधियात्तमौ । नैव शब्दान्वयिः पारं किमने
अवबुद्धः'

inflexional elements in words. Analysers of speech as they were, the grammarians had to reach the last stage of linguistic analysis, and this, as we know, was practicable by the application of the principle of *अन्वयव्यतिरेक* or the method of agreement and difference. The conclusion to which we are naturally led is that Sanskrit grammar was not busy with isolated words but was based on principles. An attempt may be made here to show that the study of grammar is not a mechanical way of mastering the conjugation and declension of certain forms and that grammar does not give a cumbrous process of fanciful derivations. Grammar, like all philosophical systems, has its own categories and logic and is ultimately based on the principles that are strictly philosophical. The study of grammar on a philosophical line received its inception at the hands of Patañjali who, in his elaborate commentary known as the *Mahābhāṣya*, has dealt with the grammatical problems from a different standpoint and has practically given them a philosophical character. The work of Pāṇini has been treated by Mādhavācāryya as a system of philosophy.¹ Grammar was no longer looked upon as an artifice but as embodying the principles of spontaneous growth. Bhartṛhari seems to have made a careful study of the *Mahābhāṣya*; this had not only widened his scope of knowledge but befitted him to

¹ वाचिनीयदर्शनम् ।

explain the principles of grammar from a purely philosophical stand-point. With him grammar was a regular system of philosophy and he treated it as such. What Patañjali and Bhartṛhari have done for grammar is really wonderful; they would always deserve our admiration as the founder of an interesting branch of study as the 'Philosophy of grammar.' Their conspicuous contribution towards the building up of this new school of thought is none the less important and valuable than what Plato and Aristotle have actually done for philosophy proper. Thanks to the labours of these grammarians, we can boast of this peculiar system of philosophy to the rest of the world.

Having taken a brief survey about the origin of grammatical speculations and the subsequent periods in which those speculations had been systematised by the ancient grammarians in a scientific way, we now proceed to shew, following the line of thought of Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, that Sanskrit grammar may be studied as a regular system of philosophy. There was a time when the authoritativeness of grammar reached such a height as to deserve such epithets as **आगम** and **स्मृति**, and the author of the 'Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha' found in the Pāṇinian system of grammar certain characteristics which induced him to treat it, as if it were a regular system of philosophy. Now, as a system of philosophy,

grammar must have its *Anubandhas*, categories and principles. Grammar, to begin with, is mainly connected with *Śabda*s and their corresponding significance, and is, therefore, popularly called *Śabda-śāstra*. The relation, again, in which words stand to the world of objects is one of *Vācya-Vācaka* (connoter and connoted), and there are as many words as there are objects to be named. Thus, we see that the scope of शब्दशास्त्र covers almost the entire sphere of thought. It¹ is said that the entire world of objects resides in words in a subtle form and the so-called *Vācya* and *Vācaka* are not really different but essentially one and the same thing. Further, no cognition² whatsoever is ever possible without the use of words, and the knowledge of all descriptions seems to be bound up with words.

Every system of Hindu philosophy has its own *Anubandhas*. Grammar, when viewed as a system of thought, may be shewn to have its particular *Anubandhas*. (1) Grammar has *Śabda* as its subject; (2) the relation of grammar with *Śabda* is that the former analyses *Śabda* into stems and suffixes (प्रकृति and प्रत्यय), and thus helps the understanding of the significance.

¹ शब्देवेवास्मिता शक्तिर्विशेषास्य निबन्धनी ।—*Vākyaśāstra*, 1.119
and शब्दविद्वन्मिव ज्ञानं सर्वशब्देन भासते ।— „ 1. 124.

² वाचनेन प्रसादेन लोकायाश्च प्रवर्तते ।—*Kāvyaśāstra*, 1. 3.
and ब्रह्मन्मन्त्रतमः कृत्स्नं वाचेन भुवनतमम् । यदि शब्दाश्च वै ज्योतिरासंसारं
न दीप्यते ।—*Kāvyaśāstra*, 1. 4.

While explaining the expression वेदानां वेदः, as an epithet of grammar, Śaṅkara states that grammar by division of words enables us to comprehend the meanings thereof. As regards the *Prayojana* or object, it is definitely stated by the expression शब्दानुशासन, that is, the first and foremost object of grammar is to formulate such principles as would serve to distinguish correct forms from incorrect (अपभ्रंश) ones. Kaiyaṭa rightly observes that by the expression शब्दानुशासन, the author of the Mahābhāṣya sets forth the immediate object of grammar and the statement रक्षोद्भागमलवृत्तसंदिग्धाः प्रयोजनम् enumerates only the indirect purposes that are served by the study of grammar. So far as *Adhikāri* is concerned, it is sufficient to say that one desirous of having the knowledge of correct words is alone competent to take up the study of grammar. It is known to all students of Hindu philosophy that the Indian teachers have, as a rule, discussed the question of *Anubandhas* in the very beginning of their discourses, with the obvious object of inducing people to those studies. There are reasons to believe that this was followed as a traditional practice, because Yāska too in his *Nirukta* did not fail to treat of such *Anubandhas*.

Having dealt with the *Anubandhas* of grammar, Patañjali has drawn our attention to the fact that the statement of objects (*Prayojana*) is of no use, as both the Vedas and grammar are required to be studied without having any

definite object in view. The question¹ of *Prayojana* may arise with regard to other branches of studies apart from the Vedas, because it is definitely enjoined that the unconditional duty on the part of a Brahmin is to make a study of the Vedas with the six popular *Āṅgas* (grammar, etymology, etc.) and acquire a thorough knowledge of them. He gives us a glimpse of the time-honoured custom regarding the ancient method of teaching in India. The Brahmins² are said to have devoted themselves in ancient times to the study of grammar just after their *Upanayana* ceremony was over; and they were allowed to study the Vedas only on their attaining a sufficient knowledge of grammar. But time has much changed. People now take up the study of the Vedas first, as their shorter span of existence does not allow them to master grammar before attempting such a vast field of study. Further, they cannot practically afford to devote the greater portion of their life exclusively to the acquisition of proficiency in grammar, since they like to turn out teachers, capable of speaking Sanskrit, in course of a short duration. This is why they take to the study of the Vedas just in the beginning of their

¹ वेदानिरिक्रमिष्ये एव प्रयोजनान्वाख्यानं न तु वेदविषये ।

—Bhāṣya Pradīpodyota.

² पुराकाले एतदासीत् संस्कारोत्तरकालं ब्राह्मणाः व्याकरणं आधीयते । तेष्वस्यतुल्यानकरणानुदानप्रदानत्रेभ्यो वैदिकाः श्रद्धा उपदिश्यन्ते, तदर्थं न तदा, वेदमधीत्य खरिता ब्रह्मारी भवन्ति ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 5.

academic career. Grammar is called *Uttarā Vidyā* which is capable of being understood to a considerable extent by intelligent students, engaged in the serious study of the Vedas. What Patañjali has observed here is also applicable to much recent times. The present-day scholars are more or less actuated by the desire of securing recognition as *Pundits* in as short a time as possible. With this object in view, they engage themselves to the study of many Śāstras, though superficially, before they have obtained sufficient proficiency in grammar to qualify them to take up other branches of study. The statement of *Prayojana* has indeed some other reasons. Patañjali has anticipated an objection that might be raised against the so-called necessity of making a study of grammar. We know that words—both Vedic and *Laukika*—form the subject of grammar. The study of grammar as a science, some may argue, is of no importance, because the Vedic words might be learnt from the Vedas and the correctness of *Laukika* or current words from popular usages.¹ The study of grammar, if pursued for the knowledge of words, is, therefore, nothing but useless. Now it is simply to do away with such unreasonable arguments that Pāṇini wrote his famous *Aṣṭādhyāyī* clearly showing the

¹ वेदांश्च वैदिकाः शब्दाः शिक्षा लौकिकश्च लौकिकाः । तस्मादनर्थकं व्याकरणमिति । तेषां एवं विप्रतिपन्नवृत्तिभ्योऽध्यवृत्तयः सुखद मूला आचार्यै रदं शास्त्रमन्वाचये—इत्यादि प्रचीनमान्येभ्यो व्याकरणम् ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 5.

objects for which grammar should be studied. The enunciation of *Prayojana*—both direct and indirect—is, therefore, necessary to show that the study of grammar is indispensable for the knowledge of the Vedic texts and the accurate discrimination of correct Sanskrit words.

The eternity of *Śabda*, as supported by the grammarians, furnishes another objection as to the usefulness of grammar. As a matter of fact, if words are held to be eternal, the science of grammar, which teaches the formation and analysis of words, should necessarily become useless.¹ The author of the *Vārttika* meets this position by holding that the principles laid down in grammar serve to put a stop to certain undesirable consequences.² One may, for instance, be led to think that the root *mṛj* always retains the form *mṛji* in all declensions (according to the wording of the *Dhātupāṭha*); but grammar in such a case brings forward certain restriction, *viz.*, grammar teaches³ that the root *mṛj* changes to *māṛji* (gets *Vṛddhi*), when it is followed by suffixes other than *kit*.

By categories of Sanskrit grammar, we mean precisely the fundamental concepts of grammar. *Śabda* is pre-eminently the basis on which rests the entire structure of grammatical science.

¹ यदि तर्हि शब्दाः शब्दाः किमर्थं शास्त्रम् ?

² किमर्थं शास्त्रमिति चेन्निरवैकल्यात् सिद्धम् ।

— *Vār.*, 10, under the rule, *Pāp.*, 1. 1. 1.

³ तच्चानेन निवृत्तिः क्रियते । सन्नेरवित्तु प्रत्ययेषु सन्निप्रसङ्गे मात्रिः साधु-
र्भवतीति ।—*Ibid.*

As *Śabda* is intimately related to thoughts and logic, the extent of *Śabda-sāstra* seems to be immensely wide. The categories of grammar, looked at from a wider point of view, comprehend almost all those that are enumerated by the Vaiśeṣikas. Mention is here made, among others, of the following grammatical concepts:—(1) Genus and individual (जातिव्यक्ति), (2) Co-inherence (सामानाधिकरण्य), समवाय (inseparable connection), (3) *Hetu* and *Karaṇa*, (4) Quality (गुण), Substance (द्रव्य), Relation (सम्बन्ध), Parts and the whole (अवयव and अवयवी), *Prakṛti* and *Vikṛti*, and Efficiency (शक्तिः). The inclusion of *Śakti* in the grammatical categories marks, however, a departure from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika stand-points.

First, both class and individual are taken by the grammarians as the significance of all words. There is, as we know, a great controversy as to whether words denote a class or an individual. The two well-known grammarians Vājapyāyana and Vyāḍi held opposite views with regard to this problem, the former, like the Mīmāṃsakas, was an exponent of the Class-theory, while the latter advocated the Individualistic theory. We have elsewhere pointed out that the Naiyāyikas seem to have brought about a reconciliation between these contradictory views by holding that it is neither class nor individual alone that is usually denoted by words, but an individual qualified by the class (जात्यवच्छिन्नव्यक्ति) is the meaning of all words. As to the view of the grammarians,

Patañjali is of opinion that both class and individual are taken to be the sense of words. He particularly observes that Pāṇini had the same view before him while framing the rules of grammar.

It is not only in the Nyāya system of philosophy that we frequently meet with such terms as सामानाधिकरण्य or co-inherence and कारण or cause, but grammar also has these concepts and their proper expositions. The term सामानाधिकरण्य means 'the state of being substratum of two qualities.' The class of compound known as *Karmadhāraya* is based upon the conception of such co-inherence. In an instance like नीलोत्पलम्, both blueness and 'the state of being lotus' inhere in a common substratum, i.e., lotus.

There is an elaborate treatment of both *Hetu* and *Karṇa* in Sanskrit grammar. The very conception of *Kāraka* is intimately related to that of cause (क्रियानिमित्तं कारकम्). By *Hetu* is meant the material cause. In the grammatical conception of *Hetu*,¹ we should remember, there is no room for action. *Karṇa* or instrument, defined as a 'cause associated with action' (व्यापारवत् कारणं करणम्) is intimately related to action. There is, however, no essential difference between *Hetu* and *Karṇa*, it is only the association with action that makes the difference.

The question of quality comes invariably in connection with the consideration of *Viśeṣaṇa*.

¹ द्रव्यादिविषयी हेतुः कारकं निवर्तजिह्वम् ।—Vākyapadīya.

Vyākṣana, *Itaravyāvarṭaka* and *Dharma* are generally the terms whereby *guṇa* is denoted. The grammatical conception of *guṇa* or quality is almost the same as we find in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems. Patañjali seems to have only reproduced a Sūtra of the Nyāya philosophy while he enumerates *guṇa* as sound, touch, form, smell and taste. Under the rule 4.1.44. Patañjali has made an attempt to give a clear definition of *guṇa*. *Guṇa*, he holds,¹ is what inheres in substance, sometimes liable to destruction, found in different classes, not produced by action and essentially different from substance. Elsewhere, he explains *guṇa* as what serves to distinguish an object from others (belonging to the same class भेदका गुणाः);² as, for instance, the same entity as water is said to be either hot or cold, according to the difference of quality. Further, he continues that *guṇas* are also found to be non-differentiating (अभेदक),³ as a man, say Devadatta, retains the same name, no matter whether he is a boy, young or old. The

¹ सत्त्वे निविशति; पैतिप्रत्यक्षातिषु दृश्यते । आधेयवाक्यानाञ्च सोऽसत्त्वप्रकृति-
रूपः । And उपेक्ष्यमानस्यव्यवहारो द्रव्यान्तरिण्यपि ।

—Mahābhāṣya under the rule, Pāṇ., 4. 144.

वाचकः सर्वविहङ्गां द्रव्यादन्वो मुखः व्युत्तः ।

² and ³ Mahābhāṣya under the *Var.* भेदकत्वात् गुणस्य, Vol. I, p. 41.
एकोऽवमानोदत्तं नाम तस्य गुणभेदादन्तर्लभ्यति । अन्त्यदिदं शीतमन्त्य-
दिदमुष्णमिति ।

उभयानिर्दिष्टं गुणेषु भेदका अभेदका इति ।

grammatical idea of *Viśeṣaṇa* (इतरव्यावर्तकधर्मः) is, therefore, essentially the same as that of *guṇa*. According to the grammarians, words like गुण, etc., are expressive of both the quality and the object qualified. Bhartṛhari, while speaking of *guṇa*, gives much stress¹ on the differentiating character as well as on the dependent² nature of *guṇa*. Its dependent nature means that we cannot conceive of a *guṇa* or quality without considering at the same time a substance in which that particular quality might inhere (द्रव्यपारतन्त्र्यम् and भेदकत्वमत्र प्रधानगुणलक्षणम्). Much has been said with regard to the object and quality in Sanskrit grammar, specially in the *Mahābhāṣya*. According to Bhartṛhari, genus, such as गोत्र, is also included in the category of quality.

A substance is the substratum of qualities (गुणान्वयो द्रव्यम्). Patañjali defines substance³ as what does not lose its essence even when different qualities come to inhere in it. A fruit, for instance, remains the same, when in course of time its blueness gives way to redness.

¹ संसर्गिभेदकं वक्ष्यते सव्यापारं प्रतीयते । गुणत्वं परतन्त्रत्वात्तस्य शास्त्रे उदाहृतम् ।—*Vākya-padīya*, 3, p. 145.

² द्रव्यपारतन्त्र्याच्च गुणानाम् । Helārāja भेदकत्वं चात्र मुख्यं गुणलक्षणम् ।

³ . यस्य गुणान्तरेभ्योऽपि प्रादुर्भावस्तु तत्त्वं न विहिन्यते तद द्रव्यम् ।—*Mahābhāṣya* under the rule, Pāṇ., 5. 1, 119.

Bhartr̥hari¹ holds substance to be eternal and enumerates soul, object, nature, body and the four elements as synonyms of *dravya*. We give below the sum and substance of what Helārāja has said in connection with *Dravya*. *Dravya*, he maintains, is of two kinds:²—transcendental and popular; it is the latter that are comprehended by Vyāḍi when he says that all words signify substance. Brought up in an atmosphere of sacred traditions and religious culture, the Hindu teachers are generally found to have approached all problems from a standpoint that is more or less metaphysical. Thus, while speaking of so concrete a phenomenon as *Dravya*, they have brought in the subtle question regarding the ultimate nature of substance, as conceived by different philosophers. *Dravya*, looked at from the transcendental standpoint, is the same as Soul. Those who support the non-dualistic view are of opinion that it is the all-pervading Soul alone that manifests itself in manifold object and appears to be diversified in association with different qualities (उपाधि). The Buddhist philosophers hold that an object (वस्तु) having its own identity as its own mark (स्वलक्षणम्) and capable of doing works is known as *Dravya*. The followers of the dualistic view understand

¹ वस्तुपलक्षणं यच्च सर्वनाम प्रयुज्यते । द्रव्यमित्युच्यते कीदृशो भेदस्तेन विवक्षितः ॥

—Vākyapadīya, 3, p. 141.

वाक्यः वस्तु स्वभावश्च शरीरं लक्षणमित्यपि । द्रव्यमित्यस्य पर्यायास्तच्च निश्चयमिति स्थितिः ।—Vākyapadīya (द्रव्यसमुद्देशः), 3, p. 85.

² द्रव्यं द्विविधं पारमार्थिकं व्यावहारिकं च ।—Under the Kārikā, 3, p. 85

existence or nature by *Dravya*. According to the view of Cārvāka, the four elements, namely, earth, water, light and air which, in their particular combination produce the body and sense-organs, are considered to be *Dravyas*.

Saṃbandha or relation is of various kinds :— it may be one of *Vācya-Vācaka*, as exists between a word and its sense ; or, one representing *Bhedaka-Bhedyā*, as is to be found between *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, and¹ as cause and effect and so on. Words and meanings are mutually both cause and effect, so far as the verbal knowledge is concerned. Having shown that the meanings of words are either class or individual (जाति or व्यक्ति) or, an individual conditioned by the class, we now turn to the question as to how a particular word always seems to be associated with a particular sense. As this question has already been dealt with, a few words are only needed to explain the relation that exists between words and their meanings. The reason as to why a particular word always implies a particular sense points to the existence of certain relation, whether conventional² or fixed by nature, otherwise the word *gauḥ* might have signified a pot and so on. The Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians held, as we know, this relation to be

¹ शब्दः कारकस्यैव स हि तिनोपजन्वते ।—Vākyapadīya, p. 112.

² शब्देनार्थस्याभिधाने सम्बन्धो दुस्तुः ।—Helārāja.

शब्देनैवचित्तोपां सम्बन्धः समवसितः ।—Vākyapadīya (3), p. 96.

अनादिर्यः शब्दानां सम्बन्धो योग्यता तथा ।— " " 110.

eternal, while the Naiyāyikas explained it as fixed by God's will (संकेत). The question of *Sambandha* occupies a prominent place in Sanskrit grammar. In grammar *Sambandha* is generally denoted by षष्ठी which is technically called *Seṣa*. Under the rule *Pāṇ.* 1. 1. 49, Patañjali says that the meanings of षष्ठी are one hundred in number. One *Śabda* is said to be related to another when both of them have close affinity regarding their places of utterance. Besides this, words may have among themselves some such relations as proximity, posteriority, etc. (आनन्तर्यं, सामीप्य).

Samavāya or inseparable connection is one in which a quality stands to the object. In *carmaṇi dīpinaṇi kanti*—the relation of skin with the leopard is one of *Samavāya*.

Avayava and *Avayavī* or parts and the whole form another concept of grammar. The class of compound known as *Ekadeśī Samāsa*, the *Paribhāṣās*, such as, *Ekadeśavikṛtamananyavat*, *Avayavāprasiddheḥ samudāyaprasidhirbaliyastī*, and the particular division of *Adhikaraṇa*, as *Aikadeśika* are instances that prove the grammatical conception of *Avayava* and *Avayavī*. Like the Naiyāyikas, the grammarians do not take the whole to be a distinct entity from the parts of which it is composed, but consider it simply as an aggregate of parts.¹

¹ अमलरत्न समुदायिप्रवचनः ।—M. B., 1. 23.

The grammarians have taken *Prakṛti* to be the final element of words ; it is either *Nāman* or *Dhātu*. In instances like *Yūpāya dāru* and *Kuṇḍalāya sucarnam*, the grammarians take both post and earring as modifications of wood and gold respectively. Thus, *Prakṛti* also means the original in relation to *Vikṛti* or modification. To the Sāṃkhyaites, *Prakṛti* is the primordial substance out of which the entire universe has evolved. Bhartṛhari has also started with the doctrine that the whole world may be viewed as only *Vivarta* or modification of *Sāda-Brahman*.

In considering the fundamental concepts of grammar, we can logically put forward what Bhartṛhari has said in connection with efficiency¹ (*Śakti*) and its different manifestations, such as, space, agent, action and time. The conception of efficiency comprehends in itself the idea of objects ; we cannot, to be more clear, conceive of any efficiency without thinking of certain objects with which it is naturally associated. We can, for instance, hardly think of the power of burning unless we think of fire at the same time. Efficiency and the efficient object, therefore, seem to be practically inseparable. It was on the ground of such inseparable connection that the Naiyāyikas did not include efficiency in their categories, as an entity distinct

¹ शक्तिरूपे यदाक्षेपासक्तमनवस्थिताः । दिक् साधनं क्रिया काल इति
बलभिधायिनः ।—Vākyaspadīya, 3. 1., p. 157.

from the object. The grammarians, however, admit that efficiency, though parctically dependent on the object (*dravyaparatantra*), has got its independent character too. Though inseparably connected and entirely identical with objects, efficiency has its own form (*Siddhasvabhāva*), since all objects are found to exhibit some efficiency or energy, as we may call it, when they perform some actions. What is true is that such efficiency is not directly implied by words which signify objects. Patañjali has clearly shown that the thing and its quality or efficiency, though related inseparably, are different; as, for instance, in using the comparative and superlative forms, such as, sweeter and sweetest, we do not apply the degree of excellence to the thing itself but to its quality, i.e., sweetness.

Both space and time are regarded as *Dravya* by the Naiyāyikas, but the grammarians take them as efficiency inherent in objects. Space involves the notions of limit, priority, posteriority,¹ and so forth. Generally, we have the idea of space when we say 'This is prior to it;' 'This is posterior to it;' 'From this place onward,' and so on. In instances like these, we get the fifth case-endings denoting *Avadhi* or *Apekṣā*. But when the relation between the whole and the parts is meant, we have *Ṣaṣṭhī*, as in *Pūrvam Kāyasya* (the fore-part of the body). The Vaiśeṣika system also mentions space as a

¹ वरापरत्वे सूत्राणां दिशसिद्धिर्भवति ।—Vākyapadiya, 3, p. 169.

Dravya, and takes space as one eternal entity without division. The so-called divisions of space, as north, west, east, etc., are only conventional; they are usually determined by the motion of the sun (*Ādityagatyā*).

Next we come to the second manifestation of efficiency, i.e., *Sādhana* or activity. This *Sādhana*¹ implies that energy or activity of a thing whereby actions are performed. As an instrument of actions, this *Sādhana* is of great importance, so far as the grammatical conceptions of cases, such as Nominative, Objective, Instrumental, etc., are concerned. The word *Sādhana* may be taken as a synonym of *Kāraka*, as both of them imply an agent or instrument of action. Patañjali has identified *Sādhana* with the combination of qualities (*Guṇasamudāyaḥ Sādhanaṁ*). What is true of a quality is that it always appears as a distinguishing mark of the thing wherein it inheres and this is exactly the case with efficiency also. Helārāja, therefore, is of opinion that the statement *Sāadhanam*² *vai Dravyam* of the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* may be explained as implying the identity of *Sādhana* with efficiency. It is by drawing an identity between the efficiency and the efficient thing that Patañjali has sometimes attributed

¹ विद्यावाक्यमिनिपणी सामर्थ्यं साधनं विदुः ।—Vākyapadīya, 3, 1, p. 173.

² यत् साधनं वै द्रव्यमिति भाष्ये द्रव्यस्य साधनत्वमिधानं तच्छक्ति-शक्तिनवोभेदा-विषयदेवत्वमनवयम् ।—Helārāja under the *Kār*, 3, 1, p. 173.

Sādhana to things also. As a solution of the question as to why efficiency is considered to be *Sādhana* or active agent and not things themselves possessing such efficiency, Bhartṛhari continues to say that the whole universe seems to have been made up of efficient force (*Śakti-kalā*) which reveals itself in manifold thing. The manifold aspect and diversified character of the world is due to the corresponding plurality and diversity of this efficiency. Patañjali understands by active agent 'an aggregate of quality.'

Time is held to be a kind of efficiency. The Naiyāyikas, as we know, have treated of time as a *Dravya*. Time is said to be the ultimate substratum of the world;¹ it is indivisible and eternal. In grammar, time has an important place as indicative of tenses. Patañjali² defines time as that whereby both growth and decay of objects are perceived. The division of time into day and night indicates some sorts of conjunction of actions with time; action or *Vyāpāra* means here the motion of the sun. Time is immaterial and conceived as a symbol of eternity. The popular division of time into moments, hours, etc., are only artificial. In grammar, we hear of three-fold division of time, namely, present, past, and future. Under the rule *Pāṇ. 3.2.123*, Kātyāyana³ rightly observes

¹ कालो हि जगद्विधातुः कालाधारी न विद्यते ।

² येन सूर्योनामुपचयापचयाय लक्ष्यते तं कालमाहुः ।

—*Maṅgabhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 409.

³ यत्किं च कालविभागः ।—*Var. 5*. विद्यन्ति पर्यन्ताः । स्यादन्ति पर्यन्ताः । तस्य पर्यन्ताः ।

that time, though essentially indivisible, is spoken of as present, past and future in the science of grammar. Patañjali has given three instances indicating the three different divisions of time, as 'Mountains exist;' 'Mountains existed' and 'Mountains will exist,' and goes on to say that in the above examples the existence is to be understood as pertaining to the action of the kings that are either present, past or would come in future.¹ Patañjali has also shown the divergent views regarding the existence of such a division of time as 'Present time.' Some² say, he continues, that there is nothing like present time. Their view is thus represented:— 'The wheel does not exist, nor the arrow is thrown; the streamlets do not flow towards the sea. The whole universe is motionless; there is nothing that moves; he who can realise it is not blind.' The second and third verses quoted by Patañjali remind us of the arguments whereby the *Mādhyamika*³ school of the Buddhist philosophy set aside the popular divisions of time. Some,⁴ again, hold, on the contrary, that there is

¹ इह भूतमविषयसमयानां राज्ञां वाः क्रियात्मनिष्ठतेरधिकरणम् ।

—*Mahābhāṣya* under the rule, *Pāṇ.*, 9. 2. 123.

² नास्ति वर्तमानः काल इति—

“न वर्तते अजनिषु न पात्यते न कन्दते सरितः सागराय ।

कुटस्थोऽथ लीको न विचेष्टितासि यो ह्येवं पश्यति सोऽप्यन्यः ।

³ अनागतमतिक्रान्तं वर्तमानमिति त्रयम् । सर्वेषु च गतिर्नास्ति नञ्चर्हीति किमुच्यते ।—*Mādhyamika Kārikā*.

⁴ नास्ति वर्तमानः काल इति । आदित्यगतिवर्गीयलभ्यते ।

—*M. Bhāṣya*, Vol. II, p. 124.

present time, though it is imperceptible like the sun's movement. Patañjali seems to have been a scholar of wide culture and thoroughly acquainted with the principal systems of Indian philosophy, consequently it is not unlikely that he might have studied the Buddhist philosophy as it existed in his time.

Next we come to *Kriyā* or action as the last manifestation of efficiency. The conception of *Kriyā* plays an important part in Sanskrit grammar, specially in connection with *Kāraṇas*. *Kriyā* is the meaning of verbal roots (*Dhātvarthaḥ Kriyā*). *Kriyā*, holds Patañjali, is immaterial, invisible and is only comprehended by inference.

The method followed throughout Sanskrit grammar is purely analytical: grammar does never attempt to coin new words, but dissolves words into their radical and formative elements in accordance with the principle of *Anvaya-Vyatireka* or the method of agreement and difference. The Indian grammarians, as we have said elsewhere, had a conception of scientific methodology, as is clearly evidenced by the way in which they had analysed words of so diversified character and determined their *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. The grammarians had to experience great difficulty in the course of analysis of words. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* gives us a clear idea as to how the grammarians, proceeding on the line of *Anvaya-Vyatireka*,

succeeded in distinguishing the radical from the formative elements. We do not like to repeat here what we have already said. It will suffice here to point out that the grammarians seem to have taken a group of similar forms such as, *ghaṭaḥ*, *ghaṭena*, *ghaṭāt* and *pacati*, *pacataḥ*, *apākṣīt*, etc., and then proceeded to find out the common and uncommon elements in them. Now the common or unaltered element, namely, *ghaṭa* and *pac*, which has not undergone any important change in all those forms is called *Prakṛti*; the uncommon elements, on the other hand, *ina*, *āt*, *ti*, *taḥ*, which are liable to variations in different forms, are termed *Pratyaya*. This is, in short, the process whereby the grammarians could successfully dissolve the words.

Though the adherents of the doctrine of *Sphoṭa* take all words to be indivisible and eternal and look upon all such disintegrations as purely artificial, we do not fail to notice the scientific value of such a procedure that furnishes an instrument to get into the meaning of words. There are three forms in which words generally appear: sentence, inflected form, and the radical and formative elements. Of these, a sentence is the logical unit or the significant part of speech. Words, as we have already said, have no independent existence apart from a sentence. According to the *Vākyavādins*, i.e., those who take a sentence to be real, indivisible, and the only significant unit, the analysis of a sentence into its constituents, i.e., *Padas*, is at best artificial, but

recourse is taken to this process, however imaginary, as it provides the only means of showing the meaning of a sentence. The *Padavādins*, on the other hand, hold that *Padas* are real, and seek to prove the unreality of a *Vākya*, as an indivisible unit. A sentence, so to speak, is nothing but an aggregate of *Padas*, consequently a sentence has no separate existence apart from its constituents. The aphorism of the *Prātiśākhya* defining *Sandhi*¹ is construed by the *Padavādins* in such a way as to indicate the priority of *Padas* to *Samhitā* and the reality of *Padas* is thus sought to be established. According to them, *Padas*, though essentially indivisible, are analysed into *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* in order to bring out their significance. The decomposition of words into *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* is the central problem upon which are concentrated the entire speculations on grammar. It is by such analysis or *Samskāra*, as it is often called, that the Sanskrit grammarians could exclude *Apabhraṃśas* from coming under the cognisance of their systems of grammar. The view of Pāṇini and Patañjali, as explained by Bhartṛhari and Helārāja, shows that both of them were in favour of the *Vākyavādins*, i.e., *Padas* are unreal and have no separate existence, whereas a sentence is indivisible and really significant by nature.

¹ पदप्रकृतिः संहिता ।—*Prātiśākhya*. पदानां संहिता योनिः संहिता वा पदावयवा ।—*Vākyapañḍya*, 2. 59.

The expression *Padākāra*,¹ as used by Patañjali, is a sufficient indication that *Padas* are essentially unreal. It is simply for the understanding of unintelligent people that the grammarians have taken recourse to such an artificial process, as the separation of *Padas* from a sentence.



¹ न कचघेन पदकारा अनुबन्धाः, पदकारेणानुबन्धमनुबन्धम्—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 117. Pūṣyaśāstra under the Vākyapadīya. Kār., 2.57. अत्र यदि पदानां सत्यता स्यात् तदा तेषां स्वर एव सिद्धत्वात् पदानि कुर्वन्तीति पदकारा इत्येतदसङ्गतं स्यात्। तस्मान्नन्यामहे पदान्यस्यन्ति। एकमभिधत्स्वभावकं वाक्यम्। तदनुबन्धवैधनाय पदविभागः कल्पित इति।

CHAPTER III

SAMJÑĀ AND PARIBHĀṢĀ

Samjñā or grammatical technique—Paribhāṣe or axioms of grammar—Rules of grammar.

Every system of philosophy has its particular concepts and contains necessarily a set of corresponding terms that are more or less restricted in their sense. Terms of this description, which are specialised in their significance, are popularly called *Samjñā* or technical terms. The Nyāya system, specially the Navya-Nyāya, contains a large number of such technical terms. These words, it must be remembered, are not used by the Naiyāyikas in their popular sense. To a Naiyāyika the words *Prakāra* and *Pratīyogin*, for instance, are not denotative of *kinds* and *competitive* respectively, but usually express an adjunct and anything that is non-existent.¹ The use of such technical terms has manifold advantage. *Samjñās* are often used for the sake of brevity and conciseness, and are consequently adopted in most of the treatises on science in their respective fashions.

¹ यस्मात्मात्रः स प्रतियोगी ।

A *Samjñā* generally means an enunciation or mention of something by name.¹ Vātsyāyana has used the word उद्देशः, as a synonym of *Samjñā*, and holds that the logical or scientific procedure comprehends enunciation, definition and examination, as necessary for the scientific treatment of a subject.² The grammarians also, as is evident from their method of treatment, have followed this scientific process. To enumerate something by name is what is known as *Samjñā* and those that are denoted or comprehended by such *Samjñā* are called *Samjñī*. Patañjali defines *Samjñā* as a shortest name which is adopted for the sake of brevity.

In the *Sūtra* वृद्धिरादैच् *Pāṇ.* 1. 1. 1, the word वृद्धिः is a *Samjñā* and आत् and ऐच् are *Samjñī*. But how are we to know that it is a *Samjñā*? The *Sūtra* quoted above forms the opening aphorism of Pāṇini and there is no preceding rule like *Samjñā* that may be taken as an *Adhikāra-Sūtra*. The question raised by Patañjali³ is that Pāṇini ought to have used the word *Samjñā* before the rule वृद्धिरादैच्, so as to avoid the ambiguity as to whether वृद्धि or आदैच् is to be taken as *Samjñā*. To recognise *Vṛddhi* as a *Samjñā* naturally presupposes an adequate conception of *Samjñā* itself. Patañjali further observes that even the

¹ नाममात्रलघुर्न संज्ञा ।

² त्रिविधा वाक्य भास्वप्रवृत्तिः—उद्देशी लघुर्न परीचा चेति ।

³ वृद्ध्यादीनां शब्दानां संक्षेपेन संप्रत्ययो यथा सात् ।

Mahābhāṣya under the rule *Pāṇ.* 1. 1. 1.

enunciation of संज्ञाधिकार is not sufficient enough to give an accurate cognition of *Samjñā* and *Samjñī*, as there is hardly any evidence in favour of accepting the word *Vṛddhi* as a *Samjñā* and आदेश as *Samjñī*. He then refers to the ancient teachers¹ whose usage is the only criterion for the precise knowledge of a *Samjñā*. That the word *Vṛddhi* denotes a *Samjñā* (as opposed to a *Samjñī*) and not a *Samjñī* is evident from the usages of the ancient grammarians. The fact is that the technical terms like *Guṇa* and *Vṛddhi*, as used in the Aṣṭādhyāyī, are not really of Pāṇini's invention, but they are rather supposed to have been borrowed from earlier systems of grammar. Similar is the history of all proper names, both popular and the Vedic; as, for instance, the name² Devadatta, with which parents baptise their newly-born son, continues to gain currency in the society by the force of popular usage. Another view that seems to be none the less plausible is that the grammatical technics, such as, *Guṇa* and *Vṛddhi*, were too popular terms to require any exposition or even enunciation. It is probably for this reason that Pāṇini did not think it worth his while to make a distinct rule as *Samjñā* as would facilitate the knowledge of *Samjñā*.

¹ आचार्याचारान् संज्ञाधिकारिः । यथा लौकिकदेविकेभ्यः ।—Mahābhāṣya 37a, Var. 4.

² लोके तावन्मातापितरौ पुत्रस्य जातस्य संज्ञितेऽवकाशे नाम कुर्वन्ति देवदत्त इति । तयोश्चपचादादन्तेऽपि जायन्तीयमस्य संज्ञेति ।.....इदं तावत् केचिदाचचार्या आहुः उद्दिश्यः संज्ञादेशः संज्ञिनः ।—Ibid.

Patañjali continues further that some grammarians, while interpreting the rule in question, have clearly indicated that the word *Vṛddhi* is a *Samjñā* and आदैच् is *Samjñā*. In order to bring out the exact significance of the rule वृद्धिरादैच्, some grammarians, again, have (only given the examples of *Vṛddhi* as, अक्षेयीत्, अकार्षीत्) only enumerated the *Samjñās* of *Vṛddhi*, such as, आदैच्, under the rule सिचि वृद्धिः परस्मैपदेषु and have thus made it sufficiently clear that the word *Vṛddhi* is expressive of आदैच् in grammar. The relation between the words *Vṛddhi* and *Ādaic* is, therefore, one of the indicating and the indicated. The rule serves practically a two-fold purpose: it expresses a *Samjñā* as well as makes the word *Vṛddhi* a *Samjñā*. What Patañjali¹ deduces from these facts with regard to the distinction between *Samjñā* and *Samjñā* is that what implies something is a *Samjñā* and what are so implied should be regarded as a *Samjñā*. The author of the *Vārttika* has suggested two more criteria so as to show the distinction between *Samjñā* and *Samjñā* more clearly. (1) *Samjñā* is formless,² whereas *Samjñās* are found to have forms. It is a fact of common experience that a *Samjñā*, like Devadatta, is given to a mass of flesh having certain form.

¹ ते सन्ध्यामष्टे यथा ब्रह्माख्ये सा संज्ञा ये प्रतीयन्ते ते संज्ञिन इति ।

Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 38.

² अनाकृतिः :—*Vā.* 6, *Bhāṣya* : अथवानाकृतिः संज्ञा । आकृतिसन्ध्याः संज्ञिनः । लोकेऽपि आकृतिसन्ध्या संज्ञापिच्छस्य देवदत्त इति संज्ञा क्रियते ।

Again, where there is a form, there is a difference. Moreover, *Samjñā* is one, while *Samjñīs* are more than one. (2) A *Samjñā* may be recognised by some special mark.¹ Patañjali holds further that *Samjñā* and *Samjñī*, like nouns and adjectives, seem to have co-inherence as well as equal case-terminations. To the grammarians, *Ādaic* (which is formed by the process of *Pratyōhāra* from the letters enunciated in the so-called Śiva-Sūtra) is really expressive of sense. Some, again, take the word *Vṛddhi* as indicative of the forms of words, viz., the word *Vṛddhi* and *Ādaic* are mutually convertible. Patañjali has suggested a few more characteristics whereby *Samjñā* and *Samjñī* might be clearly recognised. *Samjñās*, he maintains,² like *Vṛddhi* and *Guṇa*, are repeatedly mentioned in grammar, but such is not the case with their corresponding *Samjñīs*, for it is more convenient and attended with more economisation of labour to mention a *Samjñā*, say *ṽṛddhi*, than to enumerate each time *Ādaic* which contain greater number of letters. When *Samjñās* are really adopted for the sake of brevity and conciseness, the word *Vṛddhi* is preferable to *Ādaic* from a practical point of view. Further, it often comes to our notice that *Sāmjñī* is placed before the *Samjñā*³ in the rules of grammar

¹ लिङ्गिन वा ।—*Var.* 7.

² आवर्तिन्वः संज्ञा भवन्ति । इति शब्दस्यावर्तिने नादेऽन्वः ।—*Ibid.*

³ अथवा पूर्वोच्चारितः संज्ञी, परोच्चारिता संज्ञा ।—*Ibid.*

(as in अदेकः). But the rule वृद्धिरादेच् forms an exception, as the word *Vṛddhi* comes here first. This anomaly is explained by Patañjali as a particular instance where the word *Vṛddhi* has been¹ given priority only to indicate a sense of auspiciousness (मङ्गलार्थम्). Both *Samjñā* and *Samjñī* being thus reciprocally convertible, a question is raised against their mutual dependence (अन्योन्याश्रयत्व). As a matter of fact, we get a *Samjñā* like *Vṛddhi* for *Ādaio* and the *Samjñā* again serves to indicate *Ādaio*. The defect of such mutual dependence is finally set aside by Patañjali on the ground of the eternality of word (सिद्धं तु नित्यशब्दत्वात्—Vār. 9). *Ādaio* are permanent word-forms, for the denotation of which a *Samjñā* like *Vṛddhi* is adopted, but the *Samjñā* itself does not practically bring them into existence. The eternal view of *Śabda*² does not, however, render the science of grammar absolutely useless, since grammar, as it is primarily concerned with the exposition of correct words, serves to remove all possible confusion and misinterpretation by the formulation of rules.

Bhartrhari has even tried to show the permanent character of such *Samjñā-Śabda* and acknowledges the relation between *Samjñā* and *Samjñī* as permanently fixed.³ But this view is open

¹ भाट्टलिका आचार्यो महतः शास्त्रीयस्य मङ्गलार्थं वृद्धिशब्दमादितः प्रयुङ्क्ते ।—M. B. under the rule Pāp. 1.1.1.

² यदि तर्हि नित्या शब्दः किमर्थं शास्त्रम् ? निवर्तकं शास्त्रम् ।—*Ibid.*

³ नित्य एव तु सम्बन्धो लिङ्गादिषु शब्दादिषु—*Vākyapadiya*, Kār 2. 389.

to objections and is contrary to our experience. *Samjñā* or proper names are purely of human invention,¹ men giving names to objects according to their own desire. The arguments whereby Bhartṛhari sought to refute this popular view are as follows: It is admitted that in certain cases *Samjñās* are restricted in their denotations by the usages of men; as, for instance, one might say, 'From this day the word *Ditha* would mean this person.' But so far as the relation between a *Samjñā* and a *Samjñī* is concerned, there is no denying the fact that the word *Ditha*, like the word *gauḥ*, is also connected with its meaning by permanent relation.² Bhartṛhari has divided *Samjñās* into two classes—*Kṛtrima* (as *tī*, *ghu*, etc.) or artificial, and *Akṛtrima* (as *Ditha*) or popular names current in the society. The so-called artificial *Samjñās* are of modern origin; their significance is confined to the area of those Śāstras wherein they are used, that is to say, they have no meanings popularly assigned to them.

Having thus discussed the different criteria for the recognition of *Samjñā* and *Samjñī*, we now proceed to speak a few words more on the

And इत्यादीनां च शास्त्रेऽस्मिन् शास्त्रवच्छेदकत्वम् । अकृत्रिमीदृशिसम्बन्धो विशेषणविशेष्यवत् ।—Kār. 1. 370.

¹ यत्तु च निबलं संज्ञाशब्दानामनुपपन्नं संव्रतियिषमापत्तात्—ऊतकत्वाद-
निबलं सम्बन्धोपजायते । संज्ञायाः सा हि पुरुषैर्वाक्यान् प्रयुज्यते ।—Vākyaśāstra

² आमानिकवापुनिकः संकीर्ती विविधो मतः ।...कादाचित्कवापुनिकः
शास्त्रकारादिभिः कृतः ।—Vākyaśāstra. कृत्रिमा शास्त्रीया परिभाषिकीत्युच्यते ।
—Poṣyañja.

number and nature of such *Samjñās*. Different systems of grammar have their different *Samjñās*; as, for instance, Pāṇini uses *ac* and *hal*, whereas Kātantra system has *Svara* and *Pyñjana* in their stead. It will be evident from a study of these *Samjñās* that most of them are meaningless outside the short compass wherein they are used; they are neither to be found in lexicon, nor current as significant words in their specialised sense. *Samjñā-Śabda*, as a rule, are not derivable (व्युत्पन्न); and though popular words, such as, *Vṛddhi*, *Gūṇa*, etc., are used as *Samjñā*, their popular significances have practically no connection with what they signify in grammar. Bhartṛhari says that the meaning assigned to such *Samjñā-Śabda* by the grammarians is to be taken as modern convention, as opposed to the divine convention. It is to be noted here that the two *Samjñā-Śabdas*, namely, *Svara* and *Pyñjana*, as are to be found in Yāska's Nirukta and in the Kātantra system, and which are undoubtedly older than *ac* and *hal* respectively, are really significant (स्वयं राजते इति स्वरः, व्यञ्जनमन्वङ्). It is, therefore, believed that the Kātantra¹ system has preserved the old grammatical technics more faithfully than that of Pāṇini, who is rather credited with

¹ Kātantra system has also retained such old grammatical terms as *Kṛita* (Pāṇini has *vic*), *Vartamānā* (*bhavanā* seems to have been the oldest term for *Vartamānā*), *Bhasiṣyanti*, etc.

having invented a peculiar way of enunciating letters,¹ a system of *Pratyāhāra* unknown to other grammarians, and certain technical terms like *ac* and *hal*, etc.

The word *Samjñā* means ordinarily a name. Just as an object is found to have a good many names in popular speech, so in grammar a form may have different *Samjñās*. It is to be borne in mind that excepting a few instances like *Svara*, *Vyñjana*, *Lopa*, *Dirgha*, etc., as used in grammar, there are *Samjñās* as *nadī*, *tī*, *ghu*, etc., which are absolutely meaningless and purely artificial. There are numerous *Samjñās* in grammar; they are made use of by the grammarians with a view to secure the brevity and conciseness. They may be, however, divided into two classes, according as they are significant and meaningless. The *Samjñās* belonging to the former group are almost the same as used in popular speech, though with a specialised significance, while those that come under the second group are absolutely meaningless except in grammar. There are certain *Samjñās*, such as, *Nadī*,² *Agni*,³ *Śraddhā*⁴ which are used as types to denote respectively words ending in lengthened ई, ऊ, short इ, उ, and lengthened अ. The so-called Śiva-Sūtras,

¹ नपेक्षमावायः । Kātantra—सिद्धौ नपेक्षमावायः ।

² Pāp. 1. 4. 2—दृष्ट्वास्तौ नदी ।

³ द्रुद्रुद्रिः—Kāṭya. नामवाय, 8.

⁴ अ यदा—Ibid, 10.

though unintelligible by themselves and entirely meaningless to others, representing a great departure from the popular order of letters, have great importance to the students of the Aṣṭādhyāyī, as they are suitable for making *Samjñās* like *aṇ*, *iṇ*, etc. Jagadīśa understands by *Samjñā*¹ all names having convention or *Samketa* and classifies it under three classes, namely, *Naimittikī*, *Paribhāṣikī*, and *Aupādhikī*. *Samjñās* are artificial; their origin may be traced to an attempt to find out the shortest symbol to denote a group of individuals. The system of *Samjñā* is thus important for more than one reason; it is the shortest possible name for a class and consequently marked by brevity. The *Samjñās* adopted in different systems of grammar are so variant that one cannot expect to make a successful study of any system of grammar without having a thorough acquaintance with its particular sets of *Samjñās*.

Logic means agreement of facts with truth. Grammar in dealing with the formation of words and formulation of rules has sometimes shown strict conformity to truth. What is true of logic is thus true of grammar too. Science, as is well known, takes for granted certain axioms which are more or less self-evident truths and consequently require no explanation. These axioms or generalised

¹ रुद्धं संकेतवद्गमनं सैनं संज्ञेति श्रीहरीते,—Śabdasaṅkṣiptaprakāśikā. Kār. 17.

statements (deductions) are freely made use of by different systems of philosophy. These are deduced from common experience. Geometry, for instance, begins with a number of such axioms (*e. g.*, the whole is greater than its parts) and shows their applications in the exposition of problems. Logic, as a science, has also its particular axioms (a thing is what it is, *vis.*, the law of identity) which are not only applicable to logic alone but are found to be used in other departments of science for their incontestable validity. Here we find the reason why logic is popularly called the 'science of all sciences.' It has added undoubtedly to the scientific character of grammar, for it has also treated of such axioms. These axioms or generalised statements are known in grammar as *Paribhāṣās*. The fact that is established by the *Paribhāṣā*¹—'A thing does not essentially become a different one even when some of its parts get deformed,' or, more clearly, 'A dog does not become anything but a dog when its tail is cut off'—is one of common experience and equally true in ordinary life also. In grammar we find a good many *Paribhāṣās*. The *Paribhāṣās*, as used in grammar, may be explained as what represent the highest grammatical generalisation. The *Paribhāṣā* may be broadly divided into two classes: (1) *Paribhāṣās* which are not restricted in their

¹ एकदीयविकृतनननयदत् ।

applications to grammar alone but equally hold good in other spheres of experience ; (2) *Paribhāṣās* that are closely associated with grammatical operations and contain technical terms of grammar. The *Paribhāṣās* like एकदेश-विज्ञतमनन्यवत्, etc., which does not contain any grammatical term and are true to all sciences, belong to the former group of the *Paribhāṣās*. The *Paribhāṣās* falling under the second category are those that contain grammatical technics and are couched in grammatical terms, such as, यथोद्देशं संज्ञापरिभाषम्, उपपदविभक्तेः कारकविभक्तिर्वर्तीयसी, etc. These cannot be explained for obvious reasons without reference to grammar. From a study of the *Paribhāṣās* belonging to the former class, it appears that they are decidedly the older and more popular than those coming under the second group. We fail, however, to trace their origin with a degree of certainty. They are sometimes presupposed by the rules of Pāṇini and sometimes deducible from the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Pāṇini had undoubtedly before him many axioms of this description when he composed the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. It is clear from the statement of Nāgojī¹ (who has collected these *Paribhāṣās*—122 in number and explained them) that some of these *Paribhāṣās* were used as regular

¹ प्राचीनद्वैयाकरवतन्त्रे वाचनिकान्यत्र पण्डितोक्तान्त्रे ज्ञापकन्यायसिद्धान्ति माध्यात्मिकयोर्निबद्धानि यानि परिभाषावपाणि तानि व्याख्यास्यन्ते ।

—*Paribhāṣaṇḍaśekhara*.

Sūtras by older grammarians. Pāṇini has, however, incorporated some of these *Paribhāṣās* in his Aṣṭādhyāyī¹ and some of them are suggested by the rules. The *Paribhāṣās* established by either *Jñāpaka* or *Nyāya* have been referred to by Kātyāyana and Patañjali. Generally speaking, there are three kinds of *Paribhāṣās* :—(1) *Vācanikī*—*verbatim* used as Sūtra by older grammarians; (2) *Jñāpaka*—as deduced from the interpretations of Pāṇini's rules; (3) *Nyāya* referring to the axioms either taken from the experience of ordinary life or established by logical inductions. There are, again, two different forms of *Nyāya*—*Nyāya-Siddha* and *Loka-Nyāya-Siddha*. The *Paribhāṣā*—सन्निपातलक्षणे विधिरनिमित्तं तद्विघातस्य—is an instance of *Loka-Nyāya-Siddha*, because the truth it conveys is sufficiently proved by the facts of daily life, viz., 'A thing should not be the cause of destroying that wherefrom it derives its very existence.' These *Paribhāṣās* are of practical help to us for understanding the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī. Nāgojī has not only taken notice of those *Paribhāṣās* alone which might be deduced or taken directly from the *Vārttika* or the *Bhāṣya*, but has undoubtedly treated of the *Paribhāṣās* taken from other grammarians. There is a *Paribhāṣā*² which expressly enjoins

¹ समर्थः पदविधिः ।—Pāṇ. 2. 1. 1.

विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम् ।—*Ibid.* 1. 4. 1.

² आख्यानतो निषेधप्रतिषेधेन हि संक्षिप्तलक्ष्यम् ।

that for the removal of doubt and ambiguity in connection with a rule of grammar, the interpretations of the learned commentators are to be regarded as the only authoritative and decisive ones. Some *Paribhāṣās* with their respective meanings have been referred to in the 'Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus' under 'Logic of Grammar.'

Having shown the nature of *Samjñās* and *Paribhāṣās* according to their grammatical interpretations, we now propose to say a few words regarding the characteristics of the grammatical aphorisms. The style followed by the grammarians in constructing the rules is the same as adopted in the so-called *Sūtra* literature. This style of composition, in which most of the standard works of Hindu philosophy have been written, was adopted by the grammarians, as they unduly favoured brevity and conciseness, sometimes to the extent of unintelligibility. How much the grammarians favoured brevity and conciseness in the composition of *Sūtras* is best illustrated by the *Paribhāṣā* 'अर्धमात्रान्नाद्येन पुत्रोत्सवं मन्यन्ते देयाकरणाः.' The characteristic features of grammatical rules are as follows¹:—

- (1) The *Sūtras* should be so framed as to contain the least number of letters. (2) The *Sūtras* to be constructed in such a way as to avoid ambiguity and doubt. (3) The *Sūtras*

¹ सञ्ज्ञाचरमसन्दिग्धकारणत्वं विवक्ष्यतीत्युक्तम् । - निदिधिमनवर्थं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ।

must be impregnated with meanings. As Paṇini¹ is said to have composed the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī with all religious solemnities and great caution, Patañjali strongly believes that even a letter of his aphorisms, far from speaking of the entire rule, is not likely to be meaningless. (4) The Sūtras must have widest applications. This is exactly the case so far as the general rules (उत्सर्गविधिः) are concerned. (5) The Sūtras should be free from all defects and reasonable at the same time. The Sūtras having these qualifications generally fall under six categories, namely, *Samjñā*, *Paribhāṣā*, *Vidhi* or rules that enjoin something, *Niyama* or rules that enjoin restrictions, *Pratiṣedha* or prohibitive rules, and *Adhikāra*. *Samjñā* Sūtras are those that point out grammatical technics, such as, *Vṛddhi*, *Guṇa*, *Lopa* (disappearance), *ac*, *hal*, etc. As regards the *Paribhāṣā* Sūtras, we have already pointed out that certain *Paribhāṣās* were incorporated by the grammarians in their systems of grammar as regular Sūtras. The *Adhikāra* Sūtras are of four kinds.² Patañjali has illustrated three different kinds of *Adhikāra*.

As to the principle followed in the formation of rules, it must be clearly stated that it was

¹ प्रमादभूत आचार्यो दर्भपवित्रपाणिः शुचावनकाशे प्रादुर्लभ उपविश्य सङ्घता यज्ञेन चतुर्ष्वं प्रथयति अ, तत्राग्र्यं वर्षेनाध्वन्यंकेन भवितुं किं पुनरियता सूत्रेण ।
—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule Pāp., 1. 1. 1.

² श्रीयूयः सिद्धदण्डिब मण्डूकमुक्तिरेव च । गङ्गाशीतः प्रवाहय अधिकारवतुविधिः ।

indeed a great difficulty to make a thorough study of each word. We are told that Indra,¹ even under the tutorship of Brhaspati, and continuing his study for a great length of time, failed to make an exhaustive study of words. How then the grammarians had succeeded in such an arduous task? Patañjali rightly observes that the rules of grammar should be framed on the scientific basis of generalisation and particularisation,² so as to enable one to make a study of words, though so diversified and numerous, with the least amount of effort. He clearly shows that the rules कसेख्यन् Pāṇ. 3. 2. 1 and आतोऽनुपसर्गे कः Pāṇ. 3. 2. 3, were written by Pāṇini having the same object in view.

Now as to what constitutes a grammar.³ Patañjali has elaborately dealt with the question in regard to what is precisely meant by grammar. It is too well known a fact that it is the Sūtras that constitute grammar or, in other words, grammar is entirely identical with the Sūtras. We use the word *Vyākaraṇa* with reference to a number of Sūtras and do not practically understand anything else. But there are certain objections in the way of accepting this view as an accurate one. The difficulty that arises on the

¹ Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 5.

² उत्सर्गोपवादीः कश्चिदुत्सर्गः कर्तव्यः कश्चिदपवादः—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 5.

³ अथ व्याकरणमित्यस्य शब्दस्य कः पदार्थः? इत्यम्। सूत्रे व्याकरणेष्वप्युत्सर्गोपपत्तः—Vārs. 10. शब्दामतिपत्तिः। शब्दे लुप्त्यर्थे। भवे। प्रोक्तादयश्च तद्विज्ञाः। अत्यन्तवर्गे व्याकरणम्.—Vārs. 10-14, Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, pp. 11-12.

assumption of identity between grammar and Sūtras is that the question of relation, as is indicated by the expression (व्याकरणस्य सूत्रम्) 'the rules of grammar' becomes necessarily incomprehensible or incompatible, that is to say, the above expression clearly indicates that grammar is actually different from the Sūtras. Again, no cognition of words would be possible, if grammar were identified with the Sūtras, because the knowledge of words does not practically follow from the Sūtras, but rather from the interpretations and expositions of such rules. Words are then held to be constituents of grammar and this view is considered to be sufficient to meet the aforesaid objection. But this is also not absolutely free from defects, inasmuch as the identity of grammar with words would render the derivation of the term *Vyākaraṇa* (व्याक्रियन्ते व्युत्पाद्यन्ते शब्दा अनेनिति) simply inconsistent. The drift of the arguments is that words are derived by means of Sūtras and not by other words. Moreover, the rules like भवे, प्रोक्तादयश्च, तत्र भवः, तेन प्रोक्तम्, etc., will be inconsistent with their meanings, if words are held to be identical with grammar. In fine, Patañjali sets forth the conclusion that words and Sūtras in their combination form the life of grammar (लब्धलक्षणे व्याकरणम्).

The word *Sandhi* literally means conjunction of two; in grammar it implies the combination of two letters having close proximity. The definition of *Sandhi* as given by Pāṇini (which

is also to be found in the Nirukta) lays stress on the extreme proximity of letters, whether vowels or consonants, as the primary condition of *Sandhi* (*Paraḥ sannikarṣaḥ Saṃhitā*).

It has already been pointed out that the word is the same as sound. A word is, again, of two kinds, namely, sound as produced by the beat of drum, and sound as distinctly audible and expressed by letters. To the former class belong those sounds which are not capable of being represented by letters and have no real expressiveness like popular words that consist of letters. These letters, whether 48 or 49 in number, represent phonologically all possible modulations of voice. There are eight different places, such as, chest, throat, nose, head, tongue, roof of the tongue, teeth and lips wherefrom letters are produced and they are named accordingly. The order in which letters are to be read is said to be fixed (*Siddhavarṇa-samāmnāyoḥ*), but Pāṇini seems to have shewn some amount of ingenuity, as he gives rather a clumsy arrangement of letters only to serve the purpose of forming the *Pratyāhāras*. The method adopted by Pāṇini may be scientifically accurate, but it really marks a departure from the popular order of letters.

The subtle form of *Nāda* having its origin in the *Mūlādhāra* proceeds upwards till it reaches the vocal apparatus and becomes audible; it develops into distinct sound when it clothes itself with letters. This is usually the process whereby letters are produced. Letters are transient and liable to

disappear just after their utterance is over. According to the time required for pronouncing, a sound is said to be short, long and protracted. Letters are broadly divided into two classes : *Svara* and *Vyañjana*. *Svara* is so called because they are distinctly audible by themselves; *Vyañjana* requires the help of vowels for their intelligibility. The use of *ac* and *hal* in the place of more popular terms *Svara* and *Vyañjana* represents one of Pānini's manifold innovation.

There are generally two different ways in which words are uttered—rapid and slow. Patañjali maintains that close proximity is to be taken as the fundamental condition of *Sandhi*. It then follows almost naturally that no such *Samhitā* or the combination of letters takes place when two words are uttered at intervals. It is said in defence, however, that proximity of letters is the same, whether they are uttered rapidly or slowly. It is practically the time, as is required by the speaker to pronounce the words, that makes the utterance either rapid or slow. Three¹ definitions have been suggested to explain *Samhitā*, but no one is found to be strictly accurate and free from defects. The last tentative definition,² which brings in the idea of order as priority and posteriority among letters, uttered

¹ इत्यादिरानः संहिता; आदादिरानः संहिता; दीर्घापर्यन्तकालव्यपेक्षं संहिता—*Mahābhāṣya* under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 109.

² दीर्घापर्यन्तकालव्यपेक्षं संहिता चेत् पूर्वपरमाभावात् संहितासंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति—*न हि वचानां दीर्घापर्यन्तलि*—*Mahābhāṣya*.

without any intervention of time, is also open to objection, because the very idea of priority and posteriority is inconceivable in regard to letters that are never uttered simultaneously. पौर्वापर्यं is to be understood with reference to space, as we apply the terms *Pūrva* and *Apara* to things when they are found to exist simultaneously. But such is not the case with letters. It is practically seen that we cannot pronounce two letters at a time.¹ The vocal organ that operates in pronouncing the letter *ga* is not the same that gives rise to *au*-sound and so on. Again, for the transient character of sound, *ga* is no longer existent when *au* is uttered. It is to be carefully noted here that *Paurvāparya*, as stated here, is not to be taken as referring to time, because letters are liable to destruction after the utterance is over, and there can be no relation as priority and posteriority between the existent and the non-existent letters. Patañjali, then, arrives at the conclusion and brings the whole discussion to a close when he holds that *Paurvāparya*, as the essential requisite of *Samhitā*, pertains to intelligence, that is to say, the determination of priority and posteriority of letters is the operation of intelligence.² An intelligent man adopts the following procedure

¹ एकैकवर्णवर्तितादाय सञ्चरितप्रध्वंसित्वाच्च वर्णानाम्—Var. 10.

एकैकवर्णवर्तिनी वाक् । न द्वौ युज्यतुसावयति । गौरिति गकारे यावत्तौ वाक् वर्तते
नीकारे न विसृजेतौवे.....Mahābhāṣya.

² बुद्धिविषयमेव शब्दानां पौर्वापर्यम्—Mahābhāṣya.

in ascertaining the order of *Paurvāparya* :— This word is to be used in this sense and this word consists of these letters. Then, he proceeds to determine them one after another.

There is another definition of *Samhitā* given in the *Prātiśākhya*¹ which has also given rise to a considerable discussion. The main difficulty lies in the way of disjoining the compound *Padaprakṛti* which admits of double interpretation. If we take the expression *Padaprakṛti* as meaning पदानां या प्रकृतिः सेयं पदप्रकृतिः, it would naturally follow that *Samhitā* or combination is the original form of speech wherefrom *Padas* are separated. It is quite evident from this exposition that *Samhitā* represents the original form, whereas *Padas* are only modifications. According to another interpretation, which treats of the expression *Padaprakṛti* as an instance of *Bahuvrīhi* and lays down that *Padas* in their combination constitute *Samhitā* : *Padas* are to be taken as *Prakṛti* and *Samhitā* as merely modified forms. The question raised here is one of great importance, as it forms the fundamental problem of the linguistic science. The point at issue is to decide which of these (*Samhitā* and *Padas*) represents the original form. Durga² has advanced arguments to show that *Samhitā* is *Prakṛti* and *Padas* represent only *Vikṛti*. He

¹ पदप्रकृतिः संज्ञिता ।

² संज्ञितायाः प्रकृतित्वे ज्ञापकः ।—*Nirukta*, p. 135.

has based his arguments on the fact that the Vedic *Mantras* have come down to us in their *Samhitā* form (but not as isolated *Padas*); *Samhitā* or combined forms are first studied by the Vedic scholars and the *Mantras* are specially recited in their *Samhitā* form at the time of sacrificial performances. It is an established fact that we do not meet with an instance of विसृञ्चि in the Vedic *Mantras*.

A careful study of the rules concerning *Samhitā* will make it clear that the principles underlying such *Samhitā* are based on regular phonological basis. The rule इको यवचि, which enjoins that इ, उ, ऋ, followed by *ao*, are changed to *y*, *v*, *r*, respectively, records rather a phonetic tendency according to which इ+च, when uttered at a stress, are apt to take the form of य and so on. The transformation of इ into य, as in दध्यत्, is due to the fact that both इ and य are letters that originate in the same place and have necessarily natural affinity for combination. Jaimini¹ has clearly stated that in दध्यत् letters do not undergo any modification but a new letter comes into existence. The rule स्थानेऽन्तरतमः enjoins that in case of *Ādeśa*, a letter having close affinity, either through the internal efforts or owing to the similarity of place of utterance, is to take the place and function of *Sthānī*.

¹ वचान्तरमधिकारः Mīm. Sūtra, I. 1. 13.

These instances will suffice to show that the rules of *Samhitā* are outcome of natural tendencies, as are illustrated by phonetic laws. In popular usages, *Samhitā* is sometimes obligatory and sometimes optional. It is thus stated in a *Kārikā* : *Samhitā*¹ is obligatory in *Padas* ; between roots and prefixes and in compounds ; in all other cases *Samhitā* is optional.

There are, broadly speaking, five kinds of *Sandhi*, according to the nature of letters that enter into combination. Among these five, the so-called *Prakṛti-Sandhi* (an instance of *Sandhi* which is not attended with necessary changes and modifications) forms a peculiar group. We call them peculiar in this sense that the instances of *Prakṛti-Sandhi* are so rigid that they retain their original forms intact and do not come under the general principles of *Samhitā*. In an instance like *late ime* where no change is brought about by rules of *Sandhi*, it is really difficult to distinguish it from ordinary forms. In cases like this, *Sandhi* is to be determined only by accents. Similarly, compounds and non-compounds were distinguished in the ancient Vedic age simply through the instrumentality of accents.

When a conjunction between two letters takes place in *Samhitā*, we usually find that two individuals do not retain their separate

¹ संहितैकपदे द्वित्वा द्वित्वा धातुसमर्थयोः । द्वित्वा समासे नाको वृत्ता विवचनपेक्षते ।

forms but merge into one and consequently give rise to a new letter which, though practically different from them, has close affinity with those letters. In the course of combination, letters are sometimes dropped as in *Prṣodarah* and sometimes, they undergo modifications as in *Dadhyatra*. The changes and modifications brought about by *Sandhi* are natural and not artificial. In etymological¹ explanations of words we find instances of productions of letters (*Gavendraḥ*), inversion of letters (*Siṃhaḥ*), modifications of letters (*Ṣoḍaśaḥ*) and disappearance of letters (*Prṣodarah*).



¹ वर्षाशब्दो गवेन्द्रादौ सिद्धे वर्षाविपर्ययः । घोडशब्दादौ विष्कारः स्वात् वर्षनाशः प्रयोदशः ।

CHAPTER IV

THEORY OF SPHOṬA

Theory of *Sphoṭa*—identity of *Sphoṭa* with *Pratyasa*—its origin and nature—arguments against the assumption of *Sphoṭa*.

The Hindu grammarians are credited with having for the first time enunciated the doctrine of *Sphoṭa* which forms one of the outstanding features of Sanskrit grammar. It is at once the essence and result of Indian speculations on grammar; it embodies the careful ingenuity and keen-sightedness on the part of the Indian grammarians, and ultimately proves by drawing identity between *Sphoṭa* and Brahman that *Śabda-tattva* and *Brahma-tattva*¹ are only different in name but essentially convertible with each other. The grammarians have, however, carried this theory to such an extent and traced the final germ of speech to so subtle an element as to place the dissertations on words more or less upon a metaphysical level.

The history of *Sphoṭa*, judging from the height of contemplation it discloses, is calculated to reveal a mystical vision, and shows a

¹ अक्षरेवैश्वर्यं ब्राह्मणस्यै पूर्वाकारेण नमः ॥—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, *Kār.* 72. and निष्कर्षे तु ब्राह्मेण सङ्गोऽहः ।

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं वदन्तरम् ।—*Vākyapadiya*, *Kār.* 1.

peculiar pious tendency which seeks to explain all phenomena as emanating from something divine. The original conception of *Sphoṭa* goes back to the most creative period of Indian thought, we mean the Vedic, when *Vāk* was considered to be a manifestation of all-pervading *Brahman*; *Pranava* regarded as the ultimate germ of all speech-sounds and *Śabda* viewed as an imperishable and potential factor in the creation of the world. Philosophy, so to speak, begins with concrete objects of thought and finally arrives at more and more nice abstraction. The grammarians, in the same way, started with the physical analysis of words and conceived sound as what clothes itself with letters. They proceeded still further and on minute examination of internal phenomena, grasped the remotest form of speech, viz., *Sphoṭa*, that is manifested by sound, eternally existent, indivisible and really expressive of sense.¹

It is, however, difficult to ascertain as to when and with whom this theory had first originated. History does not definitely mention the name of any particular philosopher, so far as the authorship of this theory is concerned. All that we know about its history is that this theory received a strenuous support at the hands of grammarians, while almost every system of Hindu philosophy had attacked it mercilessly and rejected it as being absurd and inconsistent.

¹ अनिव्यक्ताः, निष्कः, अक्षरः, वाचकाः ।

We do not, however, definitely know of any grammarian who may be said to have formulated this doctrine, nor do we find any specific mention of *Sphoṭa* in the aphorisms of grammar. We only repeat that our knowledge is not permitted to proceed beyond the limit that the theory of *Sphoṭa* found much favour with the grammarians, who seem to have carried it to such an extent as to finally inter-weave *Sphoṭa* with *Brahma-tattva*, thus raising the artificial character of grammatical speculations to the dignity of theological discourses. But this is not the sufficient reason why we should take this theory as one of grammatical origin. On the other hand, it might be maintained with a greater degree of certainty, on the evidence afforded by some other popular theories of unknown origin, that the Indian grammarians had already found the nucleus of the theory in existence in some form or other. They interpreted it consistently with their views and finally made it their own by giving it a distinctly grammatical stamp. What the grammarians have practically done with regard to this theory is that they popularised it with all earnestness and ultimately incorporated it into their systems as a tenet of fundamental importance. Similar is the original history of some of the popular doctrines of Hindu philosophy. The main doctrines of the Sāṃkhya school, for instance, seem to have been transmitted through generations as a common heritage of man and current as a

distinct line of thought long before they were systematised by Kapila or Pāñcaśikha. In this process of tracing the origin of old doctrines, we may be allowed to seek for some clue as to why the Vedas are emphatically declared by orthodox teachers as works not of human origin ; and why it is authoritatively laid down that the Seers, who are mentioned by names in the Vedic hymns, are far from being the real authors.¹

To give a clear idea of *Sphoṭa*, we find it necessary to start with *Praṇava*. It has repeatedly been stated in the Vedic literature that the mystic syllable, i.e., *Praṇava*, represents the primordial speech-sound wherefrom all forms of *Vāk* are supposed to have been evolved. This sacred combination of three particles (अ, उ, म्), which is still uttered with the utmost reverence and regarded as a positive emblem of the supreme God, is said to have flashed forth into the heart of *Brahman*, while he was absorbed in deep meditation. *Praṇava* unfolded itself in the form of *Gāyatrī*, which again gave birth to the three Vedas—this is how the cosmic world came into existence from so subtle an entity as *Śabda*. When we present this orthodox view in all its bareness and accordingly maintain that the entire world of *Vāk* has *Praṇava* as its ultimate source, we should

¹ स्वधनुरेण भगवान् वेदी नीतः सनातनः । शिवाया ऋषि परेणा अर्चनीयः
न कारकाः—Mahābhāgavata Purāṇam.

crave the indulgence of modern scholars who are likely to discard it as an unscientific and irrational theory. The *Suta-Samhitā*¹ divides *Pranava* into two kinds, namely, *Para* and *Apara*. The former is the same as *Brahman*, while the latter is identified with *Śabda*. It must be admitted at the very outset that while dealing with so mysterious a thing as *Pranava* and showing the orthodox belief in the potency of *Śabda*, we are really drifted to a land that lies far beyond the range of common experience. *Pranava* has two more aspects—external and internal—corresponding to those of *Sphoṭa*. *Vācaspati*² in his gloss under the aphorism *विशोका वा ज्योतिषती* has attempted to show the internal aspect of *Sphoṭa*. There is a lotus, it is said, having eight petals, that resides in the region between heart and abdomen; the three constituents of *Pranava* represent in the lotus, the solar, the lunar and the fiery regions respectively. Above it, as the *Brahmavādins* are only allowed to perceive, rests the *Brahma-Nāda* assuming the form of *अर्धमात्रा*. This *अर्धमात्रा* (capable of being perceived only by the *Yogins*) which represents the *Turiya* or the fourth part of *Pranava* that resides in

¹ परः परतरं ब्रह्म ज्ञानानन्दादिशब्दयन् । प्रकर्षेण नहं यस्मात् परं ब्रह्म ज्ञानानतः ॥ अपरः प्रपञ्चः साक्षाच्छब्दरूपः सुनिर्मलः । प्रकर्षेण नयत्यस्य ईदृश्यात् प्रपञ्चः स्मृतः ॥

² उदरोरुचोर्मध्येऽधोमुखमट्टत्वं पद्मं तद्वेचकदावायामिनीर्धसुखं कला तन्नालम्बने चित्तं धारयेदित्यादि ।—*Yoga Sūtra*—*Vācaspati on the Bhāṣya*, 1. 36.

the heart of all beings, is called *Nāda-Sphoṭa*. It is emphatically laid down that the consummation of *Yoga* lies in the positive realisation of this absolute entity. Reference is made to this *Nāda* in the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*,¹ where it is identified with *Śakti* or the supreme potency that exists from eternity and is not capable of being uttered by vocal organs. The history of the Hindu 'Trinity of gods' seems to have a close connection with the theory of *Pranava*, for the three elements (अ, उ, म्) constituting the *Pranava* are popularly believed to represent the three principal Hindu deities, viz., *Brahman*, *Viṣṇu* and *Śiva*. Now it is almost safe to assert without any contention that *Sphoṭa*, taken as an imperishable unit of *Vāk* (usually manifested by sound), which finally accounts for the evolution of speech, is analogous to *Pranava*; or, to take a still more orthodox view, it is the same as *Pranava*. Moreover, the expressions like ओंकार एव सर्वा वाक् and स हि सर्वशब्दार्थप्रकृतिः which are, strictly speaking, applicable to *Sphoṭa* also, serve to confirm our belief regarding the identity between *Pranava* and *Sphoṭa*. The analogy is so striking that Nāgeśa does not hesitate to compare *Sphoṭa* with the internal phase of *Pranava*.²

¹ अर्धेनात्रा खिलता नित्या वानुवायार्थं विज्ञेयतः । 1.

² स चाहं स्फोटः आकारप्रपञ्चस्य एव ।—*Laghu-matijñānā*, p. 389.

In the Upaniṣads, however, we miss the term *Sphoṭa* in its grammatical significance, but we frequently meet with the words *Pranava* and *Akṣara* as expressive of *Brahman*. Consequently, the specific term *Sphoṭa*, as understood by the grammarians, seems to have acquired a special meaning at a later period, when the grammatical speculations began to obtain more and more philosophical treatment and ultimately encroached upon the domain of pure metaphysics. The Seers of the Upaniṣads have already declared in unmistakable terms that *Brahman* is reducible to *Pranava*, or, *Pranava* is a living symbol of the Supreme Being. Accordingly, they have advocated the worship of *Pranava*¹ as a form of spiritual practice that leads to a state of perpetual bliss. So much sanctity and reverence were accorded to *Pranava* and its potency and spiritual character eulogised in such a manner that *Pranava* came to be regarded as *Brahman* itself. What a unique place *Pranava* occupied in the spiritual thought of India is evident from the numerous Vedic passages and from the traditions that have gathered round it from the Vedic times. In the Yoga system of Patañjali, *Pranava* is not only held as what positively denotes the Supreme Being,² but repeated utterance of *Pranava* is also suggested as an instrument for attaining the concentration of

¹ ओमित्येतदक्षरमुद्गीथमुपासीत ।—Chānd. 1.

² तस्य वाचकः प्रणवः ।—Yoga-Sūtra, 1.27.

mind. We may thus adduce abundant evidence in defence of the sacred character of *Pranava*. All scriptural passages, specially the Vedic hymns, begin, as a rule, with this sacred syllable. The natural outcome of such speculations exalting *Pranava* to divinity accounts, if we are allowed to hold, for the evolution of the theory of *Śabda-Brahman*, so conspicuously dealt with by the reputed author of the *Vākyapadīya*. We have dilated at great length upon the unique spiritual aspect of *Pranava*, with a view to prepare the ground for the belief that *Sphoṭa*, like *Pranava*, is ultimately convertible with *Brahman*.¹

The four forms of *Vāk*, denominated as *Parā*, *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*, may be viewed as indicating the different stages through which *Sphoṭa* (*Nāda-Vindu*) receives manifestation. Both *Parā* and *Paśyantī* are too subtle and delicate to be comprehended by sense-organs, the former residing in the *Mulādhāra*² in the shape of motionless *Vindu*, and the latter coming up to the nasal region pushed by the internal wind. Of the four forms, it is *Madhyamā* that indicates *Sphoṭa*. All these are, however, more or less mysterious. The popular form, *viz.*, *Vaikharī* is what is uttered by the vocal organs and is capable of being heard by others.

¹ अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दवत् सर्वव्यापकम्—*Vākyapadīya*, Kār. I. ब्रह्मे ईदं शब्दनिर्माणं शब्दशक्तिनिवन्धनम् ।

निष्कर्षणं ब्रह्मैव खरीटः ।—*Vaiyākaraṇa-bhāṣya* under Kār. 72.

² परा वाङ्मूलवत्तस्या पञ्चमी नामिसंस्थिता । उदिच्छा मध्यमा त्रैया वैखरी सप्तदश्या ।

It is further¹ held that *Nāda* is simultaneously produced by *Madhyamā* and *Vaikhari*, but there is considerable difference between the two. We may have some cognition of *Nāda* as produced by *Madhyamā*, either at the time of counting (*Japa*)² or when ears are shut up. What is of vital importance is that this form of *Śabda*, as is manifested by *madhyamā-nāda* is what we precisely call *Sphoṭa*; it symbolises *Brahman* and has eternal existence. *Sphoṭa* is further said to be essentially one and without divisions. These are, in short, the salient characteristics of *Sphoṭa*. According to this theory, however, it is one and the same indivisible *Sphoṭa* that is represented by *Varna*, *Pada* and *Vākya*, just as one and the same face³ appears to be long and round when seen through stone, sword and looking-glass, or, as a piece of stone, taking reflection from red or blue flowers, seems to be either red or blue. The difference between *ka* and *ga*⁴ is not practically due to the diversity of *Sphoṭa*, but points to the peculiarities of sounds that serve to manifest *Sphoṭa*. It is to prove both the unity and indivisibility of *Sphoṭa* that it is often compared to the sky and consciousness which, though one and admits of no fractions, are said to have such attributive difference

¹ दुरपदीय मध्यमवैखरीभ्यां नाद उत्पद्यते—Mañjūśā.

² मध्यमानादश्च कर्कषिधानि जपादी च सूक्ष्मतरनावुच्छ्रितः—Mañjūśā.

³ यथा च सुखे सखिह्वयाश्रयदर्पकव्यञ्जकीपापिवशात् दैर्घ्यवर्तलत्वादिभानं तद्वत् ।

⁴ व्यञ्जकव्यञ्जितं कल-गलादिकं स्मृते भवति ।

as, घटाकाश, मटाकाश and *Jiva, Īśvara*, respectively. Those who take पद and वाक्य to be similarly indivisible units, express their views in the following way:¹ Just as letters are devoid of parts, so no letters are comprehended in *Padas* as their constituent elements. Strictly speaking, it is not admissible to take words separately by splitting up a sentence. To those who advocate the divisibility² of both *Pada* and *Vākya*, it is the last letter that indicates *Sphoṭa*, each preceding letter being only necessary for a cognition of the intended sense.

In view of the difference between *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*, we may divide sound into two kinds,³ namely, natural or everlasting (inexhaustible) and unnatural or momentary. It is the natural sound only, which is generated by *Madhyamā*, that suggests *Sphoṭa*. The unnatural (*aprākṛta-dhvani*) sound is so called because it rises from *Prākṛta-dhvani* and undergoes an amount of modifications in the shape of long and short sound. *Sphoṭa* being essentially one and without any modification is not at all effected by the quick utterance of sound, which practically refers to *Vikṛta-dhvani*. Considering

¹ पदे न वशां विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्वप्यत्र इव । वाक्यात् पदानामव्ययं प्रतिकीर्तयते न कश्चन ।—*Vākyapadīya*, I, 77.

² पदानास्त्वयोर्यस्तु सख्यवद्वयपक्षेऽतिमवर्णव्यञ्जकः स्फोट एव । पूर्वपूर्ववर्णस्तु तत्पूर्ववर्णव्यञ्जकः ।—*Mañjūśā*.

³ ध्वनिस्तु द्विविधः । प्राकृतो वैजृम्भकः । स्फोटस्तु रङ्गवत् स्फुटः प्राकृतो ध्वनिरिष्यते । उचितमिदं निमित्तमव्यञ्जकः प्रतिपद्यते ।—*Vākyapadīya*, I, 77.

Sphoṭa to be permanent, as an internal phenomenon, the grammarians have shown but scanty regard to the logical view advocating the momentary character of *Śabda*. The existence of a permanent form of *Śabda*, as is represented by *Sphoṭa* as such, proves a dubious point, so much so that it merited no support but adverse criticisms from all leading systems of Hindu philosophy. While they speak of production and destruction of *Śabda*, the Naiyāyikas seem to have *Kārya-Śabda* (as opposed to *Sphoṭa*) in their view. They refused to take a more psychological view of *Śabda* apart from what appear to be a matter-of-fact one. Consequently, they lost sight of those internal operations that are associated with the evolution of sound that goes to prove the existence of a permanent source of sound (*Sphoṭa*). Another point which is none the less important in this connection is that *Sphoṭa* alone,¹ as is evident from its derivative meaning, is really associated with the expressiveness of sense.² It is for the sake of convenience and popular practice that we assign meanings to *Śabdās*, but a closer examination of both the internal and external facts will show that *Sphoṭa* is finally the significant element of speech.

As to the reason why *Sphoṭa* is said to be one that does not admit of any division into

¹ स्फुटवर्णोच्चारिति स्फोटः ।

² वाचकता स्फोटिकनिष्ठा ।

parts, we should frankly state that the ultimate nature of *Sphoṭa*, so far as it is brought to our comprehension by sound, letters and combination of words, seems to be undifferentiated. Physical structure of words only differs by virtue of *Pikṛta-dhvani*, but the very life of *Śabda*, or, more clearly, the original *Nāda*, is absolutely one and practically changeless. What we really mean is that, though the word *Gauḥ* differs from the word *Ghaṭaḥ* both in physical and psychological aspects, the ultimate germ giving rise to such sound is really one and the same. *Sphoṭa* being one and permanent, Bhartṛhari rightly observes that such difference, as is caused by sound, is not at all essential. The apparent difference¹ of words is thus due to that of sound whereby *Sphoṭa* is indicated. *Sphoṭa* is practically one; it is only the indicator of *Sphoṭa*, viz. sound, that differs.

It is evident from what we have noticed above that it is difficult to form a definite idea of *Sphoṭa* without a proper investigation into the internal phenomena connected with the evolution of sound. We assume the existence of such a mystic element beyond sound only through the instrumentality of external sound that serves to indicate *Sphoṭa*. But we are never allowed to demonstrate its existence with a greater degree of vividness. There is no

¹ स्तोटे अक्षराध्वनिगतकलादिभाषात् ककारो बुद्ध इत्योपाधिको भेदव्यवहारः ।

—Mañjūśr.

doubt that the internal operations, as referred to above, and connected with the materialisation of thought into sound, are what actually take place in the utterance of sound. It can hardly be denied that in the course of such translation something that lies dormant within (*Ayakta*) gets itself manifested by degrees while passing from the innermost part of the body to the vocal apparatus. The internal wind which plays so important a part in the transformation of consciousness into sound has been alluded to in connection with the psychological aspects of language (*vide* Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus).

In opposition to the Naiyāyika standpoint, according to which *Śabda* is momentary and consequently liable to both production and destruction, Patañjali has strongly supported the permanent character of *Śabda*. It is curious to note that the attributives whereby he usually characterises *Śabda*, or more properly, *Spṛṣṭa*, are exactly those that are often ascribed to Brahman. There is convincing evidence that Patañjali, as a representative grammarian, had early realised the distinction between two kinds of *Śabda*,¹ namely, created and permanent. It is explicitly with reference to *Spṛṣṭa* or permanent word-form that he used such expressions² as, *Nitya*,

¹ इह ही शब्दात्मनी नित्यः काठेय ।—Mahābhāṣya.

² नित्येषु च शब्देषु कृटस्वरविचारिभिर्ब्रह्मवित्त्यमनपादोपजनविचारिभिः ।

—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 18.

Avikāri and *Kūṭastha*. In connection with the exposition of the class-theory of *Sphoṭa*, as opposed to the individualistic one, he has given us some glimpse into the salient features of *Sphoṭa*. *Śabda* is, maintains Patañjali,¹ what is perceived by auditory organs, comprehended by intellect, manifested by sound and pertains to the sky. This definition, if we are allowed to style it as such, though concise and garbed in highly philosophical language, seems to be impregnated with deep significance, and purports to bring out the exact meaning of *Sphoṭa*. Having regard to the importance of this definition, we think it worth while to take up the expressions of the *Bhāṣya* one by one and explain them in the light of Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa. *Perceptible by the sense of hearing* is used to indicate that the organ of hearing is only a fraction of ether² wherein *Śabda* or sound is directly perceived. Both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems have taken *Śabda* to be a positive quality of ether. Sound³ which has its origin in the vibration of ether is capable of being perceived only by the organs composed of the same element. Patañjali seems to have an accurate knowledge of the scientific fact in regard to the production of sound. The expression *comprehended by intellect* offers

¹ योवोपलब्धिर्बुद्धिनियता; प्रयोविद्यामिज्वलित; आकाशदेशः शब्दः ।

—Vol. I, 1. 1. 2, p. 18.

² शब्दोऽन्तरावयुः योव्याप्तः ।—*Praśastapāda Bhāṣya*.

³ आकाशप्रदेशविशेषस्य योवत्वात्... आकाशदेशस्य शब्दस्यावयवमवयवेषु ।

—Kaiyaṭa, 1, p. 2.

an explanation as to how words, though consisting of letters that are liable to disappear as soon as they are uttered, are found competent to express the intended sense. The answer is the same as suggested by the Naiyāyikas.¹ It is practically from the last letter that the cognition of the entire word is derived together with the impressions produced by the preceding letters. It is evidently an intellectual operation which enables us to retain the recollection of the entire structure of a word, even when we hear the last letter alone. *Manifested by sound* implies that *Sphoṭa*, though permanent, is not always comprehensible, but comes under our cognition only when the vocal organs are engaged in operation for its manifestation. Nāgeśa states expressly that the oneness of ether implies similar oneness in regard to *Śabda* or *Sphoṭa*. We speak of priority and posteriority in respect of *Śabda* just in the same way, as we are apt to say *ghaṭākāśa* and *maṭhākāśa* having regard only to the difference of attributes. Of both ether and *Sphoṭa*, the so-called difference is only due to their different attributes (*upādhi*). The singular number in *Śabda* is intended, as Nāgeśa points out, to indicate both the unity and indivisibility (एकत्वमखण्डत्वञ्च) of *Sphoṭa*.

It is quite evident from what he has said of *Sphoṭa* that Patañjali recognised three prominent

¹ पूर्वपूर्वैश्चक्षुषादितानिभ्यश्चिन्तितसंस्कारपरम्परापरिपाकान्त्वद्विनिर्वाह-

इत्यर्थः ।—Kaiyaṣa.

characteristics of *Sphoṭa*, viz., unity (*Ekatva*), indivisibility (*Akhaṇḍatva*) and eternality (*Nityatva*). In considering the question of time (as is required for the utterance of a word), he rightly observes that it is sound that seems to be either long or short, but what is manifested by sound, i.e., *Sphoṭa*, is not at all effected by the variations of sound. He takes the instance of a drum and continues to say that sounds that are produced by beat of drum¹ are not of equal velocity, some travelling 20 yds. and some 30 yds., and so on. The essential difference between sound and *Sphoṭa*, which has proved so difficult a problem to others—is clearly brought to light by Patañjali. He declares in unmistakable terms that *Sphoṭa* represents what is *Śabda* proper, whereas sound is only a quality, that is to say, it serves only to manifest *Sphoṭa*. The relation is, therefore, one of the *indicator* and the *indicated*. He further elucidates the point that *Śabda* has two aspects—sound and *Sphoṭa*; it is sound alone that is usually perceived and appears to be either long or short as the case may be, while *Sphoṭa* remains entirely unchanged and is not readily perceptible by sense-organs.

The foregoing observations will serve to show that *Sphoṭa*, though strictly one and indivisible, is also capable of being classified as *internal* and

¹ एवं तर्हि स्त्रीटः शब्दो ध्वनिः शब्दगुणः । कथम् ? भेदाभावात् । मेरीमाह्वय आदिदिग्धपदानि गच्छन्ति । स्त्रीटशब्दानि ध्वनिकृता इति । ध्वनिः स्त्रीटश्च शब्दानां ध्वनितुल्यं न स्यात् ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 181.

external.¹ So far as the innate expressiveness of sense is concerned, it is the internal form of *Sphoṭa* (that lies within and is only manifested by sound) that is really significant. The external form of *Sphoṭa*, as is comprehended by our hearing organs, has no such intimate relation with the meaning. In all our linguistic enquiries we engage ourselves more or less to the investigation of the external aspects of a language, but we take very little notice of the internal phenomenon which forms the very life of a language. We assign the meaning to sound, as we fail to proceed further so as to grasp the ultimate reservoir of sound that is really associated with the significance. It requires only a moment's consideration to realise that sounds or vocalised thoughts are not only produced by the operation of vocal organs, but have their origin in certain ethereal region of the body, which does not vary, though the modulations of voice are always different from one another. The grammarians have thus sought to explain the existence of an internal cause of sound. The external form of *Sphoṭa* is, again, of two kinds, denoting class and individual.

As a great exponent of the *Mahābhāṣya*, *Bhartṛhari* has dwelt at length on the question of *Sphoṭa*. *Bhartṛhari* begins with the enuncia-

¹ क्लीटो द्विविधः । बाह्यः आत्मनोरस्य । तद्व्यतिरेकस्य मूल्यं वाचकत्वम् ।
Kuṇḍikā on the *Mañjūśā*, p. 237. आत्मनोरक्लीटो वाचक इति सिद्धम् ।—
—*Mañjūśā*.

tion of two kinds of *Śabda*,¹ as the *indicator* and the *indicated*, the former representing the ultimate germ of speech-sound, and the latter being what is really expressed by *Śabda*.

In view of the popular belief regarding both plurality and order (*krama*) of *Śabda*, he makes his position clear by pointing out that no question of order, such as priority and posteriority, and that of plurality can logically be raised in relation to *Sphoṭa*, which is essentially one and eternal. It is sound, he maintains, that passes through successive stages in course of articulation and appears to be either long or short in proportion to the exertion required for the utterance of a word. It is practically due to the varying modulations of voice, as caused by the vocal apparatus, that 'ka'-sound seems to be different from 'kha'-sound and so on. But *Sphoṭa*, it must be remembered, remains unaffected. A parallel example² is then sought to explain the relation between sound and *Sphoṭa*. It is a fact of common experience that the sun, though practically a fixed body, seems to be quivering and moving when it is seen through the agitated water of a pond. Just as the agitation of water is reflected on the sun, so (inspite of the oneness and undifferentiating character of

¹ वाच्यवादानशब्देन शब्दो शब्दविदो विदुः । एको निमित्तं शब्दानामपरोक्षं प्रवृज्यते ।—*Vākya-pāṇīya*, p. 20.

² प्रतिबिम्बं यद्यन्तलं स्थितं तोयनिघावशात् । तत् प्रवृत्तिनिघावैति स धर्मः स्वीकृत्यतः ।—*Vākya-pāṇīya*, I, 49.

Sphoṭa) order and difference pertaining to sound are falsely attributed to *Sphoṭa*. The dual¹ aspects of *Śabda*, as referred to above, imply that *Śabda* has the potency of expressing itself as well as its meaning that is associated with it by inseparable connection. This fact is further corroborated by the epistemological evidence. His main thesis may be briefly stated in the following words : *Śabda*, like light, is supposed to possess a double function, as *grāhaka* and *grāhya*. A light is luminous by itself and serves to illuminate others. Similarly, a *Śabda* is first comprehended and then becomes expressive of meaning.

Then, he proceeds to show how *Śabda* is evolved. Reference² is first made to the view (as that of the Naiyāyikas) that does not take *Pada* to be anything but a combination of letters, and similarly does not recognise a sentence as distinct from *Padas* and letters. The grammarians, however, entertain quite an opposite view, because they maintain *Vākya-Sphoṭa* to be an indivisible unit that knows neither division nor order. It is nothing but an artificial device of grammar to analyse a sentence into parts (*Padas*) and those parts again into stems and suffixes.

¹ वाक्यत्वं वाक्यकत्वं च द्वौ शङ्को लेखनी यथा । तथैव सर्वशब्दानामेते पृथगवस्थिते ।—*Vākya-padīya*, I, 65.

² तद्वत् अतिरिक्तेन पदमन्यत्र विद्यते । वाक्यं सर्वपदार्थां च व्यतिरिक्तं न विद्यते ।—*Vākya-padīya*, I, 72.

There are, as the grammarian maintains, two different aspects of words, namely, *Kārya* or popular form and *Nitya* or the permanent form of speech. The former is generally produced by the exercise of vocal apparatus and serves to give a reflection of internal consciousness, the latter is what represents the ultimate germ of speech. *Sphoṭa* is identified with this latter aspect of speech.

The three views regarding the cognition of sound and *Sphoṭa* may be thus briefly summarised¹ :—(i) Sound when produced is heard by the auditory organs and becomes the positive instrument whereby *Sphoṭa* is comprehended. (ii) Having assumed the material form through the medium of sound, *Sphoṭa* is capable of being heard. (iii) Sound acts upon the organs concerned and serves to manifest *Sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari lends his support to the last one. Sound is the outer garment of *Sphoṭa*. Though incomprehensible and inconceivable by itself, *Sphoṭa* reveals its existence through the medium of sound. Sound and *Sphoṭa* are intimately related to each other. As the scientists have found out atoms or electrons as the final factor of creation, so the grammarians started with sound and ultimately reached the subtle element of speech to which the term *Sphoṭa*

¹ यथा अवाप्तुमुनदवानुपलभ्यते स्मटिकादीनां वदन्तं तथा ध्वनिदवानुपलभ्य एव
स्मोटस्तद्विभागेनोपलभ्यते इति किवाचिन्नात्म, etc.—Fuyarāja under the
Vākyapadīya, Kār. 1, 82.

was significantly assigned. As to how sound and *Sphoṭa*, related to each other as the indicative and the indicated, are to be comprehended, Bhartṛhari refers to four different views on the subject. Some say that *Sphoṭa* is recognised as identical with sound, just like a piece of marble looking red in contact with a *Javā-flower*; some holding sound (though not cognisable by itself) to be indicative of *Sphoṭa*; some maintain that the exact nature of *Sphoṭa* being too subtle to be determined, it is sound only that comes under comprehension; some, again, freely admit that *Sphoṭa* is really manifested but it is indistinct and unintelligible on account of the distance wherefrom it is evolved. No doubt, Bhartṛhari has here recorded the views of his predecessors and contemporary grammarians in order to do full justice to so important a subject. But we can hardly afford to pass over these views without taking notice of the unique advancement of grammatical speculations, as is clearly borne out by these references.

Referring to the intellectual process involved in the comprehension of *Śabda*, Bhartṛhari¹ says that the cognition of *Śabda* practically follows from the last sound together with the impressions made by the preceding ones.

The immediate consequence of holding *Sphoṭa* to be one and indivisible was a grave

¹ नादैवाहितवर्तमानत्वेन ज्ञानिना सह । आह्वयपरिपाकायां नृदी
ब्रह्मोद्भवधारेति ।—Vākyapadīya, Kār. 1, 85.

one, as it threatened to strike at the fundamental principle of grammar by making all process of analysing sentence and words purely artificial.¹ The science of grammar is primarily based upon the principle of analysis. Now, to justify the procedure of grammarians, it must be said on the contrary that they had no other alternative than to isolate words from a composite sentence, in order to make the sense of words intelligible to others. It is simply due to our inability, Bhartṛhari strongly argues, that we cannot comprehend a sentence without taking it to be a combination of words and words as consisting of no parts (*Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*). An examination of facts shows that the grammatical method of analysing sentence and words into their component parts, however artificial from the standpoint of *Sphoṭa*, is calculated to afford the only scientific means, so far as the knowledge of meaning is concerned.²

The doctrine of *Sphoṭa*, as expounded by the grammarians, is not a creation of fancy and the result of idle philosophising; it is rather based on the facts that speak for themselves. A moment's notice is only required to realise the existence of some inexhaustible potency

¹ व्यवहाराय सत्यमेव शास्त्रार्थमस्ति यतः ।—Vākyapādīya, 2. 224.

Panyasīja—एवं च निरवयवेऽपि वर्षपदवाक्येषु सादादिभासो वर्षविभागः पदविभागश्च कालजिको सिध्येति भावः ।—Under Kār. 93.

² शास्त्रीयमन्त्रविधानिर्वाहकोपायः ।

lying inside the body, which is conceived to be at work at every time of utterance. Sound that we hear is not produced by the operation of vocal organs only, but has its origin elsewhere. However subjected to adverse criticisms by the opponents, the doctrine of *Sphoṭa*, with all its mysticisms, will continue to appeal to all speculators on the psychology of language, as embodying the most accurate explanation with regard to the origin of *Āk*. That the principle of grammatical analysis is more or less fanciful is evident from the fact that systems of grammar have their different nomenclatures and technical terms, though they have practically kept the same object in view and treated of the same subject.

This analytical method, though at best artificial,¹ is supposed to have much utility, as it practically enables us to have an insight into the actual state of things. Starting with such unreal process as the division of sentences and words, with the obvious object of facilitating the study of words, the grammarians finally succeeded in obtaining a truer perspective while dealing with the problem of *Sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari² rightly observes that proper attention and close enquiry are needed to arrive at the final goal, running through a passage so artificial and bewildering.

¹ शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियामिदं विद्वेषोपवर्जितं । —Vākyapadīya, 2. 235.

² यद्येव दर्शनेः पूर्वैर्दृष्टं सन्तमसिऽपि वा । अन्वयाद्वक्ष्य विषयमन्यथैवाभवत्सति ।
—Vākyapadīya, 1. 90.

As it is imperfect observation that makes a rope look like a serpent, and such delusion ceases to exist the moment it is cautiously examined, so the grammarians first treated of a sentence as having many parts and those parts as containing various letters. But their mode of vision is materially changed on a closer examination of facts and they finally describe *Sphoṭa* as an imperishable and indivisible unit without any reservation. The discourse on *Sphoṭa* reached its culminating point when *Sphoṭa* was regarded to be as great as Brahman itself. The doctrine of grammar has thus ultimately identified itself with the same transcendental reality which has always proved to be the *be-all and end-all* of metaphysical speculations.

The later grammarians, specially Śeṣakṛṣṇa, Nāgeśa, Bhaṭṭoji and Koṇḍabhaṭṭa, have dealt with the problem of *Sphoṭa* more clearly and elaborately but all following the line of Patañjali and Bhartṛhari. The arguments advanced by Śeṣakṛṣṇa in defence of *Sphoṭa* are briefly as follows: An indivisible¹ unit as *Sphoṭa* should be accepted on the ground that the sense usually denoted by a word can neither be derived from an individual letter (as it would render all other letters entirely meaningless), nor from a combination of letters, for letters being liable to destruction as soon as they

¹ न प्रत्येकं न मिलित्वा न चैकस्मिन्निर्गताः । अयेषां वाचका वपाः किंतु स्फोटः स च दिवा ।—*Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa*.

are uttered, it would be practically impossible to have a congregate of such transient letters. It is not even sufficient to say that they are cognisable by the same act of memory, because, if it were so, the undesirable consequence will be the identity between such groups of words as, *Nadī*, *Dīna* and *Rasa*, *Sara* (there being difference of order only), as they consist of the same letters and are comprehended by the same faculty of retention. The grammarians have, therefore, proceeded a step further and recognised the existence of *Sphoṭa*, which is suggested by sound, eternal and not at all divisible into parts.

We can compare this view with what Patañjali has said with regard to order in letters.¹ As two letters, Patañjali argues, cannot be simultaneously pronounced on account of their transient character, it is useless to raise the question of priority and posteriority in connection with letters. This order is to be understood as an intellectual one.² Śeṣa continues to say that the cognition of *Sphoṭa* follows from the last letter together with the impressions made by the preceding letters.³

The later grammarians have to a certain extent shown prolixity in enunciating as many

¹ न चर्थाणां पीवांपर्यन्ति । उच्यते प्रत्यक्षं चित्वा च चर्थाणाम् ।

—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 356.

² बुद्धिविषयमेव शब्दानां पीवांपर्यम् ।

³ पूर्वपूर्वांतुल्यभावनासचिविशलिने । चेतसि स्फुरति स्फोटः ।

—*Sphoṭacandrikā*, p. 13.

as eight different forms of *Sphoṭa*, such as, *Varṇa-Sphoṭa*, *Pada-Sphoṭa*, *Vākya-Sphoṭa*, *Akhaṇḍa-Pada-Sphoṭa*, *Akhaṇḍa-Vākya-Sphoṭa*, *Varṇa-Jāti-Sphoṭa*, *Pada-Jāti-Sphoṭa*, *Vākya-Jāti-Sphoṭa*. The author of the *Śabda-Kaustubha* has clearly dealt with all these classifications. It must be, however, remembered that these varieties, with the single exception of *Vākya-Sphoṭa*, are more or less unreal and not accepted by all grammarians. Reference has already been made to two kinds of *Vākya-Sphoṭa*, viz., class and individual. An attempt is now made to see how far these standpoints (*Jāti-Sphoṭa* and *Vyakti-Sphoṭa*) are in concordance with the *Mahābhāṣya*. *Sabdātva* which pertains to all *Śabdā*s is regarded to be a class, and consequently, शब्दव्यक्ति by its very nature¹ deserves to be treated as eternal. Bhartṛhari has thrown some sidelight on this point. The word *Sphoṭa* in उभयतः स्फोटमात्रं निर्दिश्यते has led some to favour the view that *Sphoṭa* is virtually a class that is suggested by individual words or sounds, and that शब्दव्यक्ति receives the designation of *dhvani* by suggesting *Jāti-Sphoṭa*. Some, again, hold² on the other hand, that *Vyakti-Sphoṭa* (as opposed to *Jāti-Sphoṭa*) is one and imperishable. As to the apparent plurality of *Vyakti*, they maintain that the interval or intervention caused

¹ निर्यादिकप्रतीत्यम् ।

² व्यतिरेकलवादी तस्या निवृत्तं मन्यते ।—*Bhāṣyapradīpikā*.

आदित्यवत् सुः—तद् यथा एक आदित्योऽनेकाधिकरश्मयो द्रुमपद्मे-
प्रकाशप्रकाशते ।—*M. B. I*, p 18.

by time and words, which tends to prove the diversity of one and the same *Vyakti* as *a*, is only due to the variation of sounds whereby *Sphoṭa* is suggested. According to this point of view, it should be borne in mind, the *a*-sound in *da* is not distinct from that in *ṇda*. This view is, however, open to objections and is finally set aside by Patañjali. Those who like Patañjali advocate *Jāti-Sphoṭa*¹ advance their arguments to repudiate both unity and eternality of *Vyakti-Sphoṭa* on the ground that *a* seems to have more than one form, according as it is called *udātta*, *anudātta*, *svarita* and *pluta*. It is not even reasonable to suggest that the same *a* which is first pronounced as *udātta* is next taken to be *Anudātta* and so on, for, if it were so, *Sphoṭa* would cease to be eternal on account of its assuming diverse forms. Thus, *Jāti-sphoṭa* is finally accepted as what gives the correct solution of the problem.²

Having thus discussed the salient characteristics of *Sphoṭa* from all possible standpoints, we now proceed to see how *Sphoṭa-vāda*, which is popularly attributed to the grammarians, was received by different schools of Hindu philosophy. However carefully conceived and ingeniously nourished by the grammarians, the

¹ आतिरेक एका, शब्दव्यक्तवत्तत्तना इति वादीशब्दः ।—Uddyota.

² आक्षेपितवृत्त्यात् सिद्धम् ।—Mebābhūṣya, I. 1.2.

एवं व्यक्तिस्रोतस्य निराक्षेपे आतिस्फोटस्य एवाधीयते ।—Kaiaṭa.

तन्नाक्षिणा एवाधिया एवाकाराः, प्रत्यभिज्ञा आक्षेपितवत्तत्तनेति आतिस्फोटस्योऽत्र व्यक्त्यापितः ।—Kaiaṭa.

theory of *Sphoṭa* seems to have a strange fate, because it failed to have any favourable treatment at the hands of reputed philosophers. What is still more regrettable is that it was rather subjected to stern and vigorous criticisms. Though it embodies, so to speak, the crowning achievement of all grammatical speculations, the theory of *Sphoṭa* unfortunately met with nothing but disapproval on all sides. The only school of Indian thought which appears to have lent support to the assumption of an invisible speech-unit as *Sphoṭa*, is, if we are allowed to hold, the Yoga system of Patañjali. It is practically on the evidence of such aphorisms, as Yoga Sūtras 1. 31 and 3. 17 and the expositions of Vyāsa thereon, and partly in consequence of the supposed identity between the authors of the Mahābhāṣya and the Yoga Sūtras, that the existence of *Sphoṭa* is said to have been recognised and supported by the author of the Yoga Sūtra. Truth to tell, there is no clear mention of *Sphoṭa* as such in the aphorisms of Yoga system; it is only in the comments of Vyāsa and the gloss of Vācaspati that some light has been thrown on the question of *Sphoṭa*.

It is too well known a fact that all objects of thought, with the exception of *Primordial matter* and Soul, are declared to be कार्य¹ or

¹ द्रव्यविपरिवर्तयोरन्यत् सर्वं कार्यमिति ।

products by the teachers of the Sāṃkhya school. Having taken a rather perverted view against the orthodox interpretations, they have rejected the fundamental tenets of the Mīmāṃsakas, viz., eternality of sound,¹ eternality of the Vedas and eternality of the relation between sound and meanings. It requires no other evidence, hold the Sāṃkhyāites, but ordinary perception and inference to prove that *śabda* is produced by the agency of vocal organs and has only momentary existence. The Sāṃkhya Sūtra (5.57) distinctly rejects *Spṛṣṭa* as practically incomprehensible. The reason of their refutation is a very simple one. As no other element apart from letters comes to our notice in the cognition of a word, it is absolutely useless to assume the existence of *Spṛṣṭa* (which passes our vision and comprehension) as distinct from letters.² As letters are, on the contrary, directly perceived, it is more reasonable to take them to be expressive of the sense. If, again, letters are supposed to be meaningless by themselves, we are allowed to doubt the so-called expressiveness of *Spṛṣṭa*. Now, the point at issue is when letters are found to be really expressive of sense, the assumption of *Spṛṣṭa* in addition to letters becomes a superfluity which the followers of the Sāṃkhya school are not prepared to accept.

¹ न शब्दनिवर्तनं कार्यमाप्रतीतिः । १३—Sāṃkhya Sūtra, 5. 68.

² प्रतीत्यप्रतीतिर्या न स्वीकृतम् । शब्दः ।—Sāṃkhya Sūtra, 5. 57.

प्रतीतिर्बर्णानामप्रतीतिः स्वीकृतम् वर्णानि विज्ञेय, तन्मात्रं स्वीकृतम् । शब्दः किंतु वर्ण एव ।
—Sāṃkhya-Vṛtti.

There is another argument which also goes against the indivisible character of *Sphoṭa*. As meanings are liable to changes according to the different arrangement of letters (as in *Nadī* and *Dina*) and as sounds are diversified in their character and have manifold significance, we cannot reasonably take *Sphoṭa* to be one and eternal. The conclusion to which this argument leads is that *Sphoṭa*, being inconceivable, is far from being *Śabda* proper. It is letters alone, no matter if they are perishable, that constitute words in the real sense of the term.

No comment is, however, necessary to show that the Sāṃkhyaśites, who profess to be rationalistic, have taken notice of only the outward aspect of speech and have totally neglected the more important side of the question, *viz.*, psychological or internal aspect. Their main difficulty is that they ascribe significance to so transient a thing as letters, but do not strive further to find out the permanent source of *Śabda*, as is manifested by sound. As to non-perception of *Sphoṭa*, it must be remembered that the *Sphoṭavādins* also were not slow to emphasise the difficulty that lies in the way of having a perceptual knowledge of *Sphoṭa*. They made no secret as to the necessity of a thorough concentration of mind in order to realise the existence of *Sphoṭa*. It requires a good deal of mystical power, or some amount of spiritual vision, as is given rise to by the awakening of *Pratīṣṭhā-netra*, to grasp the *cit*-aspect (*Sphoṭa*) of the Supreme Being.

Moreover, *Sphoṭa* is not capable of being perceived by ordinary sense-organs : it is only suggested or manifested by sound.

Regarding the existence of *Sphoṭa* (as distinct from letters), the views of the Mīmāṃsakas, as ably represented by the author of the Ślokavārttika, are far from being reconcilable with those of the grammarians. Having taken a purely physical view of *Śabda*, the Mīmāṃsakas, like Śaṅkara, turned to the old theory of the revered teacher Upavarṣa¹ and accordingly identified *Śabda* with letters. To assume something as *Sphoṭa* apart from letters, is, as they hold, opposed to all cognition and experience. Letters are actually perceived in a word, as, for instance, the word *gauḥ* does not appear to have any other element excepting the three constituent letters—*ga*, *au* and *visarga*. It is curious to note that while so much stress is laid on the popular experience, the importance of the logical aspect of *Śabda* has altogether been ignored, so as to weaken the ground on which the grammarians sought to build the edifice of *Sphoṭavāda*. When *Śabda*, as a combination of letters, is practically seen to be expressive of the sense and as no other factor is found to be in operation in the comprehension of the meaning, it is nothing but superfluous to assume the existence of *Sphoṭa*, as distinct from letters.

¹ वचा एव तु शब्द इति भगवानुपवर्षः ।—V. S., I. 3. 28.

The grammarians, it must be remembered, have declared *Sphoṭa* to be virtually distinct from letters and further held *Sphoṭa* to be the only significant element of speech.¹ The Mīmāṃsakas² maintain that letters have no parts and that there is no such collection in the cognition of words apart from that of the component letters. In assigning meaning to words, the Mīmāṃsakas had to face one difficult problem. The question presented itself in the following form :— Are all letters individually significant by themselves, or, is it an aggregation of them whereby the meaning is expressed? The untenable character of the first view is clearly evident, since the competency of each individual letter to signify the intended sense is contrary to our experience. As regards the second view, it is not possible to have an aggregation or a simultaneous combination of letters, simply for the reason of minute intervals in the utterance of sounds. The Mīmāṃsakas make their way out of the difficulty by saying that the significance of words depends upon the convention or popular usage. As the comprehension of the meaning directly follows from the letters that constitute a word, and as nothing else is required for the purpose, it is only logical, they hold, to take letters as what express the sense. Kumāṛila shows further how by accepting

¹ वाचकता सङ्घोटेऽभिप्रायः ।

² सङ्घोटवाद्.—Śikṣa-vārttika.

Sphoṭa as an entity, we are liable to make a number of unnecessary assumptions, such as, the existence of *Sphoṭa*, distinctness of *Sphoṭa* from letters and its indivisibility. It is quite clear from what we have said that the arguments advanced by the Mīmāṃsakas against *Sphoṭavāda* are, generally speaking, reducible to two only, namely, the existence of *Sphoṭa* apart from letters (i) involves a negation of perceptible facts (दृष्टहानि) and (ii) is an unwarranted assumption of something that is invisible or imperceptible (अदृष्टकल्पना). The concluding verse¹ of the author reveals, however, the reason why he could not lend support to the theory of *Sphoṭa*. As a matter of fact, the assumption of *Sphoṭa*, which makes all divisions of a sentence and words merely artificial, is found to be entirely inconsistent with the main tenets of the Mīmāṃsā system, for it renders *ūha*, *prayāja*, etc. (which pertain to letters, words and sentences) absolutely conventional. It is, therefore, to retain the genuine character of the Vedic texts that Kumārila made such a vigorous attempt to refute the existence of *Sphoṭa*.

The Vedāntins have fully acknowledged the eternity of *śabda*. They have, on the authority of scriptural texts, even gone to the extent of investing *śabda* with the potency of producing the entire world. While dealing with *śabda*

¹ वर्णोक्तिरित्युक्तः प्रतिपिथ्यमानः पदेषु नन्दं फलमाश्नुयति ।

कार्वाक्ये वाक्यावयवाश्रयाणि सन्तानि कर्तुं कुत एव यतः ॥—Śloka-vārttika. Kār, 137.

(Logos) and its 'world-producing power,' Śaṅkara has conveniently devoted considerable space under the Vedānta-Sūtra 1.3.28 to find out the exact nature of *Śabda*. With his characteristic manner of presenting arguments, he first points out the incongruities that become almost unavoidable, if letters having both production and destruction, were to be regarded as *Śabda* proper. Subsequently he continues to acknowledge *Sphoṭa* as what represents the permanent form of *Śabda*. The way in which Śaṅkara has at first advanced arguments in defence of the existence of *Sphoṭa*, exposing the untenable features of वर्णपक्ष, leads one to believe, though temporarily, that he entertained no antagonistic view against the grammatical interpretation of *Sphoṭavāda*. This impression is, however, of a short duration, because next we find Śaṅkara¹ more favourably examining the view of Upavarṣa almost in the same way as the Mīmāṃsakas. As to the question of production and destruction of letters, he argues that it really implies the re-cognition (प्रत्यभिज्ञान) of the same letter. What is meant is that different letters are not produced and uttered each time, but, as a matter of fact, the same sound, say *ka* (as in *kala* and *kāla*) is heard. It should be, however, noticed here that the Naiyāyikas are not prepared to take the above as an instance of re-cognition, but explain the

¹ Vedānta Sūtra, Śaṅkara Bhāṣya under the aphorism, 1.3.28.

sameness of *ka*-sounds as due to their belonging to the same class (कत्व). To sum up the two views : According to the Mimāṃsakas and the Vedāntins, the same *ka*-sound is heard again and again, whereas the Naiyāyikas do not maintain the non-differentiation of the individuals and consequently take all *ka*-sounds as belonging to the same class. This re-cognition, continues Śaṅkara, does not follow from the knowledge of a class ; it is individual letters that are comprehended each time. Again, we are accustomed to hold the form *gauḥ*, though it consists of three distinct letters, as one word. How is it, then, possible to have such a cognition of oneness when its component parts are far from being one ? Having attributed the diversified character of one and the same letter to the difference of sound, he proceeds to say that sometimes many things form the subject of one intellection,¹ as many trees, for instance, are denoted by one word 'forest' (*Vana*). At last Śaṅkara sums up the arguments on both sides, *vis.*, *Vaṇavāda* and *Sphoṭavāda*, and after a minute examination of facts arrives at the conclusion that the view maintained by the *Vaṇavādins*² is simpler and appeals more to reason and experience, while that of the *Sphoṭavādins* is vitiated by prolixity and involves far-fetched

¹ अनेकस्याप्येकबुद्धिविषयत्वम् ।

² वर्णवादिनी लघीयसी कल्पना, स्फोटवादिनस्तु दृष्टान्तिरदृष्टकल्पना च वर्णवादिने कसेच गृह्यमाणाः स्फोटं अज्ञायन्तीति स स्फोटोर्थे अज्ञातीति गरीयसी कल्पना स्यात्—Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya.

speculations. To hold, he observes, letters, as they are comprehended one after another, to be indicative of *Sphoṭa*, which is said to signify the intended sense, is to take a superfluous view of the whole problem.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view, sound is a quality of ether, comprehended by the organ of hearing, and has only a momentary existence. It is of two kinds—(1) sound as represented by letters like *ka*, etc.; (2) sound as produced by beat of drum and blowing of conches and the like. The former, *viz.*, *वर्ण-लक्षणशब्द*, is alone significant and is generally used as a medium for communicating the ideas. Praśastapāda, the well-known commentator on the Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras, has attempted to show how words are produced. The view of this commentator regarding the origin of sound is almost the same as is to be found in treatises on *Śikṣāśāstra*. A desire is first felt within, the author says, by the conjunction of the mind with the soul, for the utterance of sound (in order to give expression to the thoughts rising in the mind); then efforts are made which bring about a movement in the region of internal air. Thus moved by causes from within, the internal air proceeds upwards till it comes in contact with the vocal apparatus. This conjunction which is followed by vibrations in ether gives rise to sound that is destroyed as soon as it is uttered. A word is, therefore, *Kārya*, as opposed to *Nitya*. The Naiyāyikas as well as the Vaiśeṣikas have thus taken a

non-eternal view of *Śabda* differing from the grammarians who assume a permanent form of *Śabda*, as is represented by *Sphoṭa*.

In his annotation on the *Bhāṣya*, Śrīdhara¹ has made an attempt to show the absence of logic in the grammatical conception of *Sphoṭa*. He first raises the question whether meaning is expressed by a sentence or by *Sphoṭa*. If a word is nothing but a collection of letters, holds the *Sphoṭavādins*, and a sentence not at all distinct from its component parts, then there would be no comprehension of the meaning whatsoever. For neither individual letter is competent to convey the entire meaning (as it would render other letters simply redundant), nor is a combination practically possible, as all letters cannot be pronounced simultaneously. The author meets this objection by holding, for argument's sake, that letters are eternal and not transitory, as in that case such an aggregate would not be incomprehensible. But this argument cannot stand for obvious reasons. It is further argued by the opponent that letters are perceived one after another and then impressions are produced in the mind. This is also untenable. For, if there is order in recollections, as shown above, there would be no co-existence of sounds to form an aggregation. As the comprehension of the meaning is otherwise impossible, the *Sphoṭavādins* have been led to acknowledge

¹ *Nyāya-kandali* (Śrīdhara)—Sk., p. 267.

the existence of *Sphoṭa*, as what expresses the meaning. But such an assumption has no justification to a rationalist philosopher like Śrīdhara. The following arguments, among others, are sought by Śrīdhara to refute the existence of *Sphoṭa*: *Sphoṭa* is never directly perceived, but falsely assumed by the grammarians; the denotation lies within the word and not with an imperceptible entity as *Sphoṭa*.¹ To assume *Sphoṭa*, as distinct from letters, is as fallacious as to conceive a '*flower in the sky*.'²

Before bringing this topic to a close, we have one word more. Considering what has been said about the doctrine of *Sphoṭa* by different schools of Indian philosophy, it is sufficiently clear that the main contention raised against *Sphoṭa* is based upon the fact that the assumption of *Sphoṭa* is contrary to all perception and involves far-fetched speculations. Having taken their stand on the facts established by direct perception, the opponents of *Sphoṭavāda* seem to have carried the popular view in their favour. But it would be a positive mistake to suppose that what the *Sphoṭavādins* tried to establish is nothing but fanciful. It cannot be, however, denied that the *Sphoṭavādins* made no secret as to the imperceptibility of *Sphoṭa* by ordinary means. Moreover, it is repeatedly pointed out

¹ Nyāya-Kaṇḍali (Śrīdhara), *op. cit.*, Sk. series, सुप्रसिद्धे संस्कारनिर्दिष्टपक्षम्—pp. 269-270. तद्विषयं नश्येन्न एव संस्कारधारिणोर्वैप्रत्यक्षसम्भवादयुक्ता स्फोटकल्पना ।

² नववस्तुसुमस्त्रेव स्फोटकल्पना न युक्ता ।

that the realisation of *Sphoṭa* requires a good deal of spiritual meditation as well as perfect concentration of mind. As it is not logically correct to take anything to be unreal, simply because it is not directly perceived, we do not find sufficient reason to deny the very existence of *Sphoṭa* which, though imperceptible, is said to be manifested by sound. *Sphoṭa*, to speak the truth, bears comparison with the soul, as both of them come under our cognition through the instrumentality of inference, the former being indicated by sound and the latter by volition, effort, pleasure, pain, etc. As to the other side of the contention, we should say that the upholders of *Sphoṭa-vāda* minutely examined all external aspects of words before they could grasp so subtle an entity as *Sphoṭa* by unfolding the psychological phenomena underlying the origin of sound.

To summarise what we have said about *Sphoṭa*: *Sphoṭa* is the same as *Śabda-Brahman* or *Brahman* revealed in the form of *Vāk*. *Sphoṭa* represents the internal aspect of *Pranava*; it is eternal and cannot be divided into parts (*akhaṇḍa*) and expressiveness or *Vācakatā* lies with *Sphoṭa* and not with *Padas*, isolated from the *akhaṇḍa-vākya*—the indivisible unit of speech. That there is no essential difference between *Sphoṭa* and *Pranava* has been clearly stated by the ancient seers. *Nāda*¹ or primordial sound is said to have first

¹ सनादितामनो ब्रह्मन् ब्रह्मणः परमेश्वरः ।

हृदाकान्मादभ्युदायो ऋत्विरोधादिभाष्येति ॥—*Laghumanjyāśā*, p. 889.

originated in the spatial region of the heart (*hṛdyākāśa*) of Brahman when he was deeply absorbed in meditation. This subtle form of sound is capable of being perceived by shutting the auditory passage of the ears. Out of *Nāda* arose *Oṃkāra*, the self-radiant, creative factor, which is regarded as the positive symbol of the supreme Being. Viewed from the standpoint of Yoga, *Sphoṭa*, *Pranava* and *Pratibhā* are almost the same. The internal aspect of *Vāk*, as is represented by *Parā* and *Paśyanti*, is inseparable from *cit-śakti*, the fountain source of all cognitions. *Pranava* or *Pratibhā*, as we may call it, has its permanent seat in the heart of all sentient beings ; its fourth part is what is known as *ardhamātrā* or *Sphoṭa*.¹ Further, it is held that *Sphoṭa* which serves to manifest *Vāk* is heard by the supreme Soul (*Paramātmān*), when the sense-organs lie inactive in a state of sleep.² Both *Śabda* and *Artha* are in reality the manifestation of one and the same Soul ;³ it is only to the grammarian that one gets the designation of *Vācaka* and the other as *Vācya*. *Pratibhā* or intelligence is shaped by *Śabda* and *Artha*. The inseparable connection in which *Śabda* stands to *Artha* also points to their origination from the same source, i.e.,

¹ सोऽयं प्राणिनामस्य हृत्स्थः प्रकवचुरीशोऽर्धमात्रादपी नादो वा शब्दो द्रव्यवाते ।—*Laghumañjūsā*, p. 890.

² प्रकीर्ति य इमे शब्दोत् सुप्ते श्रीते च शून्यदक् ।—*Ibid*, p. 891.

एकशब्दानामो भिदौ शब्दार्थावयवव्यसितौ ।—*Vākyasādhya*, 2, 31.

Buddhi. Durga makes this point clear when he continues to say that *Buddhi* (*Pratibhā*) residing in the heart of all in the form of knowledge (*abhidhāna*) and knowable (*abhidheya*) gets materialised into *Śabda* and *Artha* respectively.¹ Again, it is said that what is denoted by all sentences is nothing but *Pratibhā* (*Pratibhā eva vāk्यārthaḥ*). According to Bhartṛhari, it is *mahāsattā* or *mahāsāmānya* (ultimate reality) that is really denoted by all *Śabdas*. It is one and without any division (*vibhāga*) and order (*krama*). To him who has not attained that spiritual vision which enables one to visualise the all-pervading reality, this *mahā-sattā* falsely appears to be manifold, as the objects possessing it are diversified in their external outlook. *Sphoṭa* is identified with this *mahā-sattā*. *Sphoṭa* is the ultimate germ of all word-forms (*Sa hi sarvaśabdārtthaprakṛtiḥ*); words may differ from one another, so far as their external aspect is concerned, but the internal or intellectual one (*Sphoṭa*) remains the same. The Vaiyākaraṇas used to look upon *Śabda* as the audible manifestation of Brahman and advocated constant meditation on *Śabda* or *Śabda-Brahman* as a regular form of Yoga that ultimately leads to the emancipation of the Soul (*param Brahmādhigamyate*).

The standpoint wherefrom the grammarians have viewed the ultimate germ of all

¹ अद्वैत आभिधानाभिधेयकया बुद्धिर्द्वयान्वर्तताकामविवक्षिता.....
Nirukta, p. 47.

speech-sounds is materially different from those of Śaṅkara, Kumāṛila, Śrīdhara and others. To the grammarians, *Sphoṭa* is sacred and divine, so much so that it is finally identified with Brahman. Notwithstanding all adverse criticisms that have been heaped upon the assumption of an intellectual phenomenon as *Sphoṭa*, the theory of *Sphoṭa*, will continue to survive as embodying the most reasonable and scientific interpretation about the origin of sound.



CHAPTER V

SENTENCE AND PARTS OF SPEECH

Sentence—its decomposition—Parts of Speech—Prakṛti and
Pratyaya—Upasarga and Nipāta.

In accordance with the strict interpretation of the doctrine of *Sphoṭa*, as we have observed, the analytical method, though adopted by the grammarians as a cardinal principle, is liable to be regarded as purely artificial. But there is no denying the fact that the grammarians had no other alternative than to take up this process of dissolving sentences and words into their constituent elements, as the only means of getting into the meaning of words. Grammar is not a creation of fancy, nor an artificial combination of rules. Grammar is rather a popular science; the principles on which the structure of grammatical generalisations stand are more or less drawn from popular experiences. That a special rule becomes applicable in preference to a general one,¹ Patañjali observes, is a fact that is neither enjoined by a divine authority nor sanctioned by the authors

¹ जैमिनिश्च आद्यापयति नापि धर्मनूतकाराः पठन्त्यपवादैकस्यैवावाधकामिति ।
किं तर्हि ? लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः । लोकेऽपि स्यापि संभवे वाचनं भवति ।

Mahābhāṣya under the rule *Pāṇ.*, 1. 1. 47.

of the religious texts, but it is a popular example which is perfectly consistent with our daily experience. Both Kātyāyana¹ and Patañjali have repeatedly drawn our attention to the most important point that the study of grammar has for its object the discrimination of correct words. Though corrupt forms are found to be as expressive of sense as their corresponding correct words, it has been stated with all possible emphasis and earnestness that the use of correct words in conformity with the rules of grammar is alone attended with religious felicity.²

Though there are eight different varieties of *Sphoṭa*, as we have already pointed out, it is the *Vākya-Sphoṭa* alone that is held to be real, the rest being more or less artificial.³ From the standpoint of *Sphoṭa*, *Vākya* is not divisible into parts and is the really significant element of speech. Bhartṛhari has the following : Just⁴ as an unreal process like that of analysing words into stems and suffixes is also resorted to for the knowledge of unintelligent people, so a *Vākya*

¹ साधनवासनेऽस्मिन् यस्य विभाषा तस्य साधुत्वम् ।—*Vār.* under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 1. 44.

² लोकेष्वेवैवमुक्ते शब्दश्रवणे ज्ञास्तेषु धर्मेनियमः ।—*Vār.* 1.

ज्ञास्तेषु धर्मेनियमः ।—*Vār.* 9.

समानायाः धर्मवती ज्ञानेन चाप्यज्ञानेन च धर्मेनियमः क्रियते ।—

Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 8.

³ वाक्यस्फोटोऽतिनिश्चयं तिष्ठतीति न तदस्ति ;—*Vaiyākaraṇasāhitya Kār.* 59.

⁴ यथा पदे विभक्त्येव प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादयः । अपीदृशस्तथा वाक्ये पदानामुपवर्णने । *Vākyapadīya*, 2. 10. and अपीदृशत्वेन वाक्येभ्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिनाम् ।—*Ibid* *Kār.* 3.1.

is broken up into *Padas* by the grammarians with a view to get into the meaning of words. This *Apoddhāra* or decomposition is the first and foremost business of grammar.

There is much divergence of views regarding the precise nature of a *Vākya*. Bhartṛhari has stated as many as eight different views of the ancient grammarians in regard to the constitution of a *Vākya*.¹ These views are summarised as follows:—A *Vākya* is (1) a verbal form; (2) a collection of words; (3) a class; (4) one and individual; (5) an order; (6) an intellectual assimilation; (7) the first *Pada*; (8) all *Padas* differing from one another but having mutual expectancy. Of these only 3, 4 and 6, i.e., class, one and indivisible and intellectual assimilation of meanings are accepted as proper definition of a *Vākya* by those who maintain the indivisibility of a *Vākya*. The rest, on the other hand, are supposed to form the accurate definition of *Vākya* from the standpoint of those who uphold the dissolvability of a *Vākya* (*Padavādins*). Again, the definitions of *Vākya*, as either order or collection of *Padas*, are compatible with the view of the *Abhihitānvayavādins* and those as, verbal form, the first *Pada*, all *Padas* in their different aspects having mutual expectancy, are consistent with the view of the

¹ आख्यातशब्दः सहासो जातिः सङ्घातवर्तिनी । एकोऽन्वयवः शब्दः
ब्रह्मो वृत्तानुसङ्गतिः । पदमात्रं प्रत्यक्सर्वपदं साकाङ्क्षमपि । वाक्यं प्रति
सतिभिन्ना बहुधा नायवादिनाम् :—*Vākya*padīya, 2. 1. 2.

Anvitābhīdhānavādins. A *Vākya*¹ is also defined as a combination of words having mutual proximity, expectancy and compatibility. These three characteristics form the mediate causes with regard to the comprehension of the meaning from a sentence. (1) *Expectancy*—An aggregate of words that are not mutually expectant fails to give a connected idea; as, for instance, no consistent meaning is cognisable from such an unconnected group of words, as गौरश्चः पुरुषो वस्ती and घटकर्मत्वमानयनं कृतिः and so on. (2) *Proximity* implies that words that are uttered at intervals cannot have any inter-relation amongst them so as to constitute a significant sentence. (3) *Competency* means that we cannot construct a sentence out of words the meanings of which are mutually incompatible (as in वज्रिना सिञ्चति). Jagadīśa² is not, however, prepared to take these three as direct causes, so far as *Śabda-bodha* or verbal cognition is concerned, because they would tend to place *Śabdabodha* under the category of inference. The Naiyāyikas have, therefore, taken them to be *Sahakārī* (conditions), as opposed to direct causes. Expectancy refers

¹ वाक्यं स्याद धीम्यवाकाङ्क्षासप्तिकुलः पदोच्चयः ।—S. Darpaṇa.

मिथः साकाङ्क्षशब्दस्य व्युत्पत्तिं वाक्यं चतुर्विधम् ।—Jagadīśa—Śabdaśaktiprakāśika, Kār. 12.

² लिङ्गजलेनामपवुद्धेरगुमितिलिङ्गावनायत्या लिङ्गजलेनैव शब्दचिन्तः खण्डयति ।—धीम्यवाक्यसाकाङ्क्षा शब्दनिष्ठानुभाषिका । प्रत्येकं वा मिलित्वा वा नैते लिङ्गमसिद्धिः ॥—Śabdaśakti. Kār. 4.

to the physical side (शब्दनिष्ठा), whereas competency is to be understood as pertaining to the logical side of *Śabda* (अर्थनिष्ठा). We generally find that verbal expectancy is satisfied by words alone.¹ But what is logically correct is that expectancy is also connected with the meaning and not with the form alone, and consequently the expression पदंसाक्षात् means a *Paḍa* that is indicative of the meaning having mutual expectancy with that of another. It is sufficiently clear from what Patañjali has said regarding the interpretation of *vyapekṣā* that expectancy really pertains to meanings that are reciprocally expectant. Similarly, competency, as a *Sahakāri-kāraṇa*, is also to be understood as related to the meaning. As the cognition of *import* (तात्पर्य) alone cannot produce *Śabda-bodha* independently of expectancy, etc., Gaṅgeśa recognises the necessity of their help for obtaining the so-called verbal cognition. Proximity,² strictly speaking, is not a cause, it may be so with an unintelligent man, as it tends to help his quick understanding, but in the case of an intelligent man, proximity is not unavoidably necessary for his cognition. *Import* is also recognised to be the meaning of a sentence. Gaṅgeśa³ states clearly that

¹ शब्दी साक्षात् शब्देनैव पूर्यते ।

² आसक्तिः शब्दबोधे न कारणम् । मन्व्याविलम्बेन बोधे कारणम्, असन्देहं तु आसक्त्यभावेऽपि बोधी भवतीत्यर्थः ।—*Mañjūśā, Kūṣjikā Tīkā*.

³ तात्पर्याधीनं शब्दसाक्षात् ।—*Tattvacintāmaṇi*, p. 316. (*Śabda-khaṇḍa*.)

the cognition of *import* is a necessary condition in the matter of verbal knowledge. "This sentence¹ is uttered by the speaker with the explicit desire of expressing this sense"—is the way in which *Tātparya* is generally obtained. But Nāgeśa differs from the Naiyāyikas and does not take *import* as an unavoidable condition for the comprehension of वाक्यार्थ, inasmuch as the meaning of a sentence is also cognisable even without any reference to the particular *import* of the speaker. The cognition of *import* is essential in the case of those words which have more than one meaning, as हरि, सैन्य, etc. Nāgeśa, however, maintains on the authority of the Mahābhāṣya that it is the knowledge of context (*Prakaraṇa*), propriety and the like that helps us in determining the particular *import* of a word when it happens to have more than one meaning.

The author of the *Vārttika*² defines *Vākya* as a verbal form having conjunction with either an indeclinable, a *Kāraka*, or an adverb, i.e., a verbal form constitutes a sentence in combination with the above adjuncts. Some say,³ as Patañjali observes, that a verbal form with its adjuncts is sufficient to constitute a sentence. It is further suggested that a verbal form alone⁴

¹ इदं वाक्यमेतदर्थमव्यतीतीत्यहं वाक्योच्चारितम् ।—Mañjūśrī, p. 524.

² वाक्यात् साम्यकारकविशेषार्थं वाक्यम् ।—Vār. 9 under the rule Pap.,

2. 1. 1

³ अपर आह—वाक्यात् सविशेषत्वमित्येव ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ एकलिङ्गं वाक्यम् ।—*Ibid.*

is competent to constitute a *Vākya*. These definitions have made it perfectly clear that a verbal form is the main constituent of a sentence. If we take a verbal form as what constitutes a sentence, the meaning of a *Vākya* will necessarily be *Kriyā* or action (*Kriyā vākyaārthah*). A sentence, in the grammatical sense of the term, cannot be framed without a verb. Jagadīśa does not, however, lend his support to this view. He maintains, on the contrary, that a *Vākya* is a combination of mutually expectant words and does not insist on the presence of a verbal form as the first and foremost condition of a *Vākya*.¹ A verbal form does not, therefore, occupy an important place in Jagadīśa's conception of *Vākya*. His contention is based on the fact that when a combination of words like कुतो भवान्, which does not contain any verbal form, is also found to be clearly expressive of the sense, it is not strictly correct to hold that a *Vākya* without a verb is practically incomprehensible. The grammarians hold the opposite view. According to them, a sentence is not at all possible without a verb. What the soul is to the body, so is the verb to the sentence. Jagadīśa has also rejected Amar Siṃha's definition of *Vākya*,²—*Vākya* is a combination of words ending in *sup* and *tiś*³—since it is over-lapping as well as incomplete

¹ क्रियावहितं न वाक्यमस्तीत्यादिकम् प्राच्यं प्रवादी निर्युक्तिमत्तादयश्चेयः ।

—*Śabdasaṃkīrtiśāstra*, Kār. 13

² सुप्तिङन्तचयी नैवमतिव्याप्रादिदीयतः ।—*Śabdasaṃkīrti*, Kār. 13.

or open to the fallacies of *Ativyāpti* and *Avyāpti*. It is to be particularly noticed that with the Naiyāyikas the form *ghaṭam* is nothing short of a *Vākya*, because it is expressive of the sense चटुहृत्तिकर्मत्वम्. The way in which Jagadīśa has defined *Samāsa* makes it clear that the form *nīlam* is as good as a *Vākya* and the form *nīlotpalam* is, consequently, a *Mahā-vākya*. The grammarians cannot do away with the verb, so far as the cognition of a sentence is concerned. As no complete and consistent sense is comprehensible without a verb, the grammarians, as a rule, understand such forms as *asti* and *bhavati* in those cases where verbal forms are not actually present. To the grammarians, the expression कुतो भवान् necessarily implies such a verbal form as *āgacchati* without which neither is the sense complete, nor the proper *Kāraka* (*Apādāna*) determinable.

It is also a difficult problem to decide what is actually denoted by a *Vākya*. There is a great difference of views regarding the meaning of a *Vākya*. Some hold that the meaning of a sentence is the same as what is denoted by its component parts; others maintain that a sentence is expressive of the sense that is virtually different from those that are expressed by its constituents, either individually or collectively. Kumārila has thoroughly discussed these two contradictory views in the *Vākyaādhikaraṇa* of his *Śloka-Vārttika*. The doctrine of the eternality of both *Śabda* and

its relation to meaning, though so seriously supported by the Mīmāṃsakas in the face of much adverse opposition, was not considered to be sufficient to prove the authoritativeness of the Vedas. The validity of the Vedic injunctions, which have come down to us in the form of sentences, was questioned by the opponents on the ground that the meaning of a sentence is distinct from those of its constituents. The Mīmāṃsakas meet this argument by holding that a sentence is practically a combination of consistent words and denotes exactly what is expressed by each word, *i. e.*, the meaning of a sentence represents only a sum-total of the meanings of its constituent parts. There are, so to speak, two views, as held by the two distinct schools of Mīmāṃsā systems, *viz.*, Bhaṭṭa and Guru, in regard to the meaning of a *Vākya*: (1) *Abhihitānvayaavāda*¹—It means, as is implied by the very expression, that *Anvaya* or correlation between the meanings,² as expressed by words through their respective conventions, is what constitutes the significance of a *Vākya*. The special *import* (विलक्षणो बोधः) that is usually brought about by the particular connection of meanings and which does not practically follow from any constituent, is, according to this view,

¹ हास्यपर्यालोपि वाक्यार्थ इत्यभिहितान्वयवादिनां मतम् । वाच्य एव वाक्यार्थ इत्यन्विताभिधानवादिनः ।—*Kāśyapaprakāśa*, p. 27.

² शाब्दबोधे वैक्यपदार्थोपरपदार्थस्य सम्बन्धः संसर्गमर्थाद्व्या भासते ।

—*Vyutpattivāda*.

also supposed to be implied by the *Padas* themselves. What is exactly meant is that the signification of a *Vākya* is the same as is denoted by *Padas* making up a sentence ; and (2) *Anvitābhīdhānavāda*—According to this view, *Padas* are first related to one another in a sentence before they can express the consistent meanings, that is to say, the usual meaning is obtained from the particular connection of *Padas*. The grammarians not only tried to prove the indivisibility of a *Vākya*, but also attributed the same property to the meaning of a *Vākya*. Just as there are no parts in a *Vākya*, says Bhartṛhari,¹ so there is no division, so far as the signification of a *Vākya* is concerned. Some hold that the sense expressed by a *Vākya* is प्रतिभा.² To those who, like the *Sphoṭavādins*, maintain the indivisibility of a *Vākya*, the meaning expressed by a *Vākya* is nothing but *Pratibhā* or intuition. It has already been pointed out that the internal consciousness (*caitanya*) reveals itself through the medium of *Śabda* and gets the designation of *abhidheya*. Bhartṛhari has identified *Pratibhā* with the *mahā-sattā* that pervades the whole world of cognition. Though one and indivisible, Bhartṛhari continues, it appears to be manifold owing to the diversified character

¹ शब्दस्य न विभागोऽङ्गि कृतीऽर्थस्य भविष्यति ।—*Vākyapadīya*. इति वाक्यार्थस्यापि निर्विभागत्वं प्रतिपादयति ।—*Puṇyārāja*.

² विच्छेदवन्तयोऽर्थानां प्रतिभामिव जायते । वाक्यार्थ इति तानाहुः ।

—*Vākya*, 18.

and अङ्गस्यनपक्षे प्रतिभा वाक्यार्थः ।—*Puṇyārāja*.

of the objects that come to our knowledge. What is commonly called *jāti* or class and forms the vital essence of all things is the same as *Sattā*. This *Sattā*¹ is what is denoted by all words ; it is the meaning of all *Prātipadikas* and verbal roots ; it is eternal and is the same as the Supreme Soul. It is what is signified by the suffixes like *tva* and *tal*. Nāgeśa has clearly shown how the meanings assimilated by the intellect are expressed by *Vākyas*.

After dealing with the definitions and signification of *Vākya*, we now proceed to consider the composition of a *Vākya*. A *Vākya* is the combination of *Padas*. *Padas* that enter into the composition of a *Vākya* must be mutually expectant and their meanings compatible with one another. *Padas* or parts of speech are generally four in number. Yāska, as we know, divided speech into four distinct elements—noun, verb, preposition and particle. These are popularly known as *Padas*. There were evidently two classes of logico-grammarians, namely, *Padavādins* and *Vākyavādins*. The *Padavādins*²

सम्बन्धिभिदान् सत्तैव भिद्यमाना गवादिषु ।
जातिरित्याद्ये तस्यां सर्वं शब्दा व्यवस्थिताः ॥
तां प्रतिपदिकार्यं च शब्दार्थं च प्रपञ्चते ।
सा नित्या सा सद्मानासा तामाहुस्त-तत्तादयः ॥

—*Vākyapadiya*, 3. *Kūrīkās*, 33-34.

¹ पदस्वीकारवादयो यथा कथिन्निरूप्यन्ते ।—*Vākyapadiya*, 2. 63.

² पदमिव सर्वं ये मन्यन्ते ते श्लोकमप्युक्तं वाक्यं काव्यनिरुपमाहुः ।—*Puṣyaśāstra*,

and the *Vākyavādins* hold respectively *Padas* and *Vākya*, as expressive of the sense. The *Padavādins*, in opposition to the other, take *Padas* to be the only real elements of speech, and consider an indivisible unit like *Vākya* as practically incomprehensible. This view does not carry much weight to the grammarians. The falsity of *Padas* (they are made by the grammarians), is clearly brought to light by Puṇyarāja on the strength of an extract from the Mahābhāṣya, where the term *Padakāra* (one who makes *Padas*) has been used as a designation of the grammarian.¹

All words, as a rule, consist of two parts—*Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. *Prakṛti* is, again, divided into two classes,² namely, *Nāman* and *Dhātu*. The analysis of words into their bases and suffixes is grammatically known as *saṃskāra*; it forms, so to speak, the cardinal principle of Sanskrit grammar. We propose to show the nature of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* before proceeding to consider the characteristics of *Padas* that go to constitute a sentence.

Whatever may be the intrinsic value of *Sphoṭavāda* from a psychological stand-point, it cannot be denied that the assumption of an indivisible unit as *Sphoṭa* is materially inconsistent with the fundamental principles of grammar.

¹ न लक्षणेन पदकारा अनुवर्तारः पदकारिर्नाम लक्षणेनानुवर्तते । इत्यालक्ष्यं पदं कर्तव्यम् ।—Under the rule आश्रितः शर्ता, Pāṇ., 6. 1. 207.

² निवृत्ता प्रकृतिर्दधा नामधेयानुप्रमेदवः ।—*Śabdasaṃskṛti-prakāśikā*, Kār. 14.

Making all words disassociated from a sentence simply unreal and meaningless and giving a stamp of falsity to the whole grammatical method of analysing words into their stems and suffixes, the doctrine of *Sphoṭa* is calculated to have shaken the very basis of grammatical speculations.¹ There may be reasons for accepting this doctrine inspite of its rigidity and apparent disagreement with the established method of grammar, but we must frankly admit that the principle of analysis, as adopted by the grammarians, is the only scientific means for getting into the meaning of words.

Turning to the question of analysis of words, it must be stated at the outset that all words or, more properly, *Padas*, consist of two parts, viz., *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, though such decomposition is not always possible in the case of the so-called underivable *Prātipadikas* generally coming under the *uṇādi* class. Yāska too has referred to two classes of words, namely, words of which both accents and formative elements are popularly known² and words whereof these elements are not directly comprehensible³ by the usual method of grammatical analysis. The analytical process involved in such grammatical device forms the most important

¹ उपायः शिखमाद्यानां बाह्यानामपञ्चनः । अस्यैव वर्गानि धित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहति ॥—*Vākyapadīya*, 2. 240.

² समर्थस्वरसंस्कारः ।—*Nirukta*, p. 154.

³ असमर्थस्वरसंस्कारः ।—*Ibid.*

function of grammar and is almost the same as adopted by the etymologists (Nairuktas) for the determination of the meaning of words. This analysis which is popularly known as *Samskāra* is the criterion whereby the grammarians distinguished the words of pure Sanskrit origin from corrupt forms (*Apabhraṃśas*).

Prakṛti, as the very term implies, is the ultimate germ of speech to which formative elements (*Pratyaya*) are added for the evolution of regular forms of words. An attempt to find out two distinct elements (*Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*) in a word that does not essentially admit of any division, on account of its unity and indivisibility, is more or less fanciful, though not altogether useless, since it helps the understanding of meanings. Bhartṛhari¹ defines *Prakṛti* as that form of a word which, for the purpose of its own signification being qualified by that of the other, stands in need of certain forms immediately following it. Of these two mutually expectant forms, the former is called *Prakṛti* and the latter as *Pratyaya*. *Pratyaya*, as Umāpati² observes, is said to be, on the other hand, that form of a word the meaning of which cannot be shown to have any relation with that of the other without being conditioned by the significance of the word to which it is added.

¹ यः स्वेतरस्य वस्तुस्यैव स्वरूपसाम्यबोधने । अद्वैतचक्षुःपूर्वा प्रकृतिः प्रत्ययः परः ॥—*Subdśakṛti under kār. 9.*

² स्वेतरार्थान्वयविशेषसाम्यबोधने । योऽसमर्थः सैव प्रत्ययः प्रत्ययोऽयं चतुर्विधः ॥—*Ibid.*

Jagadīśa has, however, rejected both these definitions as insufficient. He takes both *Prakṛti*¹ and *Pratyaya* to be significant by themselves (*Sārthaka*), but does not fail to notice their mutual dependence. The relation in which *Prakṛti* stands to *Pratyaya* is one of interdependence, for neither of them is individually competent to express its own meaning, without having invariable association with the other. On the ground of such mutual dependence, it is contended that these elements taken individually have no particular signification of their own. As a matter of fact, if they had meanings, when taken individually, each of them might have been used independently of the other.² But it is far from being the case. No meaning is, strictly speaking, conveyed by the word *gau* when it is not associated with or followed by *Pratyaya*. Moreover, *Prakṛti*³ and *Pratyaya* being connected with each other by inseparable relation, it is not grammatically correct to use them independently. Grammar does not sanction the independent use of either *Prakṛti* or *Pratyaya*. This is the train of arguments whereby Patañjali seeks to establish that a word has no parts (such as *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*), because

¹ षट्-पाचक्षायाः प्रकृतयः, सुप्तिङायाः प्रत्ययाः स्त्रीपुष्प्राभ्याम्बोर्धे निश्चलतः शब्दान्तरं सङ्गच्छन्तं जगद्विनि ।—Śabdakāṣṭhi under Kārikā, 6

² अर्थवशा नोपपद्यते केवलीनावचनात् ।—Vār. 7. Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 219.

³ निव्यसम्बन्धावितावर्धो प्रकृतिः प्रत्यय इति ।—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāp., 1. 2. 45.

meaning is conveyed by the word as an indivisible whole.¹ How, then, are we justified in discussing the meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, as two distinct elements constituting a word? Here Patañjali takes recourse to the logical method of *agreement* and *difference*² and clearly indicates how both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, as is evidenced by such forms as *vṛkṣaḥ* and *vṛkṣau*, may be shewn to have separate meanings of their own. The base that remains almost unchanged denotes a thing having stem, branches, leaves, fruits, etc., and the suffixes signifying respectively singularity and duality. In a group of homogeneous words, as in the above examples, we find that the stem remains more or less constant but suffixes are only variant, whereas in *pacati* and *gacchati* the suffix is the same, it is *Prakṛti* that is only different. Sometimes the change of *Pratyaya* brings about a change in the meaning of words (as in *hariḥ* and *harah*) derived from the same origin.

Bhartrhari has tried to show that the discrimination of *Padas* and the comprehension of their exact meanings are, strictly speaking, far from being real. There is of course no fixed principle so as to precisely determine the

¹ समुदायस्यैव प्रयोगादवयवानामप्रसिद्धिः।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 219.

² Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāp., 1. 2. 45.

Bhartrhari—ये शब्दाः निवृत्तसम्बन्धा विवेके आशयशून्याः। अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तेषामर्थो विमल्यते॥—Vākyaspadīya, 2. 168.

meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. We cannot¹ definitely say, 'this much is denoted by *Prakṛti*, and this is exactly the meaning of *Pratyaya*.' In grammar,² as a matter of fact, we meet with instances where the basic element does not sometimes actually exist, but its meaning is usually denoted by *Pratyaya* (as in *iyān*) and sometimes *Prakṛti* is found, on the contrary, to be expressive of the sense of *Pratyaya* (as in *ahan*). He continues further that in an instance like *pacanti* what is denoted (कर्तृत्व) by the two different suffixes³ (*vikaraṇa*—अप् and तिङ्) is generally expressed by one suffix (that is, तिप् only) in the case of अस्ति (where *śap* is necessarily dropped). As to the method followed by the grammarians, Bhartṛhari rightly observes that there is rather an absence of fixed rules regarding the process of determining the significance of both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*,⁴ because systems of grammar have no agreement amongst themselves so far as the meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* is concerned. The systems

¹ ननु यदा शब्दा नित्यसम्बन्धा विविक्तेन ज्ञातशब्दयः स्मार्थेन प्रतीतेः तदा कथमेतदवगतमयं प्रकृत्यर्थोऽयं प्रत्ययार्थ इत्याशङ्क्यापीदृशस्यान्वयव्यतिरेकी निमित्तमिति ।—Puṣyarāja under the Vākya., kār., 2. 167.

² वाक्ये कचित् प्रकृत्यर्थः प्रत्ययेनाभिधीयते । प्रकृतौ विनिश्चयायां प्रत्ययार्थश्च चातुभिः ॥—Vākya-padīya, 2. 231.

³ समईमाहवृत्तिर्ग्री प्रत्ययाविक एव तम् । कचिदाह एवमीति चातुलाभ्यां निम्ना कचित् ॥—Vākya-padīya, 2. 232.

⁴ नास्ति नैवयं पदपदार्थानाम्—अन्वाख्यानवृत्तौ शि च प्रत्ययार्थानिवन्धनम् ।

निर्दिष्टार्थप्रकृत्यर्थः आत्यन्तर उदाहरताः ॥

—Vākya-padīya, 2. 233.

of grammar, though they practically deal with the same subject, are so variant from one another in respect of nomenclatures and the method of treatment that what are shown to be the meaning of *Pratyaya* in one system are taken to be the significance of *Prakṛti* in the other. Notwithstanding such examples, as shown above, we should carefully bear in mind that the meaning of a word is really expressed by both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* in their natural but grammatical combination.

Though different views are held as to the significance of *Nipātas*, there is, however, no divergence regarding the expressiveness of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. The two well-known divisions of *Prakṛti*, namely, *Dhātu* and *Prātipadika*, have their meanings fixed by popular usages. Patañjali prefers to designate *Prakṛti* as *nimitta* in relation to *Pratyaya* which is called *nimittī*. What he intends to imply is that the meanings of *Prakṛti* (as are to be found in the *Dhātu-pāṭha* and *Prātipadika-pāṭha*) are more or less known, whereas those of *Pratyaya* are not exhaustively found. Though he unconditionally admits that the whole word (as an aggregate of both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*) is alone capable of denoting the sense, Patañjali shows clearly how by the application of the logical method of *agreement* and *difference*, *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, as in वृक्षः and वृक्षौ, may be distinctly specified as having their separate meanings. The terms *Prakṛti*

and *Pratyaya* are treated in grammar as two technical words—the shortest name for a class.¹ The rule प्रत्ययः, Pāṇ. 3. 1. 1, is explained by Patañjali as an *adhikāra-sūtra* denoting a *Samjñā*. He contends further that by virtue of *adhikāra* this *samjñā* may apply to *Prakṛti*, *Upapada*, and *Upādhi* and consequently they may have all grammatical operations usually pertaining to *Pratyaya*.² There arises, therefore, the necessity of making certain restrictions. Moreover, he explains the word *Pratyaya* in two ways,³ as what either expresses the meaning, or is comprehended. He then proceeds to show how to distinguish *Prakṛti* from *Pratyaya*; ⁴ the former, it is said, is entirely comprehensible by the enumeration of roots and *Prātīpadikas*, while the latter is not capable of being known exhaustively. There is another way also to bring out this distinction. *Pratyaya* is said to be more important (superior) than *Prakṛti*,⁵ its superiority or importance being due to the fact that *Pratyaya* as a class is nowhere enumerated (as significant forms of speech) except in grammar. We should not fail to notice

¹ संज्ञा च नाम वती न लघीयः ।—M. B., Vol. II, p. 3.

² अविचारितव्यं प्रत्ययसंज्ञा । सा प्रकृत्यपदीपाधीनामपि प्राप्नोति ।

Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 3. 1. 1.

³ प्रत्याख्यतीति प्रत्ययः ।...प्रत्याख्यते प्रत्यय इति । कर्तृसाधनः कर्मसाधनश्च ।
—*Ibid.*

⁴ इह च प्रत्ययोऽनिर्ज्ञातः, प्रकृत्यपदीपाधयो निर्ज्ञाताः । क ? धातूपदीनां प्रातिपदिकोपदेशे च ।—*Ibid.*

⁵ प्रधाने कार्यसंप्रत्ययादा सिद्धम्—Vār. 3. किंच प्रधानं प्रत्ययः ।—*Ibid.*

here that *Pratyayas* like *sup* and *tin* are not mentioned separately with their respective meanings, whereas roots and *Prātipadikas* (as two divisions of *Prakṛti*) are to be found respectively in the *Dhātupāṭha* and in the enunciation of *Prātipadikas*. This view which assigns greater importance to *Pratyaya* is based on a *Paribhāṣā*.¹ The above explanation of *Pratyaya* may serve the purpose of excluding *Prakṛti*, *Upapada* and *Upādhi* from the category of *Pratyaya*, but what still demands solution is to differentiate *modification* and *augment* (विकारागमाः) from *Pratyaya*² as such. A careful study of the formation of words makes it sufficiently clear that *modifications* and *augments* (as they appertain to both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*) seem to have all the qualifications of *Pratyaya*, though they are not practically treated as such by the grammarians. The *modification* and *augment* might be included in the same class with *Pratyaya*, inasmuch as both of them are wanting in original enunciation prior to their treatment in grammar. It will not suffice to say, as Kaiyaṭa³ explicitly remarks, that

¹ प्रधानाप्रधानयोः प्रधाने कार्यसंप्रत्ययः । किं च प्रधानं प्रत्ययः ।—M. B. under the rule Paṇ., 3. 1. 1.

² विकारागमेषु च परनिष्ठानात्—Vār. 4. M. B., Vol. II, p. 2. प्रत्ययः परी भवतीत्युच्यते न च विकारागमाः परे संभवन्ति ।—*Ibid*.

³ यः परः स प्रत्ययः न च विकारागमाः परे । तेन तेषां प्रत्ययसंज्ञा न भविष्यतीत्येवं न व्याज्येयम् । न हि परतन्निहिता प्रत्ययसंज्ञा, अपि तु प्रत्ययसंज्ञानिर्णय परत्वं । तथा च परत्वाभावेऽपि बहुवचसां प्रत्ययसंज्ञा भवति । सदादेवं व्याख्यायते—प्रयोगनाभावात् विकारागमानां प्रत्ययसंज्ञा न भवति । तथा हि परविज्ञानं प्रत्ययसंज्ञाफलम् ।—Kaiyaṭa on the Bhāṣya under Pāṇ., 3. 1. 1.

Pratyaya has its position fixed, *viz.*, it comes invariably after *Prakṛti*, while there is no such fixity of position with regard to *modifications* and *augments*. But what is grammatically sanctioned is that प्रत्ययसंज्ञा does not really depend upon the posteriority of position, because *bahuc* and *akac*, inspite of their irregular positions, are also included within the category of *Pratyaya*. Again, forms like *nibha*, *samkāśa*, etc., though used after *Prātipadikas* in the sense of similarity, are not grammatically regarded as *Pratyaya*.¹ It must be noted here that the suffixes like *bahuc* and *akac* form irregular instances, so far as the position of *Pratyaya* is concerned. The difference is then shown by a reference to the construction of the *Sūtras*. The *Sūtras* enjoining *modifications* and *augments* are generally found to have षष्ठौ as what determines them, whereas *Pratyaya* is enjoined by the *Sūtras* containing पञ्चमौ. There is another criterion to distinguish *Pratyaya* from both *modifications* and *augments*. *Pratyaya*, as the very term implies, is significant, though the so-called स्वारथिकप्रत्यय like *ka* forms an exception, *viz.*, it has apparently no meaning apart from that of *Prakṛti* to which it is added. The *modifications* and *augments*, on the other hand, have got no signification at all.

It is quite evident that a word, taken as an indivisible whole, is what expresses the intended sense. This is the conclusion Patañjali has

¹ तिङ्शेषश्च विभाव्यः स वा प्रत्यय उच्यते ।—Śabdasiṅgī, Kṛ. 10.

arrived at. If this be the general principle that regulates the use of words, how can we logically say 'this much is the meaning of *Prakṛti*,'¹ and 'this is the meaning of *Pratyaya*?' Patañjali meets this position by referring to the method of *agreement* and *difference*² whereby the distinct meanings of both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* are generally comprehended.

The question does not come to an end here. It is further argued that instead of assigning meanings to both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*, it is better to hold either *Prakṛti* or *Pratyaya* alone as expressive of both the meanings; or *Prakṛti* may be supposed to be the only significant form and *Pratyaya* only indicative (*dyotaka*). This is true, Patañjali observes, so far as *Sāmānya-Sabda*, viz., word denoting a class, is concerned. It must be remembered that without reference to either context or special sense, *Sāmānya-Sabda*, as a rule, cannot express the particular meaning. But when we say *vrkṣaḥ*, what we find is that a particular sense is naturally implied. We are, therefore, bound to admit that these are not *Sāmānya-Sabda*. Now what deserves our attention is that in a word both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* have their respective meanings consistently related to each

¹ तत्र कुत एतदयं प्रकृत्यर्थस्य प्रत्ययार्थ इति ? न पुनः प्रकृतिरिवोभावर्था ब्रूयात् प्रत्यय एव वा ।—*Mahābhāṣya* under the rule *Pāṇ.* 1. 2. 45.

² विज्ञं लन्वयव्यतिरेकान्नाम् ।—*Vār.* 9. *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 219.

other so as to express one indivisible sense. The base, as Patañjali has shown, and the suffix in the word *vrkṣaḥ* means respectively (1) a material body containing roots, stem, branches, leaves, etc., and (2) oneness or singularity. Elsewhere it is said that oneness as well as *karmatva*, etc., are the meanings of the case-endings.¹

There is another difficulty with regard to the meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. As systems of grammar have no agreement so far as the meaning of *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* is concerned, one finds it difficult to determine the meaning of them with a degree of certainty. What is said to be the meaning of a *Pratyaya* in one system of grammar is taken to be the meaning of *Prakṛti* in the other.² This is why the *Sphoṭavādins* have rejected both *Padas* and *Padārthas* as unreal. There is nothing, Bhartṛhari argues, as *Pada* fixed by its very form,³ and no meaning follows from a *Pada*, but from a sentence. A *Pada*, in its grammatical sense, has no real existence apart from the sentence of which it forms an integral part. How, then, are we to justify the principle of grammar which treats of such unreal things as *Padas*? Bhartṛhari continues that *Sāstras*

¹ एकत्वादयो विभक्त्यर्थाः । सुपां कर्मादयोऽप्यर्थः ।—M. B., Vol. II, p. 58.

² ये कश्चिद्विद् स्वाकारणे प्रत्ययार्थेनोक्तास्तेऽन्यत्र प्रत्ययार्थेनोक्ताः । तस्मात् पदपदार्थायकमेव । शास्त्रमप्यनुत्पादकमेव ।—Mañjūsā, p. 409.

³ न हि किञ्चित् पदं नाम कस्यैव नियतं कश्चित् ।—Vākyapadiya.

(grammar) by their diversified methods and procedures only serve to exhibit *Avidyā* or false impressions.¹ It must be, however, admitted that the method adopted by the grammarians in the analysis of words, whether real or unreal from the standpoint of *Sphotavāda*, is not only scientifically perfect but immensely helpful to the beginner. Though dealing with words that are unreal and transient, the science of grammar, as we have already seen, does not fail to serve a very useful purpose. Just as one is liable to pass through many unreal phenomena in which he is born, before he reaches the final goal or reality, so the grammarian starts with a false appearance as *Padas* and is ultimately qualified to have a glance into the mystical element of *Vāk*, we mean *Śabda-Brahman*, by unveiling the screen of ignorance.²

Upasargas and *Nipātas* or Prepositions and Particles are, as we have seen, enumerated by Yāska³ in the list of *Parts of Speech*. Their linguistic aspects, with reference to their possibility of having been once used as regular forms of words, have been discussed in the Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus. Now we propose to deal with the grammatical side of the question. We do not find any difficulty in ascertaining the meaning of *Nāmans* and *Dhātus*, but it

¹ ग्राह्येषु ब्रह्मिण्यैवैरविद्यैर्बोधवर्थाः ।—*Ibid.*

² असत्ये नर्मानि शिवा ततः सत्यं समीहते ।—*Vākya*. 2. 232.

³ चत्वारि पदजातानि नामान्ख्याते चीपसर्गनिपादाश्च ।—*Nirukta*, I. 1.

is more or less a matter of doubt¹ whether *Upasargas* and *Nipātas* have the power of expressing the intended meaning in the strict sense of the term. To determine the precise significance of these two classes of parts of speech is a difficult problem over which the grammarians and the Naiyāyikas seem to have been conflicting.

The definition of *Upasarga*, as given by Śakāṭāyana, purports to show that *Upasargas* have no meanings when they are dissociated from verbal forms.² What follows necessarily from this statement is that they are not significant by themselves. The view of such a grammarian of revered memory seems to have received approval of Yāska and later grammarians. The indicativeness (*dyōtakatva*) of *Upasargas*, as opposed to their direct expressiveness (*vācakatva*), is clearly pointed out by Yāska³ when he lays down in agreement with the grammarians⁴ that *Upasargas* are far from being expressive of sense, but serve only to qualify or specialise the meaning of *Dhātus*. *Dhātus* are said to be of various meanings. The meaning which we generally assign to *Upasargas* is really denoted by the root itself. The additional sense (as that of *perfection* in an instance like

¹ चतुर्विधपदेष्वन विविधस्यार्थनिर्देशः । शिवते संज्ञवीत्पक्षौ नौपसर्गे-
निपातयोः ॥—Quoted by Durga.

² न निर्वेदा उपसर्गा अर्थोन्निराकृतिरिति याकटावयः ।—Nirukta, I. 3., p. 57.

³ नामान्पातयोस्तु समौपसंयोगयोस्तथा भवति ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ क्रियाविशेषक उपसर्गैः—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 256.

prabhavati) which is usually assigned to *Upasargas* is said to be expressed by *Dhātus* themselves. Gārgya, on the other hand, emphatically supports the opposite view and clearly shows how various meanings are often expressed by *Upasargas*.¹ It is no wonder that Gārgya, who is said to have assigned meanings to each individual letter that enters into the constitution of a word, would differ from the majority of the grammarians in making all *Upasargas* expressive of particular meanings. Whatever be the real value of Gārgya's arguments, we cannot help admitting that his standpoint, though finally rejected by the grammarians, is not absolutely unreasonable. The way in which *bhavati* differs from *prabhavati* and *tiṣṭhati* from *pratiṣṭhate* (stoppage of motion and motion being respectively meant) in their respective meanings is calculated to show how roots like *bhū* and *sthā* in their pure and compounded forms are distinctly different in respect of meanings. The method of *agreement* and *difference*, when applied to such cases, makes it sufficiently clear that the additional sense, as is obtained from the use of roots combined with *Upasarga*, is due to the presence of *Upasarga*, that is to say, the special meaning is directly implied by *Upasargas*. We meet with many instances of verbal forms to which the addition of *Upasargas* materially changes the meaning

¹ उदात्तः पदार्थः सन्तीति गार्ग्यः ।—Nirukta, 1. 3, p. 57.

of roots—a fact which may be adduced to confirm the position taken by Gārgya. This is the reason which led Gārgya and his followers to maintain the expressiveness of *Upasargas*.

Those who, on the contrary, advocate the indicativeness, argue in the following strain: *Upasargas* have no specific meanings of their own apart from those of roots to which they are added; the additional or special signification that is apparently given rise to by the presence of an *Upasarga* is, strictly speaking, denoted by the root itself. *Upasargas* serve only as a symbol of indication. That *Upasargas* are merely suggestive and not expressive of sense is best illustrated by the expression उपास्येते हरिहरौ. *Upāsana* or worship cannot be taken as the sense of *Upasarga* (*upa*), for in that case there could be no passive voice in उपास्येते, as the root *ās* is intransitive. Neither is it possible to consider a combination of *anu* and *bhū* as a root, because it is not so mentioned in the *Dhātupāṭha*; nor the process of reduplication and the addition of *augment* (*a* and *ā*) affect *Upasargas* at all. The verbal roots are said to have various meanings. Those that are given in the *Dhātupāṭha* are not at all exhaustive, but in most of the cases they are simply indicative. For the verbal form *bhabati* in 'यागात् स्वर्गो भवति' is found to imply *production* instead of denoting simply *becoming*. Thus, the meaning usually expressed by सोपसर्गधातु, such as *anubhavati*, *parābhavati*, *abhibhavati*, etc., are all

capable of being denoted by the simple root *bhū*. What useful purpose is, then, served by *Upasargas*, if they have nothing to signify? Their function, so to speak, is to manifest or give prominence to the latent meanings of roots (which are not ordinarily expressed when the root is simply used). The analogy of a lamp, as shown by Durga,¹ is a well-conceived one, for it illustrates the part played by *Upasargas* in the comprehension of meanings. Just as certain properties (as height, length, etc.) belonging to a thing are rendered visible through the instrumentality of a lamp, and those properties, as a matter of fact, appertain to the thing itself and not to the lamp, even so the addition of *Upasargas* serves to bring out the meaning of roots. The particular sense, usually assigned to *Upasargas*, is essentially what is expressed by the root itself.

Patañjali² explains the *Upasarga* as what particularises the action; the verbal form *pacati*, for instance, implies the action, *viz.*, cooking, and when *pra* is prefixed to it, it serves only to qualify the action, adding the special sense of *perfection* (प्रकर्षः) to the meaning of the root. He did not, however, fail to notice that in instances like *tiṣṭhati* and *pratiṣṭhate* the addition of an *Upasarga* materially changes the meaning

¹ यथा प्रदीपचक्षुर्नि द्रव्यस्य गुणविशिष्टोऽभिव्यज्यामानी द्रव्याय एव भवति न प्रदीपायतः ।—Nirukta, p. 59.

² तिवातिशेषक उपसर्गः ।—Mahābhāṣya under Pāp., 1.3.1. पचतीति क्रिया गम्यते तां प्री विशिनष्टि ।

of the root. What follows from this is that it is the presence of *pra* that causes such changes in the meaning (e.g., 'stoppage of motion' and 'motion'). The above is an instance in which there is apparent opposition between the meanings of *Dhātu* and *Upasarga*. The *Kārikā*, as quoted by Puṇyārāja,¹ clearly brings out the characteristics of *Upasargas*, as will be evident from the substance given below : Sometimes the so-called denotation of *Upasargas*, as in the above instance, seems to be in opposition with the meaning of *Dhātus* ; some follow the meaning of the root without any disagreement, and some only serve to specialise the signification of the root. Having recourse to the theory that a verbal root admits of more than one meaning,² Patañjali lays down clearly that *Upasargas* have no direct expressiveness (like *Nāmans* and *Dhātus*) and that their supposed meanings, as perfection, proximity etc., are, strictly speaking, derivable from the root. Accordingly, *tiṣṭhati* alone (without having connection with any *Upasarga*) is capable of denoting both motion as well as stoppage of motion.³

Bhartṛhari is not satisfied with the remark that *Upasargas* are only suggestive, but

¹ धात्वर्थे बाधते कश्चित् कश्चित्तन्मदुक्तते । तमेव विभिनन्नाय उपसर्गगति-
स्त्वया ॥

² अत्रैव अपि धातवी भवन्ति ।—M. B. under Pāṇ., 1. 3. 1.

³ तिष्ठतिरेव व्रजिष्ठिश्चावाह, तिष्ठतिरेव गतिश्चिदाया निष्ठतिम् ।—Mahābhāṣya under Pāṇ., 1. 3. 1.

has discussed all possible standpoints wherefrom *Upasargas* might be viewed. It is not sufficient, he holds,¹ to take *Upasargas* only as suggestive, because some of them, as *pra* in *pratiṣṭhate*, seems to be quite good in expressing the sense. Again, when the special meaning is practically expressed by the root and *Upasarga* in their combination,² it is not unlikely that *Upasargas* also have their contribution, so far as the expression of the intended sense is concerned. Thus, we find that *Upasargas* may be viewed from three different standpoints, namely, *vācaka* or expressive, *dyotaka* or suggestive and *sahakārī* or auxiliary; these three correspond to the three classes, as shown in the *Kārikā* referred to above.

So far as grammatical operations are concerned, *Dhātus* are generally found to be categorically distinct from *Upasargas*. In the *Dhātupāṭha* mention is only made of roots and not of *Upasargas*. Again, the process of reduplication (*dvivacana*) and the augment *aṭ* (*aḍāgama*) are functions that pertain to a *Dhātu* alone. Bhartṛhari³ here supports the non-difference of verbal forms (*abhedā-pakṣa*)

¹ स वाचकी विशेषायां सम्प्रदाहृतिकीऽपि वा । ब्रह्मधामाय धातोर्यां सहाकारौ प्रयुज्यते ॥—*Vākyapadīya*, 2. 190.

² धातूपसर्गौ सम्प्रदायैर्विशेषं ब्रूत इति धातोरर्थान्निधाने सहाकारिण लपसर्गौ ।—*Paṇyārāja* under *Vākyapadīya*, *Kār.* 2. 181.

³ अत्रादीनां व्यवस्थायै प्रयत्नेन निरूपणम् ।—*Vākyapadīya*, 2, p. 158. *Paṇyārāja* under it—अङ्गद्विवचनव्यवस्थायै केवलं धातवः प्रयुगपदिष्टा वस्तुतः सौपसर्गाधानेव धातुलम् ।

and maintains that *Dhātus*, though not capable of being differentiated from *Upasargas*, are separately mentioned only for the sake of *reduplication* and *aḍāgama*, but they are virtually expressive of the specific sense which is sometimes assigned to *Upasargas*. By *Dhātu* we should, therefore, understand *Dhātu* with the necessary *Upasarga* (*Sopasargāṇām-eva dhātu-vaṁ*). This view is strengthened by the existence of such root as *saṁgrām*,¹ which is inseparably united with (*Upasarga*) *saṁ* and gets both reduplication and *aḍāgama*, as in *asaṁgrāmayat* and *sisaṁgrāmayiṣate*. The particular action, according to this view, is denoted by the combination of *Dhātu* and *Upasarga*. Their undifferentiated character is made clearer when Bhartṛhari continues that it is the specialised action (*Kriyā-viśeṣa*), as is signified by a *Dhātu* jointly with an *Upasarga*, that gets itself connected with a *Kāraka*.² This is why the root *bhū*, preceded by *anu*, becomes transitive and is capable of being used in the passive voice (*karma-vācya*) as *anubhūyate*.

There arises a considerable difficulty in deciding whether a root is first joined with an *Upasarga* and is afterwards associated with *Kāraṅkas* or *vice versa*. The conjunction of

¹ तथा हि सङ्ग्रासयतिः सौदस्यैविविधिः कृतः ।
क्रियाविशेषाः संघातेः प्रकृत्यन्ते तथाविधाः ॥

—Vākyapadīya, 2, p. 154.

² साधनेनैवैति सम्बन्धं तथाभूतेन सा क्रिया ।—*Ibid.*

Upasargas with roots is a question of grammatical importance. Under the rule Pāṇ., 6. 1. 135, Patañjali has referred to two *Poribhāṣās*: (i) a root is first joined with an *Upasarga* and then gets itself connected with *Sādhana* (*Kāraka*); (ii) a root is first added to a *Sādhana* and is next related to an *Upasarga*.¹ The second *Poribhāṣā* seems to be more acceptable on the ground that an *Upasarga* serves to specify the action that is accomplished by *Sādhana*. The action is not fully accomplished until it is related to a *Kāraka*. Though more reasonable than the former, the second view is not entirely free from objections. Those who lend support to the view, Patañjali holds, that a *Dhātu* is first connected with a *Kāraka* and then with an *Upasarga*, will find some difficulty in explaining the transitive use of the root *ās* in the expression *apāsyate guruḥ*.² It is really the presence of *Upasargas* like *upa*, *anu* and the like that accounts for such uses. Bhartṛhari also has not totally discarded the first view, but has adduced a few arguments supporting the priority of relation between a *Dhātu* and an *Upasarga*. The drift of his arguments is as follows: ³—A *Dhātu*

¹ पूर्वं हि धातुस्यसंगेन युज्यते पश्चात् साधनेनेति । नैतत् सारम् । पूर्वं धातुः साधनेन युज्यते पश्चादुपसर्गेण ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 93.

² यो हि मन्वते पूर्वं धातुः साधनेन युज्यते पश्चादुपसर्गेणेति, तस्य आस्यते गुरुर्भवत्यर्थकः उपास्यते गुरुर्भवति ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 94.

³ धातोः साधनयोर्मध्य भाविनः प्रकसाद् यथा । धातुर्लं कर्मभावश्च तथान्वदपि दृश्यताम् ॥—Vākyaśatīya, 2, Kār. 136.

is so called because of its relation to a *Kāraka*. But how is it justifiable to get the designation as such (*Dhātu-saṃjñā*) before the action (*kriyā*) is completed by actual connection with a *Kāraka*? The action (the meaning of a root) is not likely to be accomplished before it is related to a *Kāraka*. In order to justify *Dhātu-saṃjñā* in a similar case where the root gets itself first connected with an *Upasarga* before actually coming in touch with a *Kāraka*, we must be prepared to assume that even the possibility of having future relation to a *Kāraka* is considered to be sufficient to indicate the relation of *Kriyā* to *Kāraḥ*. This sort of assumption is not altogether unwarranted and rare in Sanskrit grammar. The rule *Dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ samāna-kartṛkādicchāyām vā* is an instance where the expression *Dhātoḥ karmaṇaḥ* is justified on the possibility of a root having future connection with the objective case (of the root *iṣ*). The grammarians take it to be an established fact that roots admit of more than one meaning. The special meaning (as is supposed to be the denotation of *Upasargas*) is necessarily considered to be what is actually denoted by the root itself.

Having shown the three distinct classes of *Upasargas*, Bhartṛhari proceeds to maintain the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* (*dyotakatva*) on the ground of logical inference.¹ The three views

¹ छादितिः केषलेच समलादि तु सम्यते । तवानुनादिनिधातुनां प्रादि-
दृश्यते ॥—*Vākyaśpadīya*, 2. 191.

in regard to the meaning of *Upasargas* are as follows : (1) *Upasargas* are only suggestive of the sense; (2) *Upasargas* are sometimes expressive of particular meanings; and (3) the root and *Upasargas* jointly express the sense. The conclusion to which Bhartṛhari has finally come is that *Upasargas* are only suggestive of the sense. According to popular usage, it should be remembered, the form *tiṣṭhati* is always used to mean stoppage of motion and, consequently, *tiṣṭhati* alone (without *pra*) is found to be incapable of denoting 'movement.' Here arises the necessity of taking recourse to inference.¹ It is to get rid of this anomalous position that the grammarians have sought to establish the dictum *anekārthāḥ dhātavaḥ*, so as to render *tiṣṭhati* alone competent to express the sense of movement. It is to be noted that the so-called suggestiveness of *Upasargas* can also be logically supported. Bhartṛhari proceeds further to show how the method of logical inference called **सामान्यतोदृष्ट**² lends support to both the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* as well as to the plurality of meanings of the verbal root.

Before concluding this discourse on *Upasargas*, we propose to give here the substance of what Gaṅgeśa has said in this connection. Quite in keeping with the grammarians, he begins with the statement that *Upasargas* are

¹ धातुरनेकार्थं उपसर्गस्य धीवत् इत्यनुमानेन व्यवस्थाप्यते।—Puṣṭyarāja, p. 158.

² धातुष्व सामान्यतोदृष्टेनानुमानेनानेकार्थः।—*Ibid.*

only suggestive¹ and not expressive of the sense independently of verbal forms. When we take *Upasargas* to be suggestive, what is necessarily implied is that they help us in understanding the specific sense of the root. But it may be argued on the contrary that *Upasargas* are, in accordance with the principle of agreement and difference,² as good as significant forms of words like *Nāman* and *Dhātu*, inasmuch as *pra* in *prajayati* gives the idea of perfection (*prakarṣa*) and *abhi* in *abhyāgacchati* brings out the sense of 'proximity' and so on. Moreover, if the plurality of meanings on the part of roots is brought forward in support of the suggestiveness of *Upasargas*, they, it may be argued, might also be taken as possessing manifold meaning.³ To these contentions Gaṅgeśa gives his answer in the following way:—That roots admit of numerous meanings is accepted by all grammarians, but there is no such consensus of views so far as the meaning of *Upasargas* is concerned. The sense of *perfection* and *proximity* is also denoted by the root, *Upasargas* like *pra* and *abhi* being only तात्पर्यवाचक. The expression तात्पर्यवाचक, as applied to *Upasargas*, is

¹ उपसर्गस्य द्योतकत्वं न वाचकत्वं । द्योतकत्वं च धातोरर्थविशेषे तात्पर्य-
वाचकत्वं तदुपसङ्गान्न तत्र शङ्किता ।—*Tattvacintāmaṇi*—Śabdakhaṇḍa,
p. 854.

² उपसर्गान्वयव्यतिरेकानुविधानात् एतत्पर्यवत्त्वादि शङ्किः ।—*Tattvacintā-
maṇi*, p. 854.

³ धातोरिव तत्त्वावधिकार्यत्वात् ।—*Ibid.*

an indication that the Naiyāyikas have recourse to *lakṣaṇā*¹ when they take *jayati* to be expressive of 'to be in a state of perfection.' Next, he draws a fine distinction between *Dhātu* and *Upasarga* by holding that the root *sthā* preceded by *pra* has the power of denoting movement, whereas *pra* (*Upasarga*) is not (*śakta*) expressive of the sense by itself but appears like an adjunct (*śaktatāvacchedaka*).² That *Upasargas* are nowhere used as *vācaka* may be further proved with reference to an instance like *vyatise*³ (where the radical element is dropped); it is not *vi* and *ati* that are to be regarded as expressive of the sense, but we are compelled to recall to mind the root which is really significant.

Thus the grammarians have agreement with the Naiyāyikas so far as the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* is concerned. That *Upasargas* have no power of expressing the sense like *Nāman* and *Dhātu* is clear from the fact that we are not allowed to use शोभनः प्रः with the same breadth of meaning as is denoted by the expression शोभनः प्रकर्षः. Moreover, neither *Upasargas* nor *Nipātas* are capable of being qualified by adjectives. It should be, however, remembered that the capacity for independent use is not the only criterion for discriminating the

¹ 'अभिज्ञे इत्यत्र विरोधिलक्षणायाः अतोर्वैमनोयस्थितिः प्रशब्दस्तु तात्पर्यवाङ्मयः ।
—Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 856.

² शोभनः शब्देन शब्देन शक्तिरिति प्रशब्दः शक्ततावच्छेदको न शक्तः ।—*Ibid.*

³ 'व्यतिसे' इत्यादी लुप्तः व्युत्पद्यते धातुरेवार्थव्याख्यः ।—*Ibid.*, p. 857.

expressiveness of words; for *Pratyayas*,¹ though they are never used by themselves, are regarded to be expressive of sense. The rule Pāṇ., 1.4.93 may be cited as an indication of the meaninglessness of *Upasargas*.

What gave rise to much controversy² between the Naiyāyikas and the grammarians is the question of *Nipātas*. The ground of disagreement is that the Naiyāyikas seem to have drawn a specific line of demarcation between *Upasargas* and *Nipātas*. They included *Nipātas* in the category of *sārthaka*³ to the exclusion of *Upasargas*, whereas the grammarians have not made such whimsical distinction. Yāska⁴ has, however, shown that *Nipātas* have a good many meanings—similarity, collection, etc. According to the interpretation of grammar,⁵ *Upasargas* form only a special class of *Nipātas* having connection with the verb. As both of them belong to the same class of indeclinables, one is hardly justified to take *Nipātas* as expressive of sense and the other as merely suggestive. The so-called *Nipātas* only form a class of *Avyayas*. Words like *pra* and *ca*, which have no power of denoting a substance (*dravya*), are called

¹ अर्धवशा नोपपद्यते केवलेनावचनात् ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, 219 and प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोः सम्बन्धार्थनोपपत्त्यनियमात्—Tattvacināṣaṇi.

² प्राद्वी शिवकादादयस्तु नामका इति व्याचक्षते स्थितं वैषम्यमनुक्तं युक्तिसाम्यात् ।
—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa.

³ प्रकृतिः प्रत्ययश्च निपातश्चेति स त्रिधा—Śabdasaṃskṛti-prakāśikā, Kār. 6.

⁴ अन्वयवैषम्येषु निपतसि—Nirukta.

⁵ उपसर्गाः क्रियायोगे—Pāṇ., 1. 4. 59.

Nipātas. The same reason¹ whereby the suggestiveness of *Upasargas* is evidently established may be put forward to prove the equal suggestiveness of *Nipātas*, there being nothing to account for their differential treatment. The Naiyāyikas recognise the expressiveness of *Nipātas* for the following reasons: In instances like अनुभूयते, साक्षात्क्रियते, अलंक्रियते, etc., the addition of *Nipātas* is attended with a special significance, as cannot be obtained from the simple root *kṛ* and *bhū*. Moreover, *Nipātas* like *sākṣāt*, *namah*, etc., is found to have their respective meanings fixed by lexicon and popular usage. The grammarians refute this position. They hold, on the contrary, that the usual meanings expressed by *anubhavati*, *sākṣātkaroti*, etc., i.e., feeling and interviewing, are really denoted by the roots (*bhū* and *kṛ*), and *Upasargas* as well as *Nipātas* are only suggestive or तात्पर्यवाचक. As a matter of fact, we might have used the expression शोभनञ्च in the sense of a beautiful collection, if a *Nipāta* like *ca* were really expressive of the meaning. As the word *vrkṣaḥ* alone cannot give the idea of a collection (समुच्चय), the Mīmāṃsakas take the particle *ca* as expressive of collection. They do not recognise it to be merely suggestive. But the grammarians are not prepared to take *Nipātas*

¹ शीतकाः प्रादयी शिन निपाताद्यादयल्लया—Vaiyākaraṇasāhitya, Kāt.

as well as *Upasargas* as capable of expressing the sense independently of *Nāman* and *Dhātu*. It is on the principle of *Anvaya-vyatireka* that the Mīmāṃsakas have proceeded to maintain the expressiveness of *Nipātas*. Their arguments are open to criticism, since they have unduly attributed the significance to *Nipātas*. When the meaning (collection, etc.) is actually obtained from words other than *Nipātas*, the assumption of *Śakti* or significance is nothing but unnecessary, so far as the expressiveness of *Nipātas* is concerned. If we are allowed to have an assumption of this nature, the word *Gaṅgā* might have denoted 'bank' (without the help of *lakṣaṇā*) by means of its primary significance or *Śakti*.

The negative particle *na* (*nañ*) is also a *Nipāta*. Generally speaking, the particle *nañ* has got six meanings—similarity, non-existence, difference, smallness, imperfection, contradiction. But Koṇḍabhaṭṭa has tried to show that the sense of imposition (आरोपितत्व)¹ is also suggested by *nañ*. Accordingly, the word अत्राह्मण does not only mean 'a man other than a Brāhmin,' but one who pretends to be a Brāhmin² (say a *Kṣatriya*). Following the line of arguments of the Bhāṣya,³ Koṇḍabhaṭṭa has also suggested another view, according to which non-existence

¹ आरोपितत्वं नञ्-धीत्यम्—*Valyākaraṇa*, Kār. 40.

² One to whom the quality of a Brāhmin is falsely attributed.

³ अत्राह्मणी ना तदर्थोऽस्तु भाष्यस्य हि तदवस्थात्—*Ibid.*, Kār. 41.

is the sense that is denoted by *nañ*. The expression *nivṛttapadārthakāḥ*¹ (as in the Bhāṣya) is explained by him as implying the idea of 'non-existence.' Nāgeśa, however, does not agree with Koṇḍabhaṭṭa on this point. The negative particle appears to be either substantive or attributive in relation to its *pratiyogin*.² असर्वम् (as a pronoun) is an instance where *nañ* is used as an adjective and the negative particle is used as a noun in a word like असः meaning शिवः. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi³ is of opinion that both reciprocal negation and negation of association are denoted by the negative particle.

Karmapravacanīya is also regarded as a class of *Pada*. Some grammarians, as Bhartṛhari maintains,⁴ have treated of *Karmapravacanīyas* as a special class of *Padas* categorically distinct from *Upasargas*. According to this view, there are five different kinds of *Padas* including *Karmapravacanīyas*. Those who strictly support the four-fold classification of *Padas*,⁵ as enumerated by Yāska, are likely to argue that *Karmapravacanīyas*, often used as adjuncts to the relation between *Kriyā* and *Kāraka* or, simply

¹ Mahābhāṣya on Paṇ., 2. 2. 6. वहापि तर्हि नञ्-विशेषकः प्रयुज्यते ।

² अस्माभाषः स प्रतियोगी ।

³ संसर्गाभाषीऽन्वोक्ताभावय सञ्जीव्यः ।

—Śiromaṇi, *Nañ-Vāda*, pp. 1-10.

⁴ विधा केचित् पदं भिन्नं चतुर्धा पञ्चधापि वा ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. Kār. 1.

⁵ कार्यप्रवचनोदात्त क्रियाविशेषोपजनितसम्बन्धावच्छेदहेतव इति सम्बन्धविशेष-जनधारिण क्रियाविशेषप्रकाशना उपसर्गोत्प्रेक्षाभेदनीति चतुर्थेऽप पदम् ।

—Belārāja under Vākyapadīya, 3. Kār. 1.

as indicative of relation, deserve to be treated as *Upasargas*. There is hardly any justification for recognising them as a different class of *Padas*. In some cases *Karmapravacanīyas* like *anu*, *prati* and *su* exactly look like *Upasargas*, though they cannot be grammatically treated as such. So far as grammatical operations (specially the rules enjoining *ṣatva*) are concerned, it is clearly laid down that the very name (*saṃjñā*) *Karmapravacanīya* is an indication that *Karmapravacanīyas* are excluded from the categories of both *Gati* and *Upasarga*.¹ *Karmapravacanīyas* being thus categorically different from *Upasargas*, we are not allowed to have *ṣatva* in examples like *pari-siñcati* and *su-siktam*.

Now what is a *Karmapravacanīya*? It is a class of words which is generally used as an adjunct to *sambandha* or relation between *Kriyā* and *Kāraka*.² In grammar *sambandha* is usually denoted by *Kriyā* or action.³ In some cases, *Kriyā* * by its very nature gives rise to a kind of relation and then disappears without leaving any trace behind. The expression *rājapuruṣaḥ*, for instance, though apparently

¹ गत्युपसर्गसंज्ञापवादः—Bhaṭṭoji.

² सम्बन्धस्य भेदका इति । सम्बन्धस्य सर्वे; क्रियाकारकपूर्वस्यो भवति ।

—Paṇyārāja under Vākyapadīya, 2. 199.

³ तथा हि सर्वे; सम्बन्धः क्रियाफलतः—Helārāja.

* तद्वद्विद्मत् सम्बन्धं जनयित्वा क्रिया विनिवर्तते यथा राजपुरुष इति । अत्र हि राजः पुरुषोऽर्थः ; यस्मात् स राजा पुरुषं विनर्त्ति, अतो भरणलक्षणा, क्रियायवाच्यविभाजनस्य सम्बन्धं जनयित्वा निवृत्ता ।—Paṇyārāja under Kār. 2. 199.

devoid of any *Kriyā* or verbal form, grammatically means 'here is a man who is supported by the king.' Here the action *bharaṇa* (to support) which denotes a relation between the king and his man as one of the supporter and the supported is no longer existent. In some instances, on the other hand, *Kriyā-pada* is practically present (as in *mātuḥ smarati*) and there is no such difficulty in comprehending the intended relation. Logically speaking, a verbal form serves as a link between two concepts, i.e., establishes some sort of relation between them. *Sambandha* is thus shown to be a product of *Kriyā*. But there arises some difficulty with regard to the knowledge of such *sambandha*, when the verbal form is not actually present. When the verbal form or *Kriyā-pada* is practically absent,¹ one may doubt whether the intended *sambandha* is really given rise to by *Kriyā* or by other agents. In cases of doubt like this, says Puṇyarāja, *Karmappravacanīyas* serve to determine the proper relation. The main function of *Karmappravacanīyas* is thus to point out the particular relation denoted by a *Kriyā*. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* takes the word *Karmappravacanīya* as a significant one (*anvarthasamjñā*). He understands by *Karmappravacanīyas* those words that are

¹ यदा क्रियापदं कश्चिन्न भूयते, तदा क्रियाजनितोऽर्थो स्वादिति संदिग्धे वार्त्ते प्रवचनीयेन तत्र तस्या क्रियायां निवृत्त्ये वति सम्बन्धविशेषः कर्मप्रवचनीयैः प्रत्याप्यते ।

—Puṇyarāja.

no longer expressive of *Kriyā*, but indicate the relation given rise to by a *Kriyā*, whether present or absent. The difference between *Upasargas* and *Karmapravacanīyas* is that the former directly indicates *Kriyā* or specifies the action denoted by a verbal root, whereas the latter only qualifies the particular relation given rise to by a *Kriyā*.

What we have learnt from the foregoing discussion is that *Karmapravacanīyas* are not indicative (*dyotaka*) of *Kriyā* like *Upasargas*. But one may, however, argue¹ that the verbal form that is absent (*Kriyā-pada*), as we have already shown, is deducible from the use of *Karmapravacanīya*. According to this view, *Karmapravacanīyas* should be regarded as *ākṣepaka*, i.e., as what serve to derive by inference a *Kriyā-pada* that is not actually present. Bhartṛhari² has set aside this argument by holding that words whereby such verbal forms are inferred are generally found to have case-terminations, but never designated as *Karmapravacanīyas*. The second case-ending in *prādeśam*,³ as in *prādeśam vipa-tilikhati*, is due to its connection with the word *vi* which practically suggests the act of measuring (*māna*) and is only a shortened form of

¹ अयुक्तायाः क्रियायाः आक्षेपकाः कर्मप्रवचनीयाः कक्षाबाधितान् वृत्ताह ।

—Panyarāja.

² येन क्रियापदक्षेपः स कारक-विभक्तिभिः ।

युज्यते विधेया तच्च लिखाननुपसर्गता ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2, Kār, 202.

³ अत्र विधेयो मानक्रियायाः आक्षेपकः । प्रादेशं विनाय परिनिष्ठमौत्थयामयते ॥

—Panyarāja.

vimāya. Thus, we have *dvitīyā* in *prādeśam* as a case-termination (*Kāraka-vibhakti*) and not one obtained in conjunction with a *Karmapravacanīya*. Puṇyarāja further observes that *dvitīyā* available in connection with *Karmapravacanīyas* is generally found in cases where *ṣaṣṭhi* in the sense of *sambandha* in general would have been otherwise applicable. In some cases,¹ a *Karmapravacanīya* like *ann* becomes a bar to the third case-ending denoting *hetu* or cause.

From what has been said regarding the characteristics of *Karmapravacanīyas*, it is almost clear that they are not indicative (*dyotaka*) of *Kriyā* like *Upasargas*, not directly expressive of *sambandha* which is rather denoted by the second case-ending used in substitution of *ṣaṣṭhi* and not suggestive of a verbal form like the word *vi*, as in *prādeśam viparilikhati*. Having thus rejected the three views, namely, indicativeness, denotativeness and suggestiveness of *Karmapravacanīyas*, Bhartṛhari² has finally arrived at the conclusion that *Karmapravacanīyas* are those that qualify the relation brought about by a *Kriyā*, whether present or absent.

¹ आरम्भाद्वाच्यते प्राप्ता इतीया द्वितीयवत् ।—Vākyaśāstra, 2. 205.

² जियाया कीलकी नाई सम्बन्धन न वाचकः ।

नानि जियापदात्तयो सम्बन्धन तु भेदकः ॥—*Ibid.*, 2. 206.

CHAPTER VI

PRAKRTI AND PRATYAYA

Prātipadika—derivable and underivable—its meaning.—Gender—
Dhātu—a division of *Prakṛti*—*Pratyaya*—its classifications
—*Sup* and *Tiā*—*Taddhita* and *Kṛi*—*pratyayas*—
their meanings.

Prakṛti is of two kinds—*Nāman* or *Prātipadika* and *Dhātu*. This classification of *Prakṛti* is accepted by Jagadīśa. He observes particularly that what is called *Prātipadika* by Pānini and others is essentially the same as *Nāman*. *Nāman* is defined by Yāska as what denotes an object—*Sattvapradhānāni nāmāni*. Jagadīśa defines *Nāman* as that crude form of a word which requires to be invariably followed by *prathamā* (*vibhakti*) for the expression of its own meaning. Objects are generally denoted by such pronouns as अद्, etc. While giving a definition of objects, Bhartṛhari has explained what is really meant by Yāska's statement '*ada iti sattvānāmupadeśaḥ*.' Durga¹ observes that *Nāman* and *Dhātu* are not really different and entirely unconnected with each other. There is, on the other hand, an idea of object hidden in the meaning of a *Dhātu* and consequently *Kriyā*

¹ नास्ति यो धातुः सङ्गतप्रत्ययोपजनितेन...मातिपदिकानामर्त्तानिर्गतिरेव...इत्य-
प्रधान एव भवति—*Nirukta*, p. 40.

is indirectly implied by *Nāman*. It has already been pointed out that *Nāman* too has *Dhātu* as its ultimate base. Now this radical element which exists in *Nāman* develops into a *Prātipadika* while followed by *kṛt*-suffixes. In this process of transformation it loses its power of directly expressing *Kriyā* and necessarily comes to denote a substance having number and particular genders.

Prātipadika or *Linga*, as it is called in the Katantra system, is defined as that crude form of word which, though significant by itself, is other than roots and detached from *vibhaktis*.¹ What is really implied by holding *Prātipadika* to be significant² is that each of those letters that go to constitute a word is not allowed to have the designation of *Prātipadika* (simply because of their meaninglessness). It is needless to repeat here as to how letters, though meaningless by themselves, give rise to words that are found to be significant. Śrīpati,³ the author of the Katantra *Parīṣiṣṭa*, explains the term *arthavat* as expressive of both existent and non-existent things, and states emphatically that by 'significant words' one should understand those words only which have the power of

¹ अर्थवद्वाचकप्रत्ययः प्रतिपदिकम्—Pāp., 1, 2, 45.

² अर्थवदिति व्यपदेशाय वर्णानां च ना भूदिति ।

—Mahābhāṣya under Pāp., 1, 2, 45

³ अर्थवदिति सती, सती-वार्थस्याभिधायकमुच्यते । यस्येत्निरपेक्षयाभिधानं, यत्तिरसि, तद्विज्ञायेनल्लेखं संज्ञा (मानप्रकरणात्).—Parīṣiṣṭa.

expressing the intended sense independently of others. But *Pratyayas*¹ from their very nature are only significant when they come in contact with *Prakṛti*. It is, therefore, inconsistent with the view that makes *Prakṛti* dependent on *Pratyaya* for its expressiveness.

The well-known commentator Gopinātha has raised an important question in connection with the import of the word *arthavat*. In an instance of absolute negation as, *śaśa-viṣāṇa*,² (the horns of a hare), he contends, there will be no *Prātipadika-samjñā*, as the expression does not convey any sense that is materially existent. But what we actually find is that the expressions like *śaśa-viṣāṇaḥ* and *ākāśa-kusumam*, etc., are used as regular *Padas* having *sup* added to them. This anomaly is afterwards explained by him in the following way:—There are two kinds³ of objects having transcendental or absolute and practical existence, according to the Vedānta standpoint; it is only *Brahman* that has real existence (*Pāramārthika-sattā*), the cosmic world exists only in our experience (*vyāvahārika-sattā*). Words like *ghaṭaḥ*, *paṭaḥ*, etc., signify objects that have popular existence, whereas the expressions, referred to above, denote things that have practically no material existence. In

¹ पञ्चमाक्षु नियोगतः प्रकृतौरनुगच्छन्नादर्थानपेक्ष्यैव स्यादर्थानभिदधानाः ।

—Kāt. Parīkṣiṣa.

² शशविषावादावनिधियस्मान्नात् लिङ्गसंज्ञा न प्राप्ता ।—*Ibid*.

³ अर्थी द्वि विविधः—परमार्थस्य परमाद्यासंघ, सामान्याद्यासंघ लिङ्गात्मविधाद्युक्तान् ।—*Ibid*.

grammar, we should remember, both of these classes of words are held to be significant, and as such, there is no bar to apply the *Prātipadika-samjñā* to them. The reason is this. It is not absolutely correct to say that the expression 'śaśaviṣṇaḥ' is absolutely meaningless, because the two constituents, namely, *śaśa* and *viṣṇa*, when taken separately, are found to have their own meanings as hare and horns, but what makes the sense inconsistent is the relation between the parts and the whole.¹ It must be, however, admitted that the above expression is not altogether meaningless, inasmuch as it might be appropriately used as an instance of 'absolute negation' or utter impossibility. Bhartṛhari² seems to have realised the fact when he says that words, no matter whether its meaning is existent or non-existent, are always found to produce certain cognition. Gopīnātha cites in support of his view the authoritative statement of Durgasiṃha and arrives at the conclusion by holding that meanings of words are cognisable objects, whether existent or non-existent.³

Patañjali has expressly made mention of two classes of *Prātipadikas*⁴—derivable and

¹ अनद्योच्चानयदानयनिव्यवहारीऽसन्नपि विप्रलब्धादिना वस्तुं पाठते ।

—Pariśiṣṭa.

² अन्वयासन्निरितिऽर्थे ज्ञानं शब्दः करोति हि ।—Vākyapadīya.

अतो वस्तुमासुतादिशब्दानां प्रातिपदिकत्वम् ।—Laghumanājñā.

³ अतएव टीकाकारोऽपि प्रतीयमानं वस्तुमात्रमेव इति सात्वतं प्रदाय सद्यश्चेति संशयात् ।—Pariśiṣṭa (Nāmaprakaraṇam).

⁴ उपादयोऽन्यत्पदानि प्रातिपदिकानि ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. III, p. 341.

underivable. The words formed by the so-called *uṇādi* suffixes are generally called underivable words. The underivable words are those that are not capable of being derived from the recognised roots according to the rules of grammar. That words formed by the *uṇādi* suffixes are underivable, is, as the *Vārttikas* maintain, known by the way in which Pāṇini has comprehended the *Prātīpadikas*. To keep up the scientific character of his system intact, Pāṇini did not think it worth while to make provision for supporting the correctness of this class of words that are too rigid and diverse to come under any grammatical generalisation. The so-called *uṇādi-sūtras* are not of Pāṇini's making, but usually attributed to the authorship of Śākaṭāyana, who is credited with having enunciated the doctrine of 'reducibility of all words to verbal roots.' Śākaṭāyana seems to have been a grammarian of great reputation whose doctrine was accepted by Yāska and some of the grammarians. As he was not in favour of such a doctrine that tends to make all *Nāmans*, without exception of even *Samjñā-śabda*, derivable from roots, Patañjali had but scanty regard for this old grammarian. This is clear from the way in which he has derived the word Śākaṭāyana (*Śakaṭasya tokaṃ*). According to the interpretation of Yāska, the underivable words are as good as *asamvijnāta-śabda*, because their accents, grammatical analysis and the radical elements cannot properly be determined by the

usual method of derivation. Of the three classes of words recognised by Durga, the so-called underivable words come under the category of *Prakalpyakriya-śabda*, as opposed to *Pratyakṣakriya*, inasmuch as in cases like these the radical element or the meaning thereof has to be supplied by means of inference. The words of this description, as they do not admit of regular derivation, should be derived on the analogy of words having likeness with them, either physically or psychologically. In deriving words like these, observes Patañjali, one is to supply either *Prakṛti* or *Pratyaya*, as the case may be.

The Naiyāyikas have classified *Nāmans* into four classes, namely, *rūḍha*, *lakṣaka*, *yogarūḍha*, and *gaugika*. The *rūḍha* or *saṃjñā-śabda* is a *Nāman* the meaning of which is fixed by *sanketa* or divine convention. The words belonging to this class are generally found to be restricted in their particular meanings, which are somewhat different from their derivative significance. The word *gauḥ*, for instance, though derived from the root *gam*—to go, does not mean ‘one that moves,’ but restricted to a particular sense (an animal possessing dewlap, hoofs, horns, etc.). Jagadīśa has made a further classification of *Samjñā*, such as, *naimittikī*, *pāribhāṣikī* and *aupādhikī*. Words, when they are used in a secondary significance distinct from the primary or natural one, are called *lakṣaka*. Generally, we have

recourse to *lakṣaṇā* or assume a special significance when the import of a sentence seems to be inconsistent with the primary significance (*mukhyārtha*). The usual meaning of the word *Gaṅgā*, as in the expression *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, is practically incompatible with that of *ghoṣa*, for *the current of water* is not likely to be the habitation of people. The word is, therefore, not used in its literal sense in the above instance. The word is necessarily taken to indicate the *bank* so as to render the import perfectly consistent with our experience. It must be carefully noted here that there is not a distinct class of words that are always used as *lakṣaka* and enumerated as such either by the grammarians or rhetoricians, the same word being used as *vācaka* in one expression and as *lakṣaka* in the other. There are certain words, as we have pointed out elsewhere, like *praviṇa*, *kuśala*, etc., which are seldom used in their primary or original sense (skilful in playing on lyre and one who takes the *kuśa*-grass), but have acquired a more generalised meaning (i.e., expert). The *yoga-rūḍha* words are those that possess in themselves two-fold significance—derivative and conventional. The word *pañkaja*, taken as a whole (*samudāya-śakti*), means a lotus; by the force of grammatical derivation (*avayava-śakti*) it means almost the same thing i.e., ‘anything growing in the mud’ (*pañka-janī-karīṛva*). Though substances other than lotuses are also found to grow in mud, the force

of convention has so restricted the sense of the word *paṅkaja* as to mean a lotus and not the aquatic moss. The *yaugika* words are so called because their meanings are the same as is expressed by their constituents, *i.e.*, *prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. The *yaugika* words, such as *kāraṇa*, *pāṭhaka*, etc., denote the same meaning as is usually signified by their component parts to which they might be dissolved by means of grammatical analysis. In view of the words like *maṇḍapa*, *mahārajata*, etc., some have recognised another class of *Nāman* called *rūḍha-yaugika*. The word *maṇḍapa*, unlike *paṅkaja*, has got two distinct meanings. When dissolved into parts, the word means 'one who drinks scum;' and when taken as a whole (*rūḍha*), it means 'a house.' Here the derivative meaning is materially different from the conventional one. In treatises on poetics we find a special class of words known as *vyañjaka*, *viz.*, suggestive. The Naiyāyikas as well as the older school of grammarians have not recognised *vyañjanā* as a separate *vṛtti*.

There is another way of classifying *Nāmans*, *i.e.*, according as they are restricted in their use in regard to numbers. There are some words in Sanskrit which are never used in the singular number; there are some having neither singular nor plural forms; again, there are others that have neither singular nor plural forms. Thus, number also has been made a criterion for the classification of words. Jagadīśa

has already shown the five¹ different varieties of *Nāmans* (according to their numbers), as suggested by Patañjali: (1) There are words like *eka*, *vimśati*, etc., which are always used in the singular number. (2) Words like *ubha*, *dvi*, *puspavant* (which means both the sun and the moon), *aśvin* (heavenly physicians), *rodasī* (meaning both earth and heaven) are used to denote dual number only. (3) Words like *prāṇa*, *tri*, *kati*, etc., are found in plural number only. (4) The word *ubhaya* is used in both singular and plural. (5) Words like *ghaṭa*, *paṭa*, *vṛkṣa*, etc., are allowed to have all the three numbers.

Having shown that all words are expressive of *Pratibhā* or ultimately serve to bring out intuition,² Bhartṛhari proceeds to discuss the meaning of words and refers to more than one philosophical view in this connection. The utterance of a word, some hold, brings out the sense of a thing only and not its particular form and inherent properties. No qualified cognition is possibly derivable from a word, i.e., what is signified by a word is only a thing without any qualifications. Just as certain words, namely, *dharma*, *svarga*, *devatā*, etc.,³ fail to present

¹ एकैकेन तथा द्वाभ्यां वचनैस्त्रिभिरेव च । सावाङ्मयप्रयुक्तानां नाम वचनविधं कृतम् ॥—*Śabdasaṅkṣiptaprakāśikā*, Kār. 35.

² यथावाच्यं प्रतिभाति; शब्दः सर्वोऽप्येव कृतः ।—*Vakya-padhyā*, 2, 119.

³ अमूर्त्यदेवताखनः समनाहर्गैवादिषु ।—*Ibid.*

before us any material form, so words like *gauḥ*, *aśvaḥ*, etc., do not convey the idea of any particular forms. But difficulty arises when we actually consider the meaning of words like *gauḥ*, and *aśvaḥ* which, as we know, denote objects along with their respective forms. The upholder of the view says in defence that the idea of a being having hump, hoofs and horns does not really follow from the word *gauḥ* itself, but cognition of the particular form is drawn from some other sources,¹ viz., common experience obtained from the use of words. The qualified knowledge (i.e., knowledge of the form) is far from being the meaning of a word. Some, again, hold the opposite view. As in some cases words are found to denote a class and sometimes individuals, it is only plausible to maintain that the meaning of a word cannot be an unqualified one. This view, however plausible, is rejected on the following grounds. There are no words that denote only a class, because the idea of individuals invariably comes in, as a class is inconceivable without a substratum (individuals). Again, a word denoting a class alone is not competent to convey the sense of individuals. The word *gauḥ*, for instance, is capable of denoting a class (*gotva*), but fails to bring out the particular

¹ प्रयोगदर्शनाभ्यासादाकारावयवस्तु यः ।

न स शब्दस्य विषयः स हि यजान्तरायवः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2.

form of a cow-individual.¹ Similarly, the word *ghaṭaḥ*² signifies only a thing (a pot) and does not imply the particular form with which the object generally comes to our cognition. Some hold, on the contrary, that the meaning of a word comprises in itself all possible cognitions about the thing denoted.³ According to this view, the meaning of a word is *saṁkalpaka*. The particular knowledge (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) of a thing presupposes a knowledge of its qualifications. Some philosophers have tried to show that knowledge of all descriptions is likely to be more or less qualified. Finally, a way is made out of these conflicting views. Some words are really found to be denotative of objects having particular forms and some (words like *devatā*, *svarga*, etc.) producing only formless or immaterial notions.⁴ Another point is then raised. There is no fixed meaning that is always signified by a word. The meaning of a word is so variant that we are hardly allowed to say *this is exactly the meaning of this word*.⁵ Just as a thing, though retaining its form unmodified, appears to be a different one owing to the defective organs through which it is perceived,

¹ न तान् व्यक्तिगतान् भेदाद्व्यतिशब्दीऽवलम्बते ।—*Vākyaspadhyā*, 2.

² घटादीनां न आकारान् प्रत्याययति वाचकः ।—*Ibid.*

³ समुदायोऽभिधेयः स्वाद्विवाक्यसमुच्चयः ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ आकारयन्तः संवेद्या व्यक्तवृत्तिनिबन्धनाः ।

ये ते प्रत्ययभासन्ते संविन्द्यात् स्वतोन्मया ॥—*Ibid.*, 2, *Kar.* 135.

⁵ नास्ति कश्चिन्निरयत एकः शब्दस्यार्थः—*Paṇḍarāja*.

so the meaning of a word seems to be variant according to the knowledge of the speaker and the person spoken to. It is not unfrequently that we meet with words which are taken in various senses by different men. The word *ghaṭaḥ*, for instance, might be used by the Vaiśeṣikas in the sense of *whole* (*acayacī*).¹ The Sāṃkhyaītes may take it as implying a *combination of qualities* and the Buddhists and Jainas as an *aggregate of atoms* and so on. What should we then do under these anomalous circumstances? Human knowledge is limited by nature. It is not possible for a man to know anything in its entirety. To realise the ultimate essence of a thing lies practically beyond the range of human intelligence and what is almost incontestable is that our knowledge and experience, as Bhartṛhari rightly observes, are in most cases liable to be inaccurate and imperfect. Arguing from an orthodox point of view one may say that the knowledge of ancient seers² (*Rṣis*), who are supposed to have visualised the ultimate reality underlying all phenomena, is free from all limitations and imperfections and that we should do well to know everything according to their observations, so as to get rid of this stupendous anomaly. But this is far from being the actual state of things. One cannot possibly use words strictly in conformity to the manner

¹ Paṇyārāja under the Vākyapadīya, Kār. 2. 137.

² अथोवा द्रष्टुं यच्च तस्मै किं विशदयिष्यतम्—*Ibid.*, 2. 141.

of these seers. But what experience goes to prove is that they are not even above imperfection and illusion, so far as the use of words is concerned. Puṇyarāja has quoted a verse¹ which seeks to establish similarity between a child and a learned man, since both of them, depending more or less on popular usage and figurative use, are liable to reveal the same ignorance in regard to the use and knowledge of words. Human knowledge, it must be remembered, is bound to be of different types, the same object being variously perceived by different men. Truth does not reveal itself to all persons. A man's intelligence, however sharp and far-reaching, does not help him in getting into the real nature of things. If we closely examine our experience, drawn from personal observations, we do not fail to see how often we are deceived by it. Knowledge, as it comes from experience (*cf.* Locke), is subject to error. Some concrete examples are put forward by Bhartṛhari to show a number of striking inaccuracies involved in our observations or experience.² To give one of them. Even those who are gifted with clear vision are found to say '*nīlam gaganatalam*,' though the idea of *talā* or lower surface is not at all compatible with an entity like sky that pervades the entire sphere.

¹ रूपस्य-व्यपदेशाभ्यां शौचिके वर्जनि स्थितौ ।
ज्ञाने प्रत्यभिलाषे च सदृशी कालपश्चिती ॥

² तलवद्गच्छति व्योम खद्योते च व्यवाञ्चय ।
न चैत्राणि तलं व्योमि न खद्योते द्रुताशनः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 142.

What course should, then, be adopted? As our observations are likely to be false and defective in most of the cases, we should not treat them as the basis of our experience, without examining their validity by means of reasoning.¹ Thus what is perceived directly by sense-organs requires to be fully determined by reasoning. Observations unaided by reasoning are not to be relied on as evidence at all. With regard to words the meaning whereof is indeterminable (*asamākhyeatattva*), we must depend on popular usage and use them accordingly. The meaning of words in general, says Puṇyarāja, is determined by one's own range of knowledge. The way in which he has brought this lengthy discussion to a close deserves particular notice. From an extreme *Advaita* point of view, *Padārtha*² has no material background and the relation in which a *Śabda* stands to its meaning (*artha*) is nothing but a false one (*adhyāsa*). This being the actual state of things, it is only idle to dilate upon a question like *Śabdārtha*.³

The determination of the precise meaning of *Nāman* is really difficult. The sense that is usually conveyed by the utterance of a word is regarded to be the denotation of *Prātīpadīkas*. A word and its meaning seem to be inseparably connected with each other; and whenever that word is uttered, the particular meaning is at

¹ तज्ज्ञातुं प्रत्यक्षमप्यर्थं विवक्षीयितुं युक्तिरुक्तः—Vākyaspadīya, 2.

² अथासौः सम्बन्धः पदार्थस्य एवेति निर्णयः—Puṇyarāja.

³ इत्यलं निर्देशादुक्तव्यप्रदर्शनेनेति—*Ibid*.

once comprehended. Now, what is actually denoted by the so-called *Prātipadikas*? The views that are held to solve this question may be brought under three distinct classes: (i) It is class that is denoted by all words. (ii) It is individual. (iii) It is an individual qualified by the class. It should be noted here that the Mīmāṃsakas are the upholder of the class theory. They maintain that all words signify class alone, the usual meaning of an individual arising on account of the mutual dependence of the class and the individuals. Among the grammarians, Vājapyāyana and Vyāḍi, as we find in the *Mahābhāṣya*,¹ held respectively class and individual as the meaning of words. The Naiyāyikas have, however, brought about a reconciliation between these two discordant views. They hold that it is neither class nor individual alone but individual qualified or conditioned by the class is what is really denoted by a word. The defect of the class theory, as pointed out by Jagadīśa² and others, lies in the fact that the cognition of an individual is not produced at all, if class alone is taken to be the meaning of all words. The individualistic theory is, on the other hand, open to such fallacies, as *endlessness* and *vagueness*.³

¹ *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, under the rule Pāp., 1, 2, 64.

² जालिनाये हि संकेतादालेखीनं सुदुष्करम्—*Śabḍasākti*, Kār. 19.

³ आनन्त्यादिभिर्वाच्यं तत्र सङ्केतः कर्तुं न युज्यते—*Kāvyaprakāśa*, under Kār. 10.

In view of the rules of the Aṣṭādhyāyī,¹ Patañjali observes, it appears that both the class and the individual were held to be the meanings of words by Pāṇini. It is further² held by some that gender, number, and *Kāraṇas* are also signified by *Prātipadikas*. There are, therefore, practically six different views with regard to the meaning of *Prātipadikas*. Koṇḍabhaṭṭa³ has made reference to five different views—(i) class, (ii) class and individual, (iii) class, individual and gender, (iv) class, individual, gender and number, (v) class, individual, gender, number and *Kāraṇas*. Gadādhara has also alluded to these five views. While we take such a wide view in regard to the denotation of a *Prātipadika*, we cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that *Pratyayas* necessarily become only indicative (*dyotaka*), if all possible meanings were assigned to *Prātipadikas* alone. The second view, i.e., both the class and the individual are meant by words, is explained by Patañjali in the following way: it is⁴ not at all reasonable

¹ किं पुनराकृतिः पदार्थे आहोस्त्रिद्वयम् ? उभयमित्याह । कथं जायते ? उभयवशात् आचार्येण सूत्राणि पठितानि । Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 6.

² स्त्रीर्षी द्रव्यं च लिङ्गं च संख्या कर्मादिरिव च । कर्मा पश्येन नामाचार्यस्यः केषां चिद्विधिताः ॥—Quoted by Gadādhara in his Vyutpattivāda.

³ एकं द्विकं त्रिकं चाद्य चतुष्कं पञ्चकं तथा । नामार्था इति सर्वेऽर्थो पद्याः शब्दे निरूपिताः ॥ Vākyākaratābbhāṣya, Kār. 25.

⁴ न आकृतिपदार्थिकस्य द्वे न पदार्थी द्रव्यपदार्थिकस्य आकृतिर्न पदार्थः । उभयोरुभयं पदार्थः । कस्यचित् किञ्चित् प्रधानभूतं किञ्चिद्गुणभूतम् । आकृति-पदार्थिकस्योपपत्तिः प्रधानभूता, द्रव्यं गुणभूतम् । द्रव्यपदार्थिकस्य द्रव्यं प्रधानभूतमाकृति-गुणभूतम् । Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 2. 64, p. 246 (Vol. I).

to maintain that words denoting a class are never found to express the sense of an individual and *vice versa*. But what appears to be exactly true is that both the class and the individual are signified by words. Examples are not wanting to show that a word which has a class as its meaning is also capable of denoting an individual, with this difference that in one case the sense of a class is directly obtained and that of an individual is only indirectly implied. Similar is the case with regard to words denoting individuals. Some grammarians have also explained this view from the Naiyāyika standpoint. They hold that the meaning of all words is *an individual qualified by the class*. There arises, however, some difficulty when one attempts to maintain gender, number and *Kāraka* also as the meanings of *Prātipadikas* themselves. It is almost like a grammatical fallacy to include gender, number and *Kāraka* within the meaning of *Prātipadikas*. According to this view, nothing is left to be expressed by *Pratyaya*. If we take *liṅga* as pertaining to word and explain the rules Pāṇ. 1.2.47. and 4.1.3. as referring to *Prātipadikas* denoting both masculine and feminine genders, *liṅga* also appears to be denoted by *Prātipadikas*. It is definitely stated in the *Liṅgānuśāsana* that *Prātipadikas* are expressive of *liṅga*. Nāgeśa also holds the same view. The way in which the rule Pāṇ. 4. 1. 4. has been explained by Patañjali makes it clear that *liṅga* is also denoted

by *Prātipadikas*, the suffixes like *ṭāp*, *nīp* being only indicative. The real difficulty arises in connection with number and *Kāraka*. Patañjali has explicitly stated elsewhere that oneness, duality, plurality, etc., as well as *Kārakas* are signified by case-endings. Moreover, the method of agreement and difference, as applied to the analysis of words into base and suffixes, shows that number and *Kāraka* should be taken as the meaning of *Pratyaya*. We have already pointed out the difficulty of arriving at a solution whether the entire meaning of a word is denoted by the base itself and the suffix serves only as an indicative or *vice versa*. Bhartṛhari seems to have doubt with regard to this position. He maintains that the case-endings are either indicative or really expressive of sense,¹ or the meaning is expressed by both *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya* in their combination.

An examination of the grammatical treatment of gender has been made in the Linguistic Speculation of the Hindus. *Prātipadikas*² form the base to which *Pratyayas* like *ṭāp*, *nīp*, are added. The grammarians³ failed to make a scientific treatment with regard to the problem

¹ योतिषा वाचिका वा द्युहित्वादीनां विभक्तयः । *Vākyapadiya, Kār.* 2. 165.

² प्रातिपदिकप्रज्ञप्तिकाः स्त्रियामिवनेन विहित्वाद्यादयः क्वचित् स्त्रीत्वं प्रकृत्यर्थविशेषकतया बोधयन्ति । *Vyutpattivāda*, p. 118.

³ उचितकः कलानौलि कलौषपि स्त्रियां इति; (.....) शब्दानामेकार्येऽपि लिङ्ग-वचनभेदः, द्वाराः कलत्वं भाव्येति । *Durga Sūtra on the rule लीकोपचारात् यङ्यसिद्धिः*—*Kalāps*, 23.

of gender. The popular conception of gender¹ had its origin in the distinctive features of sexes such as male and female. But it is very difficult to justify the grammatical use of genders simply on the evidence of physical characteristics. A *vrkṣa* or a *khaṭvā* does not possess, as Patañjali rightly observes,² such physical features as would justify its gender. Grammar had to depend so much on popular usage with regard to the determination of gender that it failed in most cases to give a scientific explanation. One turns to grammar in vain to explain the question of sex in words like *jyotsnā* and *nadī*. The fact that accounts for such usage should be sought elsewhere. It is rather a poetical fashion, which represents all that excite pleasurable sensations and exhibit female virtues (tenderness, loveliness, submissiveness, etc.) as females, that is to a certain extent responsible for attributing the female characteristics to the 'moon-beams' and 'current of water.' The word *uśas* seems to have its gender similarly fixed by a poetical outlook of nature. The seers of the Ṛk Veda,³ as they are often called *kavi* or *krāntadarśin* (one who has visualised the finality of a thing), were not wanting in poetical idealism when they described

¹ सप्तविंशतौ स्त्री साज्ञोभयः पुरुषः सृष्टः । Muhābhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 195.

² खट्वाण्यी न सिध्यतः । *Ibid.*

³ सूर्यो दीवीसूयसं रोचमानां नवीनं बीजानम्येति वक्षतः । Ṛk Veda.

Uṣas (dawn) as the beautiful wife of the Sun-god. This is, however, a tentative explanation, as it does not apply to all similar cases. Though a flower appears to be tender and graceful to our sentiment, the word *kuṣuma* is used in neuter gender only. There is so much laxity of the idea of sex in the use of gender that it would be a positive mistake to look upon grammatical genders strictly as an indication of sex. The words ¹ *dāra* and *kalatra* form another instance of the irregularity of gender. Though denoting the same thing, *viz.*, wife, they are so sanctioned by popular usage as to be used in masculine and neuter genders respectively. As in respect of our knowledge of *laukika līṅga*, we are guided more by popular usage than by conception of sex, Patañjali has repeatedly drawn our attention to the fact that the determination of genders from a scientific point of view lies almost beyond the jurisdiction of grammar.

Patañjali² has said it more than once that the popular use of gender is too rigid and fanciful to come under any general principle. The popular conception of sex has, therefore, very little to do with the grammatical use of gender.

¹ एकादशे शब्दान्तादुर्ध्वं लिङ्गमन्वत्यम् । *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. II, p. 196.
शब्दानामेकार्धेषु लिङ्गमन्वत्यम् । दाराः कथं भवन्ति । *Durga Sūtra* under
the rule लीङोपचरान्द्वयमिति :—*Kalāpa*, 23.

² तस्मान्न वैयाकरणैः सर्वं लीङ्गमन्वत्यम् । *Mahābhāṣya* on the
rule P80., 4.1.3.

Patañjali has, however, suggested two characteristic features of males and females on a more or less physiological ground.¹ According to this view, a female being is one wherein something is developed ; a male serves as the agent of production ; and that which represents an intermediate stage between these two aspects (development and production) is known as *napumsaka*. The popular conception of sex does not help us in the least when we try to explain the propriety of gender in *vṛkṣa* and *khaṭvā*.² These criteria are not even applicable to all cases, since production and development refer to qualities and not to persons.³ Both males and females are found to be the substratum of these qualities. What, then, should be the standard of making such a distinction between sexes ? Patañjali finally says that the desire of the speaker⁴ is what accounts for such use, *viz.*, when development or growth is intended to be implied, we take it as female and so on. Gadādhara is of opinion that the suffixes like *ṭāp*, etc., enjoined by the rules *striyām*, *ajādyataṣṭāp*, etc., are sometimes found to express *strītvā*, as an adjunct to what is denoted by the base. The grammatical use of *strītvā*

¹ संस्वानप्रसवी लिङ्गमास्तेष्वी स्त्रज्ज्ञानात् : । M. Bhāṣya., Vol. II, p. 197.

² स्त्रट्ठाङ्गो न सिध्यतः । *Ibid.*

³ कस्य पुनः स्नानं स्त्री प्रवृत्तिर्ना पुनान् ? गुणानाम् । *Ibid.*

⁴ विवक्षातः । संस्वानविवक्षायां स्त्री प्रसवविवक्षायां पुनानुसवीरविवक्षायां नपुंसकम् । *Ibid.*

does not necessarily bring out the idea of a female being. It is not logically correct to say that *strīva* is directly meant by such suffixes. The words *khaṭvā* and *vṛkṣa*, etc., form exception to the popular conception of gender. The addition of an adjective as *human being*¹ does not even remove the difficulty. The word *devatā* (though it means divine being—both male and female) is found to be used in feminine gender only. According to the grammarians,² *strī-pratyayas* are only indicative (*dyotaka*) and not expressive. The grammarians have comprehended gender also in the meaning of *Prātipadikas*. But Gadadhara³ does not fully agree with the grammarians. He maintains on the contrary that *strī-pratyayas* are only expressive of *strīva*. It is why *līnga* has been specially mentioned as distinct from *Prātipadikārtha* in the rule Pāṇ. 2. 3. 66. He is quite right when he says that the *strī-pratyayas* in words like *khaṭvā*, *aṭavī*, and *devatā* are absolutely meaningless.³

Just as in the Sāṃkhya doctrine of evolution, *Prakṛti* is held to be the primordial substance out of which the entire world, both material and intellectual, has sprung up, even so in grammar

¹ प्राचिन्नेन विशेषणोऽपि देवतादौ व्यभिचारात् । Vyutpattivāda, p. 116.

² स्त्रीप्रत्ययान्तु द्योतका एव । Ibid.

³ पुंस्त्वस्य प्रातिपदिकार्थत्वेऽन्यनक्तानां प्रातिपदिकपदानां स्त्रीत्वाद्यैकत्वे गौरवात् । साधयेनास्त्रीयतां स्त्रीप्रत्ययानां तदर्थकालकत्वं नीचिख्यात् । Vyutpattivāda, p. 119. and प्रत्ययानां तु तद्व्यञ्जकतामात्रमिति नैयाकरणेऽसङ्गं तत्र दुष्कम् । Śabdasaṃhiti under Kār. 54.

Dhātu represents the ultimate element wherefrom all possible forms of words have evolved. The verbal roots are the last result of grammatical analysis and form the real foundation of all verbal structure. The roots, very much like the atoms of the chemist, do not admit of further division; it is to such roots or phonological types that the *Nairuktas* and grammarians look for the starting-point in their process of derivation.

According to the *Root-theory*, as expounded by Śākaṭyāyana,¹ all words, even without the exception of proper names, are derivable from roots. *Dhātu* is significant by itself and is said to be the final germ of all word-forms. It denotes *Kriyā* or action (*dhātvarthaḥ kriyā*). Jagadīśa's classification of *Prakṛti* is essentially reducible to one, i.e., *Dhātu*, for *Prātīpadikas* or *Nāmans* too have roots as their final elements.

According to Yāska, the meaning of a verbal root is *bhāva*, i.e., action or *becoming*. *Bhāva* or *Sattā*, as we have already said, is the meaning of all roots. It is one and all-pervading, but seems to be manifold on account of its association with different *upādhis*. This *sattā*, though intrinsically one, has got such potency as to reveal itself into manifold form.²

¹ सर्वखाण्डातकानि नामानि । Nirukta.

² एव'भुतात्मनः; काश्चन जलतो विद्यन्ते येनैकैव सती तथा तथा विचित्रेषु रूपाणि प्रतिभासन्ते ।.....तथाहि सर्वमग्न्याग्निभूतत्वाद्वायोऽनेकविधकारप्रदर्शनवानर्थ-जलत्वा भवितात्वा; शक्तिः कार्यसिद्धादुपचरितत्वात्वा समस्तोद्यामनविदः ।

Halāraja under the Vākyapadīya, Kār. 8. 36.

According to the followers of the *Āgama*, Brahman, as Helārāja says, comprises all *Śakti* as its own self. *Avidyā*, which is only a *Śakti* of Brahman, is capable of showing innumerable modifications and appears to be manifold owing to its diversity of actions. The doctrine of Vārṣṇāyaṇi, as elucidated by Yāska,¹ shows clearly how *bhāva* or *mahā-sattā* manifests itself in six different aspects, namely, *jāyate*, *asti*, *vipariṇamate*, *varddhate*, *apakṣīyate* and *vinaśyati*. We must remember that every thing is liable to pass through these stages. These successive stages from production to final destruction are to be regarded as *vikāra* or modifications of *bhāva* which, under different *upādhis*, is called by so many different names. Helārāja² maintains that a thing by its very nature is first produced before it is said to be existent. The question of *vikāra* only comes in connection with *bhāva* or objects that are already existent. One *vikāra* or modification of a state into another does not retain its nature unchanged for a moment; *pariṇāma* or modification is immediately followed by growth and growth by decay and so on. This is exactly harmonious with the Sāṃkhya doctrine of

¹ यच्च भावविकारा भवन्तीति वार्ष्णाहयिर्जायते इति विपरिणमते वर्धते उपचीयते विनश्यतीति ।—Nirukta, p. 41.

² सशक्तिसाक्षात्प्राप्तं पूर्णं जायत इत्यवचीयते पश्चादस्तीति । यन्निश्चितस्य विकारापत्तिरिति विपरिणमते तच्च विपरिणमन् मुहूर्त्तमपि भावतिष्ठते इति वर्धते धानदमेन वर्धितव्यं ततोऽपचीयते ।

—Helārāja under Vākyapadiya, Kār. 8. 33.

pariṇāma. The whole world is in a flux of constant changes and nothing, as Patañjali¹ observes, remains in its own form unchanged for a single moment. There is no growth that is not followed by decay and no decay that is not attended with destruction. In this way everything undergoes a series of changes and loses its nature every moment.

Patañjali has suggested two definitions of *Dhātu* as *kriyāvacaṇo dhātuḥ* and *bhāvavacaṇo dhātuḥ* which practically mean the same thing, i.e., (i) a root is expressive of action; (ii) a root denotes *becoming* (*bhāva*). He observes further that the meaning of a root, i.e., action, is invisible and is only comprehended by inference. That a root signifies action is clear from the fact that the verbal forms like *pacati*, *gacchati*, etc., are found to have co-inherence (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) with *karoti*.² To be more clear, the meaning of all roots is capable of being expressed by the term *karoti*.

By the meaning of a root, Nāgeśa understands 'action that is attended with efforts and leads to the fruit.'³ In pursuance of the view of Patañjali, Koṇḍabhaṭṭa⁴ says that

¹ न होतुं कश्चित् स्थायिद्राव्यमि सुखसमवतिष्ठति । वनेते वा वायवदनेन वर्तितव्यमपायिन वा युज्यते ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. II, p. 191.

² कार्यं पुनर्जायते श्रिद्रावचनाः पचादय इति ? यदेतेषां करोतिना सामानाधिकरण्यात् । किं करोति ? पचति । किं करिष्यति ? पच्यति ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, under the rule Pān. 1, 3, 1.

³ कृत्वातुल्यो यत्रसद्विती व्यापारो धात्वर्थः ।—*Madhūṣa*,

⁴ कलव्यावारयोर्धातुरायदे तु तिङ्; धाताः ।—*Vaiyākaraṇabhāṣya*, 1, 1.

both the action (favourable to the result) and the fruit are expressed by roots and that the substratum alone is denoted by the suffix *tiś*. The Mīmāṃsakas hold, on the contrary, that the fruit alone is denoted by the root, the action being denoted by the suffix. But this view goes quite against that of the grammarians. The rule *Pāṇ.* 3.4.69., clearly shows that the suffixes like *tip* have nothing to do with the action (*vyāpāra*), but they simply indicate the agent, the object, number, etc. The followers of the Navya-Nyāya school maintain that the meaning of a root is *action favourable to the fruit*. According to this view, the verbal form *gacchati* means 'an action, i.e., movement, leading to the conjunction' (*samyoga*).¹

There is, however, certain difference in regard to the way in which the grammarians and the Naiyāyikas construe a sentence for the sake of deriving the verbal cognition (*śābda-bodha*). Both the Mīmāṃsakas and the grammarians arrange the words of a sentence in such a way as to render the action (*kriyā*) principal in a *vākyārtha*, with this difference that the former take action to be the meaning of suffixes, while the latter comprehend action as the signification of roots. The grammarians are expected to put the expression *Caitraśaṇḍulam pacati* in the form of a logical

¹ संयोगानुगुणव्यापारी गन्धात्वर्थः ।

proposition which will run thus: *Caitra-kartṛka-taṇḍula-karmaka-pākaḥ*, viz., 'the act of cooking which has Caitra as the subject and rice as the object.' The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, will bring out the meaning of the expression by such an arrangement of words as would make the meaning of *prathamānta-śabda* (words having first case-ending after them) as the principal one. According to their construction, the sentence will mean: *taṇḍula-karmaka-pākānukūla-kṛtimān Caitraḥ*: viz., 'Caitra is the substratum of action that is favourable for cooking rice or which has rice as its object.'

Pratyayas are held to be significant by the grammarians, though their expressiveness depends on their association with the base. *Pratyayas* are of different kinds and numerous. Jagadīśa has classified them under four heads: (i) *vibhakti* (*sup* and *tiṣ*), (ii) *pratyayas* like *nic*, *san*, *yañ*, etc., that form part of the root, (iii) *taddhita*, (iv) *kṛt*—suffixes. Of these, the *vibhaktis*, viz., *sup* and *tiṣ*, are primary suffixes and the rest are only secondary, the former being added to *Prātipadikas* and roots to denote number, whereas the latter, though coming after *Prātipadikas* and roots, have special signification. Both *sup* and *tiṣ* generally denote

विभक्तिर्यैव धातुशतद्वितः क्वदिति ज्ञेयात् ।

अवुर्धा मन्त्रवः श्रोतः आदिभिः पञ्चधात्वया ।

—Śabdasiaktiprakāśikā, Kār. 60.

number. *Sup* is, again, of two kinds¹—(i) *sup* as denoting *Kāraṇas*; (ii) *sup* as specially enjoined in conjunction with certain words (*Upapada-vibhakti*).

The author of the *Pārttika* has expressly stated that subject, object, instrumental, etc., as well as number (singular, dual and plural) are denoted by *sup*-terminations.² Patañjali has also lent his support to this view which is directly based upon such rules of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* as *Pāṇ.* 2.3.2. and *Pāṇ.* 2.3.18. The author of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*³ enumerates substratum, limit, object, relation or efficiency alone as the meanings of *sup*. It must be, however, remembered that the expressions current in a language are so varying and numerous that the above enumeration of meanings is found to be far from being accurate and exhaustive. The Naiyāyikas and the grammarians have tried their utmost in forming the definitions of *karmatva*, *kartṛtva*, etc., so as to render them applicable to all possible instances. But they could not successfully cope with the immensity of the task. A careful examination of some

¹ कारकादंतरायां च सुप् विधा च विभक्त्यै ।—*Śabdāśakti*, *Kār.* 67.

² सुपां कर्मादयोऽप्यर्थाः संख्या चैव तथा तिङ्गम् ।—*Mahābhūṣaṇa*, Vol. II, p. 58. सुपां संख्या चैवार्थः कर्मादयश्च ।

कर्मत्वादयो विभक्त्यर्थाः (and एकादादयो विभक्त्यर्थाः) ।

³ आश्रयोऽवधिरुद्देशः सम्बन्धः शक्तिरेव वा ।

यथायच्च विभक्त्यर्थाः सुपां कर्मणि नाथतः ॥

—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, *Kār.* 24.

instances will make it clear that the meanings of the *sup*-terminations are manifold. We may hold without going into minute details that the *substratum* is the meaning of the accusative, the instrumental and the locative. *Karman* is the substratum of the fruit resulting from action. In connection with *Kriyā* and *Kāraka* two things are to be specially noticed—action (*vyāpāra*) and the fruit resulting from it (धातृपात्तश्चापारजन्मफलम्).

In an expression like 'Devadatta is going to the village', the action, *i.e.*, movement, resides in Devadatta, while the fruit produced by such action, *viz.* conjunction, accrues to the village. In the same way *Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa* may also be shown as what denote the substratum of action. Now what we like to impress is that the second case-ending, as shown above, does not only denote *substratum* but has manifold significance. In the *Vyutpattivāda*, Gadādhara has elaborately dealt with the meaning of *vibhaktis*. We propose to give here only a few instances from the *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* and the *Vyutpattivāda*.

On the strength of the rule *Pāṇ.* 2.3.2., Gadādhara observes that the second case-termination signifies *karmatva*, *i.e.*, the state or quality of possessing the fruit resulting from an action (*kriyājanyaphalaśālitvam*). Generally speaking, *ādheyatva* or the state of being the subsistent is the meaning of the second case-termination, as shown in the foregoing examples,

but it has other meanings also. In the sentence¹ *ghaṭaṃ jñāti, viṣayatva* or 'the state of being the object of cognition' is directly implied by the second case-termination, while *limit* is denoted by the same case-ending in *ārabhya tasyāṃ daśamīm ca yāvat*. Again, the second case-ending is also found to signify *vidheyatva* or *uddeśyatva* in connection with roots meaning 'to infer,' as is evident from the example *vahnim-anuminomi*.² In *taruṇ tyajati khagaḥ*, the *dvitīyā-vibhakti* means separation (*vibhāga*), and *adhikaraṇatva* in an instance like *Kāśīmanuvasati*. Thus we find that *ādheyatva*, *uddeśyatva*, *avadhītva*, *vidheyatva*, *nirūpitatva*, (as in *māmantaṛeṇa*³), *pratiyogitva*, *anuyogitva* (as in *daṇḍam vinā*) are all denoted by the second case-ending.

It should be also noticed that *vibhaktis* fall under two classes in grammar. *Kāraka* or case-terminations and *Upapada-vibhakti*, the former denoting *Kāraka* and the latter coming only when certain words are added and have no connection with *Kriyā*. When these two classes of *vibhaktis* are simultaneously applicable in regard to an instance like *namaskaroti devān*, the *Paribhāṣā*⁴ enjoins that case-terminations will have preference to *Upapada-vibhaktis*.

¹ घटं जानातीत्यत्र विषयत्वं विदधिता वा द्वितीयाद्यर्थः—Śabdośakti.

² वहनित्यर्थकधातुयोर्मि विधेयत्वमुद्देश्यत्वं वा द्वितीयाद्यर्थः—Vyutpattivāda, p. 55.

³ अन्तरान्तरेण-युक्ते इति द्वितीयाद्या निरूपितत्वमर्थः—Ibid. p. 77.

⁴ उपपदविभक्तेः कारकविभक्तिर्प्रीवसी ।

The rule *Pāṇ.* 2.3.18. implies that both the agent and the instrumental having relation to *Kriyā* are primarily denoted by the third case-ending. Durgasiṃha observes that in sentences like *prakṛtyā cāru* (beautiful by nature) the word *prakṛti* may be taken as denoting the instrumental (*karana*) in connection with such a verbal form as *bhāvati*¹ that is to be supplied to make the sense complete. In *daṇḍena ghaṭaḥ* (which is admittedly an instance of *hetu*) the third case-ending, as Jagadīśa² maintains, indicates *karaṇatva*, though it is not regarded as a *Kāraṇa* on the ground of its having no relation with action. In *ghaṭatvena jānāti*, *tṛtīyā* implies *prakāratā* or the state of being an adjective. As both subordination³ to the action of the agent as well as a cause⁴ associated with action are denoted by the third case-ending, Gadādhara arrives at the conclusion that it has a two-fold⁵ signification. This view is quite analogous to the statement of Bhartṛhari.

Substratum or recipient is said to be the general meaning of the third and seventh

¹ प्रकृत्यादीनामपि करणत्वमस्ति भवतीत्येवमागन्ताम् ।—*Ibid* under the rule येन शियते तत् करणम्—*Kaśīpa*, 218.

तथा ह्यभिप्रेतमवली प्रकृतिः करणम्—*Ibid*.

² दण्डेन घट इत्येवापि तृतीयाद्यः करणत्वम् । परन्तु तत्र कारकं विधानमविवक्षितम् ।—*Śabdasaṅkṛti-prakāśikā*.

³ व्यापारे कर्तृव्यापाराधीनत्वं निवेशनीयम् ।—*Vyutpattivāda*, p. 85.

⁴ करणत्वं तृतीयाद्यः, तच्च व्यापारवत्करणत्वम् ।—*Ibid*.

⁵ वस्तुतः समन्विष्टाहुतकर्तृव्यापाराधीनत्वे व्यापारवत्करणत्वे च तृतीयाद्याः शक्तिरयम् ।—*Vyutpattivāda*, p. 85.

case-endings. From the very definition of *kartyatva* and *adhikaravatva*, it appears that both the agent and *adhikarava* are, as a rule, regarded as the substratum of action (*kriyāśrayatva*). The difference between them lies in the fact that the agent is directly connected with a *Kriyā*, while *Adhikarava* connects itself with a *Kriyā* only indirectly, i.e., through the medium of either the subject or the object. This is quite clear from the definition of *Adhikarava* as suggested by Bhartṛhari.¹

The fourth case-ending denotes *Sampradāna*, i.e., implies the purpose (*uddeśya*). This sense is obtained from the expression *yamabhipraiti* in the rule Pāṇ. 1. 4. 32. The fourth case-ending also indicates *ādheyatva*, as in *maitrāya vacate* and *viṣayitva* in such instances as *Caitrāya kupyati*, *puṣpebhyah sprhayati*.

The fifth case-ending denotes *avadhi* or limit of separation. It also means *janyatva* or the state of being a product, as in *dharmādutpadyate sukham*. Here virtue is the cause that produces happiness as its effect. Sometimes it implies substratum and place of origination as, in *valmīkāgrāt prabhavati* and *himavato Gaṅgā prabhavati*. It is not grammatically correct to use the word *dhruva* in its literal sense, i.e. 'motionless,' as in that case one fails to support *Apādāna-kāraka* in the example

¹ कर्तृकर्मव्यवहितामवाचाद्व्यवहारतु मियान् ।

उपकुर्वन्तु विवासिद्धौ शालेऽधिकरणं शूलम् ॥—Vākyapadīya.

dhāvato aśvāt patitaḥ where the limit of separation is far from being motionless. But Patañjali has taken a peculiar position. He maintains that in *dhāvato aśvāt patitaḥ* (fallen from a running horse) 'the state of being a horse' and the swift motion are to be considered as *dhruva*.¹

The genitive implies *sambandha*; it is said to have various meanings. The relation is of various kinds. It is to be particularly noticed here that *sambandha*, as is denoted by the genitive, is excluded from the category of *Kāraka*² and *śaṣṭhī* is not treated as a case-termination (as it has no direct connection with the action).

After showing the different meanings of case-terminations, the grammarians have finally arrived at the conclusion that efficiency or *Śakti* alone is denoted by all case-endings.³ It has already been pointed out in these pages that all objects of thought, as are denoted by words, represent but different manifestations of *Śakti*,⁴ and that time, space, action, and *Kāraṇas* are only various forms of *Śakti* which pervades the entire world of thought. The inconceivable

¹ बद्धेऽवत्वमायुगमिदं तद्वत्त्वं तच्च विवक्षितम्—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I. p. 327.

² सम्बन्धो न कारकं, न वा तदर्थिकापि षष्ठी कारकविभक्तिः—Śabdāśakti-prakāśikā, under *Kār*, 67.

³ शक्तिर्विशक्तिवाचा ।—Helārāja on the Vākyapadīya, *Kār*, 3. 13.

⁴ निमित्तमेवादेकैव निद्रा शक्तिः प्रतीयते । योदा कर्तृत्वमेवावृणोत्यपि निवन्धनम् ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. 37, p. 199.

force that brought this universe into existence and whereby everything is being regulated is considered to be an inexhaustible and perpetual reservoir of *Śakti* or efficiency revealing itself through diverse objects. What is called life or conscious principle is ultimately an emblem of this all-pervading force. According to this view, therefore, everything is made up of *Śakti* or essentially a congregate of efficiency. This *Śakti* is, again, said to be either identical with, or different from, the object wherein it inheres.

Substratum¹ (*i.e.*, the agent and the object) is said to be ordinarily meant by *ākhyāta*-terminations. We have already said that *action* as well as *fruit* are expressed by roots (*phala-vyāpārayordhātuh*). Udayana² maintains that *effort* (*yatna*) *favourable to action* is the meaning of all *ākhyātas*. A root, some hold,³ signifies only *effort* and *ākhyāta* denotes the favourable action, the sense of effort being derivable by means of inference. Some hold that *tin*-terminations express action (*vyāpāra*) and do not actually signify the agent. The grammarians, however, do not agree with them; for whenever a verbal form is used, the subject is at once comprehended. The

¹ धातुमकृतिकतिङां कर्तृकर्मण्येव आशयोऽर्थः । तत्र कर्तरि व्यापाराद्ययः, कर्मणि फलाद्ययः । धात्वर्थमावाप्तुवादकस्तु भावे तिङ्—*Mañjūśā* (नित्यवैयर्थ्यम्) again आशये तु तिङः सूत्राः—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*.

² भावनेव हि यत्रात्मा सर्वव्यापकश्च गीचरः ।—*Kusumāñjali*, 5. 9.

³ धातुना यत्रः प्रतीयते, व्यापारतस्तु आनुकूलव्यापारभावार्थकत्वमाद्येवादेव च व्यवहृतम् ।—*Ibid.*, 7. 18.

Mīmāṃsakas¹ hold that *bhāvanā* or action is practically denoted by *iñ*-suffixes,² the subject being cognisable by means of *arthāpatti*. The grammarians have rejected this view on the following ground:—if action or *bhāvanā* is to be regarded as the meaning of terminations, there would be no idea of action in *bhoktavyam* which has got no *ākhyāta* suffix immediately following it. The rule Pāṇ. 1.3.9. is also an indication that roots are expressive of action. According to Kātyāyana, it is the root that expresses action and not the termination; for in *pacati* and *apākṣit* the meanings of the suffixes are varying, whereas the root *pac* with its significance remains practically the same. By the application of the method of agreement and difference it is possible to determine the distinct signification of both bases and suffixes.³ It is further held that number, time, *Kārakas* and action are generally denoted by *ākhyātas*. The expression⁴ ‘*Caitra* is going to the village’ means accordingly an action favourable for the present conjunction of the agent who is one and non-different from *Caitra* with the object that is non-different from (or identical with) the village.

¹ मञ्जुनिघाः—उल्लेखार्थं धात्वर्थः व्यापारः, प्रत्ययार्थः ।

² संख्यायां कारणे नोपौ विभज्या हि प्रवर्तते ।

उभयं चात्र तत् सिद्धं भावना तिल्-विभक्तिः ॥ (Kārttradhikaraṇa).

³ सिद्धं तन्वद्वयतिरेक्याम्नाम्—Yār.

⁴ एवमेव चिद्वचनैवाभिन्नकर्तृत्वो वर्तमानकालिको यामाभिन्नकर्मनिष्ठो यः संधीयन्तद्वद्वचनो व्यापारः ।

According to the Naiyāyikas, *lakāras* imply the agent, time and number. *Laṭ* means present time (*vartamāna*). There is also doubt whether the sense of *lakāras* is expressed (*vācya*) or suggested only. Bhaṭṭoji seems to be in favour of the expressiveness of *lakāras*. *Liṭ* is used to denote *pāroḥṣya*, viz., the state of being invisible, or imperceptibility of action. When *liṭ* is used in the first person, sometimes we have a peculiar meaning. The expressions सुप्तोऽहं किं विललाप, नाहं कलिङ्गं जगाम, etc., are intended to show that the speaker was either in a sleeping mood or in a state of oblivion. *Loṭ* means almost the same as *liṭ*, that is, injunction, invitation, etc., or, in one word, inducement (*pravarttanā*).

There are certain suffixes like *kyac*, *kyan*, *kāmyac*, *san*, *yan*, which appear to be the last part of a root. These are called secondary suffixes ; they have either *Nāman*¹ or *Dhātu* as their bases. The suffixes like *kyac*, *kyan* are added to *Nāmans* (*nāmadhātu*), while *san*, *yan*, etc., come after roots (*dhātvantāvayavarūpaḥ*).

It is not correct to say that the *taddhita*-suffixes, as a rule, have *Nāman*² as their bases, because case-endings as well as suffixes like *kyac*, etc., are also added to *Nāmans*. By *taddhita*,³ Jagadīśa understands those suffixes

¹ नामप्रकृतिकस्यार्थं चातुप्रकृतिकस्य—Śabdasaṅkṣipti, Kār. 109.

² नामप्रकृतिको नैवमन्तिव्याख्यादिदोषतः— Ibid. 110.

³ विभक्तिधार्तव्यप्रकृत्योऽप्यः प्रत्ययसहितम्— Ibid.

that are distinguished from *vibhaktis* (*sup* and *tiñ*), suffixes that form the last part of roots and *kṛt*-suffixes. The *taddhita* suffixes are of different kinds. We give below only a few specimens of these suffixes:—(i) some of them are patronymic suffixes (*apatyārtha-pratyaya*), as, *aṇ*, *iṇ*, etc. (*kaurava*, *aupagava*); (ii) some express modification as, *āśma* (modification of stone); (iii) some express colouring; (iv) some denote one's deity (*sāśya devatā*) as, *Śaiva* (one who has Śiva as his adorable deity); (v) some denote one's place of residence; (vi) some express one's possession, as, *gomān* (one having cows); (vii) some denote a collection, as *yauvatam* (an assemblage of young ladies); (viii) some are expressive of time, as *māsika* (continued for a month). From a grammatical point of view, the *taddhita*-termination *aṇ* in *aindram haviḥ* is used to express (*sāśya devatā*) the clarified butter which is offered to Indra as the deity. Koṇḍabhaṭṭa says that the suffix *aṇ* in such a case means 'what is to be offered to a deity' (*devatā-viśiṣṭam deyam*). In the above instance, *deyam* or what is to be offered is used substantively and the deity to whom such an offering is made appears to be attributive.² According to another view, both the deity and the substance to be offered are the meanings of the suffix.

¹ द्वित्वनिमित्तं देवं प्रत्ययार्थः—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*.

² प्रत्ययार्थस्त्वैकदेशे प्रकृत्यर्थो विधीयमानः—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, Kār. 52.

It is also held that the base denotes the deity and the suffix expresses the offering.¹

Bhāva (*Sattā*) or existence is what is expressed by all *Prātipadikas*. This *sattā* is the same as *sumnum genus* (*mahāsāmānya*²) which permeates through the world, only cognisable as differentiated in different individuals. It is expressed by all words; it is signified by all *Prātipadikas*, roots and suffixes like *tva* and *tal*. These two suffixes generally express the idea of a class and sometimes indicate existence or the ultimate reality of things. Patañjali has clearly shown what is precisely denoted by the suffixes *tva* and *tal* while commenting on the two *Vārttikas* on the rule Pan. 5. 1. 119. Koṇḍabhāṭṭa says in the beginning that the signification of the two *taddhita* suffixes, i.e., *tva* and *tal* (expressing 'the state of becoming,' or quality, or property) has been fully discussed by Bhartṛhari in his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* (which is no longer available). The drift of his statement is as follows: the suffixes *tva* and *tal* are added to *kṛdanta*, *samāsānta* and *taddhitānta* as expressive of relation.³ 'The expression of relation' is the sole purpose that is served by the addition of these two suffixes. The following

¹ ईषतायां प्रदिवे च सुखं यः शक्तिरस्य वा।—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*.

² सम्बन्धिनिदानं सत्त्वेन निवृत्तानां गवादिषु। जातिरित्युच्यते तथा सद्यः शब्दा व्यवस्थिताः। तां प्रतिपदिताये च धातये च प्रचक्षते। सा निष्ठा सा महानाया तानाहुस्तथादयः।—*Vākya-padīya*, 3. 34.

³ ज्ञानवृत्तिसमासिभ्यः सम्बन्धाभिधानं भावप्रत्ययिनामस्य दृष्टमिति—*व्याख्यामिश्रितसम्बन्धेभ्यः*।—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, under *Kār.* 49.

instances will make the point clear. In *rājapuruṣatva* a relation between the king and the servant; in *pācakatva* a relation between an action and the agent; in *aupagavatva* a relation between the father and the son is denoted and so on. Kaiyaṭa observes that when the word *gauḥ* is used to denote only a class (*gotva*), these suffixes would then imply only 'the form of a word' (*Śabda-svarūpe bhāva-pratyaya*),¹ but when it is used to express only an individual, the suffixes would then necessarily imply a *class* that would serve as an attributive. The terminations denoting an abstract idea, as in *sato bhāvaḥ sattā*,² are generally used to indicate a class. Kaiyaṭa³ finally concludes that *sattā* or existence is the only meaning of such suffixes (*bhāva-pratyaya*).

There are two *Vārttikas* which throw much light on the meaning of *bhāva*. The first *Vārttika*⁴ is intended to imply that the suffixes *tva* and *tal* are used to express that outstanding property (*guṇa, jātī*) or the ultimate reality of a thing) by virtue of the possession of which a thing generally gets its particular designation or name. According to this interpretation, what accounts for the use of a word in a particular

¹ गशद्वयः शब्दा यदा जातिमात्रवाचिनशदा तेभ्यः शब्दस्वरूपे भावप्रत्ययः ।

—Kaiyaṭa.

² सत्तेति जातादिव भावप्रत्ययः ।

³ तस्मात् सर्वेषु पदार्थेषु निवृत्तसम्बन्धिनो सत्तेव भावप्रत्ययवाच्यः ।

⁴ सिद्धं तु यत् कुत्रच भावाद्भवे शब्दनिवेशस्तदभिधाने ल-तलो ।

—Vār. under the rule Pāp., §. 1. 119.

sense is the inherent properties (*guṇa*, *jāti*, etc.) of the object denoted (*pravṛttinimitta*). The Naiyāyikas hold that these suffixes are added to words (as *ghaṭatva*, *manuṣyatva*, etc.) to express the idea of a class. As the Naiyāyikas usually comprehend the individual with direct reference to the class to which it belongs, they are apt to speak of a *ghaṭa* as *ghaṭatvāvacchinna*, i.e., the concept of *ghaṭa* as conditioned or qualified by that of the genus (*ghaṭatva*). It is almost evident that the meaning expressed by *tva* and *tal* seems to be as good as a qualifying attribute in relation to the meaning of the base to which they are added. This is exactly what is meant by Koṇḍabhaṭṭa when he states *prakṛtyartha-prakāratām*.¹ According to the second *Vārttika*,² the meaning of a word is exactly what it signifies by the force of its natural expressiveness. The word *gauḥ*, for instance, has *gotva* as its *pravṛttinimitta*, or the object for which it is used. Here *śabda* itself, with its meaning as denoted by the suffixes *tva* and *tal*, acts as an attributive. The sense denoted by a word serves as an instrument so far as the use of that word (for the purpose of expressing the sense) is concerned. That it is the same with the knowledge of the meaning is also sufficiently clear from

¹ प्रकृतिलिङ्गव्यवहारे प्रकाटी भावः ।—Bhaṭṭoji under the rule Pāp., 5. 1. 119.

² यद्वा सर्वं भावाः स्तेन भावेन भवन्ति च तेषां भावशब्दभिधाने ।—Vār., under Pāp., 5. 1. 119.

Gaṅgeśa's definition of *Śabdaprāmāṇya*¹ or the trustworthiness of *Śabda*.

Kṛt-suffixes have roots as their bases. Those that are used in the active and passive voices denote respectively the *agent* and the *object*.² The suffixes like *ghaṇ*, *ktin*, etc., generally express *bhāva* (action). *Bhāva* denoted by a suffix like *ghaṇ* is accomplished (*siddha*). The word *pākaḥ* is found to require a verbal form as *bhavati* and has both number and gender. Patañjali³ has shown two-fold *bhāva*—*bāhya* and *ābhyantara*. *Bhāva* denoted by suffixes like *ghaṇ* is called *bāhya* and that denoted by suffixes as *tumun*, etc., is denominated as *ābhyantara*. *Kriyā* or action manifests itself in two different forms, namely, *siddha*⁴ or accomplished and *asiddha* or unaccomplished; the former means an action like *gamana* that is accomplished, i.e., cessation of movement, and the latter indicates the continuity of action as *gacchati*. A *bhāva* when accomplished and followed by a *kṛt*-suffix seems to be as good as a substance and in consequence of such materialisation it comes to have gender

¹ प्रयोगश्चित्तुमुक्तार्थतत्त्वज्ञानजन्यः शब्दः प्रमाणम्—Tattvacintāmaṇi—*Śabdakhaṇḍa*, Vol. I, p. 1.

² कर्तृवस्तैविहितकृतता कर्तृवस्तैवो वाच्ये—Mañjuśā, लक्ष्यैर्निर्दिष्टवचनम्, p. 108.

³ Mahābhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 177.

⁴ क्रियायाः सिद्धतावस्था साक्षादवस्था च कीर्तिता ।

सिद्धतां द्रव्यमित्यस्ति तत्रैवेत्यस्ति शब्द-विधिम् ॥—Vākyapadīya.

साध्यत्वेन क्रिया तत्र घातुदणनिवन्धना ।

सिद्धभावस्तु यत्तस्याः स यथादिनिवन्धनः ॥—Vaiyākaraṇaprabhūṣaṇa.

and number and is finally treated as a *Kāraka* in relation to some other verbal forms, as *gamanam karoti*. This is the import of the grammatical dictum¹ (कृदभिहितो भावो द्रव्यवत् प्रकाशते) which clearly states that an action (*bhāva*) expressed by *kṛt* suffixes appears to be just like a substance and thus deserves all the functions of a *Prātipadika*. *Kṛtya* (*tavya*, *anya*, etc.) and *khalārtha-pratyayas*, when used to express *bhāva*, denote an action that is unaccomplished. Similar is the case with the suffix *kta* when used to denote *bhāva* only. In an instance like *edhitavyam*, it must be borne in mind that there is no desire for any other verb to make the sense complete. Patañjali² has clearly shown the difference between *bhāva* as expressed by *tiṣ* and *kṛt* suffixes, the former suggesting the idea of time and person and the latter producing the sense of a thing. There is another way of distinguishing them, as *bhāva* denoted by *tiṣ* is generally connected with the agent, while *bhāva*, as expressed by *kṛt*, is not similarly related to the agent (*pacati* gives the idea of an agent but *pākaḥ* simply means the action, i. e., cooking). Words formed by a number of *kṛt* suffixes such as, *tuman*, *ktvāc*,

¹ Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., सार्वधातुके षच्—3. 1. 67.

² अस्ति विशेषः कृदभिहितस्य भावस्य तिङ्भिहितस्य च । तिङ्भिहितेन भावेन कालपुरुषोपपत्तौ अभिव्यज्यते, कृदभिहितेन पुनर्न व्यज्यते... तिङ्भिहितो भावः कर्त्ता संग्रह्यते, कृदभिहितः पुनर्न संग्रह्यते ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. II, p. 67.
and क्तिवाभिनिरूपयतीत्युच्यते । कृदन्तस्य क्तिवोपपत्तौ यदा भ्यात् ।

संख्याविभक्त्यवशिष्टशक्तौ भावस्तदा द्रव्यमिवोपपत्त्यः ।—Bṛhaddevaṣā,

namul, etc., are grammatically treated as indeclinable (*avyaya*). These forms,¹ better known as *avyaya-kṛt*, denote *bhāva* as distinct from substance (*asattvabhūta-bhāva*) and have no regular number and gender. The verbal forms having *ktvā* and *tumun* are generally used as adjunct in relation to those that follow them. So far as the suffix *ktvā* is concerned, the two *kriyās* are related to each other, as both of them have got the same subject and stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority. On the authority of the rule Pān., 3. 3. 10, Nāgeśa holds that *tādarthya* as implying a purpose is also indicated by *tumun*. In accordance with this view, the expression *Kṛṣṇam draṣṭum yāti* will mean *one's movement for the purpose of seeing Kṛṣṇa*.

¹ Mañjūśā, Kṛdarthanirūpaṇam, pp. 1068-84.

CHAPTER VII

KĀRAKA

Kāraka—its definition—*Śakti* manifested as *Kārakas*—
different forms of *Kārakas*.

Closely connected with the meaning of case-terminations is the function of *Kārakas*. *Kāraka*, as the very term implies,¹ is intimately related to *Kriyā* or action. The idea of *Kāraka* is dependent on that of *Kriyā*. It is its relation with *Kriyā* that determines the nature of a *Kāraka*. *Kriyā*, which plays so important a part in the determination of *Kārakas*, is, as Patañjali² observes, denoted by roots and is invisible, formless and only comprehensible by means of inference.

Generally speaking, *Kriyā* means action (*vyāpāra*). *Kriyā* implies, some hold, action, effort (*kṛti* or *yatna*) and result (*phala*). There is a peculiar combination of these three in the grammatical conception of *Kriyā*. *Kriyā* is, after the grammarians, an action accompanied with effort and leading to the result. According to Udayana,³ the meaning of a root is

¹ क्रियां करोतीति कारकम् and क्रियान्वितं कारकम् ।

² धात्वर्थः क्रिया । क्रियान्वनी धातुः । क्रिया नानियमवन्तापरिहृता.....
साक्षादनुमानमन्या ।—*Mahābhāṣya* under the rule Pāp., 1. 3. 1.

³ यत्र एव कृतिः पूर्वा, परस्मिन् सैव भावना ।—*Kusumāñjali*, *Kār.* 6. 8.

effort (*yatna*) producing an action. When this exertion is directed towards the production of the result, it is called *bhāvanā*, as is denoted by the *ākhyāta*-suffix. Durga¹ has defined *kriyā* as what appears to possess both prior and posterior parts. The process of inference whereby *Kriyā* is usually comprehended has been clearly illustrated by Patañjali.² Sometimes, when all the requisites of cooking, such as pot, fuel and fire, are actually present, we are not allowed to say *pacati*, until there is a particular effort indispensably necessary for the purpose. This sort of effort (*sādhana*) without which nothing is accomplished is called *Kriyā*.³ A *Kriyā*, like *pacati*, consists of many parts all of which, viewed as an undifferentiated whole, tend to produce the same result.⁴ From a grammatical point of view, *pacati* means a group of actions, namely, to place a pot on the fire-place, to set fire to, to throw fuel on and the like. As synonymous with *ihā*, *yatna*, etc., *Kriyā* comes within the scope of quality and as such pertains to things.

There are various agents (*sādhana*) whereby actions are generally performed; these agents, whether directly or indirectly related to action

¹ कियत इति क्रिया सा च पूर्वापरौभूतावयवैव ।—Under the rule *Kalāpa*, 9 (*ākhyāta*).

² इह सर्वेषु साधनेषु सन्निहितेषु कदाचित् पचतीत्येतद्वयति कदाचित् भवति ।
—*Mahābhāṣya* under *Pāṇ.*, 1, 4, 23.

³ यस्मिन् साधने सन्निहिते पचतीत्येतद्वयति सा कृत् क्रिया ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ यद्यभूतेरवयवैः समूहः क्षमलक्षणात् ।

वृद्धा प्रकल्पितामिदः सा क्रियेत्यभिधीयते ।—*Vākyapadīya*.

(*Kriyā*), are grammatically called *Kārakas*. There are, therefore, as many *Kārakas* as there are *sādhana*s in relation to a particular action. In conformity with the interpretation of Durga,¹ *Kriyā* is immaterial and formless ; it comes under our comprehension only through the medium of *Kārakas*. *Kriyā*, like *guṇa*, is an inherent property lying dormant in all things, but gets itself manifested when objects are in operation to produce some sort of result. As the action denoted by the verbal form *patati* comprehends four things, namely, tree, leaf, ground and wind, we have in such a case as *vāyunā vrkṣāt paṇam patati bhūmau* precisely four *Kārakas*, according to their relation to the particular action (falling). The tree, for instance, which indicates the limit wherefrom the leaf falls down is called *Apādāna-kāraka* ; the leaf that falls down and is thus primarily associated with the action is named *Kartṛ-kāraka* ; the ground which forms the *substratum* of action is known as *Adhikaraṇa-kāraka* ; the wind that causes the leaf to fall is termed *Karaṇa-kāraka*, or instrumental. The name of each *Kāraka*, as shown above, is thus suggestive of the relation in which a *Kāraka* stands to a *Kriyā*. Nāgeśa² has dwelt at length on the definition of *Kriyā* as suggested by

¹ अमूर्ता हि क्रिया निरुपाया सा हि कारकैरनित्यवस्थाना कारकधरीरे
वस्तुनी शक्यते निरुद्ध्यम् ।—*Nirukta*, p. 38.

² सर्वकारकाणां धारणेऽन्यथः ।—*Laghumañjari*, p. 544.

Bharṭṛhari. He begins with the statement that all *Kāraḥas*, as a rule, get themselves connected with *Kriyā*.

Turning to the definition of the term *Kāraḥa*, we meet with considerable difficulty owing to the difference of views on the subject. First, the term *Kāraḥa* seems to have been too popular to deserve any definition; Pāṇini accordingly speaks of *Kāraḥe* as only an *adhikāra-sūtra*. Patañjali takes the word *Kāraḥe* as indicating a *saṃjñā*¹ and goes on to say that grammatical *saṃjñās* are generally made by such words as are popularly found to be denotative of sense.² With the object of pointing out that the term *Kāraḥa* serves to indicate both *saṃjñā* and *saṃjñā*, he has defined it in the following way : ' *sādhakam nirvartakam kāraḥa-saṃjñam bhavati*,' which means that an agent gets the designation of *Kāraḥa* by virtue of performing some action. He has clearly shown the difficulty that becomes almost unavoidable,³ if the *saṃjñās* are not specifically indicated by the *saṃjñā*. Patañjali takes *Kāraḥa* as a *mahā-saṃjñā* with a view to show that the derivative meaning of the word (*karotīti kāraḥam*) is exactly harmonious

¹ किमिदं कारक इति ? संज्ञानिर्देशः ।—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 23.

² यच्च हि व्याख्येयं ये वेति लोके प्रतीयमानाः शब्दास्तेऽनिर्देशाः सिद्ध्यन्ते ।—
Ibid.

³ इतरथा किमिदं प्रसज्येत । अकारकस्याप्युपादानसंज्ञा । यामस्य समीपादा-
नम्व्यतीति ।—Ibid.

with what it usually signifies.¹ But we cannot take *karotiīti kārakam* as an accurate definition of *Kāraka* from a grammatical point of view. To define *Kāraka* simply as 'what performs an action' will serve to exclude all *Kārakas*, excepting *kartṛ-kāraka*, from the category. As a matter of fact, it is *kartā* alone that acts as the direct agent, so far as the performance of action is concerned; but *Kārakas* like *Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa* are only indirectly (*i.e.*, through the agency of *kartṛ*) related to *kriyā*.

Patañjali next proceeds to show how *Karāṇa*² and *Adhikarāṇa* may also be used as *kartṛ-kāraka* consistently with the etymological signification of the word *Kāraka*. The meaning of the roots like *pac* seems to be different in relation to different *Kārakas*.³ We say *Devadattaḥ pacati* when Devadatta is found to pour water in the pot, to throw fuel into the fire-place and so on. This is, so to speak, the instance where the main agent of action is treated as *kartā*.⁴ But *kartṛtva* is sometimes transferred to *Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa*, as in *kāṣṭhāni pacanti* and *sthālī pacati*, respectively.

¹ महत्वाः संचायाः करण एतत् प्रवीक्षणमन्वयेनांश्च यदा विशदयति, करोतीति कारकमिति ।—Mahābbāṣya under the rule 'Kārake.'

² सिद्धः करणाधिकरणयोः कर्तृभावः ।—*Ibid.*

³ पचादीनां हि प्रतिकारकं क्रिया भिद्यति ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ एतत् प्रधानकर्तुः कर्तृत्वम् ।—*Ibid.*

Under the rule *Kalāpa*, 221 (*kār.*), *Durgasiṃha* is found to have given a definition ¹ (*kriyā-nimittam Kārakam*) which means '*Kāraka is the cause of action.*' This definition, we are told, is sanctioned by the popular usage. We have other definitions as well—*kriyājanakatvam kārakatvam*, *kriyānvayitvam kārakatvam* and so on. There is, however, some difficulty with regard to the definition as suggested by Durga, because the word *nimitta*, as synonymous with *kāraṇa*, means *cause* and, consequently, it must have antecedence to *kriyā*.² But in an instance of *nirvarttiya-karman* such as, *ghaṭam karoti*³ (making a pot), the pot is not logically supposed to have existence prior to the action, and, therefore, it is not strictly correct to take *ghaṭa* as an example of *karma-kāraka*. Having raised this objection, *Suṣeṇa* proceeds to support it by holding that the antecedence of the knowledge of pot is here attributed to the pot itself by a process of transference (*upacāra*).

Sambandha, though indirectly connected with *kriyā* as a remote cause of action, is grammatically excluded from the category of *Kāraka*, inasmuch as the term *Kāraka* is used by the

¹ क्रियानिमित्तं कारकं लोकतः सिद्धम् ।

² अन्यथा सिद्धियुक्त्यले सति नियतपूर्ववर्तित्वम् ।

³ घटं करोतीत्यत्र निर्वर्त्यकर्मणः कार्यं क्रियानिमित्तत्वम् ? क्रियासिद्धौ घटस्य नियतपूर्ववर्तित्वाभावात् । सत्यम् । क्रियासिद्धौ घटश्चानस्य पूर्ववर्तित्वसिद्धत्वात्, घटस्यापि पूर्ववर्तित्वमुपपद्यते इत्यदोषः ।—*Kāraka*, *Kavirāja* on the rule 221,

grammarians as a technical name¹ (*rūḍha-śabda*) applicable only to six cases. The way in which Jagadīśa has discussed the definition of *Kāraka* and specially the nature of *sambandha* deserves special consideration for logical accuracy. He defines *Kāraka*² as what is denoted by *sup* or case-endings and is apparently used as a qualifying attribute in relation to *kriyā*. As to the exclusion of *sambandha* from the category of *Kāraka*, he observes that neither *śaṣṭhī*³ (as expressive of relation) is regarded as a case-termination (*Kāraka-vibhakti*), nor is *sambandha* grammatically treated as a form of *Kāraka*, simply for the reason that *sambandha* does never directly qualify the action. Consequently, an expression like *tanḍulasya pacati*, directly connecting the verbal form with a word indicating *sambandha*, is not at all sanctioned by the popular usage. The word *śeṣa*, which is a grammatical name denoting *sambandha*, is an indication that *sambandha* is excluded from *Kārakas* as such. Instances like (i) *durgatānām pratikurvīta*, (ii) *padmasyānukaroti*, (iii) *Lakṣmīrupakurute pareṣām*, etc., where the genitive is directly connected with *Kriyā*, present, so to speak, an

¹ सन्ध्यास्य क्रियानिमित्तत्वेऽपि षट्सु कारकशब्दस्य बहुत्वात् न कारकत्वमिति संलिपः—Kavirāja (Kālāpa).

² भालवर्धने प्रकारो यः सुवर्धः सोऽत्र कारकम्—Śabdasakti., Kār. 67. and क्रियाप्रकारीभूतीऽर्थः कारकम् ।—Ibid.

³ सन्ध्या न कारकं न वा तदर्थिकापि षष्ठी कारकविभक्तिः ।—Ibid.

anomaly. Jagadīśa¹ makes his way out by holding that the above instances, like *mātuḥ smarati*, *caurasya hinasti*, are special cases where the genitive is optionally used (in place of *dvitīyā*) in connection with some particular verb, viz., the accusative of the verbal form *karoti* preceded by the *Upasargas* as *prati*, *anu*, *upa* getting *ṣaṣṭhī* instead of *dvitīyā*.

Reference is further made to such instances as *daṇḍena ghaṭaḥ* and *bhūtale ghaṭaḥ*² in order to show that the *instrumental* and the *locative* in these cases are not, from a strictly grammatical point of view, indicative of *Kārakas*, since they have no relation to *Kriyā*. The primary condition of a *Kāraka* in general is to have a direct connection with *Kriyā*. *Karṇa*, as a class of *Kāraka*, is thus differentiated from *hetu*, for it has no necessary or indispensable connection with the action. But what has proved a stumbling block to Jagadīśa is an instance like *mama pratibhāti*,³ where the genitive seems to be irreconcilable with the verb. On the strength of such popular usage as *sā me pratibhāti*, we hold that the plausible view in support of these expressions and the like is to comprehend certain words (*idam* or

¹ क्रियाविशेषयोगे कारकार्येण षष्ठी । प्रयोगद्वया प्रत्यनूयेभ्यः करोतिः कर्मण्यपि वैकल्पिकस्य षष्ठीविधेरेताव्यत्यात् ।—*Śabdaśakti*.

² इत्येव षट् इत्यादौ तु द्वितीयाद्यर्थः कारणत्वादिकं न कारकं घालयान्वितत्वात् ।—*Ibid.*

³ प्रतिभादिक्रियायामसादादिः सम्बन्धः षष्ठाः कर्तृ बोधयामकारकविभक्तित्वादिति तु विभावनीयम्—*Śabdaśakti*, under the *Kār*, 67.

etad) agreeing with the verbal form *pratibhāti* and to explain the genitive in *mama* with reference to such words as *sannidhan* or *sakāśe* understood.

While considering the different manifestations of *Śakti* or efficiency, we have seen that *Sādhana* which means an active agent in relation to an action also comes within the domain of *Śakti*.¹ Having taken an extreme view of *Śakti*,² some have tried to show that the entire universe is intrinsically made up of *Śakti*. How are we to know that it is *Śakti* and not *dravya* that is to be regarded as *Sādhana*? A thing is composed of a collection of *Śakti*. A *ghaṭa*, for instance, is essentially a combination of such *Śakti* as the capacity for fetching water; a seed has the power of producing a sprout and so on. Thus, all objects are found to be efficient for performing some actions. As *Śakti* is sometimes discriminated from *dravya*, as a distinct entity, Bhartṛhari understands *Sādhana* by *Śakti*, which is perceived to have direct association with actions. A thing, on the other hand, is not identified with *Sādhana* in accordance with this point of view, because a thing, limited as it is by its form, is not practically competent to perform all those diverse actions which naturally presuppose some kind of *Śakti* as the real active principle. Every

¹ क्रियाशक्तिसिद्धयर्थी सामर्थ्यं साधनं विदुः—*Vākyapadīya*, 3. 1.

² यत्किमात्रासम्बन्धस्य विचक्षणनिवृत्तमर्थः—*Ibid.*

thing¹ has its inborn *Śakti* that is manifested when it is at work. *Śakti* always comprehends things as its substratum, and consequently, it cannot have its existence independently of things. The relation in which *Śakti* stands to objects is one of co-inherence (*samavāya*). Having thus shown *Sādhana* as a form of all-pervading *Śakti*, Bhartṛhari continues that *Śakti* is said to have six distinct but permanent divisions or forms corresponding to six *Kāraṅkas*.² A question may, however, arise here as to the precise number of *Śakti*, since *Śakti* appears to be numerous and diverse in its aspects, according as things wherein it inheres are manifold and seem to be different from one another in several aspects. Bhartṛhari takes recourse to the argument that a close examination of the various activities is sure to prove the reducibility of *Śakti* to six only. As an alternate view, it is further suggested on the analogy of *Kāraṅkas*, which, having either direct or indirect connection with actions, express but *kartṛtva* in its different aspects, that one and the same *Śakti*³ may be said to have six different forms just in proportion to the number of causes that serve to manifest it. The point

¹ सर्वेषु सृष्ट्या शक्तिर्वाच्यमवस्थिता ।—Vākyaśāstra.

भाववत्त्वमवस्थिताम् शक्तयः ।—Hārāja.

² निष्ठा; षट् शक्तयः—Vākyaśāstra.

and द्रव्याकारादिभिरेव वाचापरिमिता इव ।

दृश्यन्ते तत्त्वमासां तु षट् शक्तौ नातिवर्तते ॥—Vākyaśāstra, 3. 35.

³ निमित्तमेवादिभिरिति शक्तिः प्रतीयते ।—Vākyaśāstra, 3. 37.

that deserves particular notice in this connexion is that the term *Kāraka* is, strictly speaking, applicable to *kartṛ-kāraka* alone,¹ the other *Kārakas* (such as *Karṇa*, etc.) getting their particular designation only as indicative of the different aspects of *kartṛtva*.

After dealing with the views with regard to both unity and diversity of *Śakti*, Bhartṛhari next takes up the question whether *Śakti*² is undifferentiated from things or has a distinct character of its own apart from the object. The grammarians, as Helārāja observes, are in favour of the latter point of view, as it is supported by both popular usage and grammar. Referring to the method of agreement and difference, Hari further attempts to strengthen his standpoint that *Śakti*, as represented by *Kārakas*, is virtually distinct from things. The burden of his arguments is as follows: as the meanings of case-terminations indicating *Kārakas* (*Karṇa* and *Adhikarṇa*) in forms like *vrkṣeṇa* and *vrkṣe* are actually different from those of the stem (*vrkṣa*), it is but reasonable to take *Śakti* as a distinct object of thought to which the grammatical term *Kāraka* is generally applied. It is almost incontestable that the standpoint

¹ निष्पत्तिमात्रे कर्तृत्वं सर्ववैवाचिकं कारकम् । and तदधीनप्रवृत्तित्वं प्रवृत्तानां निवर्तकत्वम् ।—*Vākyapadīya*, 3, 99, again—पीडा कर्तृत्वमेवावृत्तत्प्रवृत्तिनिवन्धनम् ।—*Ibid*, 3, 37, कर्तृत्वमेवान्तरव्यापारविबन्धना करणादिव्यपदेशरूपतां भवति—

Helārāja.

² तत्त्वं वा व्यतिरेकि वा व्यतिरिक्तं तदुच्यते—*Vākyapadīya*, 3, 38.

taken by the grammarians goes directly against that of the Naiyāyikas who refuse to take *Śakti* as a separate entity. According to the Naiyāyikas, fire and the power of producing burning sensation (*dāhikā-śakti*) are not materially two distinct objects. They do not recognise any difference between *Śakti* and the object possessing it (*śaktimān*). What we practically learn from a careful study of the various aspects of *Śakti* as such and what proves to be of vital importance from the grammatical point of view may be thus briefly summarised : *Sādhana*, which is only a name for *Kāraka*, is nothing but a form of *Śakti*, and, accordingly, *Kāraṇas* like *Karman*, *Karana*, etc., so far as they are denoted by particular case-endings, are only indicative of *Śakti*, or the power of performing actions as we may call it. Moreover, a mere grammatical derivation of the terms *Sādhana* and *Kāraka* is sufficient to show that they are synonymous for all practical purposes and are expressive of *Śakti*, viz., efficiency or efficient object (if efficiency is held to be undifferentiated from the efficient object).

Gopīnātha, the well known commentator on the *Kātantra-pariśiṣṭa*, has also elaborately dealt with the grammatical aspect of the problem. He seems to have arrived at the same conclusion, i.e., identity of *Śakti* with *Kāraka*. The question¹ is first

¹ अथ द्रव्यादयो वा द्रव्यादिगुणयो वा शक्तिगन्तो वा कारकाणि ।—*Parīśiṣṭa*, *Kāraṇaprakaraṇam*,

raised whether substance, quality, action, class, etc., or the potency inherent in them, or, 'things possessing such potency' are to be taken as *Kārakas*. Next, he proceeds to show that none of these standpoints are free from objections. The defect underlying the first view is as follows : if substance,¹ quality, etc., which have their essential character, as is represented by the class, unalterable by nature, are identified with *Kārakas* as such, we cannot possibly justify the instances² like *sthālī pacati*, *sthālyā pacati*, *sthālyām pacati*, and *sthālīm pacati* where one and the same substance (*sthālī*) appears to be different so far as its connection with the action is concerned. *Sthālī pacati*, for example, where *sthālī* is used as the direct active agent, is distinguished from *sthālyā pacati* where *sthālī* is no longer *kartā* but only an instrument of action (cooking). But as a matter of fact, *sthālī*, as is conditioned by its essential aspect (*sthālitva*), is one and knows no diversity at all. The second view is also untenable, for if it were so (i.e., if only activities of things were *Kārakas*), it would be unjustifiable to use the term *Kāraka* with direct reference to things³ (as we take *vṛkṣa* to be an instance of *Apādāna-kāraka* in *vṛkṣāt paṇam patati*).

¹ सत्त्वपरीक्षामावादि कलाप्यपादानादि-नानासंज्ञाप्रसङ्गात्—*Parīkṣṭa*.

² कदादानादिकारकव्यपदेशो नोपपद्यते सर्वकारकाणां परस्परव्यावर्तकत्वात्—
Ibid.

³ न द्वितीयः । उच्चादानपादानादि-कारकव्यवहारविशेषोपापत्तेः—*Parīkṣṭa*,
Kāraka.

The third ¹ one is also open to criticism on the ground that *Śakti* can neither be taken as an attributive (*viśeṣaṇa*), nor as an *upalakṣaṇa* (characteristic) with regard to things, the former giving rise to mere prolixity and the latter rendering the assumption of *Śakti* entirely futile. Having thus shown the untenable features of the above-mentioned standpoints, Gopīnātha then puts forward his own views. *Kāraṇa*,² he holds, is the same as *Śakti*, which is supposed to have different forms; substance, etc., are to be understood as the substratum of such divergent *Śakti*. As to the application of the term *kāraṇa* to a thing like *ṛkṣa*, etc., Gopīnātha explicitly states that it is simply to imply the non-difference between *Śakti* and the object possessing *Śakti* that things are popularly comprehended by *Kāraṇas*.

He has further raised an important point. There is, strictly speaking, no such rigid principle as to restrict the use of certain *Kāraṇas* to particular things, because the subjective element, such as the intention of the speaker, appears to be a prominent factor that often regulates the use of *Kāraṇas*. Thus one and the same thing, such as *aśi* (sword) may be either used as *kartā* or *kaṛaṇa*, according as the

¹ न तृतीयः । विवक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । तथा हि शक्तिमतः कारकत्वे शक्तिर्विशेषण-
मुपलक्षणं वा ।—*Parīkṣā*.

² शक्तिः कारकम् । भिन्नाय भवति शक्तयः । भिन्नानां शक्तीनामाधारो
द्रव्यादयः ।—*Ibid*.

तेन तेन स्वकर्मिण्य वा या शक्तिरिव दृश्यते । तेन तेन स्वकर्मिण्यैव शक्तिस्तु कारकम्॥

—*Ibid*.

speaker intends to imply by the operation of the active agent or that of the instrumental (*asiśchinatti* and *asinā chinatti*) with regard to the action (*cutting*).

A word is only needed to ascertain the precise number of *Kārakas*. Hari has referred to six manifestations of *Śakti* corresponding to the six *Kārakas*. *Śakti* is essentially one and indivisible. It is *avidyā* or falsity that makes it look like different. The ultimate *unity* of *Śakti*¹ is only cognisable on the disappearance of *avidyā*. The whole world with all its diversities is only a materialised image of the infinite *cit-śakti*. Viewed from a transcendental standpoint, the so-called division of the world as *external* and *internal* has no real meaning. The word *Kāraka*, as used in grammar, seems to be an underivable one (*avyutpanna-śabda*)² that is restricted to the neuter gender only. That *Kārakas* are six in number requires no further explanation. But Gopīnātha seems to have shown some ingenuity in pointing out the possibility of reducing this number to five and ultimately to two only. *Kārakas*,³ he suggests, may be divided into five classes, according as

¹ अविद्याव्यवहारदशायां पृथक्केन प्रकाशते, अविद्यानिरासे तेकलेन प्रकाशते इति शीघ्रव्युत्पत्तिः।—Harīraja, under the *Vākyapadīya*, Kār. 3. 39.

² कारकशब्दोऽव्युत्पन्नपदो निमित्तपदार्थः स्वभावाद्गुणस्य लिङ्गः—Panji (Kajāpa) on the rule 231 (*Kāraka*).

³ कारकं पुनर्द्वयशब्दक्रियाजालिखदपदेदात् पञ्चविधम्। शूद्रश्च त्रिविधं स्वशब्दार्थं परशब्दार्थं च—Parāśara, *Kāraka*.

they are represented by substance, quality, action, class and the essential property. They may, again, fall under two categories, *viz.* *svaśabda-vāya* and *paraśabda-vāya*, as they are denoted by their respective technical terms or by some other words.

Of all *Sādhana*s, *kartṛ-kāraka* or the nominative case is taken up first, as one having direct connection with the action. Considering all those qualities that go to constitute a *Kāraka*, *kartṛ-kāraka* alone seems to be primarily connected with *kriyā*, and as such, is the *kāraka par excellence*. The aphorism of Pāṇini defining *kartṛ-kāraka* lays much stress on the independent character (*svātantrya*) of *kartṛ* by virtue of which the agent is distinguished from the rest. Patañjali expressly takes the word *svatantra* as an equivalent of *pradhāna* and explains such *pradhānya* with reference to the characteristic non-dependence of the agent on any accessories, so far as the performance of an action is concerned. It is to be particularly noticed ¹ that cases like *Karaṇa* and *Adhikaraṇa* are but auxiliaries that bring about the completion of the action under the direct operation of the subject. The agent, on the other hand, is not similarly subservient to those instruments of actions in the strict sense of the term. This is why *kartā* is called *svatantra* or self-dependent in opposition to the rest, that

¹ करणदीर्घा तु कर्तृविनिर्धोगादेन सव्यापारि स्वातन्त्र्यम्।—*Halārāja* on *Vākya*., 3, 99.

are more or less *paratantra* or dependent on the agent. Patañjali has referred to both *svatantra* and *paratantra* and rightly observes that the entire question of dependence and independence is practically based upon the intention of the speaker.¹ Thus, as a matter of fact, one and the same object may be treated either as the limit of separation (*avadhī*, i.e., *Apādāna*) or as the agent of action (*valāhakāt vidyotate* and *valāhako vidyotate*²). We now draw an example from common experience. Just as the representatives of a king³ appear to be subordinate in the presence of their king, though they are independent for all practical purposes when they work independently of the king in their respective spheres of activities, so *sthālī* may be taken either as *svatantra* or *paratantra* according as it is intended to be spoken of either as *pradhāna* or merely as an auxiliary in relation to the action. *Vivakṣā* or the intention of the speaker being thus an important factor that determines the nature of a *Kāraka*, we are allowed to use the word *sthālī*, for instance, as *Kartā*, *Karma*, *Karaya*, and *Adhikaraṇa*. From what we have seen above, it is sufficiently clear that in view of the preponderance of *vivakṣā*, the word *svatantra* in the rule *svatantraḥ kartā* should be taken as

¹ सर्वत्रैवाय स्वातन्त्र्यं पारतन्त्र्यं च विवक्षितम्—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 325.

² *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 325.

³ यन्मात्वादीनां राज्ञा सह समवाये पारतन्त्र्यं, अथवायै स्वातन्त्र्यम्—*Ibid*, p. 325.

implying *vivakṣita-svātantrya*, as opposed to the inherent or natural non-dependence. When the speaker, Bhaṭṭoji says,¹ intends to transfer the usual operation of the agent to *Kāraṇas* other than the agent, it is not unlikely that cases like *Karāṇa*, and *Adhikarāṇa* may be grammatically used as *Kartā* having *svātantrya* in their respective functions. How are we to understand the super-independence of *Kartā*?² The answer is not far to seek. It is a matter of ordinary experience that even when all the requisites (fuel, utensils, water, fire, etc.) for cooking are brought together, we are not practically allowed to say *pacati*, i.e., 'cooking is going on,' unless and until the cook is at work. This is an indication that accessories of action, such as are represented by *Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa*, etc., have to depend on the agent so far as regards the completion of the action. Though there is no contention regarding the independence of the agent, we should not lose sight of the fact that cases like *Karāṇa*, etc., have an independent aspect also, so far as their respective efficiency is concerned. Wherein, then, lies the superiority of the subject?³ The

¹ इदा सौकर्यातिशयं दीतयितुं कर्तारि कर्तृव्यापारो न विवक्ष्यते तदा कारकान्तराण्यपि कर्तृसंज्ञां लभन्ते सन्वापारि स्तुतन्वात्—*Siddhānta Kaumudī*, *Bhāṣya*—स्वाधी पचतीति अधिकारस्य कर्तृत्वम्, काष्ठानि पचन्तीति कारकस्य कर्तृत्वम्—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 325, and पचामं वरणाधिकारपयोः कर्तृभावः—*Mahābhāṣya*.

² कार्यं पुनर्ज्ञायते कर्ता प्रधानमिति ? यत् सर्वेषु साधनेषु सन्निहितेषु कर्ता प्रवर्तयिता भवति—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I., p. 326.

³ करवादीनामपि सन्वापारि स्तुतन्वात् कौटिलियः कर्तुः ?—*Helārāja*.

subject has certain special features or properties, as are clearly shown by Hari,¹ which serve to distinguish it from other *Kārakas*. As an efficient cause of action by itself, the agent does not derive its specific function from any other accessories whatsoever, but renders such instruments only subservient to its operation. The so-called independence of cases like *Karāṇa* and *Adhikarāṇa* is only borrowed from that of the agent; the accessories are employed by the agent desirous of attaining the accomplishment of action, and their functions are liable to be stopped as soon as the agent ceases to work. The supreme independence² of the agent is also clear from the fact that the agent, like *Karāṇa*, etc., cannot have a substitute without a change of action. Moreover, the agent is allowed to have its operation unimpaired even when no other instrument of action is sought for, but the reverse of the case is impossible, that is to say, *Karāṇa*, etc., are not competent to accomplish the action independently of the agent. Helārāja³ makes an important observation here. He says that the independence of the agent is

¹ प्रातःपथः शलितामात् न्यग्भावापादनादपि । तदधीनप्रवृत्तिमात् महतीनां निवर्तनात् । अदृष्टत्वात् प्रतिनिधिः प्रतिवेक्षे च दर्शनात् । आरादण्युपकारित्वे स्वात्मनः कर्तुं शक्यते ॥—Vākyapādiya, 3. 99-100.

² करकादीनां प्रतिनिधित्वाः । कर्तुः स नास्ति—Helārāja and सम्भूयकारिणो विशिष्यते कर्ता ।

³ एतेन हेतुवशात् कर्तुः करकादेवत्या ज्ञियासिद्धौ विप्रकृष्टोपकारकत्वेऽपि—स्वात्मनः प्राधान्यनिवन्धनमुक्तं इति तस्मैव कर्तृसंज्ञा न तु करकादिः स्वस्यापि स्वतन्त्रस्यापीत्यर्थः—Helārāja on the Vākyapādiya, 3. 99-100.

so prominent that the instrumental or *Karana*, though more closely connected with the action than the agent itself, is not popularly designated as such.

While *independence* (*svātantrya*) is explained with such a breadth of implication and the agent made a repository of so many properties,¹ we can hardly preclude the apprehension as to how inanimate objects such as *agni* and *ratha* in *agnih dahati*, *ratho gacchati*, etc., can legitimately be taken as the agents. Bhartṛhari seems to have his answer ready. It does not necessarily follow, he says, that objects possessing those properties are only capable of being regarded as agents, but what is plausible from a grammatical point of view is that anything, whether animate or inanimate, may be used as the agent, only if such properties are verbally attributed to the object in question.² It is from the use of words that the *agent* is comprehended. It does not matter much if such grammatical agents are found to have no innate relation with those properties which are usually ascribed to them. Further, as a system of study entirely devoted to words and their popular signification, grammar does not care so much for strict adherence to reality or

¹ धर्मैरव्युद्भिदैः शब्दे निवसो न तु वस्तुनि । कर्तुर्धर्मविवक्षायां शब्दात् कर्ता प्रतीयते ।—Vākyapadiya, 3. 101.

² शब्देन वक्ष्यते धर्मोः प्रमाप्यते च कर्ता—Helārāja.

agreement of thought with truth,¹ but takes words and their meanings as they are popularly used. The real factor that accounts for such transference of properties to inanimate objects, is, as we have already pointed out, the desire of the speaker himself. As the independence of the agent is a matter of *vivakṣā*, one and the same thing (as the soul) may be used, as in the example *ātmānamātmanā hanti*, either as the subject, the object, or the instrumental. Under the *Vārttika*, *ātma-samyoge karmakartuḥ karmadarśanāt*, Patañjali has clearly shown how one and the same soul may become both the subject and the object (*ātmātmānam hanti*) according to the desire of the speaker. The differentiation of the soul, as in such a case, is far from being real, but is only comprehended by different forms of the word (*ātmānam*, *ātmanā* and *ātmā*). As there is hardly any contention regarding the unity of the soul, of course from the Vedānta standpoint, we are justified to raise the question what destroys the soul and what is really destroyed by the soul.² It is curious to note how Patañjali has advanced arguments in support of the duality of the soul. Self has, he holds, two distinct forms,³ namely, corporal soul (*śarīrātmā*) and intellectual

¹ न तु वस्तुविषयतया धर्माणादीनां सम्प्रतीत्यन्वेषणीयः । येनापेक्षनविषयेऽपि दर्शयति नदीं बहतीत्यादी न कर्तव्यं न स्यात् ।—Heṭhārāja.

² *Ch.* नाशं हन्ति न हन्यते ।—Gītā.

³ कः पुनरात्मानं हन्ति, कीं वात्मानां हन्यते ? हावात्मानावत्तरात्मा शरीरात्मा च ।
—Mahābhāgya, Vol. II, p. 68.

soul (*antarātmā*); the corporal soul performs those actions whereby the intellectual soul enjoys either pleasure or pain and *vice versa*. Kaiyaṭa's observation on this point :¹ difference of souls is here actually meant and not the agency and objectivity of one and the same soul. According to the Sāṃkhya system, *antarātman* is the same as (*antaḥkaraṇa*) intellect, which is said to be active; the Naiyāyikas, on the contrary, take *puruṣa* to be *antarātmā* on account of its being the active agent, unlike the *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhyaitees.

The instance *aṅkuro jāyate* (a sprout is growing) presents another difficulty. There is much controversy regarding the question whether it is really existent (*sat*) or non-existent (*asat*) that comes into being. This question, as is well known, embodies the first philosophical enquiry² about the genesis of the universe that had early engaged the attention of the Vedic Ṛṣis in the remotest period of the intellectual history of mankind.

The reference is to the well-known *Sat-vāda* and *Asat-vāda*. According to the *Sat-vādins*, it is *sat* or something having existence that is produced (*sadeva jāyate*); the *Asat-vādins* hold, on the contrary, that it is *asat*

¹ नस्तु एवात्ममेव न लेकमेव कर्मलं कर्तृत्वं च । सांख्यपक्षे अन्तःकरण-मन्तरात्मा तस्मैव कर्तृत्वात् । पुरुषस्तु कर्तृत्वात् । गेयायिकादीनां मते तु पुरुषस्तु कर्तृत्वात् स एवान्तरात्मेति विवक्षितः ।—Kaiyaṭa on the Bhāṣya.

² सः स एवमथ आसीत्, असन्ना एवमथ आसीत् ।—(Cf. Nāsadīya Sūtra) Taittirīyopaniṣad, 2, 7.

that comes into existence. A thing seems to be non-existent before it is actually produced. This kind of non-existence is called *prāgabhāva* by the Naiyāyikas. Again, what is *sat* is not liable to destruction, and it is equally true that nothing comes out of nothing.¹ *Sat* is one of the three aspects with which Brahman is usually conceived by the Vedāntins. *Asat* or *abhāva*² is also maintained to be the ultimate cause or final principle by a section of the Buddhist philosophers.

The sprout is found to have no existence before it grows;³ and it is not therefore strictly correct to assume a non-existent thing as the agent of the verb *jāyate*. To get rid of this difficulty we should either explain the production of the sprout on the assumption of existence however unreal, or depend entirely on the desire of the speaker as what accounts for such transference of existence. Moreover, the word 'sprout' is used in like instances by the speaker, as if the sprout were already existent. The order in which the six *bhāvavikāras* have been arranged by Vārṣṇāyaṇi evidently shows that *astī* presupposes *jāyate*,⁴ i.e., a thing cannot be said to be existent before it is produced. But it does not strictly represent a correct view.

¹ नास्त्यो विद्यते भावो नाभावी विद्यते सतः ।—Gṛta, 2. 16.

² अभावाद्भावीवृत्तिर्नास्त्यस्य प्रादुर्भावे ।—Nyāya Sūtra, 4. 1. 14.

अभावाद्भावी ज्ञायते इति कस्यचिद्दर्शनम् ।—Nyāya-vārttika.

³ लक्षणेः प्रागस्यतो वृद्धावस्थानिवन्धनः । अविशिष्टः सतानेन कर्ता भवति लक्ष्यः ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. 103.

⁴ न ज्ञातोऽस्तीति श्रूयते ।—Durga, under Nirukta, p. 45.

In course of explaining the expression *jāyate* *iti pūrvabhāvasyādīmācaṣṭe*, Durga does not fail to observe that *jāyate* also comprehends existence.¹ The reason is quite obvious. A thing that is non-existent is not capable of being produced. We can, however, assume a causal connection that serially links one *bhāva* with another. The ultimate reality (*bhāva*) is the final cause of which these *vikāras* are only different manifestations. There is only one *bhāva* or *satā* that permeates through the entire sphere of existence. *Kriyā* implies an action having both prior and posterior stages. *Purvāparya* is to be understood with relation to time and space. *Vrajati* means accordingly a collection of actions all tending to produce the same result (conjunction with a particular space). *Jāyate* and *asti*, *vipariṇamate* and *vardhate* and the like are all related to each other. A thing first comes into being and is then said to be existent and so forth. Having shown their mutual relation, Durga concludes with the remark that *jāyate* means only *production*² and not the next stage (existence), which invariably comes in association with the idea of *jāyate*.

According to the Buddhist philosophers,³ a *kāraṇa* has to destroy itself before it can bring into existence a *kārya*. The sprout is

¹ न स्रविद्यमानो ज्ञायते ।—Durga, under Nirukta, p. 45.

² ज्ञायते इत्येष शब्दो जन्मैव बोधार्थं प्रकीर्ति ।—*Ibid.*

³ न किलविनष्टे कारणे कार्यमुत्पद्यते इति ।—Nyāya-vārttika uncer Nyāya-sūtra, 4. 1. 14.

found to grow only when the seed is destroyed. As long as a seed remains a seed, there does not grow a sprout as such. The destruction of the seed is, therefore, the immediate cause that gives rise to a sprout.¹ What we gather from this trend of arguments is that a sprout grows from non-existence of the seed² (*abhāva*). As it seeks to trace the origin of all things to a huge nothingness or nihilism, this view was rejected by all orthodox teachers.

The Naiyāyikas argue in the following way: it is really out of a seed and not out of its final destruction that a sprout is produced.³ A change of physical composition is brought about in a seed when it is about to give birth to a sprout. The seed is not essentially destroyed but some cells are developed in it wherefrom the sprout is formed.⁴ The seed is, therefore, to be considered as the material cause of a sprout. Here the agency is to be understood as pertaining to *kārya*, i.e., what is produced (sprout). The sprout is supposed to have intellectual existence before it is actually produced. As a matter of fact, the material existence of the sprout before it is actually produced is contrary to all experience; but it must be admitted that the

¹ बीजविनाशोऽङ्कुरकारणमिति ।—*Nyāya-vārttika*.

² अभावाद्वाच्यो जायते ।—*Ibid.*

³ एवं च बीजोपादानं युक्तम् ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ बीजावयवानां पूर्वव्युत्पन्नित्वेन व्युत्पन्नान्तरमुत्पद्यते इति व्युत्पन्नान्तरादङ्कुरादिर्भवतीति ।—*Ibid.*

solution suggested by the grammarians refers more to the use of words than to the actual state of things. The grammarians¹ have repeatedly drawn our attention to the fact that they unhesitatingly take the meaning usually denoted by a word as its real signification and do not insist upon the material validity of such meanings. Here the science of grammar bears close comparison with the deductive logic which, as we know, is more or less concerned with the formal side of the proposition (as opposed to the material truth). An expression like *golden mountain*, though the material existence of what it denotes is really questionable, does not practically lie beyond the scope of the deductive logic.

Bhartṛhari seems to have approached this question from a different point of view. It is shown with reference to the Vṛttacaryā how the cause is changed into the effect and is said to be *jāyate* in the shape of *kārya*. He seeks to establish the non-difference² between the cause and the effect as well as between *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* (substance and its modification). This is another problem of much philosophical importance to decide whether it is the cause or the effect that is to be considered as *sat*. Some hold, as the

¹ व्याकरणे हि शब्दार्थोऽयं.—Helārāja.

² कारणं कार्यभाविन इदा वा व्यवतिष्ठते । कार्यग्रहं तदा कञ्चु कार्यतेनापि जायते ॥ Vākyapadīya, 3. 104. Helārāja has the following :—परिणाम-दर्शने तद्विदप्य इदं कथ्यते । कार्यकारणयोः प्रकृतिकारणरूपतया चोदं दधि सम्यदाते, योजनसङ्करो जायते इत्यभिहितम् । व्यवहारादेकस्याप्यवस्थानुरवस्थानिविशेषस्त्रीकरणमात्रं स्वतन्त्रमिति ।

Naiyāyikas, the *cause* to be *sat* and look upon the *effect* as essentially different from it (*asat*). The Sāṃkhyaite takes the *effect* to be real (*sat*), i.e., as what represents the cause only in a changed form. According to this view, *kāraṇa* and *kārya* are the same as *prakṛti* and *vikṛti*. In contradiction with the view that an effect is virtually different from its cause, Hari maintains identity between *kārya* and *kāraṇa* and *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* on the ground of such instances as 'milk is turned into butter,' and 'the seed is transformed into a sprout' in order to show that the cause and the effect are not distinct entities, but represent only different phases of one and the same object. In accordance with this standpoint, the expression 'a sprout is growing' should necessarily imply that the cause which has existence is what gets transformed (in the form of *kārya*) at a later time. This explanation seems to be based on the so-called *pariṇāma-vāda* as expounded by the Sāṃkhyaite.

Referring to the difference of the cause and the effect,¹ Bhartṛhari has attempted to show how *aṅkura* may be viewed as the agent. It is an indisputable fact that the sprout, as an individual (*vyakti*), cannot be supposed to have existence before it is produced; but it is equally true, we must admit, that the sprout,

¹ कार्यकारणबीजद्वयादिषु बाधविन रूपेण जनिकर्तृत्वमाह ।—Helārāja.

विभक्तिर्यदि यत् कालि कारणेभ्यः प्रवर्तते । स्यात्कालिव्यक्तिरूपेण तस्यापि व्यवतिष्ठते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 106, and कालिरूपेण कर्तृत्वं व्यक्तिरूपेण जन्मत्वमिति ।—Helārāja.

viewed as a class, is comprehended to have perpetual existence (*cf.* the Nyāya conception of class as an eternal entity). What we learn from Bhartṛhari and Helārāja regarding this point is that the sprout (a sprout is growing) appears to be the agent when taken as a class, and that it is said to be a product when it is viewed as an individual. The agent and the object that grows are, according to this interpretation, not different from each other, the former representing a class, and the latter representing an individual. The seed develops into a sprout or assumes a formal change in the shape of an effect. Moreover, the class and the individual being mutually dependent, we are not justified in taking one as distinct from the other.

The discussion on such a nice point does not, however, end here, but has practically given rise to a far more complicated question. It is really difficult to say whether *prakṛti* or *vikṛti* should be taken as the agent of production, because there is no consensus of opinions with regard to this problem. A careful examination of facts,¹ it must be remembered, goes to show that both the cause and the effect might be treated as the agent according to the nature of *vivakṣā*. In an instance like 'milk is turned

¹ प्रकृति-विकृतिविषयपर्यायतः कर्तृत्वं कारकत्वयोः प्रयोगमेवेति ।

—Helārāja.

विकारी जन्मनः कर्ता प्रकृतिरेति संशये । भिद्यति प्रतिपत्तुषां दर्शनं सिद्ध-
दर्शनेः ॥—Yāgyapadiya, 3. 112.

into curd' (*kṣīram dadhi sampadyate*) we find that the relation in which *prakṛti* stands to *vikṛti* is one of co-inherence (*sāmānādhikaranyā*). An expression like *bijamaṅkuro jāyate* is sanctioned only to show the non-difference between *kāraṇa* and *kārya* or *prakṛti* and *vikṛti*. A sprout is not materially different from the seed wherefrom it grows; it is only an aspect of the seed or development from a crude form into a bulky one. *Aṅkuro jāyate*, therefore, means that the cause (seed) which is *sat* gets a new life (*janman*) or reveals itself in the form of a sprout. Now there arises a doubt as to which of them is predominant in relation to the other. It is necessary to find out the dominant one, as it is dominant or *pradhāna* alone that is to be regarded as the agent in connection with the verbal form. There are practically two different views, namely, one supporting the agency or *kartṛtva* in favour of *vikṛti*, and the other upholding the agency of *prakṛti*. *Vikṛti*¹ comes to be regarded as the agent, when there is absence of co-inherence and the words denoting *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* are found to have different case-endings (as in *bijāt aṅkuro jāyate*). The rule *janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ*, Pāṇ. 1.4. 30, which undoubtedly ascribes the agency to *vikṛti*, may be explained here to show not only the formal but also the material difference between *prakṛti* and

¹ भेदविवक्षायां तु जनिकर्तुः प्रकृतिरिहपादानपक्षेऽपि कारकविभक्तिः ।
अभेदविवक्षायां तु चतुर्थ्या अपवादात्...विचारस्य कर्तृत्वावसायः—Hārāṅga.

vikāra. The agency of *vikāra* is also clearly pointed out by such expression as *mātrāya sampadyate yavāgūḥ*, i.e., *mātram jāyate*. What is deducible from these popular instances of grammar¹ is that *vikāra* is directly connected with the action, and, consequently, treated as the agent; and that *prakṛti* has only indirect connection with the action and is generally used in the ablative case in order to prominently bring out its difference from *vikāra*. The expression² *sucarṣopiṇḍaḥ kuṇḍale bhavataḥ*, where the number of the verbal form agrees with that of *vikāra*, serves to strengthen the view that *vikāra* alone should be used as the agent. But examples are not, however, wanting to show also the agency of *prakṛti*. The expressions *saṅghābhavanti Brāhmaṇāḥ* and *atvam tvam sampadyate* clearly indicate how *prakṛti* is used as the subject. Now it is almost clear that both *prakṛti* and *vikāra* are entitled to be regarded as the subject, according to the nature of the examples.³

The discussion on *Kāraṇas* in general, and *kartṛ-kāraṇa* in particular, will be hardly complete and exhaustive without an adequate reference to the logical method of interpretation. The Naiyāyikas, specially the followers of the Navya-nyāya, such as Jagadīśa and Gadādhara, have supplemented the study of grammar in a

¹ यवामूर्द्धं जायते—प्रकृतेरत्र विकारद्वारेण क्रियाजन्यत्वं न साक्षात् ।

Heisrāja.

² Mahābhāṣya, I. 1. 1, Vol. I, p. 7.

³ Vyākyaṇāḍhya, Kārikās, 3. 114-115.

large measure ; they have dealt with the problems of grammar in their characteristic fashion with the result that niceties of an incomprehensible nature were sometimes allowed to mar the perspicuity of the subject to such a degree that the study of grammar ultimately passed through a completely different channel at their hands.

To do full justice to their labour, it must be said, however, that they have practically given, as it were, the finishing touch to the interpretation of certain problems of grammar and have undoubtedly shown a new line of thinking and approaching a problem. The advent of the Navya-nyāya, with its characteristic tendency to abstrusities and a peculiar stock of technical terms, opened the portal of a new realm of thought which has more or less influenced all later philosophical speculations. This influence, as is quite evident, is nowhere so prominent, as in the case of later commentaries on philosophical treatises and grammar. The last phase of grammatical literature, both in language and mode of interpretation, seems to have been moulded by this process of thinking. Such well-known grammarians, as Nāgeśa, Bhaṭṭoji, Koṇḍabhaṭṭa, Durgasiṃha, Gopīnātha, Suseṣa and others, are supposed to have been thoroughly acquainted with the Navya-nyāya line of arguments.

As the logical method of definition is free from all defects and scientifically accurate, the grammarians have conveniently followed it in forming

the definitions of grammatical categories and concepts with the obvious object of getting rid of the so-called *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti*. How far the grammarians have assimilated and absorbed this particular process of thinking and the line of arguments is borne testimony to by the fact that if any modern grammarian is asked to give an accurate definition of *Karma-kāraka*, he would not possibly say *karturīpsitotamaṁ karma* or *yat kriyate tat karma*, but would give his answer in the strictly logical form, i.e., *kriyājanya-phala-sālitvam karmatvam* and so on. Jaga-dīśa's *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* and Gadādhara's *Vyutpattivāda* are two important works that give us purely logical interpretation of the grammatical problems; Durga and Suśeṣa (two well-known commentators on the Kātantra system) have also dealt with the problems of grammar from a strictly logical point of view.

The logical definition of *kartṛtva*¹ is *kriyāśrayatvam kartṛtvam*, i.e., the agent is the substratum of action. This is based on the assumption that the action is generally denoted by the root, and the idea of a substratum follows from the suffix *tip*. As this definition is likely to prove the agency of time also which is the final substratum of the world (*kālo hi jagadādhārah*), Suśeṣa² has made some improvement

¹ शब्दान्तेन वातुवाच्यव्यापारवत्त्वं—Durga (Kalāpa-Tīkā) and वातुवाच्यव्यापाराद्ययः कर्ता ।

² कालस्यापि कर्तृत्वं स्यात् तस्य सर्वोपपत्तेः क्रियाया अप्याद्यवत्त्वात्—Kavirāja under the rule 230 (Kalāpa).

oy adding *prādhānyena* to the aforesaid definition. The state of being a *substratum of action* is not a correct definition from a grammatical point of view. If so, the objective case, affected as it is by the action, may also be treated as *kartā*. The definition finally suggested by Suṣeṇa is as follows: *prādhānyena dhātuvācāya-vyāpāravattvaṃ* (*kartā* is the main substratum of action as is denoted by a root).

To show an instance how the logical process of arguments has its application in grammar, we give below the summary of a discussion on the definition of *Kartṛ-kāraka*. There arises some difficulty with regard to the definition of *kartṛtva* as given by Sarvavarman (*yaḥ karoti sa kartā*, *Kalāpa*. 220), because this rule is not, strictly speaking, applicable to such instances as *ghaṭo bhavati*, etc. (the pot does not do anything but is simply brought into existence by the agency of the potter). The logical definition is not even sufficient to solve this anomaly, inasmuch as the adjunct *kriyāśrayatvaṃ* is equally applicable to *Kartṛ* and *Adhikaraṇa*. It is, therefore, necessary to add the expression *sūkṣāt sambandhena* (by direct association) to the above definition in order to differentiate *Kartṛ-kāraka* from *Adhikaraṇa*. The reason is that both the agent and *Adhikaraṇa* are used as the substratum of the action (*kriyāśraya*), the difference lies in the fact that the subject is directly or primarily connected with the action, while *Adhikaraṇa* has only indirect association with the action

(through the operation of the agent). But the train of arguments and counter-arguments does not end here. The additions of *sākṣāt sambandhena* is not, however, sufficient to make the point clear, because in an instance like *gale baddhvā gaurṇiyate*, the locative is found to have been the direct substratum of action (binding). Now it is necessary to make further addition to the definition (*ananya-prayojyatva*) for the purpose of eliminating both *ativyāpti* and *avyāpti*. The special characteristic,¹ which serves to distinguish the subject from the cognate cases, like *Karṇa* and *Adhikarṇa*, is the super-independence² of the agent, i.e., the agent is capable of accomplishing the action without depending on the so-called accessories.³ The agent presents itself in three forms, namely, *buddha*, *prayojaka* or *hetu*, and *karmakartā*.

Both *Karṇa* and *Adhikarṇa* are intimately related to the agent; they help the agent in the accomplishment of the action. In accordance with the definition of Pāṇini, *Karṇa* is held to be the most important or indispensable of all accessories that help the agent in bringing about a completion of the action.

¹ कर्ता जननप्रयोगः स्वतन्त्र इत्युच्यते...फलकामी हि कर्ता करणादीनुपाज्ज्यते, तथा च पूर्वमेव शक्तिसाम् स्वतन्त्रः, करणादीनां तु वर्तमानियोगादेव स्वतन्त्रम्—Helārāja.

² कारकवक्रव्यापारमतिवन्धीभूतव्यापाराभाववत् स्वतन्त्रमिति ।—Kari-rāja (Kalāpa).

³ स्वतन्त्रत्वं च कारकालयनधीनत्वे सति कारकत्वम् ।—*Ibid.*

Patañjali in his characteristic fashion has anticipated certain objections against the desirability of retaining the suffix *tamaḥ* after the word *sādhaka* in *sādhakatamaḥ karaṇam*. If *Karaṇa* is said to be, Patañjali argues, merely an accessory and not the most important one, the undesirable consequence will be that all *Kāraṇas*, by virtue of their direct or indirect association with the action, will be entitled to receive the designation of *Karaṇa*.¹ It needs hardly be pointed out that all *Kāraṇas*, as the very term implies, are practically so many accessories (*sādhakas*) with reference to the accomplishment of the action. The use of *tamaḥ* (superlative degree) is not therefore meaningless, because it serves to differentiate *Karaṇa* from other *Kāraṇas*. Again, it may be further argued that the sense usually conveyed by the suffix (*ātisāyā*), i.e., excessiveness, is also comprehensible even in the absence of that word. We can justify this point of view by an illustration drawn from popular experience. As, for instance, when one says 'a daughter² should be given in marriage to a handsome person,' what we necessarily understand is that the person spoken of should be 'perfectly handsome' (*abhirūpatama*), though the word denoting excess or *super-excellence* is not explicitly mentioned. Similarly, the word *sādhaka*

¹ सर्वेषां कारकाणां कारकसंज्ञा प्रसज्येत and सर्वेषां हि कारकाणि साधकानि—*Mahābhāṣya*, under the rule Pāp., 1. 4. 42.

² अमिदमाय कन्या दीया...तचामिदमपत्नयेति ज्ञेयते—*Ibid.*

might be alone sufficient to denote as much meaning as is usually expressed by *sādhakatama*. Now what follows from this discussion is that the suffix *tama* is redundant. The rule *sādhakatamam karaṇam* might be reduced to *sādhakam karaṇam* without any alteration of the meaning. But it cannot be denied that Pāṇini had some particular object in view so far as the use of this suffix is concerned. What Pāṇini¹ likes to indicate by the use of *tama* is that the suffixes (denoting degrees of excellence) *tarap* and *tama* should have no application in the rules defining *Kāraṇa-samjñās*, or, in other words, the *Paribhāṣā* (*gaṇa-mukhyayōrmukhye kāryasam-pratyayaḥ*) should have its application restricted to this rule and not to any other rules belonging to the section of *Kāraṇa*. This is why the grammarians do not insist upon *apāya* or physical separation alone (according to the strict interpretation of the rule), but also acknowledge the validity of intellectual separation (*buddhi-kṛtāpāya*) in the determination of *Apādāna*.² Similarly, the rule *ādihāro'dhikaraṇam* is not only applicable to *tilesu tailam*, but comprises such instances also where the entire substratum is not pervaded by the thing inherent.³

¹ कारकसंज्ञायां तद-तत्त्वयोरी न भवतीत्यत्रापि सिद्धं भवति—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 42.

² सांकाश्येभ्यः पाठनीयवका अभिरुपतराः ।

³ गङ्गादी घोषः, कूपे गगैकुलम् ।

यस्य ज्ञातृक आधारात्मा व्याप्ति भवति । तेनैवैव ज्ञातृ तिष्ठेत् तैर्न दधि निर्दिष्टि । गङ्गायां गावः, कूपे गगैकुलमित्यत्र न स्वात् ।—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule 1. 4. 42.

Wherein lies the superiority or relative importance of *Karāṇa*? Those that help the agent in the accomplishment of the action are grammatically called *upakāraṇa*; of all such *upakāraṇas*, *Karāṇa* is decidedly the most indispensable accessory¹ that comes in close contact with the agent (*sannipatyopakāri*) in course of operation. The relative superiority of *Karāṇa* is mainly due to the fact, says Bhartṛhari,² that the accomplishment of the action actually takes place immediately after the operation of *Karāṇa*. The part played by *vivakṣā* or the desire of the speaker in the use and determination of *Kāraṇas* in general has already been referred to. Bhartṛhari³ emphatically lays down with special reference to the *Instrumental* case that it is not possible to say (with regard to a thing) that this is always *Karāṇa* and this is not, as if it were fixed by the rules of grammar. It is the desire of the speaker that practically accounts for the use; as, for instance, one and the same thing (as *sthālī*) might be used both as the substratum (*sthālyām pacati*), and as the instrumental (*sthālyā pacati*) according to the desire of the speaker.

¹ यद्यपि क्रियासिद्धौ बहुलि साधनानि आश्रयन्ते तथापि यत् प्रकृतोपकारक-
मनन्तरं विवक्षितं तदेव कारकमित्यर्थः ।

² क्रियायाः परिनिष्पत्तिरङ्गपारादमन्तरम् । विवक्ष्यते यदा तत् करणं
तदा कृतम् ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. 89.

³ यस्तुतस्तदनिर्देशं न हि वस्तु व्यवहितम् । स्यात्वा पञ्चत इत्येवा विवक्षा
दृश्यते यतः ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3. 90.

In accordance with the definition as suggested by the Naiyāyikas, *Karaṇa* is the same as *Kāraṇa* (*vyāpāraṇat kāraṇam karaṇam*) only with this difference that *karaṇa* is closely associated with the action, i.e., cause, when it is actually in operation to bring about the accomplishment of the action, is what is called *karaṇa* in grammar. Gadādhara maintains that the words *kartṛ-vyāpārādhiṇatva* should be added to the above definition (*vyāpāraṇat kāraṇam karaṇam*) so as to clearly indicate the subserviency of *Karaṇa* to the agent. An accessory (as *Karaṇa*), as we find, cannot accomplish the action unless and until it is set to work by the agent (*kartṛ-viniyoga*). This being the actual state of things, one may possibly bring forward the argument that it is more plausible to attribute the adjunct *sādhakatama* to the agent itself in preference to *Karaṇa*.¹ Bhartṛhari² meets this objection by saying that the primary function of the agent is to employ the accessories to operation³ which, thus engaged, immediately accomplish the action. This is to show how *Karaṇa* comes between the agent and the action, and, consequently, has greater proximity to the operation than the agent itself.

¹ कर्तृविनियीसीयरकाली साधकानां प्रहरोसदपेक्षया कर्तरेव साधकतमल
व्यावृत्ति—H. & R. J. a.

² सातले २५५ प्रयोहारमारदिवीपकुर्वते। करणेन हि सर्वेषां व्यापारी
व्यवधीयते ॥—Vākyapadiya, 3. 99.

³ विनियीमी हि कर्तृव्यापारः।

Now it is sufficiently clear why *Karāṇa* is said to be *sādhakatama* in relation to other accessories. Bhartṛhari has again alluded to the preponderance of *vivakṣā* and the difference between the agent and *Karāṇa* by referring to the example *asiśchinatti* (where the function of the agent has been attributed to the instrumental, viz., sword, with a view to indicate the independent activity or excessive power for accomplishing the action on the part of *Karāṇa*). In the above example, it should be noted,¹ the sharpness of the sword comes to be regarded as *Karāṇa* when the sword itself is used as the agent.

Though apparently synonymous, *hetu* and *Karāṇa* are, however, distinguished² by the grammarians, the criterion of such difference being 'the invariable association with the action' on the part of *Karāṇa*. The first and foremost thing necessary for a *Kāraka* is to have close relation with the action. *Hetu* generally gives the idea of a substance and has practically no invariable connection with the action. Bhaṭṭoji³ has clearly elucidated this distinction. A substance unconnected with action is called *hetu*, but *Karāṇa*, as a form of *Kāraka*, is

¹ असादीनां तु कर्तृत्वे तेषां कर्तृत्वं विदुः—Vākya-pāṇiniya, 3. 94.

² द्रव्यादिविषयो हेतुः कारकं निवृत्तक्रियम्—*Ibid.*

³ द्रव्यादिमाधारणं निवृत्तीपारमाधारणं च हेतुत्वम् ।

कारणत्वं तु द्विगुणान्वितत्वं व्यापारनिवृत्तं च ॥—Bhaṭṭoji under the rule
Paṇ. 2. 3. 23.

necessarily found to have connection with the action. *Hetu*, to speak the truth, is the cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) pure and simple, and continues to be so as long as it does not come in close touch with the action, but the moment it does so, it ceases to be a *hetu* and becomes a *Karāṇa*. The Naiyāyikas have agreement with the grammarians on this point. Gadādhara takes *dhanena kulam*, *vidyayā yaśaḥ*, etc., as instances of *hetu*, since *dhana* and *vidyā* have no direct association with the action (*kriyāyogābhāvāt*). Jagadīśa has, however, taken a slightly different view. He insists that even the third case-ending in *daṇḍena ghaṭaḥ* is really indicative of *Karāṇa*, though *daṇḍena* is not grammatically regarded to be a *Kāraka* as such,¹ obviously for the absence of relation with the action. On the ground of having close proximity with the action, *Karāṇa* is virtually the same as cause (*janaka*).²

Under the rule *hetvarthe*, Durgasirāha has clearly shown what is meant by *hetu* in an instance like *annena vasati*. So far as the popular usage is concerned, Durga maintains, a thing, though not actually connected with an action that leads to the final result, is called *hetu* simply on account of its having capacity for the accomplishment of action (*phalamaniṣpādayannapi kriyāyogyatayā heturucyate*). *Hetu* is of

¹ इत्येव षट् इत्यपि तृतीयार्थः करणत्वं, परन्तु तत्र कारकं क्षियमानधिलान् ।

—Śabdasaktiprakāśikā under Kār. 71.

² करणशब्दस्तु व्यापारप्रत्यासत्त्या जनकस्य वाचकः—Śabdasaktiprakāśikā.

various kinds. One that intimately connects itself with the accomplishment of the action is termed *Karāṇa*. Suśeṇa has referred to two-fold *hetu*—grammatical as well as popular. The nominative case of a verb used in a causal form (as *kārayati*) is an instance of grammatical *hetu* (*kārayati yaḥ sa hetuśca—Kālāpa*). A *hetu*, in its popular sense, is an object that is capable of performing the action favourable to the result (*phalasādhana-yogya-padārtha*). *Hetu* means *capacity* and not actual connection with *kriyā*.

Adhikarāṇa is the substratum of action. What is popularly known as *ādhāra* or substratum of action is technically called *Adhikarāṇa* in grammar. There is, however, some difference between the popular and grammatical conception of *Adhikarāṇa*. According to the popular usage, substance,¹ quality and action are all comprehended by *Adhikarāṇa*, but in grammar the word is often used in a specific sense, i.e., *Adhikarāṇa* is said to be an accessory (that indirectly helps the accomplishment of the action) that forms the substratum of action only indirectly. Bhartṛhari lays much stress on the dependence of *Adhikarāṇa* upon both the agent and the object and defines *Adhikarāṇa*² as an *upakāraka* or accessory that becomes the substratum of action only

¹ लोकेऽधिकरणमभिहितं द्रव्यगुणक्रियाविषयमभिधीयते—Hebārāja.

² कर्तृकर्मव्यवहितानुसाराद् धारयत् क्रियाम् । उपकर्मत् क्रियानिधौ शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं कृतम् ॥—Vākyapadīya.

through the intervention of the agent or the object, and serves, though indirectly, to accomplish the action.

We actually find that the effort or the action principally inheres in the agent and partially in the object; consequently they form the real substratum of action in the strict sense of the term. This is why Bhartṛhari¹ has used the expression 'through the medium of the agent and the object,' and has thus made it sufficiently clear that *Adhikaraṇa* is only indirectly related to the action. Intimately related to *ādhāra* is *ādheya* or what inheres in the substratum. The relation in which the inherent stands to the substratum is manifold, such as conjunction, inherence and so on. But Gadādhara² has here raised his voice of objection so far as 'conjunction' is concerned. He argues in the following strain:—the relation between *ādhāra* and *ādheya* cannot be one of conjunction (*samyoga*), for, if it were so, there would be no criterion to distinguish the one from the other, that is to say, *ādheya*³ also might be treated as *ādhāra*, as the very idea of conjunction comprehends two things (*samyogasya dvaiṣṭhatvāt*).

Patañjali has divided *Adhikaraṇa* into three classes, namely, *vyāpaka*, *aupaślesika*, and *vaiṣayika*. Of these, *vyāpaka* is the principal

¹ कर्तृकर्मव्यवहितान्—किंवा कर्तृरि कर्मणि वावहितान्—Halārāja.
Vākyapadīya, 3. 1. अधिकरवाधिकारः ।

² आधारविषयभावश्च न संयोगाद्विषयसम्बन्धभावकः—Vyūtpattivāda.

³ कृच्छादिसंयोगिनो बहुरादैरपि कृच्छाधारताप्रसङ्गात्—Ibid.

form of *Adhikaraṇa*. An expression like *tīleṣu tailam* constitutes an example of *vyāpaka*. The special feature of this class of *Adhikaraṇa* is not only that the inherent (*ādheya*) and the substratum are related to each other by co-inherence (*samavāya*), but also that the entire space of the substratum is pervaded by the inherent. 'Devadatta is sitting on a mat' is an instance of *aupaśleṣika*, because here the agent sits only on a part of the mat and does not occupy the whole space. Here the relation between the *inherent* and the *substratum* is one of simple conjunction. *Vaiṣayika* is expressed by such example as *mokṣe icchāsti* (there is a desire for salvation). Helārāja has cited *khe śakunayaḥ* as an instance of *vaiṣayika*, and observes that it does not strictly come under *aupaśleṣika*, because the sky being one and indivisible cannot possibly have any parts. The so-called division of *Adhikaraṇa* as *sāmīpika* denoting proximity does not really form an additional class. Helārāja has explained the sentence *Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* as an instance of *aupaśleṣika* that indicates the residence of *ghoṣa* in certain parts of the bank having close proximity with the current of the river.

Adhikaraṇa is generally denoted in grammar by the seventh case-ending. Both Jagadīśa and Gadādhara¹ hold that *saptamī* indicates *ādheyatva* (as is implied by the *Adhikaraṇa*) or

¹ आचारसप्तम्या आदिपलनर्थः—Vyatpattivāda.

the state of being the inherent.¹ *Saptamī* has more than one meaning in grammar. In an instance of *bhāve saptamī*, the seventh case-termination precisely signifies 'contemporaneousness of action' (*samakālīnatva*); in *carmanī dvīpinam hanti*, *saptamī* denotes *nimittatva* or 'the state of being the cause' and so on. There is, however, some inconsistency with regard to such examples as *vīṇḍyām śabdaḥ* and *karṇe śabdaḥ*, etc., because there is no verbal form so as to clearly give the idea of a *Kāraka*. Gadādhara rightly observes that in cases like these, where the verbal forms denoting an action are not explicitly used, we are forced to understand such verbs as *bhava'ti*,² etc., in order to explain the *Kāraka-vibhakti*. But the grammarians also seem to have the same answer, as they have taken recourse to the dictum³ according to which a verb, though not expressly mentioned but only understood, is even said to be competent to account for the case-ending.

From a grammatical point of view, *Kārakas* are denoted by *sup*. A question is, however, raised by Bhartṛhari,⁴ if *vibhaktis* have any signification of their own so as to indicate the nature

¹ आश्रितत्वं सप्तम्यानुमान्यते ।—Vyutpattivāda.

² एषु कारकानि वाङ्मय भवन्तीत्युक्त्वाहारः । अत्रच्येयत्वादिप्रयोगोऽप्याधारसम्बन्धः ।
—Vyutpattivāda.

³ सम्मानादि द्विवा कारकविभक्तौ प्रयोजित्वा ।

⁴ प्रचाद्यर्थान्वयसमादिभक्त्यर्थेऽप्युच्यते ।—Vākyapāṇīya, Kār. 3. 43.

of *Kārakas*. The meaning¹ is expressed by a word taken as a whole and not as a composite of two parts, i.e., *Prakṛti* and *Pratyaya*. Attention has already been drawn to the fact that the meaning of *Prakṛti*, as in *vrkṣe* and *vrkṣeṇa*, remains the same, while the sense usually denoted by the case-endings, i.e., *substratum* and *instrumentality*, only seems to be different. But the decision of the grammarians is of a peculiar nature. Since they hold that the meaning is expressed by a word as an indivisible whole (*akhaṇḍa*), the grammarians have given their verdict in support of the unreality of *pratyayārtha*, as distinct from *prakṛtyārtha*. It is, however, contrary to the usual principle of grammar, because we find that the meaning of a *Pratyaya* is related to that of a *Prātipadika* in order to determine the nature of a *Kāraka*. What is, therefore, plausible is that the meaning of *Pratyayas*, as distinguished from those of *Prātipadikas*, is a fact that can hardly be denied. As the whole discussion on *Kārakas* depends on the assumption of meanings on the part of the case-endings, the meaning of each *vibhakti* has been specifically shown by the grammarians.

Pāṇini defines *Karman* as what is sought to be obtained by the agent as the most desirable

¹ अमेदंमि प्रकृत्यर्थस्य इति उवाचैवादी विभक्त्यर्थस्य साधनत्वस्यैव व्यतिरेकः । तया तत्र च विभक्त्यर्थसाधनत्वं । शून्य प्रातिपदिकार्थेऽशान्तये अनुवर्गो ह्यसती नन्यामहेति अविनाशिरिक्तः प्रत्ययार्थभूतोऽनपेक्षणीयः साधनत्वस्यैव क्रियामन्वाच्योऽर्थ इति साधनवितिः ॥—Hollārāja under the Vākyaśāstra, Kār. 3. 43.

thing. According to the logical conception, *Karman* forms the substratum of the result as is produced by the action (*kriyājanyaphalaśālitvam*). As it is not always the most desirable thing alone that the agent likes to obtain, Pāṇini had to frame another rule (Pāṇ., 2.4.50) to make provision for such cases as *viṣam bhunkte*, where an undesirable thing like poison is even used as the object. But Patañjali thinks that this rule might be done away with, as the preceding rule is capable of being interpreted in such a way as to apply to all these instances. His arguments stand on the following facts :¹ sometimes swallowing of poison also happens to be desirable on the part of a certain man. It is not unlikely that a man suffering from various kinds of distress (as poverty, bereavement, etc.) may be compelled to take to poison as a desideratum or relief; the swallowing of poison is as desirable to him as other eatables. Patañjali has finally arrived at the conclusion that the negative particle² in *anīpsita* does not indicate simply the opposite, viz., undesirable, but denotes anything other than the desirable.

In the Kātantra system, *Karman* is defined as what is done by the agent (*yat kriyate tat*

¹ विषमञ्चयमपि कस्यापि दीप्तिं स्यात् । कथम् ? इह च एव मनुष्यो दुःखाती भवति सोऽथानि दुःखान्मनुनिशम्य विषमञ्चयमेव ज्ञात्वा मरुते ।—*Mahābhāṣya* under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 50.

² पर्युदासोऽयं अवन्वदीप्तितादृशीप्तिम् ।—*Ibid.*

karma), and neither Sarvavarman nor Durga has spoken of such divisions of *Karman* as *desirable* and *undesirable*. Suseṇa has made some important observations in connection with the interpretation of *Karman*. Following the method of the Naiyāyikas, he defines *Karman* as forming the substratum of the fruit produced by the action (*kriyājanyaphalabhāgitvam*). A careful examination of examples will, however, show that this definition is only a tentative one, and is not absolutely free from defects (*ativyāpti*). According¹ to the strict wording of the definition, the extent of the objective case would be so wide as to comprise even the agent, for, in an instance like 'Devadatta is going to the village,' we find that the fruit of the action, *i.e.*, *conjunction*, does not accrue only to the object (village), but goes to the subject also as equally partaking of the fruit. It is, then, necessary to make further addition to the definition so as to render it applicable exclusively to the object.² The additional words *parasamavetātva* would serve to distinguish the object from the agent in this respect that the former is the recipient of the fruit of the action that relates to others, *viz.*, the agent (that is to say, the action is first brought into existence by the agent, the fruit

¹ रामं गच्छति देवदत्त इत्यादौ कृतिप्रियाजन्मसंयोगपक्षप्रमाणित्वात् यथा रामस्य कर्मत्वं तथा कर्तुरपि स्यात् । इति चेत् परममवेतप्रियाजन्मपक्षप्रमाणितमिति वृत्तः ।—Kavirāja (Kāraka) on 219.

² परममवेतप्रियाजन्मपक्षप्रमाणितं कर्मत्वमिति ।—*Ibid.*

whereof next accrues to the object). This is, however, not sufficient to preclude possible vagueness and misinterpretation, for, if the word *para* in *parasamaveta* is taken to imply something different from the substratum of the fruit (*phalāśrayābhinna*), the village, as in the above example, would not have legitimate claim to be treated as the object. When this definition also proves insufficient for reasons stated above, Suṣeṇa at once suggests another which runs thus :¹ *Karman*, though it does not directly form the substratum of the action (like the agent), comes to partake of the result produced by that action. But the example *parvatādavarohati* (descending from a mountain) furnishes an obstacle in the way of accepting this definition as the most accurate one. Because in the above example (*i.e.*, descending from a mountain) the mountain, though unaffected by the act of moving, is practically found to be the substratum of the fruit of the action (*vibhāga*), *i.e.*, separation. Consequently, it should be treated as the object and not as *Apādāna*.² But grammar does not sanction such an usage.

Prompted by a strong desire to suggest a definition that would not involve any defect whatsoever, and aided by his intimate acquaintance with the logical method of argument,

¹ तत्क्रियानामयले सति तत्क्रियानामयलभासितमिति ।—Kavirāja.

² पर्यवसायि अन्तर्क्रियानामयलेन अन्तर्क्रियानामयलभासितमयलभासितत्वेन कर्मत्वं स्यादिति ।—*Ibid.*

Suṣeṇa has afterwards said the last word on the subject.¹ He says that though it does not comprise in itself the action, *Karman* is the recipient of the fruit of that action as it is qualified by the meaning of the root. Here *qualified by the meaning of the root* is to be taken as an adjunct of the 'fruit.' *Avacchedaka* means something like *attribute* or the object for which the action is resorted to (*yaduddiśya kriyā pravartate*). The act of descending has *conjunction with the posterior place* as its result, which does not pertain to the mountain (*uttaradeśasamyogastu parvate na vidyate eva*) so as to make it the object of the verb *avarohati*. The mountain, so to speak, is the substratum of separation (*vibhāgāśraya*), and is not consequently entitled to get the designation of *Karman*. This is, therefore, the most accurate definition conceivable, from both the logical and grammatical points of view, that applies to all examples of *Karman*.

The association with the fruit is the criterion whereby roots are divided into two classes,² namely, *sakarmaka* and *akarmaka* or transitive and intransitive. A root is said to be *sakarmaka*, when it denotes an action leading to the fruit, and *akarmaka*, when it denotes

¹ तत्प्रतिबन्धनाययत्ने सति धातुर्वाच्येदकोभूत-तत्प्रतिबन्धनायफलमाहितं कर्मेत्यमिति ।—Kavirāja.

² धातूनां कर्मावच्छिन्नव्यापारवाचित्वे सति सकर्मकता, विधिव्यापारवाचित्वे असकर्मकता । and

विधिव्यच्छेदकं यस्य फलं कर्मा विवक्षितम् ।

तदेव कर्मधातुस्य फलानुज्ञावर्त्मकः ॥—Kavirāja.

only an unqualified action. Thus, when we minutely follow the line of thinking, as revealed here, and consider the cogency of those arguments whereby definitions after definitions were rejected till one was found acceptable, our wonder is really excited to a great extent for what has been done by the Indian logico-grammarians.

Karman, it must be remembered, has got the widest and most varied applications in grammar. Just as *śaṣṭhī* is allowed to be used as a substitute for most of the *vibhaktis*, so *Karman* is the only case that may grammatically replace all the rest.¹ It is expressly enjoined by the rules of grammar that *Karman* should have the preference to other cases (when it is so intended by the speaker). The examples of the so-called *dvikarmaka-dhātu* (*viz.*, roots having double objects) furnish evidence how *Karman* might be used in the place of *Apādāna*, *Sampradāna*, and *Adhikaraṇa*.² The indirect objects in such cases as *gām dogdhi payah* might be treated quite as good as an *Apādāna-kāraka* and so on.

There are, broadly speaking, seven different forms of *karman*,³ namely, *nirvartya*, *vikārya*,

¹ अकर्मितं च—Pāṇ., 1. 4. 51.

² सां द्योमि पयः, कथिताच पूर्वापादानसंज्ञा। पुनं ब्रूते धर्मम्, कथिताच पूर्वा संप्रदानसंज्ञा। अग्नयस्त्वपदि सां व्रजम्, कथिताच पूर्वाधिकारसंज्ञा।

—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 51.

³ निर्वर्त्यं च विचार्यं च प्रार्थ्यं च चिन्तितं मतम्।

तत्रेचित्ततमं कर्म अतुर्धाऽन्यत् कथितम् ॥—Vākyapadiya, Kār., 3. 45.

prāpya, *audāsīnya*, *anīpsita*, *saṃjñāntarā-nākhyāta* and *anyapūrvaka*. According to Bhartṛhari, the first three are to be regarded as principal varieties and the rest are more or less fanciful (*kalpita*). (i) *Nirvartya* generally means what is brought into existence by an action. We have a *nirvartya-karman* when the word denoting *prakṛti* or material cause,¹ whether existent or non-existent, is not expressly mentioned. *Ghaṭam karoti* is an example of *nirvartya-karman*. Here we find that *prakṛti* or material cause, whether existent or non-existent, is not expressly mentioned. We notice that *Prakṛti* or material cause (i.e., earth) of the *pot* is not expressly said to have assumed the shape of a pot (as *mṛdā ghaṭam karoti*) by way of modification, so as to show the non-difference (*abheda*) between the cause (earth) and the product² (pot). Now, what is desired by the speaker is to show as if clay and pot were different (as in *mṛdā ghaṭam karoti*) or the product were not a modification of the cause. *Prakṛti* is existent, but is not actually said to have undergone any change so as to re-appear in the

¹ सती वा विद्यमाना वा प्रकृतिः परिणामिनी ।

यस्य नाशोयते तस्य निर्वर्त्यत्वं प्रचक्षते ॥—Vākyaśāstra.

² यस्य निर्वर्त्यस्य घटादिः प्रकृतिः सती वा यथा सदादिका अविवक्षिता वा परिणाममापादित्वा अभेदेन नाशोयते, सदा घटं करोतीत्येवंकथनं न निवर्त्तिता ; किं वक्षि ? सदा घटं करोतीत्यादिभेदेनैव ॥—Hārāja.

form of *kārya*. When the modification (*pariṇāma*) of *prakṛti* or cause is intended to be expressed, we have *vikārya-karman*, as in *mṛdā ghaṭam karoti*, *kāśūn kaṭam karoti*, *aṅgārān bhasma karoti* and so on. It should be, however, remembered ¹ that *ghaṭam karoti* may also prove to be an example of *vikārya-karman* to those who take the product or the effect only as a transformation of *prakṛti* or the material cause. It is difficult to determine what really comes in existence (*sat* or *asat*). The question of *production* and *existence* with particular reference to their mutual dependence has already been discussed. What is now produced, some hold, was non-existent previous to its production (*asat*). Again, some hold that it is really existent (*sat*) that is produced (*sadeva jāyate*).

According ² to both these views, *Karman*, as manifested or brought into existence by the activity of the agent, might be regarded as *nirvartya*. Those who are *satkāryavādins* like the *Samkhya*ites are likely to support *nirvartya-karman*. A thing that comes into being by some sort of action or is simply manifested by its birth (*janmanā yat prakāśate*) is called

¹ घटं करोतीत्यत्रापि प्रकृतेः परिणामित्वेन विवक्षायां निवर्तयेत् ।

—*Vaiyākaraṇabhāṣya*.

² यद्वद्व्यादौ सहा जन्मना यत् प्रकाशते । तत्रिर्वैत्तं विवक्ष्यं च कर्म चेदा व्यवहितम् ॥—*Vākyapadīya*, 3. 42.

nirvartya. Here *janman* implies the manifestation of something that was previously existent, as *putram prasūte* (giving birth to a son) necessarily means the birth of a son that was existent before delivery in an embryonic stage. But when *prakṛti* is intended to be expressed by the term *janman*, what is produced may be looked upon as *vikāra* or modification in relation to *prakṛti*.

Vikārya-karman is so called because it appears to be a modification of *prakṛti* or material cause. *Vikāra* means a change from one state to another and presupposes existence, i.e., modification pertains to things that are already existent (*labdhasattākamevāvasthāntara-māpadyate*). It is principally of two kinds,¹ namely, (i) as produced by the entire annihilation of the material cause (*prakṛtyuccheda-sambhūtam*), as in *kāṣṭhaṃ bhasma karoti* (reducing the fuel to ashes); and (ii) as characterised by some different properties or qualities (distinct from those of *prakṛti*), as *suvarṇam kuṇḍalam karoti* (earrings are made out of gold).

Quite in agreement with the definition of *nirvartya*, the expression *bhasma karoti* is to be taken as an instance of *nirvartya*, since *prakṛti* or material cause (fuel), of which ashes are only modification, is not expressly

¹ प्रकृत्युच्छेदसम्भूतं किञ्चित् काष्ठादिभज्यत् । किञ्चिद् गुणानदीत्पद्मा
सुवर्णादिविकारवत् ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. 50.

mentioned. In the first case *prakṛti* is found to have entirely lost its own self in course of modification. That the difference between *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* is only formal¹ and not material is made clear by the example *suvarṇam kuṇḍalam karoti*. Those who support the view² that product or *vikāra* has its existence in the cause (fuel) in the shape of efficiency are not likely to differentiate *prakṛti* from *vikṛti*, assuming *ashes* to be already existent in the fuel.

From a strictly Vedāntin point of view, *kuṇḍala* is *vivarta*, as opposed to *vikāra*, because it differs from gold only in form but not in essence. From what we have seen above, it is clear that there is, strictly speaking, no remarkable difference³ between *nirvartya* and *vikārya*, as the instance *ghaṭam karoti* has been explained in both the ways; the difference is mainly created by the desire of the speaker. A *Karman*, as Helārāja clearly points out, is called *nirvartya* when *prakṛti* is not directly mentioned (by the speaker), and the same is called *vikārya* when *prakṛti* is expressly mentioned.

¹ काचित् प्रकृतितत्त्वज्ञानी स्वल्पं संख्यामानरापद्या विकृतित्वमुच्यते ।—Helārāja.

² सत्यमेवै काष्ठानवस्थापानपि शक्तिरूपेण भवान्; सत्यवान् । ते हि कारणेण शक्तिरूपेण कार्योत्पत्तिरित्युच्यते ।—Kavirāja (Kāśpa).

³ वाक्यानि भव्य करीति, निर्वर्तमानत्वं कर्म प्रकृतेरविवक्षया । विनवायां तु विकार्यम् ।—Helārāja.

(3) *Prāpya*, i.e., *prāpya-karman*¹ is that where-
in the action of the agent does not produce or
give rise to any special feature or quality.
Usually we have a *prāpya-karman* when the
action does not produce any *viśeṣa* or change
comprehensible either by direct observation
or inference. A *karman* in its ordinary gram-
matical sense is known as *prāpya*. In *ādityam*
paśyati,² mere perception serves only to suggest
a relation between the action and the object
observed, and nothing like *viśeṣa* is cognisable.
In the case of a *nirvartya-karman* as *ghaṭam*
karoti, the speciality that is (*kriyākṛta-viśeṣa*)³
perceptibly brought about by the action is the
production of the pot. But sometimes inference
also helps us to get a specific cognition,
as one can easily determine through the help
of inference whether a man is enjoying plea-
sure or not only by observing his facial features.
But in an instance of *prāpya-karman*, such
as *ādityam paśyati*, we find that the action
(seeing) does not bring about any change or
special feature in the sun.

Some, however, do not recognise any-
thing like *prāpya-karman* on the ground

¹ क्रियाकृतविशेषाणां सिद्धिर्यत्र न गम्यते । दर्शनादनुमानाद्वा तत् प्राप्यमिति
कथ्यते ॥—Vākyapadiya, 3. 51.

² निर्वर्त्यकर्मणि निवृत्तिरात्मकान एव क्रियाकृतौ विशेषः, विकार्ये तु विकार
एव क्रियाकृतौ विशेषः ।—Helārāja.

³ कर्तुः क्रियाविषयभावमालेखेक्षिततमत्वात् प्राप्य' कर्म' । प्रमाणाभ्यां क्रिया-
सम्बन्धमालं तु सत्त्वते, न च स एव विशेषः ।—Ibid.

that the action is invariably followed by some sort of changes, whether directly perceptible or comprehensible by inference only.¹ Even the simple act of seeing is sometimes attended with *vikāra*. Snakes² are proverbially said to have poisonous look; whoever is eagerly seen by them, though not actually bitten, is sometimes found to be in an agony of pain.

(4) *Audāsīnya*.—It is what is done by the agent through indifference; as, for instance, a man while going to a village may happen to touch a straw on his way (*grāmam gacchan tṛṇam spṛśati*), though in so doing (touching) he has got no particular object in view. The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has illustrated this class of *Karman*.

(5) *Anūpsita* or undesirable *karman*.—This has been explained in connection with such examples³ as *viṣam bhuñkte* (taking poison).

(6) *Anākhyāta*.—This, too, has been explained with reference to the rule *akathitam ca*.

(7) *Anyapūrvakam*.—This refers to those cases where *karma-kāraṇas* are specially sanctioned by the rules of grammar in the place of other *kāraṇas*, as in *krūramabhikrudhyati*, etc.

The objective case also admits of other divisions, such as direct and indirect, in

¹ नास्तेन प्राप्यकर्म सर्वत्र शिवाङ्गविशेषावधारणात् ।—*Helārāja*.

² दृष्टिविशैरदृष्टिभिर्निरीक्षितो विषयो व्यञ्जनज्वालासीदौ च तद्वत् ।—*Ibid*.

³ Pāṇ., 1. 4. 50.

connection with those roots that comprehend two objects. We have already alluded to the condition (the desire of the speaker) under which *Karaka* and *Adhikaraka* might be used as the subject. There are instances like *pacyate odanaḥ*, *lūyate kedāraḥ*, etc. where the objects are found to have practically changed into the agent. The so-called agent is known in grammar as *karmakartā*.

Helārāja has spoken of two more divisions of *karman*, namely, *antaraṅga*, as denoting things, and *bahiraṅga* as comprehending such objects as time. Some intransitive verbs ¹ (*āste*, *svapiti*) are allowed to be governed by only such objects as denote particular *time*, *country*, *path* and *action*. Therefore, in grammar ² intransitive verbs are those that can have no other objects excepting time, country, etc. Bhatṭhari is not prepared to take these as regular objects; his contention is that it is impossible to conceive of any objects in connection with the intransitive verb. What appears to be reasonable on a minute examination ³ of such examples as *māsamāste*, *kurūn svapiti*, etc., is that their *karmatva* is,

¹ कालमात्रादिभिरन्याः कर्मसंज्ञा कृतकर्मणाम् ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 336.

² येषां देशकालादिभिर्जन्यं कर्म न संभवति तेषां कर्मकाः, न तद्विवक्षित-
कर्मोच्यन्ते ।—*Siddhāntakaumudī* under 1. 4. 52.

³ कालान्तरादिष्वपि तेषां कर्मत्वम् ।—*Helārāja*, व्याख्यादिक्रियया नित्यमाव-
त्तात् कालादीनां स्फुटमेव कर्मत्वम् ।—*Helārāja*.

strictly speaking, due to their implied relation with some other verbs as *vyāpya* meaning *lasting for* (understood). According to this interpretation, the expression *māsamāste* really means *māsam vyāpyāste* (staying for a month).

Patañjali has referred to another form of *Karman*, namely, *kalma*,¹ which means 'an unaccomplished object' (*aparisaṃāptam karma*). These irregular *Karmans* (as are illustrated by the rule *akathitam ca*) take *dvitīyā* as their only characteristic feature, but do not generally receive all those grammatical operations which are applied to the regular objects alone.² Kaiyaṭa observes that the term *kalma* was used by the ancient grammarians as a technical name for those objects that are sanctioned and recognised as such by the rule *Pāṇ.*, 1.4.51.

Apādāna is that form of *Kāraka* which denotes the limit of separation. The definition of Pāṇini (*Pāṇ.*, 1.4.24) deserves careful examination, specially with regard to the word *dhruva* as occurring in the *sūtra*. The word *dhruva* generally means 'motionless,' but this sense is hardly compatible when the limit of separation is also found to be in motion,³

¹ विपरीतं तु यत् कर्म तत् कलम इति विदुः ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 335.

² न बाह्यं सर्वानि कर्मकार्याणि क्रियन्ते, किं तर्हि, द्वितीयम् ।

³ गतिरुक्त्यापदानसंज्ञा नीपपक्षेऽप्यस्तीति ।—*Vār. on the rule Pāṇ.*, 1. 4. 24.

as we say 'fallen from a running horse.' Here both the horse and the rider are equally in motion and, consequently, it is not possible to have the cognition of a fixed limit so far as the act of separation is concerned. How, then, are we justified in taking the word *aśva* in a sentence like 'fallen from a running horse' as an instance of *Apādāna-kāraka*? Patañjali¹ holds that there are also some stationary or permanent elements in the horse, such as the genus (*aśvato*) or the state of being a horse and 'the swift motion' which are said to be the implication of the speaker in a sentence like *dhāvato'svāt patitah*. He thus makes it clear that in like cases what the speaker desires to indicate refers really to *dhrūvato* or motionlessness and not to the opposite.

The word *dhrūva* should not be taken in its strictly literal sense,² i.e., motionless. Of two things, namely, the limit and the object that is actually separated, the former, i.e., tree, as in *vrkṣāt paṇam patati*, is more or less unaffected by the act of separation; consequently, it is grammatically called *dhrūva* in relation to the leaf that falls down as the result of separation.

Bhartṛhari has stated clearly that *Apādāna* forms the limit of separation, whether movable

¹ इह तावदप्राप्तत्वात्पतितः—इति यत्तदर्थं स्थलमाद्यमानि तद् भुव' तत्र विवक्षितम् ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 327.

² द्रव्यस्वभावी न धीव्यमिति कृते प्रतीयेते । अपादाविषयं धीव्यं यत्तु तारक्षितचितम् ।—Vākyapadīya, 3. 3. भूव' कूटस्थ' निमित्तमिति द्रव्यस्वभावी धीव्यमिति न कृते प्रतीयेतम् ।—Holārāja

or fixed (*calam vā yadi vācalam*) and that the limit, though the substratum of separation, is not practically affected by the operation of the wind which is the direct cause of separation. In the example *kuḍyāt patato'ścāt patitaḥ* both the wall and the horse are to be regarded as *dhruva*, the former constitutes the limit of separation in regard to the falling of the horse, and the latter in regard to the man who falls down from the falling horse. The word *dhruva* is thus used as a relative one; it does not necessarily mean an absolutely motionless thing, but generally what remains more or less unaffected in the course of separation. When separation is brought about by the reciprocal action of the two, as in *apa-sarato meṣādapasarati meṣaḥ*, each of them is to be considered as *dhruva*¹ in regard to the action of the other.

It is necessary to make one point perfectly clear. In the oft-quoted instance of *Apādāna*, viz., 'a leaf is falling from a tree,' the relation, it must be remembered, between the tree and the leaf is one of simple conjunction and not of co-inherence (*samavāya*), that is, we have *Apādāna* only when the leaf happens to be brought over the tree either by the wind or by birds, but not when the leaf stands in an inseparable connection with the tree.

¹ 'नीपान्तरक्रियापिचमवधितं' पृथक्, पृथक्। मेवमीः खल्लियापिचं' कटौलं
च पृथक् पृथक्।—*Vākya-padīya*, 3. 6.

When, on the other hand, co-inherence is intended to be expressed, we get *śaṣṭhī* instead of *pañcamī*, as in *vrkṣasya parṇam patati*.¹

As the act of separation equally affects the tree as well as the leaf (the very idea of separation comprehending two objects), Suṣeṇa argues that the leaf also may have the designation of *Apādāna* in such a case. But it is against the desire of the speaker. Moreover, *pañcamī*² in *yataḥ* is indicative of *limit*, which, in the fitness of things, applies to the tree and not to the leaf. Suṣeṇa³ then suggests a logical definition of *limit*—‘though practically unaffected by the operation (of the wind) that relaxes the connection, the limit or *Apādāna* forms the substratum of separation.’⁴

Separation may be either physical or intellectual. Patañjali has recognised the desirability of acknowledging the intellectual separation and has, consequently, rejected some *sūtras* and *vārttikas*, such as Pāp., 1.4.25, 1.4.26, 1.4.27, 1.4.28, as superfluous. In accordance

¹ वृक्षस्य पत्रं पततीत्येवं भाष्ये निर्दिष्टम् ।—Vākyapadīya. वृक्षसम्बन्धिनः पत्रस्य पातो वाक्यार्थो विवक्षितः, इति वृक्षस्यावधिना विवक्षा नस्ति ।—Heṭhārāja.

² सती, ऐति भवनादसे वा तदपादानम् ।—Kāṭhā, Kāra, 214.

³ Suṣeṇa has the following :—अन्वयाद्यो विच्छेदः विभाज इति यावत् । स च पर्यनिष्ठो वृत्तिश्च, ततो यथा वृत्त्यापादानसंज्ञा तदा पर्यव्यापि कथं न स्यात् ? इति चेन्न, अस्मिन्नापदिज्ञानात् ।

⁴ अवधिलम्—विभाजनजनकौभूतव्यवहारादिविधानाद्यले सति विभाजाद्यवत् ।
—Kavirāja.

with his view,¹ the rule *dhruvamapāye'pādānam* is quite sufficient to explain all those instances that are usually supported by the additional rules.

Bhartrhari speaks of three kinds of *Apādāna*,² namely, *nirdiṣṭaviṣayam*—when the limit of separation is fixed, or, where the sense of separation is directly denoted by the verbal form, as in *grāmādagacchati* (coming from a village) and *aśvāt patitaḥ* (fallen from a horse); *upāttaviṣayam*—when the sense of another verb appears to be either principal or subordinate, as in *valāhakāt vidyotate* (lightning flashes forth from the cloud); *apekṣitakriyam*—when the act of separation is to be understood, as in *kuto bhavān* (wherefrom do you come)? Here the verb like *āgacchati* is to be supplied.

Sampradāna is that form of *Kāraka* which is desired (by the agent) to be the recipient of the fruit of ownership (*svatva*) pertaining to the object of the root *dā* (to give). Suśeṇa explains *yamabhipraiti* as what is connected with the action (*dadāti*) by the instrumentality of the objective case. *Abhipraiti* gives the idea of a relation which is, in the logical terms, thus expressed: a recipient of the fruit, i.e., ownership pertaining to the object of the action (*kriyājanya-karmanisṭha-svatvaphalabhāgitvam*).

¹ य एव सगुणः प्रेक्षापूर्वकारी भवति स पश्यति दुःखीऽधर्मो नानेन क्लृप्तमस्तीति । स बुद्ध्या संप्राप्य निवर्तते । तच्च भ्रुवमपादिपोदानमित्येव सिद्धम् ।
—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 1. 4. 24.

² निर्दिष्टविषयं किं चिदुपात्तविषयं तथा ।

अपेक्षितकियं चेति विधायादानमुच्यते ॥—Vākyapadīya, 3, p. 138.

According to the interpretation of the Vyutpattivāda,¹ the example *viprāya gām dadāti* (giving a cow to a Brahmin) will mean 'a Brahmin who is the object (*uddeśya*) of the desire for gift which is made with the intention of making him the recipient of the ownership of the cow, as is effected by the act of giving.'² *Sampradāna* is, therefore, the same as *uddeśya*,³ i.e., a person to whom something is made over. This is clear from the language of the rule *yasmai ditsā*, etc. (Kalāpa, 216).

The word *sampradāna* is treated as an *anvarthasamjñā*, i.e., it means exactly the same thing as is denoted by its derivative meaning (*sampradīyate yasmai*). It is a gift⁴ (*dāna*) by which the previous owner transfers his legal right to another. *Prayer*,⁵ *acceptance* and *inducement* are considered to be the causes that persuade a man to make a gift of his own right. A gift⁵ in the religious sense of the term should proceed from a desire for either worship or favour as in *devatāyai puṣpam dadāti* (offering flowers to a deity) and *bhṛtyāya vastram dadāti* (giving clothes to a servant), when in so doing the person to whom something is made over is entitled to the actual ownership.

¹ व्याकरणाधिकारिकानिष्ठसूत्रभाषितया दातुमिच्छाविषयो ब्राह्मणः ।

² स्वतुल्यव्यमानद्रव्यस्य स्वत्वभाषितेनोद्देश्यत्वं संप्रदानमिति ।

³ स्वत्वत्वं संपूर्णकपरस्वत्वावादान् ददातिरर्थः ।—Kavirāja.

⁴ अतुल्यनिराकर्तृप्रेरकं व्याकारणम् ।

⁵ संप्रदानं तद्वैयं स्यात् पूजानुयुक्त्याम्बवा । दीयमानेन संयोगात् स्वामित्वं लभते यदि ॥—Kārikās quoted by the Paṇjikāra.

The word *Karman*, as in *Pāṇ.*, 1.4.32, is used to exclude the objective case from getting the designation of *Apādāna*, since *what is desired by the agent* (*yam-abhipraiti*) is a qualification that also applies to the object. It is generally explained as particularly implying the object of the root *dā* (to give), but the author of the *Bhāṣya* has taken it in the sense of *action* (*kriyā*) in general. He has also cited popular instances to show that the word *karman* is used with the same signification as *kriyā*.¹ *Kriyā* is sometimes called *karman*. As there is no difference of meaning between the two expressions, namely, *kām kriyām kariṣyasi* (what action will you do ?) and *kim karma kariṣyasi*, one is allowed to use the word *karman* in place of *kriyā*. Patañjali calls it a kind of artificial (*krtrima*) *karman*. It is called *artificial*² because its use in this particular sense is not sanctioned by the grammarians in general. If *karman* is taken to be synonymous with *kriyā*, one may apprehend some difficulty in explaining the rule *Pāṇ.*, 1.4.49, since it is impossible for one *kriyā* to render another as the most desirable one (*katham ca nāma kriyayā kriyepsitatamā syāt*).

¹ क्रियापि कृत्रिमं कर्म—*Mahābhāṣya*.

² क्रियापि कृत्रिमं कर्म। न सिध्यति। कर्तुरीप्सिततमं कर्म इत्युच्यते। कथं च नाना क्रियायां क्रियेप्सिततमा स्यात्? क्रियापि क्रियेप्सिततमा भवति। कया क्रियया? इह न एव बहुव्ययः प्रेक्षापूर्वकारो भवति स तुल्यता तावत् किञ्चिदर्थं संप्रत्यति संज्ञते; प्रायेणा प्रायेणावामध्यवसायोऽध्यवसाय आरम्भ आरम्भे निवेष्टि निवेष्टौ वत्सावसि;—*Mahābhāṣya*, under the rule 1. 4. 32.

How minutely Patañjali¹ used to observe the logical sequence of facts is clearly seen from the way in which he has shown the successive stages through which one *kriyā* or action may become the most desirable by means of another action. The usual order is as follows: a man first conceives something by his intellect, then he feels a desire to have it, next comes the effort which is followed by the actual commencement of action, then the completion or accomplishment of the action, and finally the attainment of the desired end.

As it is not always the case that *Sampradāna* should be invariably connected with the object of the root *dā* alone, Kātyāyana has added a *Vārttika*² obviously to widen the scope of *Sampradāna*. On the strength of this supplementary *Vārttika* we are allowed to explain *Sampradāna* even in the case of an intransitive verb like *patye śete*, where the root being an intransitive one, we cannot grammatically expect to have an object that might be connected with *Sampradāna* as such.

Patañjali seems to have minutely scrutinised every part of the *sūtra*, *Pāṇ.*, 2.4.32. He does not take the root *dā* in its strictly literal sense (to give), nor does he lay much stress on

¹ *Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 380.

² जियया वनभिप्रैति सोऽपि संप्रदानम् । Patañjali has क्रियायद्वयमपि कार्यव्यन्, इहापि यथा स्यात्—यथाय निगर्हते, युद्धाय संप्रदाते ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 380.

the derivative meaning (*sampradīyate yasmai iti*), but considers *Sampradāna* to be one to whom something is actually given. The instance *śiṣyāya capeṭam dadāti* (gives a slap to the pupil), as cited by Patañjali, is a clear indication that he held a far wider view of *Sampradāna*. It is not evidently the use of the root *dā* that always gives the idea of *Sampradāna*, because in the example *rajakasya vastram dadāti* (where the genitive is intended by the speaker) the explicit mention of *dadāti* is not even attended with *caturthī* (*Sampradāna-kāraka*).

Suṣeṇa explains the rule Pāṇ. 2.4.32 in the following way :—*Sampradāna* is what is desired by the agent through the instrumentality of the object. It is neither ' the object of the verb in general, nor virtually the object of *dadāti* in particular wherewith *Sampradāna* is really connected ; for, according to the first view, the village, as in *ajām grāmam nayati* (' brings a goat to the village ') would be quite as good as *Sampradāna* ; according to the latter, the designation *Sampradāna* might be applied to the ' washerman ' in the example ' clothes are given to a washerman.' The anomaly presented by the above instances received an ingenious solution at the hands of Suṣeṇa. The drift of his argument is as follows : as the sense of *giving* naturally follows from the very

¹ द्विवाचावस्य कर्मणा यं संबधति, ददाति: कर्मणा वा ? नाह:; अजां यानं नयति—इत्यादौ यामस्यापि संपदानाप्रसङ्गात् । नापि द्वितीयः, राजकस्य वस्त्रं ददातीत्यदावतिप्रसङ्गात्—Kavirāja (*Kāraka*).

construction of the word *Sampradāna* (*anvartḥa-samjñā*), the definition is not vitiated by the fallacy, viz., *ativyāpti*,¹ that is to say, the village cannot grammatically have the designation of *Apādāna* owing to the absence of any connection with the root *dā*. Similarly, as the preposition *sam* in *Sampradāna* serves to indicate that *dadāti* does not mean merely *giving*, but signifies *gift* in its legal sense, i.e., the *waiving of one's own right* (in regard to a thing) so as to allow another to enjoy the same as his own possession, the washerman cannot be treated as *Apādāna* even in connexion with the verbal form *dadāti* (*dadāti* means here 'to make over' [*arpana*], and not actual giving [*dāna*]).

Suṣeṇa, therefore, explains *dāna* as a kind of 'desire'² to transfer one's right to another after the entire cessation of one's own right, and gives the accurate definition of *Sampradāna* in the following terms—*tyāgajanya-svatoaphalabhāgitvam*, i.e., *Sampradāna* is the recipient of the result of right or ownership that is transferred to one by formal gift. He further asserts that the principal³ or direct instances of *Sampradāna* are

¹ अत्राने, संप्रदानमित्यनेयसंज्ञायां दी-धातोः अत्रादादितिर्लभ्यते...तथा समुप-सर्गस्य सन्धक् प्रदीयते यच्चै तत् संप्रदानमिति व्युत्पत्त्या स्वस्वत्वध्वंसपूर्वकपरस्वत्वादादानं ददातिरर्थो लभ्यते ।—Kavirāja.

² स्वस्वत्वध्वंसद्वारा परस्वत्वजननीभूतः संकल्पविशेषो दानम् ।—Kavirāja.

³ एतत् सुदै यत्र वास्तविकं तत्र सुष्ठुमेव संप्रदानम् । अवास्तविके तु निवचनमात्रेण प्रयोगस्य साधुत्वम् ।—Kavirāja.

those where the transference of right actually takes place, and that in regard to other cases, it is generally the desire of the speaker (*vivakṣā*) that accounts for the use.

The validity¹ of *Sampradāna* in *pradīyatām Dāśarathāya Maithilī* (as Rāvaṇa had no legal right over Sītā so that he might be entitled to make a gift of her to Rāma) depends upon the desire of the speaker, *i.e.*, it is said as if Rāvaṇa had transferable right over Sītā. The fact is that one cannot give anything to another in the legal sense of the term, if he does not own it actually.

Bharṭṭhari has spoken of three kinds of *Sampradāna* :—(i) *anirākarṭṭ*—it means a kind of *Sampradāna* that does neither accept nor refuse what might be offered to it ; as, for instance, *Sūryāya argham dadāti* ; the sun neither solicits worship nor is likely to refuse it ; (ii) *prerakam*—*i.e.*, what induces others to make over something to him, as in *viprāya gām dadāti*. Here the Brahmin is supposed to have induced the man to make a gift of the cow to him ; (iii) *anumantṭ*—who approves of a gift, *i.e.*, permits a man to make over something (though he does not actually request him to do so) as in *upādhyāyāya gām dadāti* (presenting a cow to the teacher).

¹ इत्यत्र रावणस्य मैथिल्यां स्त्रियाभावेऽपि स्त्र्यविचक्षया प्रवीणस्य साधुत्वम् ।—
Kavirāja.

CHAPTER VIII

SAMĀSA

Samāsa—definition—The meaning of *samātha*, *ekārthābhāva* and *vyapekṣā*—Classification of *Samāsa*—Power of expressing the additional sense.

The psychological principle underlying the formation of compounds and the unity of sense denoted by *Samāsa* has been considered in my "Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus." An attempt will be made here to show the grammatical side of the problem with particular reference to the conflicting views held by the *Naiyāyikas* and the grammarians on the question of the additional denotating power of *Samāsa*.

The word *Samāsa* literally means brevity,¹ i. e., condensed or concise expression. This grammatical device has the advantage of condensing a sentence without any change of signification. It must be, however, remembered that it is not only words, or more properly *nāmans*, that combine with each other in a compound, but their meanings, too, are so consistently related to each other (as noun and

¹ समसनं समासः संक्षेपः ।

adjective) as to give rise to one qualified idea. Though composed of two or more *padas*, a *Samāsa* produces only one idea in the mind.

According to the rule *samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*, *Pāṇ.* 2.1.1, which is quite as good as a *Paribhāṣā*, words are allowed to form a compound when they are found to be mutually expectant and their meanings compatible with each other. Sarvavarman has *nāmnām samāso yuktārthaḥ*, which means that a compound represents the 'consistent unification of the meanings of two or more *nāmans*.' A combination of *nāmans* expressing a united sense is what is grammatically called *Samāsa*. The meanings are consistently united when the words forming a compound are related to each other as substantive and attributive. The *kārikā*¹ quoted by Durga goes to show that *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* in their harmonious association are only competent to form a compound. *Samāsa*, holds Durga,² is distinct from a sentence. But it is generally expressed by a sentence (*vigraha*) only to help the understanding of unintelligent people. The word *samartha*, as used in the *sūtra*, is of considerable importance and has given rise to various interpretations.

Patañjali has explained *sāmarthyā* from two different standpoints, namely, *vyapekṣā* or mutual

¹ विशिष्यस्य विशिष्यस्य निमित्तं दुरुक्तमुच्यते । समासाख्यं तद्वैयर्थ्यादित्युच्यते ।

² स पुनः स्वभाववाक्यादिभिः तत्पञ्चदशपादयव इति कला अवयवबोधनाय नावां दृष्टार्थं इत्युच्यते ।—*Kaṭapa, Tika.*

connection and *ekārthībhāva* or the oneness of meanings. He has made it abundantly clear with reference to all forms of compounds that no *Samāsa* whatsoever is grammatically admissible in the absence of such *sāmarthyā* or competency. He has also suggested various meanings of the word *samartha* in order to show how the word might correctly be used to imply both *vyapekṣā* and *ekārthībhāva*.

According to his interpretation,¹ the word *samartha* may be used in the following senses, namely, consistent or mixed up (*saṅgatārtha*), united (*samsr̥ṣṭārtha*), visible (*samprekṣitārtha*) and connected (*sambaddhārtha*); the first two meanings indicating united into one (*ekībhūtam*) are agreeable with the *ekārthībhāva* point of view, and the last two indicating connection of meanings being harmonious with the *vyapekṣā* standpoint. So far as the *ekārthībhāva*² view is concerned, the word *samartha* should be taken as implying united meanings (*ekībhūtam*), and it brings out the sense of 'connected meanings' (*sambaddhārtha*) or 'reciprocally expectant meanings,' when *vyapekṣā* is considered to be the essential condition of *Samāsa*. The word *samartha* indicates that words are not allowed

¹ *Mahābhāṣya* under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

² तद् यदा वापदेवार्थोन्मादः सामर्थ्यं तदेव विपक्षः अविपक्षे संगतार्थः समर्थः संसृष्टार्थः समर्थ इति । एकीभूतमिति गच्छते ।—*Mahābhāṣya* under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

to form a compound unless they are *samartha*, i.e., have either mutual connection or compatibility of meanings.

Patañjali then proceeds to bring out the full import of *sāmarthyā* and clearly shows why *Samāsa*¹ does not usually take place in expressions like *bhāryā rājñāḥ puruṣo devadattasya* and *mahat kaṣṭam śritaḥ*. What he means to say is this: no compound is possible between two words when one of them is grammatically connected with another word that does not form a part of the compound; in *mahat kaṣṭam śritaḥ* the form *kaṣṭam* is *asamartha* (incompetent) to be compounded or consistently united with the word *śritaḥ* on account of its having relation with the word *mahat* that qualifies it. Here *asāmarthyā* for a regular combination in order to form a *Samāsa* is due to the fact that the words *mahat* and *kaṣṭam* are mutually expectant as noun and adjective.² To use the logical phraseology, *sāpekṣatva* implies the state of having relation with a word that is not a member of the compound.³

The grammarians, as a rule, are not prepared to allow the formation of compounds in cases of such *sāpekṣatva*.⁴ This is what is actually meant by the dictum *saviśeṣaṇānām*

¹ असामर्थ्यात् ।—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

² सापेक्षमसमर्थं भवतीति ।—*Ibid.*

³ वृत्तार्थघटकौभूतपदादिरिक्तपदसम्बन्धितं सापेक्षत्वम् ।

⁴ न सापेक्षे लक्षितसमासाः ।—Mahābhāṣya.

vriddhina, that is, a word cannot enter into combination with another word (in a *Samāsa*) if it happens to have an adjunct. A question may arise at this stage as to how compounds are admissible in instances like *rājapuruṣo abhirūpataṛaḥ* and *rājapuruṣo darśanīyaḥ* (a beautiful officer of the king), because the word *puruṣa* is here compounded with the word *rājan* in spite of its relation with the adjective *abhirūpa*. Now Patañjali¹ comes forward with his argument to justify the formation of a compound in such cases. When the principal member and not the subordinate one, he holds happens to be *sāpekṣa* or connected with some other word (as adjective), there is practically no restriction for the formation of a compound. What we actually find in *rājapuruṣaḥ abhirūpaḥ* is that the principal member, i.e., *puruṣaḥ*, is connected with the adjunct *abhirūpa* and, therefore, *Samāsa* is grammatically admissible.

But sentences like *Devadattasya gurukulam* and *caitrasya dāsabhāryā* (the wife of the servant of Caitra), etc., which are avowedly correct in popular usage, present further difficulties. Patañjali first tried to get rid of this anomalous position by explaining the genitive in *Devadattasya* as implying relation with the whole and not with the

¹ *Maṇḍbhāṣya*, p. 360 : प्रधानस्य सापेक्षं, भवति च प्रधानस्य सापेक्षत्वादि समासः ।

word *guru* alone, but this argument also proved futile, because, the sentence is really intended to express particularly *Devadattasya yo gurustasya yat kulam* and so on. He then finally concludes that *Samāśas* are admissible in these cases (even inspite of *sāpekṣatva*) on account of *gamakatva* or power of expressing the intended sense. A compound is said to be *gamaka* when it is capable of expressing the very same sense (no matter if there is *sāpekṣatva*) as is implied by the words that go to form such a compound. This is exactly what is meant by the statement *sāpekṣatve'pi gamakatvāt samāśaḥ*. As to why *Samāśa* is not admissible in *mahat kaṣṭam śrītaḥ*, there is no denying the fact, says Patañjali,¹ that the signification of the sentence in this case is not necessarily the same as is expressed by the compound. This is the way how Patañjali relaxed the rigidity of his previous statement (*sāpekṣa-masamartham bhavātīti*).

Jagadīśa² ventures to differ from the grammarians. He has little regard for the view that a compound and its *vigraha* (the sentence to which the compound might be

¹ इह समासार्थेन वाक्येन समासेन च भवितव्यम् । अथेहार्थो वाक्येन गम्यते महत् कष्टं श्रित इति न जातुचित् समासिनासी गम्यते महत्कष्टश्रित इति । यत् गम्यको भवति भवति तत् इति, यथा दिवदत्तस्य दुरङ्गुलम् ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 361.

² विग्रहे एव समाससम्बन्धस्य बोधकत्वं तर्कं, न तु समासो विग्रहार्थस्य, विग्रहस्यार्थोक्तिर्गम्यकोऽर्थोऽर्थकवैधुर्मेव प्रादुर्भवः समासादोच्यतात् ।—*Śabdśaktiprakāśikā*, under the *Kār.* 38.

dissolved) must have the same meaning,¹ and holds in opposition that the *vigraha*, as a rule, should bring out the sense of the compound but it is not equally binding that a compound should necessarily express the entire meaning of the sentence. He has, accordingly, disjoined the compound *sphuradvāṇī* (articulate speech) as *sphurantīm vāṇīm* without having any regard to the equality of case-terminations between *vyāsa* and *Samāsa*.²

The two views—*ekārthibhāva* and *vyapekṣā*—correspond respectively to *jāhatsvārthā vṛtti* and *ajāhatsvārthā vṛtti*: the former means that when a compound is formed, its component parts cease to retain their individual meanings, and give rise to only one united sense; and the latter implies that such constituent parts do not, as a rule, give up their meanings (as in a sentence) as a necessary condition of *Samāsa*.

According to the first view,³ *samartha* implies the oneness of meanings (i.e., the members of a compound having different significations are made to signify only one sense). A sentence, on the other hand, is made up of different *padas* that continue to retain their own meanings as *rājñah puruṣah*. We have to deal here with a problem of great importance.

¹ आसमनाद्योक्त्यायैकत्वम् ।

² Śabdafakti—Samāsaprakaraṇam.

³ पञ्चम्यादीनामिकाधीभावः समर्थवचनम् ।—*Vār.*

इषमर्थाणां पदानामिकाधीभावः समर्थेति श्रूयते ।—*Maṭābhāṣya.*

As a matter of fact, there is no material difference between a sentence and a compound so far as the meaning is concerned,¹ for instance, the compound and the sentence like *rājñah puruṣa ānīyatām* and *rājapuruṣa ānīyatām* grammatically mean the same thing, viz., 'fetch an officer of the king.' It, therefore, goes against the assumption of Jagadīśa who made a distinction between *Samāsa* and *vigraha* with reference to their meanings.

Wherein, then, lies the difference between *vyāsa* and *Samāsa*? The criterion to distinguish a *Samāsa* from a sentence is that the former is characterised² by *aikapadya* and *aika-svarya* from the grammatical point of view. The prominent points of difference are as follows³ :—(1) there is no elision of case-endings in a sentence as in a compound; (2) in a sentence other words (adjectives) are allowed to intervene between such mutually expectant words as *rājñah ṛddhasya puruṣa iti*, but such is not the case in regard to the compound *rājapuruṣah*; (3) in a sentence there is hardly any restriction as to the syntax or order of words, but one cannot possibly alter the order of a compound without substantial change of meaning; (4) in a compound

¹ इह समानार्थेन वाक्येन भवितव्यं समासिन च ।—*Mahābhāṣya*.

² एकपद्यमेव सर्वमेकविभक्तिर्वाच्यं च सर्वदेकार्थमिति दृश्यते ।—*Kaiyaṭa*.

³ सुबन्तोपो व्याख्यानं यथेष्टमन्यतरिणाभिप्रेत्यन्वः स्वर इति ।—*Mahābhāṣya*.

there is only one accent and not two as in the sentence *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*. It might be, however, observed here that these special features, as enumerated above, are not really brought about by *ekārthābhāva* or oneness of the sense, but they, strictly speaking, represent the result of Patañjali's interpretation.

Then, Patañjali continues to point out other points of difference between *vyāsa* and *Samāsa*¹: (i) there is difference of number in a sentence, as *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*, *rājñōḥ puruṣaḥ*, *rājñām puruṣaḥ*, but no such difference is comprehensible in the compound (*rājapuruṣaḥ*); (ii) the meaning of a sentence is clear, while that of a compound is sometimes ambiguous (the reverse of the case is also possible, viz., a compound appears to be sometimes more clear than a sentence); (iii) an *upasarjana* or subordinate member is allowed to have a qualifying adjunct (*rddhasya rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*) in a sentence, whereas there is a positive restriction that a member of the compound cannot have grammatical connection with an adjective lying outside the compound. This also, to speak the truth, does not constitute a special feature of *Samāsa*, because compounds in *Devadattasya gurukulam*, etc., have already been declared admissible on the ground of expressiveness (*gamakatva*); (iv) *ca* is used in a sentence

¹ संज्ञाविशेषो व्यञ्जनाभिधानसमूहसंज्ञकविशेषश्च चतुर्विधः ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 362.

(in the sense of collection), but not in a compound.

Some explain, on the other hand, 'mutual connection' as the proper implication of *sāmarthya*; ¹ the expression 'mutual connection' should not be, however, misunderstood as referring to words (reciprocally expectant words), but as pertaining to their meanings.² When, *vyapekṣā* (mutual connection) pertaining to the meaning is thus held to be the denotation of *sāmarthya*, both the king and the man, as in *rājāṇaḥ puruṣaḥ*, seem to be related to each other. The king³ is connected with the man as the master (*mamāyāmiti*), and the man also gets himself related to the king on account of his being dependent on him (*ahamasya*). The genitive is thus indicative of the relation between them. The older grammarians are supposed to have been in favour of *vyapekṣā* as an indispensable condition of *Samāsa*.

In course of interpreting the rule 2.1.1 (Pāṇ.), Patañjali has referred to various standpoints regarding the characteristics of *Samāsa*. If *Samāsa* is considered to be a *vṛtti* (i.e., if it, as a rule, always brings out a specific signification),

¹ परस्परव्यपेक्षा सामर्थ्येति ।—*Mahābhāṣya*.

² *Mahābhāṣya*, p. 365. का पुनः शब्दव्योपेक्षा ? न पुनः शब्दव्यतिरिक्तः किं तर्हि ? अर्थव्यतिरिक्तः ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, p. 365.

³ इह राज्ञः पुरुष इत्यन्ते राजा पुरुषस्येति अनायमिति, पुरुषोऽपि राजानस्येति हेतुमतीति । तयोरेकसम्बन्धस्य धर्मी नाप्यन्ता भवति ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

these views, holds Koṇḍabhaṭṭa,¹ are, by minute examination, reducible to two only, namely, *jahatsvārthā* and *ajahatsvārthā*.

The three views mainly discussed in the Mahābhāṣya are as follows;² (i) *ekārthābhāva* or the unity of meanings takes place in a compound as the salient characteristic, but a *vigraha* (sentence) comprehends *vyapekṣā* or *vyapekṣā* is found to be the primary condition of a sentence; (ii) on the assumption of *vṛtti*, *Samāsa* will fall under the category of either *jahatsvārthā* or *ajahatsvārthā*; (iii) just as *vyapekṣā* or mutual connection is necessary in a sentence, so it is in a compound, i.e., some hold *vyapekṣā* (as the real meaning of *sāmarthya*) to be the main factor that goes to form a compound.

Kaiyaṭa, like Patañjali, supports *ekārthābhāva* as the most plausible view from the standpoint of the grammarians who ascribe eternality to *śabda*. He argues further that the question of *vṛtti*, as shown above, is absolutely immaterial to those who take a sentence as containing no parts (*niravayava*), and look upon *śabda* as eternal. The division of *vṛtti* into *jahatsvārthā* and *ajahatsvārthā* represents the view of those who take *śabda* to be *kārya*.

¹ Vaiyākaraṇabhāṣya, Kā. 30.

² इत्थं तावद्वाच्ये पञ्चमूढिः प्रतीयते । समासादविवर्धनीभावः, विशदवाक्ये च स्वपेक्षकः पक्षः । अथ ये वृत्तिं वर्तयन्ति द्वयारभ्य जहत्स्वार्थाजहत्स्वार्था चेति पञ्चमेदेन गतात्तरम् । समासादावपि वाक्यवद्वापेक्षैव सामर्थ्यमिति आपरं मतम् ।—

*Samāsa*¹ is a *vṛtti*, that is to say, *Samāsa* is attended with a special significance. *Vṛtti* is of two kinds, namely, *jahatsvārthā* and *ajahatsvārthā*. According to the standpoint of *jahatsvārthā-vṛtti*, the members constituting a compound generally give up their particular meanings and the compound necessarily acquires a special signification. This special sense may be produced either by *śakti* (denotation) or by *lakṣaṇā* (implication), the former helps us in getting the *united meaning* (*ekārthābhāva*) and the latter is resorted to in case of *vyapekṣā*. Patañjali has here made use of a very well-chosen example to show the nature of *jahatsvārthā*. 'A carpenter,² for instance, when engaged to perform the work of a king, is compelled to give up his own work to a certain extent.' So far as the other form of *vṛtti* is concerned (*ajahatsvārthā*), the members of a compound continue to retain their respective meanings; as, for instance, 'a beggar³ does not necessarily leave off what he procured first even when he happens to secure alms for the second time.' But there is some difficulty in accepting this standpoint as a reasonable one. The compound form should necessarily have the dual number, if each of the members

¹ परावर्त्तिमिधानं वृत्तिः। परस्मै शब्दस्य यौग्यैकस्याभिधानं शब्दान्तरेण यच्च स्याद्वृत्तिरित्यर्थः।—*Kaīyaśā.*

² तथा राज्ञश्चर्मणि प्रवर्तमानः स्वं कर्म त्यजति।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 354.

³ भिक्षुकीदृशं विदीयां भिक्षाभावात् पूर्वो न त्यजति।—*Ibid*, p. 355.

(*rājan* and *puruṣa*) were allowed to retain their respective meanings.

Patañjali has thus examined the validity of several views in regard to the exposition of *sāmarthya* and advanced arguments as well as counter-arguments either to support or to reject them. But the question that still awaits solution is to determine which of these two views is really acceptable from the standpoint of grammar, and appeals more to reason. In view of the emphasis laid on the *ekārthibhāva*, it is clear that Patañjali accepted it as the most correct explanation. From what we have been able to gather from his lengthy discourse on the rule *samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*, it appears that Patañjali, whose decision is held to be authoritative on all problems of grammar, was in favour of the *ekārthibhāva*¹ point of view (or *jahatsvārthā*). The *ekārthibhāva* view, it must be remembered, is also the only reasonable explanation so far as the psychological aspect of *Samāsa* is concerned. According to Haradatta, both *vyapekṣā* and *ekārthibhāva* are necessary in a compound. In the absence of *vyapekṣā* or mutual connection, words are not allowed to form a compound.

Patañjali² has, however, drawn attention to the fact that *jahatsvārthā* does not mean

¹ इह व्यपेक्षायां समासो न भवति, एकार्थीभावे वाक्यं वेति ।—Kaiyaṣa on वाचस्पतियस्येति ।

² जहद्व्यस्यै स्थायं वाच्यत्वात् जहाति । यः परार्थविरोधी स्थायकः जहाति ।

—Mahābhāṣya under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 1.

that the constituents of a compound are liable to give up their respective meanings altogether. But only that sense which is found to be inconsistent with the specific signification (*parārthavirodhī*) as denoted by a compound, is forsaken. This is why the expression *rājapuruṣo ānīyatām*¹ does not simply mean the bringing of a man, but particularly *the* man having relation with the king.

Sāmānyā has been explained by some as pertaining to *vṛtti*. According to this view,² difference (*bheda*) as well as association (*sam-sarga*) are the meanings of *sāmānyā*.

Patañjali has raised another question which is not less important in connection with *Samāsa*. A compound is generally said to be optional, that is to say, we may have either a *Samāsa* as *rājapuruṣaḥ* or a sentence like *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ* without any change of meaning. To form a compound, or to use the compound-form depends upon the desire of the speaker. This view does not carry much weight with Patañjali. What he means to say is this : there are practically two views, namely, *vṛttipakṣa*, i.e., compound and *avṛttipakṣa*, i.e., sentence. Both the sentence and the compound have their distinct characteristics fixed by nature, and there is nothing to confuse the one with the other.³

¹ राजपुरुषमानीयत्युक्ते पुरुषमात्रसांग्रहणं प्राप्नोति । नैष दोषः ।—
Mahābhāṣya.

² भेदसंसर्गौ वा सामान्यमिति व्यपरे वादः ।—*Ibid.*

³ सामास्यवैयर्थ्यवति वाक्ये च समासश्च ।—Mahābhāṣya under the rule P80., 2. 1. 1.

Kaiyaṭa¹ clearly shows the difference between a sentence and a compound by stating in clear terms that no compound is admissible in case of *vyapekṣā*, and, therefore, a sentence is impossible when *ekārthībhāva* is intended to be implied.

It must be noticed that the view held by Haradatta goes against such a rigid distinction. Some hold, on the contrary, that *ekārthībhāva*, *vyapekṣā* and *ajahatsvārthā vṛtti* are all that is required in the formation of a compound.² Those who hold the non-eternality of *śabda*³ are of opinion that compounds are capable of being formed optionally out of sentences, the formation of compounds being a matter of option with them. Those who, like the grammarians, maintain that *śabda* is a permanent entity⁴ (*naiṭya-śabdika*) opine that sentences and *Samāsas* are materially different, that is to say, *Samāsas* represent a permanent combination of words, for they are so fixed by usage that they do not admit of any decomposition. To be more clear, the drift of Patañjali's argument is that the so-called process of disjoining a compound into *vyāsa* or *vigraha* (whereby a compound is dissolved into its elements) is at best

¹ इह व्यपेक्षायां समासो न भवति, एकार्थोभावि वाक्ये नेति ।—Kaiyaṭa.

² सखादिकार्थोभावेव्यपेक्षाऽजहत्सखायां चेति वयं समुचितं परिभाषाप्रतिपत्तुः—*Vaiyākaraṇabhāṣya*, under *Kār*, 80.

³ कार्यशब्दिका वाक्यादिव विकल्पो न इति लिप्यायां सम्मानात्—Kaiyaṭa.

⁴ नैकशब्दिकास्तु इतिवाक्ये निम्ने विविक्तविषये सम्मानो—*Ibid*.

artificial, and that recourse is taken to such a method only for the purpose of bringing out the signification of a compound which is really an indivisible unit of speech. This view is analogous to what we have already referred to in deciding the priority of *saṃhitā* to *paḍas* (*paḍaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā*). Further light is thrown upon this view by the so-called *nitya-samāsas*, because we are not allowed to disjoin a compound like *kṛṣṇasarpak* (as we cannot do so without altering the sense); this class of compounds is not capable of being broken up into parts without necessary change of meanings. They do neither admit of *vigraha* in the usual way, nor are their meanings directly expressed by their component parts, but some other words are required to bring out their signification (*avigraha* or *asvapada-vigraha*).

Bhartṛhari¹ has also shown the difference between a sentence and a compound. *Samāsa* is held to be an indivisible unit and the so-called *vigraha* is after all an artificial method that serves to bring out the meaning of a compound to unintelligent people. Durga has *tato'nyat vākyamiti*, which implies that a compound is distinct from a sentence by its very nature. There are, so to speak, two

¹ अनुधान् प्रत्ययाया विधिनाः प्रतिपत्तये । यथा 'नन्वाद्यन्त' मीदी वा-
समासयीः ।—Vakya-padīya.

different views on *Samāsa*,¹ namely, (i) a compound is a permanent unit of speech; (ii) a compound² is only a condensed form of a sentence, or, in other words, a sentence is reduced to a compound-form for the sake of brevity or conciseness. Patañjali and his followers seem to have supported the first view. Others hold that there is no material difference between a compound and a sentence, that is to say, *Samāsa* is a designation that may be optionally applied to a sentence under certain conditions.

Samāsa depends more or less on current or popular usage. According to Durgasiṃha, *Samāsa*³ is sometimes permanent or obligatory (as in *kṛṣṇasarpah*), optional in the majority of cases, and is not admissible in some instances (*Rāmo jāmādagnyah*). A *Samāsa* is called *nitya* or obligatory, when its constituents fail to express the intended sense, as, for instance, the members of the compound *kṛṣṇa-sarpah* mean simply *a black serpent* by their respective powers of denotation, but it is far from being the actual sense, viz., 'a snake that cannot be subdued either by medicinal herbs or by snake-charmers.'⁴ An optional

¹ समसात् सूत्रावादिषु वाक्यं निवृत्तिरिति निवृत्तिसमासवादिनी मतम् ।—
Durga's Tīkā on the rule 'नास्तीं समासो वृत्तार्यः' ।

² वाक्यमेव समासोभवतीति मतं दर्शयितुमाह—संज्ञयैव वा विधिरन्वाह्यत इति ।
—Durga.

³ क्वचिद्विद्यः क्वचिद्विद्यः क्वचिन्न स्थात् ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ मेघनविज्ञाननिवार्यः संप्रतिमेघः ।

compound means that we are allowed to say either *rājapurusaḥ* or *rājñāḥ puruṣaḥ*, the former having only the advantage of conciseness. According to this point of view, most cases of compounds are simply dependent on option. *Samāsa* is grammatically inadmissible in those cases where *padas* are so related to each other that they cannot give rise to any special signification (*parāarthābhidhānā*).

It should be particularly explained here what is really meant by holding *Samāsa* to be a *vṛtti*. *Vṛtti* means, as Patañjali maintains, 'the power of expressing the sense that is different from those that are denoted by the members of a compound,' that is to say, *Samāsa* is expressive of some special or additional signification.

Patañjali has dealt with the problem of *Samāsa* with such elaboration and in such minute details that his successors have had no room for making further contributions to the subject. In a number of popular *kārikās*, Śrīpati¹ has carefully summarised all that can be said concerning *Samāsa* in general. Jagadīśa's² definition and exposition of *Samāsa* are such as to show that the followers of the *Navya-nyāya* considered a compound to be the same as a sentence, though

¹ प्रतिबोधिगणपदादस्यत् वदन्नात् कारकादपि । प्रतिशब्देकदेशार्थे सन्ध्यान्तेन निबन्धे ॥—Kāt. Pariśiṣṭa.

² शब्दस्य सप्ताशकस्यासत्तादि निवारणे । यादृशाद्यर्थधीरेतुः स समासस्तद्वैकः ॥—Śabdśākti., Kār. 31.

in a condensed form, and, unlike the grammarians, they did not necessarily recognise the special signification of *Samāsa*.

In course of showing the applicability of his definition to all cases of *Samāsa*, and dealing particularly with certain irregular forms of compound, Jagadīśa has made some important observations which one can hardly afford to pass over for an adequate knowledge of the subject. We give below only a few instances of *Samāsa* where Jagadīśa has given a stamp of his originality of exposition.

(i) The *vigraha*¹ (the sentence whereby the meaning of a compound is usually expressed) should be such as would bring out the entire meaning of a compound, but there is no such rigid condition in the case of a compound. It is generally found that a compound-form does not contain anything to give an exact idea as to the precise number and gender of the *vigraha*. Thus, Jagadīśa refutes the view that 'both *vyāsa* and *Samāsa* are exactly expressive of the same sense.'

(ii) In cases other than those of *Nipātas*, the meanings of two *Nāmans* (words) are related to each other as if they were identical.²

(iii) As the genitive (denoting relation) is dropped in a compound like *rājapuruṣaḥ* (as a

¹ विग्रहे एव समासजन्यायेत्येव बोधकत्वं तत्, न तु समासे विग्रहायेत्येव ।—
Sambhāṣaṭī.

² विभक्त्यातिरिक्तस्त्वर्थे नामार्थयोरेकैवान्वयस्यान्युत्पन्नत्वं ।—*Ibid.*

necessary condition of *Samāsa* in general), the Naiyāyikas¹ have taken recourse to *lakṣaṇā* to expressly indicate the relation of *puruṣa* with *rājan*.

(iv) Though *Karmadhāraya* compounds having pronoun like *yaḥ* and *tad* as their last members are not generally recognised by the grammarians,² Jagadīśa has supported the validity of such a compound as *paramasaḥ* on the authority of Jumarānandī.

(v) If a compound is allowed to be formed by the combination of more than two *padas*,³ it should be either *Dvandva* or *Bahuvrīhi*, i.e., excepting these two compounds no other compounds are generally found to consist of three or more members.

(vi) An anomaly is presented by the expression *karmacāṇḍālaya-yogottham*, because *yogottham* (resulted from the conjunction) cannot be grammatically taken here as an adjunct qualifying *pāpa* (sin) which forms a part of the compound *pāpakṣayaḥ*. Jagadīśa meets this position by suggesting that *yogottham* should be taken in the sense of *yogaprayojyam* (i.e., resulting from a conjunction of *Rāhu* with either the sun or the moon) which might be

¹ राजपुरुष इत्यादी पूर्वपदे प्रत्ययसंबन्धे लक्षयति सचिकुदुल्लभसि संगच्छते ।—

Subdāśakti.

² तद्वायुत्तरपदकाः कर्मधारयः प्रायशो लेशते, तथापि नीलवदस आस्त्राय इत्यादि प्रयोगात् कचिद्व्यति, प्रयुक्तं च जुमरानन्दिना 'परमः स' इत्याद्यर्थे परमसः परमतावित्यादि ।—*Ibid*.

³ बहुपदे बहुव्रीहिरिव नितरी इत्याम्बः समासः ।—*Ibid*.

consistently connected with the meaning ¹ of *pāpakṣaya* by the relation of identity.

(vii) As *Dvigu* ² and *Karmadhāraya* compounds are found to have a striking similarity between themselves from both physical and psychological aspects (each having the first member as an adjective and both indicating the relation of identity) only with this difference that in cases of *Dvigu* the first *pada* is a numerical adjective, Jagadīśa has no objection in including *Dvigu* within the category of *Karmadhāraya*.

On the evidence of the rule *Pāṇ.* 2.1.23, Bhaṭṭoji ³ also speaks of both *Dvigu* and *Karmadhāraya* as two special classes of *Tatpuruṣa*, taking a wider view of the latter.

(viii) According to Jagadīśa, ⁴ a *Tatpuruṣa* compound, with an adverb as its first member, is also admissible. He recognises *stokapaktā* as an instance of *Karmadhāraya*. But there is some difficulty in explaining the compound as such, because the meaning of the adverb *stoka* (little) is not such as may have the relation of identity (*tādātmya-sambandha*) with that of

¹ श्रीगोळनिलय श्रीमद्योजनिलयः, स चासिद्ध पापक्षयेऽन्वितः ।—

Śabdaśakti.

² द्विगोः कर्मधारयान्वेतत्वेऽपि न चतिः ।—*Ibid.*, under the *Kār.* 38.

³ तत्पुरुषविशेषः कर्मधारय स्वरिषो द्विगुः ।

⁴ लोकपक्षेत्यादी विशाविशेषः कर्मधारय एक । महाकविमहाविश दत्तादी कवितादिव.....नामादिकदी पञ्चमादापरनामादिकानिदान्यमोक्षकतया लघाजसम्भवात् ।—*Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* under *Kār.* 39.

pakṭy (one who cooks). As a matter of fact, the adverb is really connected with the action (cooking) and not with the agent. Here Jagadīśa has been compelled to admit the validity of *nāmārthaiḥkadeśānvaya*, that is, the relation with a part of the meaning of a *Nāman*, and, accordingly, suggests on the strength of such examples as *mahākavi*, *mahāvijñā* (where *mahatva* or greatness refers respectively to the state of being a poet and that of being wise, that the adverb *stoka* is related to *pacana* (cooking) which forms part of the meaning of *paktā*.

(ix) By supporting such expressions as *stokanamrā stanābhyām* (as used by Kālidāsa), Jagadīśa has sought to refute the view that 'no compound' whatsoever is admissible with an adverb.'

(x) Jagadīśa has thoroughly rejected the grammatical definition of *Avyayībhāva* compound, as it involves the fallacy of *avyāpti*. It is not strictly correct to say that an *Avyayībhāva* compound has always an indeclinable as its prior member, for, in instances like *śalākāpari*, *akṣapari*,² etc., we find an indeclinable as the last member; again, *trijamunam* (a collection of three Jumnas),

¹ जिवाचिमेवैः समान एवाव्युत्पन्न इति तु न दिश्यम् ।—Śabdśākti under Kār. 33.

² अक्षपरि शलाकापरि—इत्याद्यव्ययीभावेऽव्याप्तिस्तस्याव्ययमर्थेति यदि तत्पूर्वकत्वाभावात् ।—Śabdśākti.

lohitagaṅgam (the country where the Ganges is red) are examples of *Avyayībhāva* where no indeclinable is traceable.¹

There is evidence to believe that it was accent that determined *Samāsa* in the early stage of the Sanskrit language. A slight defect² in the use of accents is said to have proved fatal to the sacrificer himself. What an important part was played by the variation of accents in the determination of *Samāsas* is best illustrated by such examples as *trimuni* (*vyākaraṇam*) which with slight difference of accents may be taken either as *Avyayībhāva* or *Bahuvrīhi* compound.

The ancient grammarians³ are said to have divided *Samāsas* into four classes according to the predominance of the meanings of members forming the compound. The principle underlying these classifications, as we shall see later on, is connected more with the meaning than with the physical aspects of *Samāsas*. They are as follows : (i) *pūrvapadārthapradhāna* as *Avyayībhāva*—in this class of compounds the meaning of the first member (indeclinable) seems to be principal in relation to that of the last ; (ii) *uttarapadārthapradhāna*, i.e., *Tatpuruṣa*—it is so called because in all varieties

¹ एतद्व्ययमैवसामान्यमात्रम् ।—Śabdasaṃgrahaḥ, p. 52.

² दृष्टः शब्दः स्वरतो वर्णतो वा निर्या प्रयुज्यते न तस्यैवाह । न बान्धवो यजमानं हिनस्ति वयिन्द्रशत्रुः स्वरतोऽपराधात् ॥ Śikṣā.

³ इह कश्चित् समासः पूर्वपदार्थप्रधानः, कश्चिदुत्तरपदार्थप्रधानः, कश्चिद्व्यपदार्थप्रधानः, कश्चिदुभयपदार्थप्रधानः ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 379.

of *Tatpuruṣa* compounds the meaning of the last member appears to be predominant ; (iii) *anyopadāρθapradhāna*, i.e., *Bahuvrīhi*—the characteristic feature of this class of compounds (*anekamanyopadāρθe*) is that the sense of a word that does not actually enter into the combination comes to have the predominance ; (iv) *sarvopadāρθapradhāna* as *Dvandva*, where the meanings of all members are of equal importance. Following the classifications of earlier grammarians such as Vābhata¹ and others, Jagadīśa has made an addition (*madhyapadapradhāna*) to the aforesaid division of *Samāsas* as given by Patañjali. *Tatpuruṣa* compounds like *ghatānadhikaraṇam* and *prati-yogitānavacchedakaḥ*, etc., are explained by Jagadīśa as instances wherein the sense of the middle *pada* (i.e., non-existence—as denoted by the negative particle *na*) is predominant, and he, accordingly, calls them *madhyapadāρθapradhāna*. On a close examination of facts it is, however, found that these classifications of the earlier grammarians are neither sufficient to cover the entire field, nor free from the fallacies of *ativyūpti* and *avyūpti*. Bhaṭṭoji² has clearly pointed out how the principle underlying such divisions cannot be applied to instances like *atimālaḥ*, *unmattagaṅgam*,

¹ पूर्वमग्राह्यसर्वात्म्यपदप्राधान्यतः पुनः । प्राच्यैः पञ्चविधः शीघ्रतः समासो नामटादिसिः । Śabdadarśanī, Kār. 33.

² समासचतुर्विध इति तु प्राचीनवादः ।—Bhaṭṭoji.

etc., from a strictly grammatical point of view. In conformity to the rules of grammar, *atimālaḥ* is taken to be an example of *Tatpuruṣa*, though the sense of the first member in this case appears to be the principal one. Thus, the predominance of the sense of the first member of a compound cannot be grammatically regarded as the only criterion for determining an *Avyayībhāva* compound.

According to the popular divisions, *Samāsas* are six in number, or seven by the inclusion of the so-called *Upapada* compound. Some grammarians, however, interpreted the rule सह सुपा, Pāṇ., 2.1.4, in such a way (applying the principle of *yogavibhāga*) as to establish six¹ different kinds of *Samāsas*; the peculiar among these being the compound made of two verbal forms as *khādatamodatā* on the strength of the *gaṇa-sūtra*—*ākhyātamākhyātena kriyāsātatyē*.

According to Jayāditya,² *Samāsas* are capable of being divided into two well-known classes, namely, *nitya* and *anitya*. *Anitya-samāsas* are those where the addition of the case-terminations to the members of the compound is sufficient to bring out the sense, as, for instance, the genitive and *prathamā* respectively in *rājñāḥ* and *puruṣaḥ* are competent to express the meaning of the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ*. In the case

¹ सुपां सुपा तिङ्ग नाम्ना धातुनाथ तिङ्गो तिङ्ग ।
सुनन्तेति विज्ञेयः समासः षड्विधो सुधैः ॥

² विशिष्टिमात्रविधानिजालनैतानामसु ।
स्वार्थस्वाधीधनीधाम्नां निव्यानिव्यौ समासकौ ॥

of *nitya-samāsa*, on the other hand, the mere addition of the case-endings to the constituent elements cannot fully bring out the sense of the compound, for by simple analysis of the compound *kṛṣṇasarpah* as *kṛṣṇaścāsau sarpaśceti* (meaning any and every kind of black serpent) one cannot get into the meaning of the compound (i.e., a snake irresistible either by medicinal herbs or physicians).

The most important question that deserves to be particularly considered in connection with the problem of *Samāsa* is to decide whether the sense denoted by a compound is virtually the same as is expressed by the constituent members, or a compound has by nature the power of expressing a special signification distinct from those of its members. This is a problem over which the grammarians and the Naiyāyikas hold different views. Jagadīśa¹ has referred to Patañjali and his followers as *samāsa śakti-vādins*, who do not take number to be the denotation of a compound, specially *aluk-samāsa*, in spite of the presence of the case-endings that indicate number (as in *kanthe-kālāḥ*).

Reference has already been made to the two views—*ekārthibhāva* and *vyapekṣā*; the grammarians evidently uphold the former (as it is quite clear from the interpretation of the *Mahābhāṣya*), while the Naiyāyikas and the

¹ व्यङ्गकस्यः सत्त्वेऽपि संख्या न बुध्यते इति समासशक्तिवादिनः पातञ्जलाः । — Śabdasaṁkṣipta.

Mīmāṃsakas seem to have supported the latter. The main point at issue is that the *ekārthābhāvavādins*¹ are of opinion that a compound as a whole has the distinct power of expressing a sense in addition to the meanings usually signified by the members,² whereas the *vyapekṣāvādins* have either taken recourse to *lakṣaṇā* wherever the members of a compound are not likely to bring out the full signification or have taken the sense of a compound as exactly equivalent to those of its members.

The arguments usually advanced in favour of the *ekārthābhāvā* view are as follows :—a compound-form like *citraguḥ* (*Bahuvrīhi* naturally indicates ‘the owner of handsome cows ;’ *rājapuruṣaḥ* means ‘one having relation with the king ;’ *upakumbham* gives the idea of ‘proximity with a pitcher’ and *pāṇipādam* expresses the sense of a ‘collection of hands and feet’ (*samāhāra*). These meanings, to speak the truth, are not directly expressed by the members of those compounds; as, for instance, the sense of the ‘owner’ is not denoted by either *citrā* or *go*, the idea of ‘relation’ is not brought out by either *rājan* or *puruṣa*, and ‘collection’ by either *pāṇi* or *pāda*

¹ एकार्थभावे समास एकः संवृत्तीतो न व्यपेक्षायामिति भावाद्वैकार्थ्येति भाव एव सिद्धान्तसम्मतः । राज्ञः पुरुष इति वाक्यात् प्रतिपाद्यार्थस्य विशिष्टरूपेण शब्दस्य प्रतिपादनं च तत्त्वमिति समाधिं यदि निधाय भाष्यकारमतं समासीदितिरिक्तं शक्तिं साधयन् समर्थयति ।—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*.

² समासे स्त्रुतु निद्वैय शक्तिः पदत्वशब्दवत् । नञ्नां इति धर्माणां वचनेरेव साधने । शब्दवत् नौरत्वं तथाद्वैकार्थ्येति भाव आश्रितः ॥—*Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, Kār. 81.

and so on. The grammarians have, therefore, assigned the power of expressing such special or additional senses as those of 'owner,' 'relation' and 'collection,' etc., to the compounds, taking *Samāsa* as a whole or an indivisible unit of speech.

The word *paṅkaja* admits of double meanings—one as 'lotus' signified by *samudāyaśakti* and the other as 'something that grows in the mud' (*avayavaśakti*) denoted by its parts. Similar is the case with a *Samāsa*; it has one meaning as is denoted by its parts and the other as expressed by the whole. According to the Naiyāyikas, the word *paṅkaja* falls under the category of *yoga-rūḍha*, that is to say, it has two-fold signification as denoted by the parts and the whole. The grammarians have recognised such a *samudāyaśakti* in order to arrive at the additional sense of a compound.

Moreover, the *ekārthibhāva* view is not vitiated by prolixity or *gaurava* as is the case with the *vyapekṣāvāda*. The Naiyāyikas¹ or the *vyapekṣāvādins*, on the contrary, are not prepared to admit of such *śakti* or power of expressing the additional sense so far as compounds are concerned. They have rather taken recourse to *lakṣaṇā* whenever they failed to get the intended sense directly from the members of a compound. They have, for

¹ अविवादादिनो नैवाविवादयः । न तावदुद्गोही शक्तिर्लक्षणेनोपपत्तेः ।
—Vaiyākaraṇaśāstra.

instance, resorted to *lakṣaṇā* in the case of *citraguḥ* so as to obtain the sense of the 'owner.' Kōṇḍabhaṭṭa maintains that in such cases the assumption of *śakti*¹ is almost unavoidable, since *lakṣaṇā* in regard to either *citrā* or *go* is not sufficient to bring out the full signification, i.e., the owner of beautiful cows. But there is some difficulty in the way of applying such *lakṣaṇā*,² for, if the word '*citrā*' were indicative (*lakṣaka*) of 'the owner of the beautiful cows,' it would have no consistent relation with the meaning of the word *go*; again, if the word *go* were to indicate the same sense, the meaning of the word *citrā* would not be compatible with that of 'the owner' (because it is not the owner who is *citra* or handsome but his possessions—the cows). In a *Tatpuruṣa* compound such as *rājapuruṣaḥ*,³ Gaṅgeśa says that *lakṣaṇā* is to be attributed to the relation as is denoted by the genitive in *rājñāḥ*. According to the *Mīmāṃsakas*,⁴ the whole sentence should be taken as *lakṣaṇā* or indicative (as Gaṅgeśa has clearly pointed out).

¹ चित्रगुरित्यादौ स्त्राभ्यादिप्रतीत्यै शक्तिरावश्यकी, न च लक्षणाया निर्वाहः ।
—Vaiyākaraṇyabhiṣaṇa under Kār. 34.

² न च चित्रापदं चित्रगोस्त्रामिलक्षणं, तत्र गोपदार्थानन्वयान् । नापि गोपदं लक्षणं गोस्त्रामिनि चित्रापदार्थानन्वयापत्तेः ।—Tattvacintāmaṇi—Śabdakhaṇḍa, p. 702.

³ राजपुरुष इत्यादौ पूर्वपदे यज्ञाद्यसम्बन्धे लक्षणेति शक्तिरदुष्कृतमपि सङ्गच्छते ।
—Śabdaśakti, p. 41.

⁴ तस्मात्तत्पदार्थचित्रगोस्त्रामिलक्षणा पुरुषस्य प्रतीत्यैषुश्रीदौ वाको एव लक्षणेति ।—Tattvacintāmaṇi—Śabdakhaṇḍa, p. 737.

The Naiyāyikas have, however, resorted to *lakṣaṇā* in regard to only one *pada*, either *aiṭrā* or *go*, and taken the other as only suggestive or *tātparya-grāhaka*, as in *rājapuruṣa*¹ the word *rājan* is said to be indicative of the relation with the king and so on. They do not, therefore, agree with the Mīmāṃsakas so far as the indicativeness of the whole sentence is concerned.² It is specially in the case of *Bahuvrīhi* and *Tatpuruṣa* compounds that they have taken the help of *lakṣaṇā* for the purpose of getting the intended sense. It is not necessary to resort to *lakṣaṇā* in a *Karmadhāraya* compound,³ where the sense of *identity* is derivable from the very relation of meanings.

The expressions *niṣādashapatiṃ yājayet, varṣāsu rathakāro'gnimādadadhīta* have given rise to considerable difficulties. The Mīmāṃsakas do not take *niṣādashapati* as an instance of *Tatpuruṣa* (as in that case *lakṣaṇā* is to be resorted to) but construe it as a *Karmadhāraya* compound (*niṣāda eva sthapatih*) identifying *sthapati* with *niṣāda* (the architect who is one and the same as *niṣāda*).

¹ बहुव्रीहौ न बाको लक्षणा, किन्तु पदे...समुदायगतौ नामानामात्—Tattva-cintāmaṇi. न हि बहुव्रीहौ समस्तपदानां लाक्षणिकत्वम्...एकपदमात्रलक्षणायां बहुव्रीहौ व्यवहृत्यात्—Śabdasaṃgrahaprakāśikā—Samāsa, p. 50.

² कर्मधारये न लक्षणा, पदार्थयोः यदायानभेदस्य संसर्गतया नामात्—Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, समासशक्तिनिर्णयः, p. 159.

CHAPTER IX

GRAMMAR IN OTHER SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT

Language and Grammar—problems of grammar in the
Mīmāṃsā—*Ngāya* and treatises on *Alaṅkāra*.

Grammar is a popular branch of study. Consciously or unconsciously, every one makes use of grammar or follows certain principles in the verbal expression of his thought. Man as a speaking animal is first acquainted with grammar, though he does not know that the way in which he combines one word with another presupposes a number of principles upon which is based the science of grammar. Grammar has its origin in the popular mode of expression, and derives its vital essence from the popular usage. Grammar, particularly Sanskrit grammar, is indispensably necessary for an adequate knowledge of all branches of literature. Bhartṛhari calls it *adhividyā*¹ in order to point out that grammar is intimately connected with all branches of learning, and in consequence of this intimate relation it is held to be the most useful of all departments of studies.² One

¹ यद्विदं सर्वविद्यानामधिविद्यं प्रकाशते ।—*Vākyapadiya*, *Kār.* 1. 14.

² तद्वैय सोर्वी विद्यानामीषा विद्यापरायणम् ।—*Ibid.*

can hardly expect to make a profitable study of any branch of Sanskrit literature without having a thorough knowledge of grammar. Grammar, Patañjali rightly observes,¹ is a useful companion to the study of the entire Vedic literature.

Speculations on grammar naturally presuppose the existence of language; and the relation in which the study of a language stands to that of its grammatical system is an intimate one. The grammar of a language generally makes its appearance when that language in particular has reached a certain stage of development and produced literary records comprising a vast field of knowledge. Based as it is on the strictly scientific method of generalisation (*utsarga*) and particularisation (*apavāda*) on the one hand, and that of agreement (*anvaya*) and difference (*vyatireka*) on the other, Sanskrit grammar is found to have thrown much light upon what are known as the fundamental problems of philology. Moreover, the rules of Sanskrit grammar, as they unfold the laws that regulate the growth, formation and correctness of the recognised linguistic forms, are in themselves short formulæ of the science of language. Again, the rules, such as *paraḥ sannikarṣaḥ saṃhitā* (Pāṇ., 1.4.109) and *akāḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ* (Pāṇ., 6.1.101), which

¹ सर्ववेदपारिषदं वीरं शास्त्रम् :—Mahābhāṣya, under the rule Pāṇ., 6.3.14.

virtually show the tendency of two vowels having close proximity and homogeneity to lengthening, are as much phonological as grammatical. There was, as we have already pointed out, a period in the history of the Sanskrit language when, in the absence of such technical devices of grammar, *Samāśas* had to be determined by different modulations of voice. The division of sound into *udātta*, *anudātta* and *svarita*, the transformation of sounds as is illustrated by the rules of *saṃpra-sāraṇa*, and the principles of euphonic combination (*sandhi*) are indication how intimately grammar is related to phonology.

The study of Sanskrit from a philological basis and that of the methodology of its grammatical systems present before us problems of *Semantics* which, as a cognate science, deals with the psychological aspects of language. 'The science of meaning,' though of comparatively modern growth in the domain of western philological researches, seems to have already developed into a scientific branch of study at the hands of the Nairuktas or etymologists. 'The antecedence of ideas to words,' the relation between the sign and the object signified, the eternal² connection between *śabda* and *artha*,

¹ अर्थसमर्थः शब्दप्रयोगः । अर्थे संप्रत्याययित्वासीति शब्दः प्रयुज्यते ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. II, p. 15. सर्वो हि शब्दोऽर्थसमर्थनात् प्रयुज्यते*—*Tantra-vārtika*, under 1. 2. 8.

² यौतुपनिकसु शब्दकार्थेन समन्वयः—*Mīm. Sūtra*, 1. 1. 5. सिद्धे शब्दार्थ-समन्वे and निवर्ते स्मार्थवतानर्थेऽसिसमन्वयः ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, Vol. I, p. 7.

the derivability of words¹ from verbal roots, the method of naming objects, the origin of certain words (as *kāka*, *kokila*, *duṇḍubhi*, etc.) from an imitation of natural sound,² and the way how words change their meanings (as *kavi*, *mrga*, *kuśala*, *pravīṇa*, etc.) are facts that have been scientifically dealt with by the Nairuktas and the grammarians. The etymological explanations of words, as they occur in the Brāhmaṇa and Nirukta literature, is an evidence that investigation in the science of meaning was not only necessary for the proper understanding of the Vedic texts, but formed an important part of the study of Sanskrit grammar. Though an independent branch of study mainly devoted to the psychological side of language, the Nirukta, as Yaska maintains, is materially akin to grammar, the former serving as a complement of the latter.³

In course of foregoing discussions on grammatical problems, we have had occasion to make reference to certain philosophical views, mainly from the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya systems, having direct bearing upon problems of purely grammatical interest. As a department of study intimately connected with the process of thinking, grammar, like

¹ नामान्पास्वानतजानीति शाकटायनो नैरुतसमयसः।—Nirukta, 1. 12.

² काक इति शब्दानुक्रितिकदिदं शक्तिनिष्ठं वचुक्तम्।—*Ibid*,

³ तद्विदे विद्यास्त्वानं व्याकरणस्य कात्'का' स्वायंसाधकं च।—Nirukta, p. 115.

logic, deals with a subject (*śabda* and *artha*) that forms the very basis of knowledge. The supreme importance of *Śabda-śāstra* lies in the fact that it deals with words whereby we think, know and express our thoughts to others. Every word is a symbol of intelligence. No knowledge whatsoever, says Bhartṛhari,¹ is possible without words; knowledge of all denominations is materialised through the medium of words. Puṇyārāja² particularly points out that the use of words (*śabda-bhāvanā*) acts as an important factor in the manifestation of qualified knowledge (*savikalpakajñāna*). An attempt is made here to show the extent to which grammar is related to other philosophical systems, specially the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya.

Certain Mīmāṃsā doctrines are found to have close relationship with those of grammar. (i) The eternality of *Śabda* (*Śabda-nityatāvāda*): The Mīmāṃsakas have not only accepted the eternality of words with all earnestness but have made it a fundamental tenet for defending the eternal character of the Vedas. It seems to have been on the part of the Mīmāṃsakas a pious necessity to maintain the eternality of words in spite of the arguments advanced by the Naiyāyikas. Unless words are held to be eternal, it is not

¹ न सोऽस्मि प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दादुत्पद्यते ।

अतुविदन्ति चानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥—Vākyapadīya, Kār. I. 124.

² सा हि वागुपता प्रजयमर्थः सविकल्पकज्ञानं तत्सम्पादिकेयम्.—Puṇyārāja under Vākyapadīya, Kār. I. 125.

possible to establish the authoritativeness or trustworthiness of the Vedas which, as we find, consists of a huge collection of words representing the *Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas*. The *Mīm. Sūtras* 6-11 are those that are usually put forward by the *Naiyāyikas* against the eternal character of words. The *Mīmāṃsakas* had their arguments ready to refute those attacks one after another (*Mīm. Sūtras* 12-19) in a manner that reflects much credit on them. The final conclusion is arrived at by the statement ¹ *darśanasya parārthatvāt* which means that words are held to be *nitya* on account of their being used for the purpose of signifying the sense. Words ² do not, as the *Naiyāyikas* hold, exist only for a moment and totally disappear after the utterance is over, but continue to exist so as to express the intended meaning.

Grammar, as we have already shown, though based on a purely analytical method, has also established the eternality of *śabda*. But there is some amount of difference regarding the standpoints from which the eternality (*nityatva*) has been conceived by the *Mīmāṃsakas* and the grammarians. The *Mīmāṃsakas* take sound to be eternal, ³ as it is manifested by the utterance

¹ नित्यत्वं स्वाद्वर्तनस्य परार्थत्वात्—*Mīm. Sūtra*, 1. 1. 18.

² दर्शनश्रुतवारणं तत्परार्थं परमर्थं प्रत्याययितुम्। उच्यते तस्मात् किं विनष्टे शब्दे चार्थं प्रत्याययितुं न शक्नुयात्—*Sāhara-bhāṣya*.

³ किंचिद् भ्रान्तिवद्वा न त्वत्वात् नित्यं शब्दमाहुः—*Kaīyaṣa*. किंचिदिति नौमांसकाः—*Pradīpodyota*.

and is represented by the letters, whereas the grammarians have gone a step beyond sound as such and sought to find out the subtle element which is exactly manifested by sound, that is to say, they realised the existence of *Sphoṭa* as the final cause of sound. The grammarians understand *Vākya-Sphoṭa*¹ as representing the true type of *nitya-śabda*. A glance into the characteristic attributes with which *nitya-śabda*² is comprehended by Patañjali is sufficient to corroborate the view that *Sphoṭa* to the grammarians was the same as Brahman to the Vedāntins.

(ii) The Mīmāṃsakas have agreement with the grammarians in regard to the relation of words with their meanings. The Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, 1. 1. 5, states expressly that a word (preferably those that represent the Vedic *mantras*) has inborn or eternal relation (relation that is permanently fixed) with its signification.³ The first *Vārttika* of Kātyāyana⁴ and the exposition of Patañjali thereon purport to establish the very same view so far as the relation of words with their meanings is concerned. The view of Kātyāyana as incorporated in the opening *Vārttika* goes to show that the grammarians used to look upon words, meaning and the relation as

¹ वाक्यस्फोटमपरे (वैद्याकरणाः) संशिरन्ते ।—Kaiyaṭa.

² भुवं सूटस्त्रमविवाह्यमपाद्योपलभ्यविकार्यैशुत्पन्नस्य दृष्टव्यस्योपि यत्तद्विषयनिमित्तम् ।
—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 7.

³ शीत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दसार्थेन सम्बन्धः ।

⁴ सिद्धे शब्दायैव सम्बन्धे ।

permanently fixed (*siddha*). Patañjali¹ has expressly stated that a significant word is permanently related to its meaning. The relation of a word with its meanings is called *nitya* in this sense that it is found to be current in popular usage from time eternal² (*anādi*). This relation is grammatically known as *śakti*³ or may be viewed as one of identity; a word is *śakta*, i.e., capable of denoting the sense, the meaning is *śakya* and the relation subsisting between them is called *śakti* or *yogyatā*.

(iii) The Mīmāṃsakas agree with the grammarians in respect of the denotation of a word. The Mim. Sūtra, 1.3.33, lays down that all words denote a class (*ākṛti*), the individual being comprehensible by means of mutual dependence⁴ between the class and the individual or *avinābhāva*. The author of the Bhāṣya has clearly pointed out the difficulty that arises, if an individual only is held to be the denotation of a word. The two well-known grammarians, Vyāḍi and Vajapyāyana, held opposite views, the former advocating the class-theory and the latter supporting the individualistic one. The view of Pāṇini,⁵ as explained by

¹ निवृत्तिं शब्देवतानर्थैरभिसम्बन्धः ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 7.

² सम्बन्धस्यापि व्यवहारपरम्परशानादित्यादिश्रुत्या ।—Kaiyaṣa.

³ शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धश्च शक्तिरूपं तादात्म्यमिदं ।—Pradīpoddya.

⁴ शक्तितर्हि श्रुत्या नित्यसम्बन्धः ।—Sabara-bhāṣya.

⁵ समदया शब्दाव्यर्थे च श्रुत्याऽपि पठितानि ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 6.

Patañjali, is that both the class and the individual are denoted by words.

(iv) In the *Śloka-vārttika*, Kumārila has devoted a lengthy chapter to refute the theory of *Sphoṭa* as expounded by the grammarians. As the theory of *Sphoṭa* is apprehended to destroy the glorious edifice of the Vedas by declaring all divisions of sentences and words as merely artificial, the Mīmāṃsakas could not recognise the existence of *Sphoṭa* apart from sound. The assumption of *Sphoṭa* is thus untenable from the Mīmāṃsā point of view. So far as experience goes, letters that constitute a word are found to be significant,¹ and it is, therefore, nothing but unreasonable to acknowledge an incomprehensible thing as *Sphoṭa*, which is materially distinct from letters.

(v) There is a distinct section in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras called *vyākaraṇādhikaraṇa* dealing mainly with the problems of grammatical interest. The subject discussed in this particular section is almost the same as dealt with by Patañjali in the first *āhnikā* of the *Mahābhāṣya*. The question² that presents itself for solution is to ascertain the reason for using words of purely Sanskrit origin. While correct forms (as *gauḥ*)

¹ दीपवत्ता लकारादिर्गोवादिः प्रतिपादकः ।

अ. ६ प्रतीक्षमानत्वात्पूर्वमपि प्रतिपादनात् ॥—*Śloka-vārttika*, *Kār.* 136.

² शीघ्रं यथा साक्षादिति प्रमाणं, किं तथा साक्षादशोऽप्युत निति सन्देहः ।—*Sāhara-bhāṣya*, under 1. 3. 25.

as well as the incorrect ones (as *gāvī*, *gonī*, *gopotalikā*, etc.) are found to be equally expressive of sense, it is really difficult to understand the import of the scriptural injunction¹ which unconditionally prohibits the use of corrupt words (*apabhraṃśas*). This prohibition seems to have been strictly followed by Sanskrit-speaking Brāhmins, particularly at the time of sacrificial performance, lest the purity of their rituals might be vitiated by the utterance of corrupt words. These incorrect words, hold the grammarians, are distorted forms of Sanskrit, this distortion or mutilation of forms being due to wrong imitation or inability of pronouncing the correct words of Sanskrit origin.² The grammarians have drawn a clear line of demarcation between these two classes of words as the first and foremost function of the science of grammar.³ As it helps the discrimination of correct words, the science of grammar has been elevated to the dignity of *Smṛti* by the Mīmāṃsakas.

Though the meaning is equally expressed by correct and corrupt words, it is the use of correct words alone, holds Patañjali,⁴ that is attended with religious merits. It must be,

¹ शास्त्रेण न स्वेच्छित्वै नापभाषित्वे । स्वेच्छी ह वा एव यदपभ्रंशः ।

² शब्दशक्तियानुसरत्वात्—Mim. Sūtra, 1. 3. 28. गोशब्दसुचारवितुक्तानीन केनपिदशक्या नावीत्युच्चारितम् ।—Sabara-bhāṣya.

³ अनुश्रव्यते; सापशब्दे स्वी विविच्य श्राव्यतेऽनेनेति शब्दानुशासनम् ।—Nāgārja.

⁴ समानायामर्थगती शब्देन चापशब्देन च धर्मनियमः कियते शब्देनैवार्थोऽभिधेयी नापशब्दे नेत्येवं कियमाशयमभ्युदयकारि भवतीति ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 8.

however, remembered that this principle of preferring the use of words strictly in conformity with the rules of grammar to those that do not come under the cognisance of grammar, is based on a purely religious consideration. How, then, are we to distinguish correct words from incorrect ones? According to the Mimāṃsakas, it is grammar or *Vyākaraṇa-smṛti* that serves as the helping guide for such a discrimination. The rules of grammar are, therefore, held to be authoritative and a kind of trustworthy evidence.

(vi) The Mimāṃsā-Sūtra, 1.3.28, makes it clear that the origin of corrupt forms should be traced to natural inability to pronounce the correct words, and that the meaning is expressed by such distorted forms on account of their structural similarity¹ with correct words. This view is exactly analogous to what is held by the grammarians in regard to the origin of *apabhraṃśas*. Patañjali² maintains that *apaśabdās* or perverted forms are the result of imperfect imitation and inborn ineptitude. Bhartṛhari has the following: Sanskrit is a divine tongue current from time immemorial;³ it has undergone distortion at the hands of those who failed to give utterance to the correct Sanskrit word by reason of their natural

¹ अनुसृतो हि नाप्यस्मिन्निवृत्त्यः ।—Śabara-bhāṣya.

² यमल्लिङ्गानुकरणादेः ।—Mahābhāṣya, Vol. I, p. 19.

³ देवो वाग् व्यवसोर्देवमगतेरभिधातुमिह ।—Vākya-pāṇīya, Kār. 1. 166.

incompetency. They are also significant like correct words, but their signification is a matter of inference,¹ that is to say, they become significant only by recalling the corresponding correct words with which they have close resemblance.

(vii) In the *bhāvārthādhikaraṇa*, there is a discussion as to whether noun or verb is related to the result (*apūrva*). As it is produced by the action, *apūrva* is connected with the word indicating the verb and not with words denoting either substance or qualities.² The Mīm. Sūtra, 2.1.1, enjoins that all verbs should signify action. This view bears close comparison with the statement of Patañjali (*kriyāvacaṇo dhātuh* and *bhāvavacaṇo dhātuh*). The view of the Mīmāṃsakas regarding the meaning of the root and of the suffix (result and action respectively) is different from that of the grammarians.³ The Mīm. Sūtras, 2.1.3 and 2.1.4, give the definitions of *nāman* and *ākhyāta* respectively, which⁴ remind us of the definitions suggested by Yāska. The Mīm. Sūtra, 2.1.6, speaks of a twofold division of action, namely, primary and secondary, and the subsequent rules give their definitions.⁵

¹ ते साधुष्वनुमानेन द्रव्ययोत्पत्तिरित्यतः ।

तादात्म्यमुपपन्नस्य शब्दार्थस्य प्रत्याशङ्काः ॥—Vākyapadīya, Kār. 1. 151.

² कर्मशब्दा एवापूर्वस्य विधायकाः, न द्रव्यगुणशब्दा इति ।—Śabara-bhāṣya.

³ सङ्गममित्राः—सङ्गमार्थं धात्वर्थः, व्यापारः प्रत्ययार्थः ।

⁴ सत्त्वप्रधानानि नामानि, भावप्रधाननाम्नाख्यातम् ।—Nirukta.

⁵ शैट्ठ्यं न चिकीर्षते तानि प्रधानभूतानि द्रव्यस्य गुणभूतत्वात्—and वैस्तु द्रव्यं चिकीर्षते गुणस्यैव प्रतीयते तस्य द्रव्यप्रधानत्वात् ।

The Nyāya system, specially the Navya-nyāya has made valuable contributions to the study of grammar. The Naiyāyikas are credited with having expounded the most scientific theory about the origin of sound. To the Naiyāyikas, *śabda* is a quality of the sky, i.e., space (*śabda-guṇamākāśam*). Though they have taken *śabda* as the product of human effort, the Naiyāyikas have included *śabda* or, more properly, verbal cognition, within the category of *pramāṇas*.¹ In accordance with their view, *śabda* is liable to production and destruction²—two important characteristics of all things that are *kārya* or non-eternal. They have sought to explain the relation between *śabda* and its meaning with reference to the will of God. *Śakti* or primary signification of a word is not determined, hold the Naiyāyikas, by social convention, but seems to have been fixed by the volition of God (*saṅketa*) expressed in the following strain: 'let this word be denotative of this sense' (*ayam śabdo'mumartham pratipādayatu*). According to the Naiyāyikas, *Śabda-bodha* or verbal knowledge is derivable from a sentence³ and not from individual words; and so far as verbal cognition is concerned, the knowledge of

¹ शब्दवानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणाणि ।—Nyāya-Sūtra, 1. 3.

² प्रागुत्पत्तेरभावीवपत्तेर and आदिमत्तादेन्द्रियकत्वात् कृतकवदुपचारात् ।—Nyāya-Sūtras, 2. 2. 12 and 2. 2. 14.

³ वाक्यभावमवाप्त्यर्थेकशब्दबोधतः ।

सम्पद्यते शब्दबोधी न तन्मात्रस्य बोधतः ॥—Śabdaśakti., Kār. 12.

*viśeṣaṇa*¹ (adjective) must have precedence to that of *viśeṣya* (noun). They have made a distinction between *Upasargas* and *Nipātas*, holding the former to be indicative (*dyotaka*) and the latter as directly expressive of sense (*vācaka*).

Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is an epoch-making work, remarkable throughout by its originality of thought; it ushered in a new order of thinking that was readily assimilated by the later grammarians. The *Tattvacintāmaṇi* is, indeed, a valuable record marking the height of perfection which the Indian thought had reached at that time. Scholars of outstanding genius such as Raghunātha, Mathurānātha, Jagadīśa and Gadādhara tried their level best to popularise this new school of logic following in the wake of Gaṅgeśa. This work is divided into four parts dealing with perception, analogy, inference and *śabda*.

The *śabda-khaṇḍa* deals, among other things, with all important problems of grammar: (i) it has established the trustworthiness of *śabda* as a *pramāṇa*; (ii) it has advanced arguments in support of the non-eternal character of *śabda*; (iii) it has shown how to determine the *śakti* or primary signification of words;

¹ नाम्महोतविशेषणा इतिविशेष्येदूपजायते and शब्दोधि प्राक्प्रतीयमानत्वं विशेष्यत्वम् ।

(iv) it has given an adequate treatment of *Dhātu*, *Upasarga*, *Nipāta* and *Samāsa*; (v) it has elaborately dealt with *expectancy*, *compatibility*, *proximity* and *import* as important factors of verbal knowledge; and (vi) it has discussed the question of the origin of corrupt words (*apabhraṃśas*). How indispensable Jagadīśa's *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* and Gṛādādhara's *Vyutpattivāda* are for the proper study of the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar has already been pointed out.

In Grammar lies the origin of the science of Poetics. The *Alaṃkāra-śāstra* is not less akin to Grammar than is the *Nirukta*. The contribution of grammar is nowhere so prominent as in this particular branch of study. The science of poetics may be said to have been principally based on grammar. *Śabda* and *artha* not only form the subject of grammar but have also provided the fundamental basis upon which stands the whole fabric of the *Alaṃkāra-śāstra*. *Vyākaraṇa* and *Alaṃkāra* are organically connected and used to be studied in India as cognate departments of study.

The rhetoricians or *Ālaṃkārikas* have extensively dealt with poetical compositions with special reference to their merits and defects. Having regard to what constitutes the essence of poetry, they have expounded the doctrine of *vyāñjanā* and made an elaborate treatment of *rasa*.

Poetry is the outcome of joy. Endowed with the power of articulating his voice and born in the midst of magnificent beauties of nature, man feels naturally inclined to clothe his emotions in a rapturous and rhythmical language, seeking proper expression for the music of his heart and tending to give a poetic touch to his thought, when he is in an ecstasy of joy. Whether it is 'a spontaneous overflow of powerful emotions' or whether it 'makes us inhabitants of a world to which the familiar world is a chaos,' poetry appears to be the living manifestation of the internal storehouse of joy. Poetry has been rightly called *hlādaikamayī*, that is to say, 'comprehending joy alone, rising from a source that is often represented as the sea of joy (*ānandābhi*).

The three attributes generally ascribed to Brahman are *Being* (*sattā*),¹ *Consciousness* (*cit*) and *Joy* (*ānanda*). To a Vedāntin, the transcendental self is an inexhaustible source of joy. The expression *raso vai sah*² is explained by the Vedāntins in such a way as to identify the supreme self with *rasa*—the joy of all joys. A religious devotee, particularly a *Vaiṣṇava*, adores a deity who is the repository of all

¹ आनन्दनयोऽप्यसात् ।—Vedānta-Sūtra, I. 1. 12.

² आनन्दमयं ब्रह्म 'रसो वै सः' इति तस्मैव रसब्रह्मण्येति 'रसो ह्येवायं' इति शङ्कराचार्येण ।—Śaṅkara-bhāṣya.

beauty, full of joy and the bestower of all blessings. Śrī Kṛṣṇa, as depicted in the Bhāgavata, is an incarnation of joy and love, characterised by things that are not only exceedingly beautiful but serve to excite the most pleasant emotions in a moment of deep devotion. If the supreme Godhead has any conceivable form, or, to put the idea in a different way, if the formless is at all cognisable in any particular form, it is joy and joy alone. He is, to speak the truth, the embodiment of joy. The ṛṣis of the Upaniṣads have called him *rasa* and *amṛta*—the fountain source of perpetual joy.¹ One that dwells in us all is joy² itself, serene and supreme; it is the immortal (*amṛta*) in all beings that makes us sometimes joyful even in the midst of cares, and anxieties. What is called *mukti* or final emancipation is only a state of everlasting joy, what the *yogins* yearn to attain is a serene joy that knows no bounds; what the artist designs to paint is the image of the one that is most beautiful and joyful; what the poets of all ages have been eager to depict with all their resources of imagination is the figure of perfect beauty and joy. The ultimate motive of all arts is to find out this eternal source of joy, the attainment of which quenches all thirsts and satisfies all mundane desires. To

¹ सर्वं ब्रह्मसत्त्वं ब्रह्म and आनन्दं ब्रह्मसत्त्वं विद्वान् ।—Taittirīyopaniṣad.

² आनन्दमयस्य सर्वानन्दसत्त्वात् ।—Sāṅkara-bhāṣya.

those who have visualised the *Beautiful* in themselves, the whole world appears to be dancing in an ecstasy of divine joy.

Poetry is the expression of such joy. The mission of a poet is to reveal this thrill of joy hidden in the storehouse of nature, touching those tender chords of the heart that are naturally moved by emotions. The poet is a creator in the idealistic sense of the term, his creation being a world of ideal beauty—a dream-land shining with touches of fine imagery. *Rasa* which forms the life of poetry is brought into existence by the genius of the poet through the *suggestiveness* of his composition. The imaginative pictures drawn by the poet are different from those that are found in the world of experience.¹

The art of poetry seems to have been cultivated in India from a very long time. The hymns of the Vedas, which embody the most ancient literary records, are specimens of beautiful poetry with considerable amount of rhetorical embellishment here and there. The hymns in their simple flow represent the genuine outburst of a heart seized with extreme joy and wonder, excited by the awe-inspiring splendour of nature on all sides. More poetical

¹ निवृत्तिस्तद्विषयमरुहतां ह्यादेकनयोन्यन्यपरतन्त्रम् ।
नवरसश्चिरां निर्मितमादधती भारती कवेर्जयति ॥

—Kāvya-prakāśa, Kāv. I.

एतद्विलक्षणा तु कविवाङ्मनिरिति—*Ibid.*

in outlook are the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata—two great monumental works in Sanskrit epic poetry, written in simple but elegant style, and preserving a brilliant record of Indian culture in all its phases. These two epoch-making works prepared the ground for the advent of a more advanced type of classical poetry as is evident from the works of Kālidāsa and others. The sweet melody and high-flown similes of Kālidāsa, the pathetic touches of Bhavabhūti and the beautiful expressions of Śrīharṣa will continue to keep the poetical horizon of India reverberated for ages to come.

Turning to the definition of *Kāvya*, we find that it is *śabda* and *artha* that go to constitute a *Kāvya*.¹ The body² of a *Kāvya*, to use the language of the rhetoricians, is composed of two elements, namely, *śabda* and *artha*, or a combination of words capable of expressing the intended sense.³ A word, some hold,⁴ expressive of a beautiful sense is *Kāvya*. Viśvanātha has laid greater stress on *rasa*, comprehending it to be the vital element of poetic compositions. To quote his definition, *Kāvya*⁵ is a combination of words possessing *rasa* in an appreciable extent.

¹ तददीशो शब्दार्थौ समुपादयन्तुर्वी पुनः कापि ।—Kāvya-prakāśa.

² शब्दार्थौ वपुरस्य ।—Bhāvali.

³ शरीरं तावद्विद्यार्थव्यवच्छिन्ना पदावली ।—Kāvya-darśa.

⁴ रसवीर्यार्थप्रतिपादकः शब्दः काव्यम् ।—Rasagaṅgādhara.

⁵ वाक्यं रसात्मकं काव्यम् ।—Sāhityadarpaṇa.

Kāvya is generally divided into two classes, namely, *superior* and *inferior*. A poetical composition,¹ where the suggested sense appeals more beautifully to our sentiment than the meaning ordinarily expressed by words, is known as the best type of poetry. An inferior class of poetry is one that is characterised by only sonorous words and marked by the absence of suggestiveness (maximum of words with minimum of sense). Mammata has referred to the grammatical doctrine of *Sphoṭa* in connection with the definition of the *superior* class of poetry.

The *Ālaṃkārikas* have divided words into three classes,² namely, *vācaka* (expressive), *lākṣaṇika* (indicative) and *vyañjana* (suggestive). This threefold division, it must be remembered,³ refers intrinsically to the designation (*upādhi*) and not to the object designated (*upādheya*), because there are no fixed classes of words as denotative, indicative and suggestive. The same word, say *Gaṅgā*, as in the expression *Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, may be taken either as denotative or indicative according to the context and propriety of sense. It should be particularly noticed here that *vyañjanā*, as an additional *vṛtti*, has been accorded a prominent place only

¹ इदमुत्तममतिशयिनि अद्वयं वाच्यमितिर्बुद्धिः कथितः ।—*Kāvyaśrutiśāstra*, 4.

² स्वरूपवर्गी भावविशेषः शब्दोन्मेषाद्व्यञ्जनविशेषः ।—*Kāvyaśrutiśāstra*.

³ अन्वयवर्गीभावविशेषः कथितं न नूतनविशेषः ।—

in the science of Poetics and not in other systems of thought.

The grammarians have acknowledged *śakti* (primary signification) and *lakṣaṇā* (secondary sense or implied signification), and, consequently, recognised both *vācaka* and *lākṣaṇika* as two kinds of words. *Lakṣaṇā* is called by other names also, such as *upacāra*, *āropa*, etc., and the sense that is indicated is often called *bhākta* in philosophical treatises. Gotama¹ has enumerated the causes that give rise to *upacāra* or transference of one's attributes to another.² Quite in agreement with Gotama and almost in the same language, Patañjali³ has under the rule Pāṇ., 4. 1. 48, clearly shown the four different circumstances under which *Lakṣaṇā* is usually resorted to. Viśvanātha's definition⁴ of *Lakṣaṇā* is materially the same as suggested by the rhetoricians.

Bhartṛhari has divided the meanings of words as *gouṣa* (secondry signification) and *mukhya* (primary signification) and has shown twofold *upacāra* (imposition) as pertaining to *śabda* and *artha*. Those who take one word⁵ as capable of expressing several meanings, that is to say,

¹ Nyāya-Sūtra, 2. 2. 63.

² अथर्वविधिं तदुपचारः ।—*Ibid.*

³ अहमित्यप्रकारैरतस्मिन् स भवति । तात्पर्यात्तादर्थ्यात्तात्सानीयात्तात्पराच्चर्चादिति ।—*Maṅgalaśāstra*.

⁴ लक्षणां शक्तिसम्बन्धेन तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिः ।—*Bhāṣāpariccheda*.

⁵ एकमात्ररूपेणैव शब्दस्यैव परीक्षाः ।

निमित्तभेदादिकस्य सावर्ण्यं तस्य मिथ्या ।—*Vākyaśāstra*, 2. 252.

find only *one word* like *go* which is applicable to both cow-individual and *Vāhika*, have their theory based on the assumption of restricted or accidental meanings.¹ It must be, however, remembered that a word does not simultaneously express more than one meaning.² The other meanings, apart from what is called primary signification, seem to be quite as good as synonyms, comprehensible by either context or connection with some other words.³ Bhartṛhari⁴ maintains that the word *go* which is used to denote a being possessing dewlap, hump, hoofs, etc., is also applied to *Vāhika* (an inhabitant of *Vāhika*—modern Punjab) on account of his proverbial similarity to an ox in point of dullness. How, then, are we to justify the division of meaning as *gaṇa* and *mukhya*? The first meaning, we must admit, seems to have obtained more currency than the latter, that is to say, the word *go* is popularly used to denote a cow and implies *Vāhika* only indirectly or accidentally. The author of the *Vākyapadīya*⁵ states clearly that it is popular and accidental usage that renders one meaning *mukhya* or *gaṇa*. In connection with imposition (*upacāra*)

¹ तस्यैवशब्ददर्शने शब्दोपचारः प्रसिद्धाप्रसिद्धिनिमित्तकः ।—Panyarāja.

² शीतपद्यनतिशय पर्याये व्यवतिष्ठते ।—Vākyapadīya.

³ अर्थप्रकरणाभ्यां वा शीतपद्मव्याख्यानरेण वा ।—Ibid.

⁴ यथा साक्षादिनान् पिच्छी गोशब्देनभिधीयते ।

तथा स एव गोशब्दो वाहीकेऽपि व्यवस्रितः ॥—Ibid.

⁵ प्रसिद्धिनिदादौपलं सुखलं शीतपद्यते ।—Ibid.

pertaining to *artha*, Bhartṛhari¹ speaks of two kinds of meanings, namely, *svarūpa* or naturally fixed by its very form and *bāhya* as is indicated by imposition or *upacāra*. The word *go* denotes a class *gotva* by the force of *mukhyārtha*, and the same is transferred to *Vāhika* for the purpose of implying the same amount of stupidity and dullness on the part of a *Vāhika*. Thus, we find that the Ālaṃkārikas not only agree with the grammarians in regard to the circumstances and causes that necessitate the acceptance of *Lakṣaṇā*, but have made use of the same examples (*Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* and *gaurvāhikah*).

The difference is, however, remarkable so far as regards the treatment of *vyañjanā* in the science of Poetics. *Vyañjanā*, as distinct from both *śakti* and *Lakṣaṇā*, has been given a prominent place in discourses on Poetics, though an additional *ortti* like *vyañjanā* is not actually accepted by other schools of thought. In accordance with the view of the Ālaṃkārikas, it is *Vyañjanā* or suggestiveness that gives rise to *rasa* in all poetical compositions. As *śakti* and *Lakṣaṇā* are not sufficient to bring out the sense of *extreme coldness* and *sanctity* of the Ganges, in the expression *Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, the Ālaṃkārikas were compelled, as it were, to

¹ Vākyapadīya, 2, 256.

अर्थशब्दस्य द्विविधः स्वयंप्रकाशश्च । तत्र निमित्ताज्जात्यादिर्गोत्रं वाहीके-
ऽप्यनुपपद्यते, शब्दस्य गौरीनेत्रादिभिर्वा इति वाच्यार्थोपचारः । (—Purayāṇa).

acknowledge the suggestiveness of words.¹ The Naiyāyikas and the earlier grammarians have not recognised *vyañjanā* as an additional meaning like the Ālankārikas.

Jagadīśa² has referred to the same example *mukham vikāṣitasmitam* (face blooming with a smile) whereby *suggestiveness* has been established by Mammata and others, and discussed at length whether *vyañjanā* is at all worthy of recognition. There is no justification, he argues,³ to recognise the existence of something like *suggestiveness*, so far as the direct or indirect meaning of a word is concerned. The so-called suggested sense, i.e., *extreme coldness* and *sanctity*, or *fragrance* (i.e., the smiling face is as fragrant as flowers) is derivable by the usual mental cognition, the special beauty of the erotic sentiment (*camatkāra*) being a matter of mental apprehension (*mānasa-bodha*).

The meanings of words,⁴ says Bhartṛhari, are not only determined by their very forms, but there are other instruments such as sentence, context, time, place, etc., which also help us

¹ विरतास्त्रिधायासु यवार्थो बोध्यतेऽपरः ।

सा इतिवैकल्या नाम शब्दस्वार्थदिकस्य च ॥—Śāhityadarpaṇa.

² Śabdasaṅkṣiptaprakāśikā, under Kār. 24.

³ यथा कश्चिदुपनयनयोगेन मनसैव विशिष्टधीमन्वानात्, मानोरथिकमुखप्रमेद-
पर्वनमितं चमत्कारं प्रत्यपि शब्दस्त्वेव मानसस्यापि बोधविशेषस्य हेतुतायाः सुवचसात् ।
नञ्जलाण्यपदार्थानरस्य स्वरूपसत्ताया अनवबुद्धौ तद्धेतुस्य च प्रमाद्यविरदिशासम्भावेति
संक्षेपः ॥—Śabdasaṅkṣipta, under Kār. 24.

⁴ वाक्यान् प्रकरणादर्थोद्भिन्नान् शकालतः ।

शब्दार्थाः प्रविमन्यन्ते न रूपादेन कीकृतात् ॥—Vākyapadīya, 2. 315.

in ascertaining the intended sense, specially when a word happens to have more than one meaning. When the primary signification of a word having several meanings is fixed or restricted by association, etc. (as shown by Bhartṛhari), the other meanings, holds Mam-maṭa,¹ are to be regarded as *suggested* (*vyāṅgya*). This is called *suggestion based on primary sense* in the science of Poetics.

There is no evidence to believe that *vyāñjanā* was ever recognised by the ancient grammarians. Among the grammarians, Nāgeśa has definitely supported *vyāñjanā*, and he lays much emphasis on the desirability of acknowledging it from the standpoint of grammar.² Nāgeśa has, however, tried to show that he was not the first among the grammarians to recognise *vyāñjanā* as such. In accordance with his interpretation, the grammarians,³ like Bhartṛhari and others, have also indirectly referred to *vyāñjanā* by supporting indicativeness (*dyotakatva*) of the *Nipātas* and taking *sphoṭa* as what is *suggested* by sound. With Nāgeśa, *dyotakatva* is the same as *vyāñjakatva*. The sense of *perfection* in *prajayati* and that of *measuring* in *prādeśam vilikhati* is nothing but *suggested*, because *lakṣaṇā* in such cases is not admissible

¹ अनेकार्थस्य शब्दस्य वाचकत्वे निवर्तिते ।

संयोगादीरवाध्यायीकहादितिरञ्जनम् ।—Kāvya-prakāśa, 1. 19.

² शब्दकरणात्मवेतत्स्वीकार आबन्धकः ।—Mañjūśā, p. 160.

³ अतएव निपातानां द्योतकत्वं स्फोटस्य व्यङ्ग्यता च इत्येदिभिरुक्ता—*Ibid.*

owing to the absence of primary signification on the part of *Nipātas*. Thus, what we call *dyotakatva* in connection with *Nipātas* and *ākṣepakatva* in relation to *Karmapravacanīya* are only different in names, but indicate the same thing, viz., suggestiveness (*vyāñjakatva*).

The science of Poetics comes in closer touch with grammar in regard to the problem of rhetorical defects (*doṣa*). The entire discourse on *doṣa* is more or less grammatical in nature. The most prominent among them are as follows : *cyutasamśkṛti*¹ (ungrammatical form) such as *anunāthate* for *anunāthati*; *aprayukta* (not sanctioned by popular usage) as *daivataḥ*; for *daivatam*; *asamartha* (incompetent) as *hanti* in the sense of *gacchati*; *nirarthaka* (meaningless) as *hi* in *mama hi gauri*; *avācaka* (not capable of expressing the sense), as the use of the word *dina* in the sense of 'bright'; *avimṛṣṭavidheyāmśa* (to place the predicate before the subject), as - *nyakkāro'yameva* instead of *ayameva nyakkāraḥ*, etc. It must be, however, remembered that these and similar other grammatical mistakes were committed by the poet almost unconsciously. Poets found it often difficult to abide by the rigid rules of grammar, and even the most famous of our poets had the boldness of using certain forms in direct violation of the rules of grammar. This is why Mallinātha often calls them *nirāṅkuṣa* (ungovernable).

¹ Kāvya-prakāśa, 7.

The beautiful poetry of the Vedas exhibits a considerable amount of rhetorical excellence. Sometimes we meet with examples of beautiful similes and metaphors in the hymns. The poets of the Rk-Veda have not only poured forth ritualistic prayers and invocations to the forces of nature, but also succeeded in giving a stamp of poetical beauty to their expressions by making use of some well-conceived figures of speech, mostly similes and metaphors. The sun-god ¹ (riding in a chariot drawn by seven horses) running after the resplendent Dawn (*uṣas*) is compared to a man following a beautiful woman. How brilliant is the conception with a touch of classical beauty! Again, the goddess of *Vāk* ² is described as unfolding her graceful person to a learned man, just as a loving wife dressed in fair garments shows herself to her husband. We have other instances of beautiful similes in the following: 'just as one' ³ sifts the barley corn by means of a sieve, even so the wise discriminates the correct words by intelligence; 'as the water of a pond is agitated by a strong wind;' and 'overcoming' ⁴ the sins just as crossing a river by means of a boat.' A well-chosen metaphor conveniently used in the Upaniṣads to show the difference between

¹ सूर्यो देवीसुवर्चं रोचमानां मय्यो न योषामन्वेति पश्चात् ।—Rk-Veda, 1. 16. 125.

² उतो मय्ये तस्य' विसृष्टे नायेन पत्य उग्रतो सुवासाः ।—Rk-Veda, 10.3. 71.

³ सक्तुमिह तिततना पुनन्तो यत्र पीरा मनसा वाचमकल ।—*Ibid.*

⁴ नावेन सिन्धु' दुरितान्यग्निः ।—*Ibid.*

jīvātman and *paramātman* is as follows: 'two beautiful¹ birds related to each other by mutual friendship reside in the same tree, one of them eating the sweet fruit (*pippala*) and the other only witnessing without partaking of the fruit.' There are other instances of beautiful *upamā* such as *hamsāviva patatamā* (falling like swans), *siṃho na bhīmā āyudhāni bibhret* (holding weapons as dreadful as lions) and so on. Here and there we meet with brilliant poetic expressions as *amṛtasya putrāḥ* (the children of the immortal); *ṛtasya panthāmanveti sādhu* (following the path of righteousness); *ṛtena ṛtamapihitam* (truth veiled by truth); *dūto devānāmasi* (*Agni* is described as the messenger of the gods) and *dyaurvedaḥ pitā prthivī mātā* (heaven is your father and the earth is your mother). These show unmistakably that the *Rṣis* of the *Rk-Veda* were acquainted with the poetical use of beautiful metaphors.

Grammar seems to have some bearing upon *alaṃkāra* or figures of speech, specially upon *upamā*. As one radically connected with most of the *alaṃkāras* and one that lends supreme excellence to poetry in general, *upamā* is placed at the head of all figures of speech. The main principle underlying *upamā*, viz., similarity²

¹ यथा वातः पुष्करिणीं समिद्धयति सदैवः ।—*Rk-Veda*, 5. 6. 78.

² वा सुपर्वा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिपस्मजति । तयोरेव्यः पिप्पलं सादृशा नृपत्रयो अमिवावसीति ।—*Rk-Veda*, 1. 22. 164.

³ साधर्म्यमुपमा भेदे ।—*Āṅgyaprakāśa*.

between two different objects (*samāna-dharma*), has been clearly explained by the rules of grammar (Pāṇ., 2.1.55 and 2.1.56). *Sādrśya* or similarity means *tadbhinnatve sati tadgata-bhūyodharmavaṭtvam*, viz., two things are said to be similar when they are materially different but possess some common properties. The particles and suffixes that often indicate similarity (*vati*, *iva*, *yathā*) are also clearly shown by the rules of grammar (Pāṇ., 5.1.105). *Jimūṭasyeva* (like the cloud) occurs in the R̥k-Veda and has been made use of by the grammarians as an instance where the case-ending is not dropped (*nitya-samāsa*). The expression *puruṣavyāghraḥ* (a tiger-like man) shows that the man, though different from the tiger, as belonging to two distinct species, possesses those qualities such as valour, strength, courage, etc., which are generally found in the tiger. Under the rule *upamānāni sāmānyavacanaiḥ* (Pāṇ., 2.1.55), Patañjali¹ has thoroughly dealt with the characteristics of *upamāna* and *upameya*. He says that two things are generally related to each other as *upamāna* and *upameya* when they are in possession of some properties that are common to both. Quite in keeping with the Ālankārikas, Patañjali² has explained

¹ एवं तद्धि यत् किञ्चित् सामान्यं कश्चिद् विशेषस्तदीपमानोपमेये भवतः ।—*Mahābhāṣya*, under the rule Pāṇ., 2. 1. 55.

² चन्द्रमणौ दिवदन्तेति—चन्द्रमण्डौ शुभाः, या चासी दिवदर्शनता सा गम्यते ।—*Ibid.*

the expression *candramukhī devadattā* by observing that qualities in the moon such as *gracefulness to the sight* is transferred to the face on account of its striking similarity with the moon. The popular example under the rule Pān., 2. 1. 55, i.e., *ghanaśyāmaḥ*¹ (black as the cloud), where the common property is expressly mentioned, is an attribute of Kṛṣṇa, who is often compared to a cloud on account of his black complexion. The Vedic expression² *mygo na bhīmaḥ* (fierce as the beast) is a similar instance where the common property, i.e., *dreadfulness* is clearly pointed out.



¹ शास्त्रवर्णनसामान्यवर्णनसामान्यवर्णनम् ।

² Rk-Veda, 1. 21. 154.


INDEX

- Adhikaraṇa*, a Kāraka—
discussion on, 253ff,
three classes of, 254f.
- Adhividyā*, epithet of gram-
mar, 18.
- Ajahatsvārthā*, a kind of
Vṛtti, 291.
- Ajīhvā rājapaddhati*, epithet
of grammar, 18.
- Ālankāra-Sāstra*
relation of, with grammar
325ff; division of words by
Ālankārikas and gram-
marians, 330ff; recog-
nition of *Vyañjanā* by
later grammarians, 335f;
grammatical nature of
Doṣa section of, 336;
bearing of grammar on
figures of speech, 338ff.
- Ākhyāta*, meanings of, 203f.
- Anākhyāta*, a variety of
karman, 268.
- Anāpsita*, a variety of
Karman, 268.
- Anirākartyā*, a kind
of *Sampradāna*, 238.
- Anitya*, a kind of *Samāsa*,
305.
- Anumanīyā*, a kind of
Sampradāna, 280.
- Anyapadārthapradhāna*, a
class of *Samāsa*, 304.
- Anyapūrvaka*, a variety of
Karman, 268.
- Apādāna*, a Kāraka—
discussion on 270ff;
Pāṇini's definition of,
270f; three kinds of,
274.
- Apokṣitakriyā*, a kind of
Apādāna, 274.
- Antaraṅga*, a variety of
Karman, 269.
- Audāsīnya*, a variety of
Karman, 268.
- Aupaślegika*, a variety of
Adhikaraṇa, 255.
- Bahiraṅga*, a variety of
Karman, 269.
- Bhāvārthādihikaraṇa*, section
of *Mīmāṃsā* dealing
with the relation of
noun or verb to *Apūrva*,
322.
- Class theory* of the sense of
words, 44f.
- Dvītiyā vibhakti*, various
meanings of, 198f.
- Ekārthabhāsavādīns*, 307.
- Grammatical gender, mean-
ing of, 107ff.
- Hetu*, various meanings of
252f.
- Individualistic* theory of the
sense of words, 44f.
- Jahatsvārthā*, a kind of
Vṛtti, 291.
- Kalma*, a form of Karman,
270.

- Kāraḥ*, number and classification of, 227f; definitions of, 216ff;—according to Patañjali, 216f;—according to Durgasirpha, 288f; according to Jagadīśa, 219f.
- Kāraḥ-vibhakti*, 199.
- Karṇa*, a *Kāraḥ*—discussion on, 264ff; difference with *Hetu* of, 251f; logical definition of 250; relative importance of, 249.
- Karman*, a *Kāraḥ*—discussion on, 257ff; Pāṇini's definition of, 257f; Kātantra's definition of, 248f. Logical definition of, 258ff; wide application of, 262; seven forms of, 262ff; other divisions of, 268ff.
- Karmapravacanīya*, the sense of *Akṣepakatva* of—336.
- Kartṛ*, a *Kāraḥ*, discussion on 228; independent character of, 228ff; reducibility of other *Kāraḥ*s to, 217; logical definition of, 244ff.
- Kṛt* suffixes—sense of *Bhāva* 210ff; *Bhāva* of two kinds, 210.
- Kṛtrima-karman*, *kriyā* regarded as, 276.
- Kriyā*, meaning of, 218ff; regarded as an artificial object, 176.
- Lakāras*, sense of, 205.
- Mīmāṃsā*, doctrines of, in Grammar, 315ff.
- Nipāta*, sense of *dyotakatva* of, 336.
- Nitya*, a kind of *Samāsa*, 305.
- Nirāśṭaviṣaya*, a kind of *Apādāna*, 274.
- Nirvartya*, a variety of *Karman*, 268ff.
- Nyāya*, a system of philosophy,—contribution of, to the study of Grammar, 323ff.
- Pada vādin*, 58f.
- Pañcamī*, various senses of, 210f.
- Paribhāṣā*, meaning of, 69f; classes of, 70f, 72.
- Parts of speech, four mentioned by Yāska, 136-149; twofold and fivefold division of, 165; meanings of the four classes of, 150ff.
- Prākṛta*, origin of, 11.
- Prāpya*, a variety of *Karman*, 237i.
- Prākṛti* (stems) and *Pratyaya* (suffixes), meaning and mutual relation of, 139ff.
- Pratyayas*, varieties of 196; meanings of different classes of, 197ff.
- Preraka*, a kind of *Sampradāna*, 280.
- Pūrvapadārthapradhāna*, a class of *Samāsa*, 308.
- Sabdakhaṇḍa*, section of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*,—grammatical problems dealt with in, 324f.
- Sakti*, meaning of case-endings, 202.

- Samāsa*, occasions of, 282ff; divisions of, 305f; sense of, 306f; four characteristic senses of, 304.
- Samāsa-śaktivādins*, 306.
- Samgraha*, a work on grammar, 27.
- Samipaka*, a variety of *Adhikaraṇa*, 255.
- Samjñā*, nature of, 61f; Classes of (1) *Kṛtrima* and *akṛtrima*, 66, (2) significant and meaningless, 68; (3) *Naimittikī* etc, 69.
- Sampradāna*, a *Kāraka*, discussion on, 274ff; signification of the term, 275; three kinds of, 280.
- Samarthyā*, various meanings of, 283.
- Sandhi*, meaning and definition of, 6; fundamental condition of, 78ff; different classes of, 82f.
- Saptamī*, the seventh case-termination — meaning of 255; use in various senses of, 256.
- Sanskrit Grammar*, origin, of 4ff; origin of the different systems of, 10ff different epithets of 10, 18, 22, 42, first author of 18f; need of the study of 18f; speculations in Vedic literature on 19ff; identified with *Smṛti* 19; —with *Veda* or *Āgama* 10, 22, 35, relation of, with *Mīmāṃsā* 315f; with *Nyāya* 323f; *Alampkāra* 325f.
- Sphoṭa*, theory of the origin of, 85f; identity with *Prapñata* of 87f; derivative meaning of 94; characteristics of, 99; views of *Bhartrhari* on, 100ff; views of later grammarians on, 107ff, forms of, 109; non-mention of, in the *Upaniṣad* 90.
- Sphoṭavāda*, examination of the views of different philosophical systems on, 110ff,—*Yoga* system, 111,—*Sāṃkhya*, 112ff,—*Mīmāṃsā*, 114ff,—*Vedānta*, 118ff,—*Nyāya-vaiśeṣika*, 119ff.
- Sūtra*, characteristics of, 73, classes of, 74.
- Taddhita* suffixes, kinds of, 206; sense of *tea*, and *tal*, 207ff.
- Trimuni-vyākaraṇa*, an epithet of grammar, 30, 303.
- Tṛtīyā*, various meanings of, 200.
- Sarvaapadārthapradhāna*, a class of *Samāsa*, 304.
- Upapada-vibhakti*, 199.
- Upasarjana*, a subordinate member in a compound, 289.
- Uttarapadārthapradhāna*, characteristic sense of a class of *Samāsa*, 303.
- Uttarāvidyā*, epithet of Grammar, 42.
- Vaiśayika*, a variety of *Adhikaraṇa*, 255.

- Vāg-yogavit*, epithet of a grammarian, 20.
- Vākya*, sentence,—views on its real nature, 128ff.
- Vākya-vādin*, 57f.
- Vedānām Vedam*, epithet of grammar, 10, 22.
- Vedas*, relation with grammar of, 3f.
- Vikārya*, a variety of *karman*, 265f.
- Vṛtti*, as *Samāsa*, 298.
- Vyāḍi*, a grammarian, 13, 27.
- Vājapyāyana*, a grammarian, 13, 27.
- Vyākaraṇa*, connotation of, 75f.
- Vyākaraṇādīkaraṇa*, section on grammar in *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, 319ff.
- Vyākaraṇāgama*, 35.
- Vyākaraṇasmṛti*, 19.
- Vyāpaka*, a variety of *Adhikaraṇa*, 254f.
- Vyapekṣāvādins*, 307.
- Vyāsa*, a sentence, difference between *Vyāsa* and *Samāsa*, 289.
- Words, theories regarding the sense of 44 ; classification of, 170f.
- (1) *Nāman*, *Prātipadika*, *Līnga* (nominal base), definition of, 170ff ; classification of, 173ff ; meaning of, 178ff ; various theories of, 184ff.
- (2) *Dhātu* (verbal root), 191ff ; meaning of, 192ff, 194 ; definitions of, 194.



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